

Nimbārka

A Pre-Śaṅkara Vedāntin and His Philosophy

Joseph Satyanand



This work investigates a figure, Nimbārka, who is famous and yet shadowy as to his identity, his time, his authentic teachings and work. The method followed in this investigation is adequate: First, securing as basis a work whose genuineness is not controvertible, the *Vedāntapāñijāta Saurabha*; second, in its light, investigates the genuineness of other works allegedly composed by Nimbārka; third examines critically all relevant traditions concerning Nimbārka and determines their value as mere legend or reliably historical documents; fourth, ascertains the kind of literary or doctrinal affinity that exists between Nimbārka and Śamkara and Śrīnivāsa; fifth, discerns the contrasts and affinities between the teachings of the *Saurabha* and other forms of Vaiṣṇavism; sixth, draws the conclusions of such on historical enquiry with careful discrimination and moderation in claims of certainty or probability.

The author has also provided a close analysis of the *Saurabha* as the solid basis of his exposition of its philosophy. It has the quality of security, being solidly grounded in a text with which the author is thoroughly familiar and which he has scrutinized in and out. Due to his talent as a Sanskritist, he has drawn all the implications of Nimbārka's expression, vocabulary and phrasing. All Vedānta scholars will be grateful to have this work in hand.

Dr. Joseph Sanyanand IMS, Professor of Indology at Vishwa Jyoti Gurukul, Varanasi, holds a Shastri degree from Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, Varanasi and a Theological degree from the Jnanadeepa Vidya Pitha, Pune. He had his earlier philosophical studies at the Vishwa Jyoti Gurukul. Later he received his M.A. in Sanskrit-Pali and Ph.D. in Sanskrit (Vedānta) from the University of Pune. He teaches Indian Philosophy and Religion in a number of philosophical and theological centres in India.



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Munshiram Manoharlal
Publishers Pvt Ltd

*Dedicated to my beloved parents
Mr Joseph and Mrs Aleyamma*

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PREFACE

It may please many that the idea to take up this study on the teachings of Nimbārka came from the late Mā Gangādevi Vedānta Pañcatīrtha of Varanasi. My contact with the late **Māyī** introduced me to the Nimbārka Sampradāya, of which she was a great spiritual authority. Her encouraging request took me to study the *Vedāntapārijāta Saurabha* of Nimbārka for my doctoral research.

Many pertinent questions concerning Nimbārka and his school of Vedānta continued to ring on my ears. One of them was the question raised by Dr Rasik Vihari **Joshi**¹ : Why is there no reference to *Śāṅkara bhāṣya* in Nimbārka's commentary and why has Nimbārka not refuted the views of opponents as Śāṅkara, Rāmānuja, Vallabha, Śrī Kaṇṭha and Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa have done? I have tried to find answers to some of these questions in my Thesis titled 'Nimbārka and His Philosophy' submitted to the University of Poona in 1983. The present work is a revision of my doctoral Thesis.

One of the striking features of the intellectual life of our ancient sages, as remarked by R.G. **Bhandarkar**, was a total lack of historical sense. "Tradition often confuses" says **Bhandarkar**,² "different persons together and attributes to one what belongs to another". Nimbārka, the author of the *Vedāntapārijāta Saurabha*, and his school of thought have

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1. R.V. Joshi in his foreword to "The Philosophy of Nimbārka" by M.M. Agrawal, 1977 p. 1
 2. R.G. Bhandarkar, 1913, p. 92

also suffered at the hands of the historical confusion. Nimbārka, like the other ancient sages, has persued the contemplation on the mystery Brahman and ātman with scant regard for his own personal importance. The ultimate realization of his contemplation has been handed down to us in the form of a commentary on the *Brahmasūtras* called the *Vedāntapārijāta Saurabha*. The absence of any historical data about its author in the *Saurabha* has caused confusion of myths, legends and beliefs with history. I have tried to discuss, to discern and to distinguish facts from beliefs and history from myths. The first six chapters of the present work contain these discoveries of mine.

The *bhedābhedavāda* as unfolded by Nimbārka in the *Saurabha* is the touchstone for judging the authenticity of any other works attributed to the Ācārya. Scholars in the past did not take note of this fact. This failure on their part has really done great disservice to the cause of Nimbārka and to the antiquity of his school. Many works containing doctrines either contradictory to the ones propounded in the *Saurabha*, the *magnum opus* of Nimbārka or are in no way in confirmity with his general teachings and outlook are attributed to the Ācārya. Therefore we have tried to examine the authenticity of many works alleged to be written by Nimbārka and have found them as later additions. This discovery had enabled us to have deeper insight into the *bhedābheda* philosophy of Nimbārka. Chapters Seven to Eleven of this work present the philosophy of Nimbārka as propounded in the *Saurabha*.

I take this occasion to express my sincere gratitude to all those who helped me in one way or other in the prosecution of this work. I am very grateful to my guide Dr. S.D. Joshi, M.A Ph D, the then Director of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, University of Poona, whose valuable, scholarly and enlightening guidance can be seen in this present work. Pro. Richard De Smet Ph. D. of De Nobili College, Poona and Pro. V.Venkatachalam, the present Vice-Chancellor of Sampurnanand Sanskrit University, Varanasi who have helped me see through the many confusing and intriguing situation that crept up from deeper study and meditations on the subject.

Invaluable help regarding the traditional aspect of the Nimbārka school of thought was given by ŚrīMāī Gangadevi pañchatīrtha of Varanasi, by Śrī Vrajavallabha Sharana of Śrīji Mandir Vrindavana, and Śrī Kathiyababa, the Mahant of Kathiyababa Ashram, Vrindavana.

I have been to various libraries in my effort to collect meaningful material for the study. Many grateful thanks to the librarians of C.A.S.S, University of Poona; Jayakar Library, University of Poona; Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune; Jñāna Deepa Vidyāpīṭha (Pontifical Athaneum), Pune; Viswa jyoti Gurukul Library, Varanasi; Anadā Devī Gurukul Library, Varanasi; Maitri Bhavan, Institute for the study of Religions, Varanasi; Śrīji Mandir Library, Vrindavana; University Library Allahabad; Ganganath Jha Research Institute, Allahabad, Śrī Nimbārka Pīṭha, Allahabad; to mention just a few of them and the dedicated staff of these libraries I thank most sincerely.

My gratitude is also due to my Religious Superiors Rev. Fr. Sila Nath, who initiated me into the field of Indology and Rev. Fr. Prabhuprasad and Rev. Fr. Joseph Dilasa who have taken keen interest in this work. A special mention must also be made of my friends Dr. S.K. Lal MA. Ph.D. of C.A.S.S, Poona, Dr. Chacko Valiaveetil SJ, Dr. I. Puthiadam S.J. of Maitribhavan, Varanasi, Fr. Albert of Vidyabhavan, Pune who have rendered me valuable help to clear up many doubts and difficulties. To them and my personal friends and well-wishers I owe a debt of immense gratitude.

My sincere thanks to Missio Aachen for making this publication possible for me.

Joseph Satyanand, IMS

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ABBREVIATIONS

ABORI	.. Annals of Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona
AC	.. Ācāryacaritam
ASIAR	.. Archaeological Survey of India, Annual Report
BhagP	.. Bhāgavatapurāṇa
BhavisyaP	.. Bhaviṣyapurāṇa
BS	.. Brahmasūtras of Bādarāyaṇa
BVP	.. Brahmavaiivarta Purāṇa
Chand	.. Chāndogya Upaniṣad
CII	.. Corpus Inscriptionum Indicarum
CSS	.. Chawkhambha Sanskrit Series
DHI	.. The Development of Hindu Iconography (III ed)
DSS	.. Dvaitādvaita Siddhānta Setuka
E.I.	.. Epigrapha Indica, Calcutta
GM	.. Gurubhakti Mandākinī
GOS	.. Gaikward Oriental Series, Baroda
IHQ	.. Indian Historical Quarterly
Katha	.. Katha Upaniṣad
Kath.Sam	.. Kāthaka Samhitā
Kaus	.. Kauṣītaki Upaniṣad
Kena	.. Kena Upaniṣad

KP	.. Kūrmapurāṇa
KSS	.. Kāśī Sanskrit Series
LM	.. Laghu Mañjūṣā
LS	.. Laghu Stava rāja Stotram
Maitri	.. Maitrī Upaniṣad
Mañjusa	.. Vedānta ratna mañjūṣā
MatP	.. Matsyapurāṇa
Mbh	.. Mahābhārata
MRS	.. Mantra Rahasya Ṣoḍaśī
Mund	.. Muṇḍaka – Upaniṣad
NadP	.. Nāradiyapurāṇa
NarPr	.. Nārada Pañcarātra
NS	.. Nyāya Sūtras
NSKHK	.. Nimbārka Sampradāya aur usake Kṛṣṇa bhakta Hindi Kavi
NUS	.. Śrīnimbārkācārya aur unake Sampradāya
PadP	.. Padmapurāṇa
PIHC	.. Proceedings of the Indian Historical Congress
PK	.. Prapanna Kalpavallī
PPGV	.. Parapakṣagirivajra
Prasna	.. Praśna Upaniṣad
PTR	.. Purānic and Tāntric Religion
QJMS	.. Quarterly Journal of Mythic Society, Bangalore
RV	.. R̥gveda
ŚAKV	.. Śrutyanta Kalpavallī
Sāra	.. Nimbārka Vedānta ka Saṁkṣipta Sāra
Sat.Br	.. Satapatha brāhmaṇa
Saurabha	.. Vedāntāpārijāta Saurabha
SBE	.. The Sacred Books of the East
SJ	.. Siddhānta Jāhnavī
SK	.. Siddhānta Kusumāñjari

SKI	.. Sāmkhyakārikās of Īśvarakṛṣṇa
SN	.. Śrīnimbārkācāryas tan matanca
SNKS	.. Śavīśeṣa nirviśeṣa Śrīkṛṣṇa stavarāja
SNM	.. Śrīnimbārka Mahāmuniṇdra
SS	.. Siddhānta Setuka
SSS	.. Śrūtisiddhānta Saṁgraha
Svet	.. Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad
Tait	.. Taittirīya Upaniṣad
TP	.. Tattvaparakāśikā
Vaj Sam	.. Vājasaneyī Saṁhitā
Vip	.. Viṣṇupurāṇa
VisnudharmottaraP.	.. Viṣṇudharmottara Purāṇa
VKA	.. Vedāntakārikāvali
VM	.. Vedantaratnamāla
VPSK	.. Vedāntapārijāta Saurabha of Nimbārka and the Vedānta Kaustubha of Śrīnivāsa

FOREWORD

This is an important book. It embodies a definite achievement in the field of Nimbārka research, a field marked so far by uncertainty and ill-grounded beliefs. Dr. Joseph Satyanand undertook a thorough investigation of all the evidence regarding chiefly the life and work but also the teaching of the Vaiṣṇava Vedāntin Nimbārka claimed as their founder by the Nīmavant or Nimbārka adherents of the *Sanakādisaṁpradāya* (the tradition going back to Sanaka and his brothers).

There is no reason to doubt the attribution to a certain Nimbārka of the first extant commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa. This is the *Vedāntapārījāta Saurabha*, which is therefore to be taken as the criterion by which to evaluate the authenticity of other works allegedly composed by Nimbārka. The evidence from the *Saurabha* establishes that its author was a *Bhāgavata* Vāsudeva Vaiṣṇava and not a Nārāyaṇa Pañcarātrin or a Rādhā worshipper.

This destroys the validity of the traditional accounts of Nimbārka's date and life and of the list of other works traditionally ascribed to him. But is it possible to date the *Saurabhakāra* and his authentic work?

The great discovery of the author is that this work is the unnamed source to which Śaṅkara turned repeatedly for his selection of a prior opinion (*pūrvapakṣa*) when starting his commentary of several important *sūtras*. This identification of at least one of the *pūrvapakṣins* of Śaṅkara delighted me. I witnessed its discovery and verified every step of it: Satyanand's determination of criteria for such an identification, his careful comparison of the relevant texts of the

bhāṣyas of Nimbārka, Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Śrīnivāsa, his solving of the doubt regarding the direction of the reference (from Śaṅkara to Nimbārka or vice-versa). Satyanand's method was impeccable. The discovery stands.

Once established that Nimbārka preceded Śaṅkara, other features of the *Śāurabha*, especially its familiarity with pre-*kārikā* Śāṅkhya and early *śāktism* rather than with their well developed forms, led to the conviction that Nimbārka must have flourished during the first quarter of the sixth century A.D. Consequent conclusions concerning the post-Śaṅkara dating of Śrīnivāsa and the even later adoption by the Nimbārka sect of the Rādhā-Kṛṣṇa cult were also secured.

Finally, the author could weed out the late accretions to the doctrine of the Saurabhakāra and expose in his own terms his genuine *bhedābheda* (difference cum non-difference) conception of the relationship between creatures and their Cause, the Brahman.

Here now is this worthy work duly published and opened to the critical appreciation of all scholars competent in Vedānta.

Prof. Richard DeSmet

De Nobili College

PUNE

INTRODUCTION

One of the basic philosophical questions discussed in India is the relation between the Absolute and the relative, the Cause and the effect, the One and the many, Unity and plurality, God and the world. Even within the Vedānta philosophy diverse and opposing views are accepted. Various schools of Vedānta are well known. Śrī. NimbārkaĀcārya, who is also known under the names of Nimbāditya and Nīmba Bhāskara, is universally venerated as founder of the *Svābhāvika bhedābheda* or *Bhinnābhinna* school of Vedānta. It is wrong to call Nimbārka a *dvaitādvaitavādin* as many modern authors tend to do. Such terminologies are not at all found in his *ṛtti* (commentary) on the *Brahmasūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa. The commentary of Nimbārka on the *Brahmasūtras* is known as *Vedāntapārijāta Saurabha*, which is free from all dialectical controversies of *dvaita* (dualism) and *advaita* (non-dualism).

In the *Vedāntapārijāta Saurabha* the Ācārya gives only a brief explanation of the *sūtras*. His style is aphoristic. Therefore the commentary of Nimbārka on the *Brahmasūtras* is rightly called a *ṛtti* rather than a *bhāṣya*. Our present study is based on this *ṛtti* of Nimbārka. In this *ṛtti* Nimbārka proposes that the relation between Brahman, jīva (soul) and jagat (the world) is one of both natural difference and non-difference (*svābhāvika bhedābheda*). According to Nimbārka this paradox of difference and non-difference is both natural and metaphysically compatible. He uses many paradigms to explain this relationship between Brahman and jīva-jagat.

There is a natural and metaphysical difference between Brahman, the cause and jīva-jagat, the effects. Brahman is

the whole while the *jīva-jagat* is a part. While Brahman is the inner controller and the indweller within the heart of the *jīva*, the *jīva* is the controlled, the place dwelt in. Brahman is the object of our worship and the goal of our lives. We as creatures are the worshippers and the knowers of Brahman. In liberation we attain Him. Brahman is always the Infinite, the Omniscient, Omnipresent, Omnipotent, and the Sovereign ruler of the Universe. The soul is always finite, atomic, limited and metaphysically dependent and relative. This distinction between Brahman and the *jīva* remains even in the state of liberation, wherein the *jīva* has become similar to Brahman in all other aspects. The creatures can never share the transcendence of the Creator. There is a natural difference between the Creator and the creatures because the Creator transcends the creatures. The Creator can never be exhausted by the creature. He remains always the 'Beyond'.

This difference between Brahman and the *jīva-jagat* is only one aspect of the Reality. There is equally a metaphysical and natural non-difference between them. Being effects of Brahman both *jīva* and *jagat* are non-different from Brahman, their Cause. The effects share the very essence and the *esse* (being) of the cause. Without the continued support and the immanence of the cause in the effects the effects cease to exist. The dependance of the clay pot (the effect) on the clay (the cause) is total and absolute. There is an absolute and natural non-difference between the pot and the clay, the effects and the cause, the parts and the whole. The cause continues to permeate every aspect of the existence of the effect. Brahman is the Ultimate Cause of the world. The creatures share in His being and existence. Apart from Him, the Cause, they (the effect) have no existence at all. He indwells them. He is more present to them than even their own every existence to them. He is immanent in every form of existence. According to Nimbārka Brahman both transcends the creatures as also indwells them. There is both a natural identity and a natural difference between the cause (Brahman) and the effects, the *jīva-jagat*. The non-difference (*abheda*) between the effects and the cause is thus a metaphysical one. The immanence of the cause in the effect is natural and metaphysically compatible.

According to Nimbārka the basic teachings of the Upaniṣads on the relationship between Brahman and jīva-jagat is one of both identity (*abheda*) and difference (*bheda*). Brahman is the only Absolute Reality. The creatures are the relative, contingent entities, who owe their very existence to the creative activity of Brahman.

As Nimbārka upholds both a natural and metaphysical difference and non-difference between Brahman and the jīva-jagat his view is rightly called the *svābhāvika bhedābhedavāda*. Nimbārka explains this profound doctrine in his own simple and a matter-of-fact style. In our study we have tried to present this doctrine of Nimbārka contained in the *Saurabha* in a simple and a systematic way for your kind perusal.

One of the special characteristics of Nimbārka in the *Saurabha* is that he has no inclination for controversies with fellow Vedāntins. But there are many disputes and controversies concerning Nimbārka. Some of these controversies are concerning his very name, his parents, his time, his works, his religious beliefs and even his very *iṣṭa devatā*. We have examined some of these issues involved in these controversies in the first few Chapters of the present study. Now, let us enter into the details.

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Chapter 1

THE VEDĀNTAPĀRIJĀTA SAURABHA AND ITS AUTHOR

The *Vedāntapārijāta Saurabha* (hereafter *Saurabha*) is an extant *vākyārtha* on the *Brahmasūtras*, attributed to Nimbārka. The *Saurabha* is generally free from sectarian animosities and polemical details. It is a very condensed exposition of the Vedānta doctrine, without any attempt at refuting or maligning any other school of Vedānta philosophy¹. The author explains the *sūtras* in a few words in simple language and style. His terminology is more archaic and his Vaiṣṇava theology is less developed compared to the works of the well known Vaiṣṇava commentators like Rāmānuja and others.

The colophon at the end of each *pāda*, perhaps a late addition by some disciples², reads *iti śrīmad bhagavan nimbārka virācite śārīraka mīmāṃsā vākyārthe vedāntapārijāta saurabhe....*". Thus this work has been attributed to Nimbārka. For our present study *Nimbārka is the Saurabhakāra*³. Even a quick perusal of the *Saurabha* gives us a few valuable and definite pieces of information about the Saurabhakāra.

1. The Saurabhakāra was a Bhāgavata Vaiṣṇava

The *Saurabha* contains only a few Vaiṣṇava terms. But for them, this *vākyārtha* of Nimbārka would be free of every

form of a sectarianism. According to Nimbārka *Ramākānta Puruṣottama*, the greatest of all, is denoted by the term Brahman, because of His infinite, inconceivable and innate nature, qualities and powers⁴. Nimbārka calls Him Brahman⁵ in His transcendental form, *Śrī Puruṣottama*⁶ or *Bhagavān Vasudeva*⁷ in His relation to the cosmos and *Paramātman*⁸ or *Antaryāmin*⁹ in His relation to the jīva.

(a) *The Vāsudeva Bhāgavatas*

A short perusal of the origin and development of Vaiṣṇavism will help us to understand the philosophy of the Saurabhakāra better. The classical Vaiṣṇavism with which we are familiar today, is a kind of amalgam of various religious elements which were originally independent¹⁰. The chief among them are the elements of Bhāgavatism (Vāsudeva cult) and *Pañcarātrism* (Nārāyaṇa cult). The original Vāsudevism, centred around the Vṛṣṇi hero, Vāsudeva, seems to have flourished at least from the time of Pāṇini (450 B.C.)¹¹. The popularity of the Vāsudeva cult even among the foreigners is evident from the Besanagar inscription of Heliodoros¹². This inscription also makes it clear that Vāsudevism was known as Bhāgavatism. The various elements that merged in Bhāgavatism are the cults centred around the Vṛṣṇi heroes, Arjuna¹³, Śamkarṣaṇa Baladeva¹⁴ the Yādava hero, Kṛṣṇa¹⁵ and the Abhira hero, Gopāla Kṛṣṇa¹⁶. The actual date of their merger and identification with the vedic Viṣṇu is even now a matter of speculation. R.N. **Dandekar**¹⁷ and H.C. **Chaudhuri**¹⁸ hold that such an identification has taken place at least by the time of the Besanagar inscription. S. **Jaiswal**, on the other hand, holds that such an identification has taken place only by the time of the completion of the Mahābhārata¹⁹. The Mahābhārata attempts to make a single homogeneous mythological figure of Kṛṣṇa from the various currents and traditions that merged together to form the Vāsudevism as we know it today²⁰. The identification of Kṛṣṇa with the Vedic Viṣṇu has definitely taken place at least by the beginning of the fifth Century A.D., as is evident from the Tuṣān (Hissar District) rock inscriptions²¹, in which Viṣṇu is described as "the mighty bee on the lotus like mouth of Jāmbavatī". Now Jāmbavatī is one of the wives of Vāsudeva Kṛṣṇa²².

Another tradition that has contributed to the development of Vaiṣṇavism, as we have said early, is the *Pañcarātra* cult. Suvira **Jaiswal** gives a detailed explanation of the term *Pañcarātra*²³. Mahābhārata XII. 325.4 speaks of the *Pañcarātras* as worshippers of Nārāyaṇa and the Nārāyaṇīya section of Mahābhārata speaks of Nārāyaṇa as a *Pañcārātrika*. The *Pañcarātra* cult had Nārāyaṇa at its centre as opposed to the Vāsudeva of the Bhāgavatas. The former upheld the *Vyūhavāda* as opposed to the *avatāravāda* of the latter²⁴.

(b) The Nārāyaṇa *Pañcarātras*

We have no archaeological or historical remnants of the Pre-Gupta *Pañcarātra* Sect. The earliest mention of Nārāyaṇa is in the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* 12.3.4.1 and the oldest available *Pañcarātra* literary document is the *Ahīrbudhnyā Samhitā*²⁵. According to the *Ahīrbudhnyā Samhitā*²⁶, one of the important doctrines of the *Pañcarātra* Sect is the five fold forms of the ultimate reality namely the *Para*, *Vyūha*, *Vibhava*, *Antaryāmin* and *Arca*²⁷. J.N. **Banerjea**²⁸ has disproved all the early contentions of scholars like H.C. **Ray Chaudhuri** and has established beyond doubt that none of “the *Vyūha* image” so far discovered can be dated to an earlier period than the late Gupta period. This fact gives credence to the fear that there was stiff hostility to the *Pañcarātra* in pre-Gupta period so much so that all traces of its influence were destroyed. Post-Gupta period seems to have been more tolerant towards the *Pañcarātras*, because some type of an assimilation of the Nārāyaṇa element into Bhāgavatism seems to have taken place by that time. Although the Nārāyaṇīya section of the *Mahābhārata* seems to be primarily meant for the “*narayanaization*” of Vāsudeva Kṛṣṇaism²⁹, the *Bhagavadgītā* avoids any mention of Nārāyaṇa or the doctrine of *Vyūha*³⁰.

The *Pañcarātrism* was condemned in the early *Dharmaśāstra* works and law books³¹. When some Brahmins accepted the priestly services including the idol worship in the *Pañcarātra* temples, they were condemned and were regarded to be lower than the traders in meat and weapons³². In spite of this condemnation, many Brahmins seem to have accepted the temple services because of its

popularity among the masses, and the fact that officiating at these temples was a lucrative profession³³.

Bhāgavatism, on the contrary, was mostly limited to the higher castes. It received the patronage of kings. Even the Kuṣāṇa kings, who were Patrons of Śaivism and Buddhism were not averse to *Bhāgavatism*³⁴. Most of the Gupta emperors gloried in calling themselves *Paramabhāgavatas*³⁵. When foreigners were received into *Bhāgavatism*, they were accommodated within the corresponding castes of the *Bhāgavatas*³⁶.

It must be pointed out that inspite of the identification of Nārāyaṇa with Vāsudeva in the *Mahābhārata*, the distinction between the *Pañcarātras* and the *Bhāgavatas* continued to exist. The *Pañcarātras* continued to offer, even upto the sixth Century A.D. the *Nārāyaṇabali*³⁷ which is a special feature of the Sect. Some writers and *ācāryas* seem to make a clear-cut distinction between the *Bhāgavatas* and the *Pañcarātras*. For example, Kumārila in his *Tantravārtikam* counts the *Pañcarātra* along with the Śākya, Sāṅkhya, Yoga, and Pāśupata as not purely vedic³⁸. Medhātithi in his commentary on the *Manu-Smṛti* 2.6 has the same outlook on the *Pañcarātras*. Above all, Bāṇabhaṭṭa (A.D. 606-648) makes a clear distinction between the *Bhāgavatas* and the *Pañcarātras* as separate religious Sects³⁹.

A greater amalgamation of *Bhāgavatism* and *Pañcarātrism* seems to have taken place by the time of Śaṅkara. Yet he seems to make a distinction between the *Bhāgavatas* and the *Pañcarātras* in so far as he says that a part of the *Bhāgavata* system agrees with the Vedānta school while another part is condemnable⁴⁰. Śaṅkara was not completely averse to the *Bhāgavata* doctrine⁴¹, nay he had profound respect for the *Bhāgavata matam*⁴². But he was not prepared to accept the *Vyūha* doctrine which had come to the *Bhāgavata* religion, as we have seen above, from the *Pañcarātras*. He was not prepared to accept the origin of Śaṅkarsaṇa, etc. from Vāsudeva. Therefore, he rejected the *Vyūhavāda* on the ground of such resultant defects as the non-permanence of the soul⁴³.

On the contrary, a total merger of *Pañcarātra* into and its complete identification with the *Bhāgavata Vaiṣṇavism* seems

to have taken place by the time of Rāmānuja, with the result that Vaiṣṇavism had accepted the *Vyūhavāda* as an essential doctrine. Therefore it became the responsibility of Rāmānuja to defend the *Vyūhavāda* as well as the *Pañcarātra* system as a whole against the attacks of the advaitins.

(c) *The Saurabhakāra not a Pañcarātrin*

Nimbārka does not appear to be a *Pañcarātra-Ācārya*. First of all, there is nothing of the Nārāyaṇa cult in the *Saurabha*. As pointed out earlier the *iṣṭadeva* of the *Saurabhakāra* is *Ramākānta Puruṣottama*. Nimbārka avoids even the reference to Nārāyaṇa, while quoting from the *Mahābhārata*⁴⁴. Nimbārka also does not make any defence of the *Pañcarātra-Āgamas* as authoritative *Śāstra* as Madhva had done under BS 1.1.3. The theory of creation in the *Saurabha* is not at all in conformity with that of the *Pañcarātras*, as expounded in the *Ahīrbudhnyā-Saṁhitā*⁴⁵. Moreover, there is no mention of the *Vyūha* doctrine in the *Saurabha*. If Nimbārka were a *Pañcarātrin* we would expect him to bring in something of the *Pañcarātra* doctrines in the *Saurabha*. Above all, if he were a post-Śaṅkara *Pañcarātrin* we would expect him to defend the *Pañcarātra* doctrines and scriptures against Śaṅkara and his advaita school⁴⁶ as done by the post-Śaṅkara Vaiṣṇava *ācāryas*. Therefore Nimbārka does not appear to be a *Pañcarātrin*.

(d) *Nimbārka a Vāsudeva Bhāgavata*

The conclusion would be that if Nimbārka was not a *Pañcarātrin*, he should be a *Bhāgavata Vaiṣṇava*. A careful perusal of the *Saurabha* would support this view⁴⁷. The *Saurabha* contains doctrines which are in complete conformity with the Brāhmaṇic Bhāgavatism and the Bhagavadgītā. There is no trace of any *Pañcarātra* influence on the *Saurabha*. Now as a *Bhāgavata-Vaiṣṇava-bhāṣyakāra* he would reject the *Pañcarātra* tenets in BS 2.2.42 as Śaṅkara has done. First of all, as pointed out by J.N. Banerjea, nobody before Śaṅkara considered BS 2.2.42-45 as dealing with the *Pañcarātra* doctrine of *Vyūhavāda*⁴⁸. It suffices to say that the *Saurabhakāra* seems to be unaware of even Śaṅkara⁴⁹ and therefore it did not strike him to see a possible refutation of the *Vyūhavāda* in BS 2.2.42-45.

Moreover the *Saurabhakāra*'s silence on the *Vyūhavāda* may point to the fact that he lived at a period when a slow merging of the *Pañcarātra* into the *Bhāgavata* religion was taking place and the resulting Vaiṣṇavism was in its formative stage. It was meaningless to antagonize "the newcomers" into the fold who were in the process of giving up their early *tāntric* tendencies and becoming one with the *Bhāgavatas*. Therefore Nimbārka would have felt it more prudent and useful to reject the *tāntric* or rather the *Śākta* cult which he does under the same sūtras⁵⁰. While commenting on the same sūtras Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja clash on the *Pañcarātra* system because by the time of Rāmānuja the merger of the *Pañcarātra* into *Bhāgavatism* was complete and the resulting *Vaiṣṇavism* had accepted the *Vyūhavāda* as its own, over and above the *avatāravāda* coming down from the *Bhāgavatism* and the *Bhagavadgītā*.

Now the opinion of some modern scholars that Nimbārka lived sometime after Rāmānuja⁵¹ and so he did not feel the need of defending the *Pañcarātra* system, which had already been strongly defended by Rāmānuja is unfounded since we have ample evidence to show the pre-Śaṅkara nature of the *Vedāntapārijāta-Saurabha* of Nimbārka⁵². True, there are some similarities between the *Saurabha* and the *Śrībhāṣya* since both teach the *Vaiṣṇava vedānta*, but the terminology of the former is more archaic and its *Vaiṣṇava* concepts more primitive⁵³. Besides, in the post-Rāmānuja *Vaiṣṇavism*, *Rādhā* seems to replace *Ramā* or *Lakṣmī*, and *Rādhākṛṣṇa* cult seems to become more popular. That takes us to another discussion.

2. Nimbārka was not a Rādhākṛṣṇa worshipper

The present day followers of Nimbārka are worshippers of *Rādhākṛṣṇa*. There is a general belief that Nimbārka himself was a worshipper of *Rādhākṛṣṇa*, and has composed a few prayer stanzas or *stotras* in honour of *Rādhā* and *Kṛṣṇa*⁵⁴. Against all the traditional beliefs it must be pointed out that there is no mention of either *Rādhā* or *Rādhākṛṣṇa* in the entire *Saurabha*. The goddess that he associates with *Puruṣottama* is *Ramā*⁵⁵, who is identified with *Lakṣmī* by *Amara Siṃha* in his *Amarakośa*⁵⁶, a work of the sixth cen-

tury A.D.⁵⁷ The mere absence of any mention of Rādhā and Rādhākṛṣṇa in the entire *Saurabha* will go a long way to dethrone the myth that Nimbārka was the propagator of the Rādhākṛṣṇa cult⁵⁸. As seen earlier the *iṣṭadevatā* of the *Saurabhakāra* is Ramākānta. He could very well have substituted Ramā with the word Rādhā, had he been a Rādhākṛṣṇa worshipper, since the place where it occurs is a prose passage, and as such it does not demand any change for the sake of metre. Further, it must also be pointed out here that there is a contradiction in the tradition of the Nimbārka school itself, which considers Nimbārka to have lived at the end of the *Dvāparayuga*⁵⁹ and to have been a propagator of Rādhākṛṣṇa cult⁶⁰. For, all the available evidences show that Rādhā appeared on the religious scene only after the tenth century A.D.⁶¹. We will now examine these evidences.

(a) *The Rādhā cult a later development*

In the earlier Purāṇas the wife of Kṛṣṇa Vāsudeva is named Rukmiṇi⁶². Therefore scholars are almost unanimous in asserting that the Rādhā element in Vaiṣṇavism is of recent origin⁶³ and they strongly reject the opinion of those who try to trace Rādhā in Vedic literature and Astronomy⁶⁴. Rādhā could be associated with Vāsudeva Kṛṣṇa only after the latter became identified with Gopāla Kṛṣṇa of the Ābhira⁶⁵. Once that identification was established, it was easy to attribute the amorous dalliances of the Ābhira god Gopāla Kṛṣṇa to Vāsudeva Kṛṣṇa of the Vṛṣṇis and the Yādavas. This also explains why such stories are found only in the later Purāṇas. Although the *Mahābhārata*, the *Harivaṁśa*, the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, the *Viṣṇupurāṇa*, etc. deal with the dalliance of Kṛṣṇa with *Gopis* in general, on the bank of the river, Yamunā, there is no mention of Rādhā in any of them⁶⁶.

Perhaps the *Gāthā Saptasatī*, a work in Mahārāstri prākṛit of the Śatavāhana emperor Hāla, is the earliest work to mention the dalliance of Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa⁶⁷. Even there, Rādhā is clearly stated only in one stanza, which reads:

*muhamāruena taṁ kahaṇa goraam rāhiāē avaṇento
etāṇam bālavīṇam aṇṇāṇam vi goam harasi*⁶⁸

Keith⁶⁹ dates this work to a time between 200-450 A.D. After a careful study S.C. **Mukherji**⁷⁰ comes to the conclusion that though the work received additions down to the eighth century A.D., the bulk of the work was composed before the seventh century A.D. Perhaps the stanza 1.29, mentioned above may belong to the later stage because the archaeological and other literary evidences available from the seventh and eighth centuries A.D. substantiate only the association of Kṛṣṇa with the *gopis* in general where no special importance is given to any particular *gopi*⁷¹. But from the ninth century onwards we have an abundance of reference to Rādhā in the literature and her amorous dealings with Kṛṣṇa became the popular theme for the poets⁷². Love stories of gods offered rich grazing field for the imagination of the poets in India even from the time of Kālidāsa. In course of time the theme of Rādhākṛṣṇa dalliance became the most favourite topic of poets, perhaps because the 'cowherd' life of Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā was most suitable for wide imagination of the poets on love. For them Rādhā became the ideal woman for the description of various stages of *Ṣṅgārarasa*. These poets seem to be more interested in the description of the *rāsailā* rather than the deification of Rādhā⁷³. This has been the general tendency of the poets from the ninth century A.D. to the 15th century A.D. By the 15th century A.D., the Vaiṣṇava poets began to emphasize the *madhura* aspect of *Rādhākṛṣṇa prema*. For them Rādhā became the embodiment of *madhurarasa*.

In the sphere of popular religion, it is to be noted that even at the end of the tenth century A.D. Rādhā didn't attain the status of Lakṣmī, nor was she an object of worship⁷⁴, because they were considered to be distinct entities as is evident from the three inscriptions of king Vākpati Muñja of Malava issued in A.D 974, 982 and 986⁷⁵.

S.B. **Dasgupta**⁷⁶ has established on the basis of available ancient documentary evidences that in and through literature Rādhā entered the field of philosophy and religion at the earliest by the 12th century A.D. Once she found a place in philosophy and religion, she grew stronger and became more important, the background for which had already been prepared in the philosophical conceptions and

speculations of Lakṣmī as the Śakti of Viṣṇu⁷⁷. The remote background for such a philosophy seems to be the Sāṃkhya concept of prakṛti and Puruṣa.

On the strength of the available archaeological evidences, especially of the Anavada (Gujarat) inscriptions of A.D. 1292, during the reign of Sārangadeva, **Majumdar** established that Rādhā became the object of cult only in the 13th century A.D. that is to say, a century after the appearance of the *Gītāgovinda* of Jayadeva⁷⁸. Caṇḍīdāsa seems to be the first poet who attempted to reconcile Rādhā and Lakṣmī⁷⁹. According to the Purāṇas⁸⁰, the parents of Rādhā are Vṛṣabhānu and Kalāvati or Kīrtidā. As pointed out by **Dasgupta**⁸¹ Śrīkṛṣṇa *kīrtana* of Caṇḍīdāsa, however, gives a different genealogy of Rādhā. Here she is presented as born of the womb of Padmā, in the house of Sāgara⁸². The Śrīkṛṣṇa *kīrtana* showers Rādhā with many of the epithets of Lakṣmī like Padmini etc⁸³.

It may be proper here to say a word about the contribution made by the later Purāṇas in propagating the Rādhā cult. According to **Majumdar**⁸⁴ a real attempt is made in the *Brahmavaivarta Purāṇa*⁸⁵ to reconcile all the legends and traditions concerning Rādhā and to thrash out the contradictions through stories newly invented with this purpose in view. As a result the *Brahmavaivarta Purāṇa* presented Rādhā as the lawful wife of Kṛṣṇa⁸⁶, whose marriage was solemnized by Brahmā himself. Similarly the present extant version of the Padmapurāṇa is also a late work containing eulogies of the later Rādhā cults and their super human results⁸⁷. It was mainly due to the Purāṇas like *Brahmavaivarta* and Padma that the Rādhā cult became popular and she attained the same status in relation to Kṛṣṇa as Lakṣmī in relation to Viṣṇu.

Besides these Purāṇas the works of poets like Śrīdharadāsa, Caṇḍīdāsa, Vidyāpati of Mithilā etc. played a magnificent role in making the Rādhā cult popular in Bengal. *Padmāvatī* of Rupa Gosvamin, containing the composition of many of the earlier poets, not only of Bengal, but also of the neighbouring states, is a lasting testimony to the popularity of the Rādhākṛṣṇa theme among the poets from 12th century A.D. onwards, so much so that the Bengalees even considered that the theme of Rādhākṛṣṇa love was a *sine qua non*

for lyrics⁸⁸. But the greatest contribution in making the Rādhā cult more popular is made by the religious movement started with Caitanya Mahāprabhu⁸⁹. The philosophical writings of the Gauḍīya Gosvāmis of Vṛndāvana further strengthened the foundations of Rādhā cult.

(a) *Rādhā enters in post-Śrīnivāsa era*

The above discussion proves that there is a contradiction with regard to the traditional belief that Nimbārka, an Ācārya living in the first century of *Kaliyuga*⁹⁰ was a propagator of Rādhā cult. Here it must also be pointed out that even Śrīnivāsa, the first commentator on the *Saurabha*, does not mention Rādhā, although he mentions Kṛṣṇa⁹¹ several times, and he actually quotes some portions of the extant version of the *Daśaśloki*⁹². What is striking is that he avoids that stanza of the *Daśaśloki* in which a mention is made of Rādhā. As will be pointed out, this omission seems to be wilful⁹³.

Furthermore, it must also be mentioned that the traditionalists cannot take refuge in the contention that today Rādhā is accepted as identical with Śrī or Lakṣmī and therefore any mention of the name or a synonym of Śrī or Lakṣmī in the ancient literature or archaeological monuments is a reference to Rādhā. As we have stated earlier, just as many streams of religious traditions have merged into the making of the personality of Kṛṣṇa and the Kṛṣṇaite religion, so also various religious elements and traditions have come together in the making of the personality of Rādhā. From a historical point of view these elements are different and had their origin in different backgrounds. They have become merged into the mainstream at a particular period in history. These distinctions have to be kept in mind in any meaningful evaluation of the historical aspects.

We may conclude that Rādhā cult, which originated sometime after the tenth century A.D., has entered the Nimbārka school some time after Śrīnivāsa, the first known commentator of the *Vedāntapārījāta Saurabha*.

3. The Saurabhakāra was a disciple of Nārada

The Saurabhakāra considered Nārada, the teacher of the *bhūman* doctrine as his *guru*. In his commentary BS 1.3.8

Nimbārka asserts:

*Paramācāryaṭh śrīkumārair asmad gurave śrīman
nāradaḥ upadiṣṭo bhūmātvena vijijñāsitavyaḥ (Chāṇḍ 7.22.1)
ityatra bhūmā prāṇo na bhavati kintu śrīpuruṣottamaḥ kutaḥ?
Prāṇād upari bhūmna upadeśāt*⁹⁴.

(a) *His guru; Nārada of the Chāṇḍogya*

In the above passage, the Saurabhakāra acknowledges that he belongs to the *Chāṇḍogyan* tradition in which the doctrine of *bhūmā* was originally taught by Śrīkumāra to his disciple Nārada. Who could be this Nārada, whom Nimbārka considers as his *guru*? There is no compelling reason to regard Nārada, the *guru* of Nimbārka to be identical with the sage Nārada, who is also regarded as the author of the *Nārada Pañcarātras* and the *Nārada-bhakti-sūtras*.

Nārada, the author of the *Nārada pañcarātras* could not be the *guru* of Nimbārka because, on the one hand, this work belongs to the 16th century A.D.⁹⁵ and, on the other hand, even the most “pessimist” among the “detractors” of Nimbārka places him at least in the 13th century A.D.⁹⁶ If Nārada of the *Bhaktisūtra* was the *guru* of Nimbārka, then there would result a contradiction within the tradition. On the one hand, according to the *Ācāryacaritam*, Nimbārka is also called Āruṇi, being the son of the sage Aruṇa and is considered to be the immediate disciple of Nārada⁹⁷. On the other hand, Nārada, the alleged author of the *Bhakti-sūtras*, enumerates the names of the earlier *Ācāryas*, among whom Āruṇi is also praised⁹⁸. Therefore we are unable to accept Nārada, the propagator of the Rādhākṛṣṇa cult, as the *guru* of Nimbārka, if Nimbārka is really Āruṇi, whom Nārada, the alleged *Bhaktisūtrakāra* himself, regards as an earlier *Ācārya*.

(b) *Nimbārka unaware of later Nārada legends*

Even if we assume that Nārada of the *Chāṇḍogya* and the sage by the same name found in all the legends are the same person, one has to accept that there was a steady development of legends concerning Nārada in course of centuries. Nārada, in fact, is a complex personality in the mythological narratives. That Nimbārka is not aware of all the known legends concerning Nārada, say by the time of Śaṅkara⁹⁹, is

evident from the *Saurabha* itself. In his explanation of *sūtra* 3.3.32¹⁰⁰, Nimbārka put forth the example of Vasiṣṭha to show that the persons who are appointed to particular "offices" on account of some meritorious deeds in the past, continue to remain embodied as long as their office itself lasts, owing to the influence of the works of which their "office" is the result¹⁰¹. The *sūtra* does not limit the example of office to Vasiṣṭha alone as has been done by Nimbārka. It is worth noting that Śaṅkara in his *bhāṣya* on the same *sūtra* brings in also Sanatkumāra and Nārada and their "offices" mentioned in the *Vaiṣṇava Purāṇas*.¹⁰² It is reasonable to infer that, had Nimbārka been aware of this Nārada legend, he could not have omitted it. It would have been a grave negligence on his part not to speak of the special "office" of his guru, Nārada, and to give importance to Vasiṣṭha in spite of the fact that Śaṅkara mentions not only Nārada, his guru, but also Sanatkumāra, his *Paramācārya*. Such a grave omission is least expected of Nimbārka who regards the *guru* as the only *deva*.¹⁰³

It seems that some of the later followers of Nimbārka mistook his statement in the *Saurabha* 1.3.8 and identified Nārada, mentioned therein, as the one mentioned in the *Bhaktisūtra*¹⁰⁴ and attributed all the contemporary legends of Nārada to the *guru* of Nimbārka, although such an identification and attribution were unwarranted. But it was quite natural for the later Vaiṣṇavas to do so. For example, even as late as the 16th century, Dāmodaradeva (1488-1588) is believed to have been initiated by the sage Nārada taking the form of an ascetic¹⁰⁵. It is interesting to note the tradition that even Vyāsamuni was instructed by Nārada, when the former was at Bādarikāśrama. At the instruction of Nārada, it is believed, Vyāsamuni wrote down the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* and obtained solace and peace of mind¹⁰⁶.

Some modern scholars of the Nimbārka sect like N.D. **Sharma** try to defend the belief that Nārada of the mythology is the real *guru* of Nimbārka on the ground that Nārada is ever young and ever immortal¹⁰⁷ and that he possesses supernatural *siddhis* from yogic exercises¹⁰⁸ so that he can appear to anybody and accept him as a disciple. But then we are in the sphere of faith according to which Nārada appears

whenever there is any kind of an impasse or indecision regarding the Vaiṣṇava doctrine. There is also a belief that Nārada is the synthesizer of two opposite principles¹⁰⁹ of *Nigama* and *Āgama*. But then we are beyond historical perspective.

Therefore we may conclude that Nimbārka appears to have belonged to a period in which the complex traditional legends, centred round the personality of Nārada had not yet grown¹¹⁰, because Nimbārka is unaware of some important legends concerning Nārada¹¹¹. When various legends around Nārada grew and developed they were easily attributed to the original personality of the sage¹¹². The unscrupulous attribution of various legends to the original personality of Nārada creates a lot of historical problems and it has done much damage even to the historical personality of Nimbārka.

(c) *No motivated claim*

Some scholars attribute motives to Nimbārka for claiming Nārada as his guru. One of such motives is to show the antiquity of his own doctrine. Says Roma **Bose**:¹⁰³

"Nimbārka might very well have called Nārada his preceptor simply for showing the antiquity of his own doctrine as well as for glorifying it and making it more acceptable to the people, for quite naturally people would fall in with his doctrine far more easily if they were to learn that it was not invented by Nimbārka, a man, but was handed down to him by Nārada, a divine sage, who, again, learnt it from the Kumāras, sons of Brahmā, who, finally, learnt it from the Lord Himself".

Here it must be pointed out that if Nimbārka had any such desire for popularity and acceptance among the masses it should have been for the *Bhūman* doctrine of the Chāndogyan tradition, in the context of which he claims Nārada as his guru. I, in fact, fail to comprehend the propriety of the argument advanced by Roma **Bose** that Nārada was supposed to be well acquainted with the *glory of Rādhākṛṣṇa, the central point of Nimbarka's doctrine*¹¹⁴. The presumption that the central point of the doctrine of Nimbārka is the Rādhākṛṣṇa cult is unwarranted and without any foundation in the entire *Saurabha*. As we have pointed out, Nimbārka was not a Rādhākṛṣṇa worshipper at all. If he wanted to popularize the cult of Rādhākṛṣṇa he should have presented them, instead

of *Ramākānta puruṣottama*, as the ultimate reality. A mere statement that the *Bhūman* taught by the *Paramācārya Śrīkumāra* to his *guru* the reverend (*Śrīmad*) *Nārada* is *Śrī Puruṣottama*¹¹⁵, does not at all mean that *Nimbārka* wanted to popularize the cult of *Rādhākṛṣṇa* among the masses.

Conclusion

The above study based on the *Vedāntapārijāta Saurabha* shows that its author was a *Bhāgavata Vāsudeva Vaiṣṇava*. Our study leads us to conclude that the *Saurabhakāra* was not a *Nārāyaṇa Pañcarātrin* or a *Rādhā* worshipper. These elements seem to have come into the classical *Vāsudeva Vaiṣṇavism* in a post-*Saurabhakāra* period. Similarly, the claim of *Nimbārka* that he is a disciple of *Nārada* cannot be taken to mean that he is an "immediate disciple" of *Nārada*.

Chapter 2

TRADITIONAL ACCOUNTS ON NIMBĀRKA

Introduction

After establishing what we could assume certain about the Saurabhakāra on the basis of his work *Vedāntapārijāta Saurabha*, an attempt is made in this chapter, to evaluate some of the traditional beliefs as well as the controversies among the modern scholars about him.

1. The traditional bio-data and its evaluation

The traditional account of the life and activities of Nimbārka is given in the *Ācāryacaritam* (A C.) written by Śrī Nārāyaṇa Śaraṇadevācārya¹ (1760-1810 A.D.). A manuscript of the same dated Vikrama year 1917 (i.e. 1860 A.D.), belonging to Śrī **Vrajavallabha Śaraṇa** is available in the library of *Śrīji Mandir*, Vrindavana². A portion of it was published in 1916 A.D. from Vrindavana. This work seems to accommodate the various versions of the legends — even contrary ones connected with Nimbārka, found in the *Purāṇas* like *Vāmana*, *Bhaviṣya*, etc. It also quotes from a sectarian work called *Audumbara-Saṁhitā*, which is, now, non-extant. The A C contains also the legends and the traditional accounts of all other *ācāryas* of the school, beginning with Śrī Haṁsa, the swan incarnation of Viṣṇu, down to Śrī Paruśurāma devācārya. Purely from a historical point of

view, the work is of insignificant value. But it can be considered a valuable document of the faith and legends of the Nimbārka school of Vedānta in the 17th century A.D.

Tradition accepts Nimbārka as an incarnation of the *Sudarśanacara* of Viṣṇu for the spread of the Vaiṣṇava religion³. It is said that Brahmā, who was himself ignorant of the highest reality, requested Viṣṇu to teach the Supreme Truth to his four *mānasaputras*⁴ viz., Sanaka, Sananda, Sanātana and Sanatkumāra. The four sons received the ultimate wisdom from Viṣṇu, who manifested himself as a swan⁵, and they, in their turn, taught Nārada the same⁶. Nārada, for the good of the world which was still merged in darkness, imparted that knowledge to Nimbārka⁷. Since all the figures in the above anecdote, except Nimbārka, are mythological, the historical importance of the legend is of anybody's guess⁸.

There is no unanimity even among the followers of Nimbārka about his original name, genealogy, place of birth and works. Tradition seems to have confused various elements. To begin with, let us first consider the genealogy of Nimbārka. The AC contains at least two traditions, connected with the parentage of Nimbārka. According to one of them⁹, also supported by the *Stotratnāvalī*¹⁰, his father was Aruṇa and his mother was Jayantī¹¹. The other tradition¹² considers Jagannātha as his father and Vijayantī as his mother. This view has been partly supported by *Harivyāsadeva*¹³ in so far as he considers Jagannātha as the father of Nimbārka. According to Harivyāsadeva the mother of Nimbārka was Sarasvatī. From such accounts no conclusions are possible. Anyway such variations in the traditional accounts mutually reduce their credibility. Perhaps these variations may point out that the historical Nimbārka was very much cut off from the later community in which these legends and traditions around him grew.

With regard to his place of birth also we have at least two traditions. We may name them as the "Southern" and the "Northern" as they locate Nimbārka's birth place in South India or North India respectively. According to *Vedāntaratana-maṇjūṣā*¹⁴ he was born in Telinga, in the Sudarśanāśrama, which was situated on the bank of the

river Godāvarī. This tradition handed down in the *Mañjūṣā* is the oldest written document we have about the birth place of Nimbārka, because the author of the *Mañjūṣā* is said to be Puruṣottama, the fourth successor¹⁵ of Nimbārka. Puruṣottama himself is said to be a native of Telinga. Although tradition assigns him to the fifth century A.D. the internal evidence of his *Mañjūṣā* compels us to place him after Śaṅkara, because he is well familiar with the Advaita doctrines of Śaṅkara¹⁶.

But the Southern tradition is not unanimous in assigning Nimbārka's birth place to the Sudarśanāśrama. Some consider Muṅgipattana¹⁷ a town in Telanga to be his birth place, while others consider¹⁸ Nimba or Nimbapur in the district of Ballary as his place of birth. Lalita Krishna **Goswami** places Nimbārka's birth at Paṇḍarpur near Vaidūryapattana on the bank of Godāvarī¹⁹.

According to the Northern tradition Nimbarka was born in Mathurā or rather right in Vrindāvana, a place so intimately associated with Śrīkṛṣṇa. The AC²⁰ places Nimbārka's birth in *Vrindāvana*, the sacred spot of the *Rāsalīlā* which is so intimately associated with the Rādhākṛṣṇa cult. The AC²¹ also gives another tradition based on the *Audumbara Sāmhita* which considers that Nimbārka was born in *Nimbagrāma* near the celebrated hill Govardhana near Vrindāvana. It is clear that the assignment of Nimbārka's birth place to Nimba, Nimbapur, Nimbagrāma, etc. is clearly based on *nimba*, a part of his name rather than any historical fact. Moreover the danger in the Northern tradition that assigns Nimbārka to Vrindāvana or Govardhana is that it might have been prompted by religious consideration, since these spots are sacred for the Vaiṣṇavas, especially for the devotees of Rādhākṛṣṇa. The Southern tradition, on the contrary, has the support of the *Vedāntaratna Mañjūṣā*, which is the oldest extant document available today on Nimbārka's birth place. Therefore the Southern tradition seems to be more probable. Besides, the special criticism of the *Śāktas* in the *Saurabha* 2.2.42-45 by Nimbārka demands that he lived at a time and place, where *Śāktism* was predominant so much so that he considered it necessary to refute this system. The Telinga origin of Nimbārka seems to suit such a demand since

Telinga was surrounded by places where *Śāktism* was rampant in the Gupta and post-Gupta period²².

Even about the birthday of Nimbārka we have two traditions. According to the *Siddhāntakusumāñjali* of Harivyāsadevācārya²³, which seems to be the oldest extant document on the subject, Nimbārka was born on the third day of the bright half of the month of *Vaiśākha*. The AC and the *Audumbara Samhitā* also appear to be aware of such a date of his birth²⁴. The other tradition, handed down in the AC holds that Nimbārka was born in the evening of the full moon day in the month of *Kārtikā*²⁵. This latter tradition is more open to question because there are more theological and mythological reasons behind such a belief. For, according to the *Purāṇas* the *Kārtikapūrṇimā* is the *jāgarāṇa* (awakening from sleep) day of Viṣṇu²⁶, who has been sleeping from the 11th day of the *śuklapakṣa* of the month of *Āṣādhā*. Such a conception seems to have been prevalent at least from the Gupta period²⁷.

The *Kārtikapūrṇimā* has another significance. It is believed among the worshippers of Rādhākṛṣṇa that in the eternal *Goloka*, the grand dalliance which began on *Āśvinapūrṇimā* reaches its zenith on *Kārtikapūrṇimā*²⁸. Since the belief assigning his birth on *Kārtikapūrṇimā* seems to be influenced more by theological reasons, its historical value is diminished. At any rate the tradition within the school is not unanimous in considering his birth on the *Kārtikapūrṇimā*.

Tradition gives us various names of the *Ācārya*. As pointed out earlier, the colophons at the end of each pāda of the *Saurabha* names its author as *Nimbārka*. Among the other traditional names Āruṇi and Jayanteya are based on his parentage²⁹. He is called Āruṇi because he is regarded as the son of Āruṇa and is called Jayanteya because his mother was called Jayantī. He is also known as Harivardhana³⁰ and Haripriya³¹. Since he is regarded as the *avatāra* of the *Sudarśanacakra*, he is also known as Sudarśana³². He is reverently called by his disciples as Nimbārka³³, Nimbāditya³⁴, Nimbabhāskara³⁵ and Niyamānanda³⁶.

As it is evident, the names Nimbārka, Nimbabhāskara and Nimbāditya are formed out of the two words consisting

of *nimba* (the neem tree) and *āditya* or *bhāskara* which are synonyms of *arka* (sun). These names, therefore connect the *Ācārya* with the *nimba* tree and the sun. It may be probable that the belief that he is the *avatāra* of the *Sudarśanacakra* is based on the fact that his name contains a synonym of the sun (*arka*), which is so intimately connected with *sudarśana*. The ancient fertile Indian mind could easily weave legends connecting the *nimba* tree, the *ācārya* and the *arka*. We have such legends in the AC³⁷, the *Bhaviṣya Purāṇa*³⁸, etc. According to these legends, once an ascetic came to the hermitage of the sage Aruṇa, who was out of station. Therefore Jayantī played the host. But as it was past sunset, the guest refused to take his meals. Therefore her son approached the ascetic and requested him to be pleased to accept their hospitality, because the sun (*arka*) was still lingering over the yonder *nimba* tree. He showed the ascetic the brightly shining sun over the said tree. Therefore the ascetic obliged the hosts. But when he finished his meals, to his utter surprise he realized that it was really past midnight. Therefore the ascetic gave the boy the name "Nimbārka", because he had shown him the *arka* over the *nimba* tree long after the sunset. According to one version of the legend this visitor was Brahmā himself in the guise of a sage³⁹, while according to another version he was a mere Yati⁴⁰ or a Jaina ascetic⁴¹ or even the sage Nārada⁴² or *Ācāryapāda*⁴³ the father of Śrīnivāsa, the "first disciple" of Nimbārka.

There is yet another etymological explanation of his name. It is said that he practised severe penance under a *nimba* tree, sustaining himself on the juice of its fruits only⁴⁴.

Niyamānanda is another oft-repeated name he has among the *ācāryas* of the school⁴⁵. Here also a later attempt at an etymological explanation is made. It is said that he is called Niyamānanda because he brought all people under his control or that he controlled himself, i.e., dedicated himself to the Lord through *bhakti*⁴⁶. Another explanation is that he controls (*niyamayati*) all those who have gone astray from the path of righteousness and he gladdens (*ānandayati*) their hearts⁴⁷. According to another interpretation in the AC⁴⁸ he

is called Niyamānanda because he expounded the *niyamas* i.e. the Vedas.

The more there are variations of his name and subsequent attempts at etymological explanations, the more sceptical one becomes in accepting all of them. Perhaps these attempts show that tradition is just trying to find a way out from uncertainties. Among these various names "Nimbārka" and its synonyms seem to be nearer the truth, not only because the colophon at the end of each *pāda* of the *Saurabha* contains that name, but also from the fact that tradition attempted to build up a beautiful legend around that name. The legend seems to be an outcome of the name rather than the name an outcome of the legend. Perhaps even the belief that he is an *avatāra* of the *Sudarśanacakra*⁴⁹ for the spread of the *Bhāgavatadharma* might have originated, not only from the fact that he was a great *Bhāgavata* sage⁵⁰, but also from the fact that his name contained *arka*⁵¹ or a word meaning the sun, which is intimately connected with Viṣṇu and his *Sudarśana*. Besides, as we have seen above, there are many attempts in tradition either to connect him to the *nimba* tree, or to assign his birth place to the *Nimbagrāma* or to *Nimbapura*. These also may point out that there should be a *nimba* element in his name⁵². This fact is further supported by the written evidence of Śrīnivāsa, the first commentator on the *Saurabha*, who calls the *Saurabhakāra* either as Nimbārka⁵³ or Nimbabhāskara⁵⁴.

On the other hand, *Niyamānanda* seems to be a favourite name for the *Ācārya* among many of his later disciples, starting with Puruṣottama, the author of the *Mañjūṣā*⁵⁵. We are unable to confirm whether "Nimbārka" or any of its synonyms was the *saṁnyāsa* name of the *Ācārya* and Niyamānanda his civil name or vice versa. But if one were to make a choice between Nimbārka and Niyamānanda on the basis of objectivity, Nimbārka and its synonyms would have greater support in tradition and reason⁵⁶, besides being the epithet, contained in the colophons at the end of each *pāda* of the *Saurabha*, although these colophons seem to have been added at a later time as we have pointed out above when Nimbārka himself obtained recognition and authority among the people.

The other names such as *Hariprīya*, *Harivardhana* etc. assigned to the *Ācārya* need no special comment. They seem to be epithets rather than proper names.

2. The works attributed to Nimbārka and their authenticity

The task of determining the authentic works of a founder of an ancient system of philosophy is really a stupendous one, since there is a tendency to attribute many spurious works to the great *ācāryas* and founders of the schools. To prove the validity of the doctrines, developed later, it is generally accepted that it was the practice of the commentators to read them back in the authoritative text. In this way they tried to bring the doctrine to perfection. Therefore, it is reasonable to guess that some scholars or paṇḍits in the school of Nimbārka also considered it a pious duty in the interest of the Sect to attribute their own works, either directed against the opponents of the school or merely explaining the new doctrines of the Sect as originating from earlier or more famous *ācāryas* including Nimbārka himself⁵⁷.

(a) *The SNKS is not a work of the Saurabhakāra*

Therefore it needs be pointed out that it is difficult to decide the authenticity of a work merely on the strength of the colophon at the end of the work or on the strength of the introduction at the beginning of the work. We have a very well known case in this regard, in the Nimbārka Sect itself, namely the work called *Saviśeṣanirviśeṣa Śrīkṛṣṇastavarāja*. This work seems to be of an ancient time because three great commentaries have been written on it⁵⁸ and it was held in high esteem in the Sect as an authentic work of Nimbārka until recent times⁵⁹. For the first edition of SNKS Pt. **Kisoridasa**, one of the great scholars of the Nimbārka Sect in modern times, used a manuscript which had an introduction "*śrīnandagrhe sāksāt śrīkṛṣṇam dṛṣṭvā tam stauti bhagavan nimbārkaḥ*". But when scholars like Roma **Bose** pointed out⁶⁰ that SNKS contains criticism of the Advaita theories of *nirguṇavāda* the doctrine that the *ahamartha* is not the essence of the self, *dṛṣṭisṛṣṭivāda* and the doctrine

that Brahman is the *āśraya viṣaya* of *ajñāna*, the pundits of the Sect searched for further manuscripts and were lucky to find one which did not have the introductory verse "*śrīnandagr̥he sākṣāt śrīkr̥ṣṇam dr̥ṣṭvā...*"⁶¹. Therefore the conclusion that the Sect finally arrived at is that SNKS is a spurious work. But such a conclusion was already implicit in the findings of Roma **Bose** when she had rightly pointed out that the style of the SNKS is rather heavy and not so simple as that of the *Saurabha*. The SNKS also contains polemics and sectarian controversies, which are anathema for the Saurabhakāra⁶². These facts themselves are sufficient to prove the spurious nature of SNKS even if all the manuscripts contained the introduction "*Śrīnandagr̥he...*".

The authenticity of the works attributed to an *ācārya* has to be tested on certain definite and non-disputable grounds. With regard to the problem of the authorship of a particular work and its dating the following three conditions may be satisfied:—

- i) The doctrine or other items referred to must be historically identifiable;
- ii) the author must be known;
- iii) The doctrine or other items referred to must be datable.

What else can offer such a norm except the *opus magnum* of the author. The test stone for any work attributed to Nimbārka is the *Vedāntapārjāta Saurabha*, the *opus magnum* of Nimbārka, which is also by all means the undisputed work of the *ācārya*. Whatever doctrine he had to teach as a Vedāntin, as a founder of a system, and as an *ācārya* of the school of Philosophy should be expounded in this *opus magnum* which is also his commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*. Therefore we can determine the authenticity of the other works attributed to Nimbārka on the basis of the following two conditions:

1. The other works attributed to him must not contain doctrines that are contradictory to the ones taught in this *opus magnum*. But if they do so, they can be regarded as spurious and unauthentic.
2. Similarly if the other works contain doctrines developed later on even within the school or elsewhere they must

be spurious, because there is always the danger that these works are attributed to the founder *ācārya* of the Sect in order to claim authority for them.

It is also to be pointed out that even in an original and authentic work interpolations in larger scale are possible. For example **Kathiyababa** claims that the criticisms of the four schools of Buddhism in the *Kaustubha* of Śrīnivāsa (2.2, 18) are interpolations at a later period from the *Vedānta Kaustubha Prabhā* of Keśavakāśmīri Bhaṭṭa⁶³. Here **Kathiyababa** seems to acknowledge that the Pundits and scribes of the Sect in the past had taken liberty to interpolate words, sentences and even longer passages in the original work. If there is such a liberty why should not an entire work, however small or big it may be, be attributed to an earlier *ācārya* including Nimbārka?

Therefore even if some works are found mentioned in some catalogues as the original works of Nimbārka, they need not in fact be his real works. On the basis of certain catalogues Roma **Bose** considered⁶⁴ *Madhvamukhamardana* as a work of Nimbārka. In spite of her persistent efforts she was unable to see the original manuscript or a copy of it to verify her hypothesis⁶⁵. Yet she suggests that Nimbārka wrote this work in order to reduce the influence of Madhava on the people and thereby to make himself popular among them.

(b) *The Madhvamukhamardana: a mistaken identity?*

Now supposing that there is a real work called the *Madhvamukhamardana* written by Nimbārka, we are unable to say whether that deals with Madhvācārya the *dvaitavādin* or Madhva the *Sāṃkhyācārya* (500 A.D) who was defeated by the Buddhist teacher Guṇamati⁶⁶. That can be decided only after the discovery of the manuscript of the *Madhvamukhamardana*.

Even if there was a work titled *Madhvamukhamardana*, it could be accepted as a work of Nimbārka only if it is found in agreement with the *bhedābheda* philosophy expounded in the *opus magnum* of Nimbārka. Until then no conclusion can be drawn from the mere mention of the *Madhvamukhamardana* in any catalogue against the name

of Nimbārka. Perhaps the said catalogue might be referring to the *Madhvatantramukhamardana* of Appaya Dixit. It is published by Ānandāśrama⁶⁷. In the absence of an extant work titled "*Madhvamukhamardana*" besides the extant *Madhvatantramukhamardana* of Appaya Dixit, all our discussions about the authorship of the former work are merely speculative and hypothetical. Therefore all that is asserted *gratis* could also be rejected *gratis*. Similar is the case with the *Vedāntasiddhāntapradīpa* wrongly attributed to Nimbārka in the Notices⁶⁸. It is in fact an *advaitic* exposition of the Bhāgavata and its author is Śukasudhī⁶⁹. In this context we may mention the *Aitihiyatattvarāddhānta*⁷⁰ and *Pañcasāṁskāra Pramāṇa*⁷¹ which are attributed to Nimbārka in some catalogues, but which are never accepted or venerated as works of any of the *ācāryas* at any time in the school of Nimbārka.

(c) *Other works wrongly attributed to Nimbārka*

We have other types of work, which are attributed to Nimbārka in some manuscripts, and are accepted in the school with respect. But now the authors of these works are established to be *ācāryas* later than Nimbārka. Examples would be the *Vedāntatattvabodha*⁷², whose author is Anantarāma, a 17th century follower of Nimbārka⁷³, and *Svadharmādhvabodha*⁷⁴ which is a work dealing with the ritualistic problems and whose author is identified as Ramācandra⁷⁵.

(d) *Works venerated in the Sect*

There are a few other works, which are universally attributed to Nimbārka. Today these are venerated as the original works of the *ācārya*. According to N.D. Sharma⁷⁶ they are four:

1. *Vedāntapārijāta Saurabha*
2. *Vedānta-Kāmadhenu*, also known as *Daśaśloki*
3. *Mantrarahasyaṣoḍaśī*
4. *Prapannakalpavālī*

The list of **Kathiyababa** contains⁷⁷ three more works besides the above four works. They are the following:

1. *Rādhāṣṭakam*

2. *Kṛṣṇāṣṭakam*
3. *Prātaḥ Smaraṇastotram*

We can leave aside the latter three works found in the list of **Kathiyababa** as unauthentic, on the following grounds. First of all, none of the earliest *ācāryas* or commentators has mentioned them or commented on them⁷⁸. Secondly even now they are not unanimously accepted as the works of Nimbārka in all the Sects within the Nimbārka school as can be inferred from the fact that N.D. **Sharma** does not give them the same status as the other four works. The reason for attributing these works to Nimbārka seems to be to make them acceptable and popular among the followers⁷⁹. Besides, as pointed out earlier, Nimbārka was a *Bhāgavata Vaiṣṇava* whose *iṣṭadeva* was *Ramākānta* while the content of these works is the worship of *Rādhā* and *Kṛṣṇa* who are never mentioned anywhere in the *Saurabha*. Therefore they cannot be the works of the Saurabhakāra.

(e) *MRS and PK are later developments*

Now among the remaining four works *Mantrarahasyaśoḍaśī* (MRS) and *Prapannakalpavalī* (PK) are said to be two sections of a work called *Rahasyamīmāṃsā* attributed to Nimbārka⁸⁰. The remaining portions are not available today. The *Prapannakalpavalī* is a small work, consisting of 24 stanzas and the *Mantrarahasyaśoḍaśī*, as its name indicates, consists of 16 stanzas.

The doctrine explained in the *Prapannakalpavalī* is *prapatti* (self-surrender to God). It consists in the absolute dependence of the devotee on the Lord for everything and at every moment, surrendering oneself completely to the mercy of the Lord⁸¹. Anyone who longs for salvation through the *sādhana* of self-surrender must give up one's narrow feelings of individuality as an independent, self-sufficient being⁸², and giving up all other *sādhana*s⁸³, and realizing one's own utter helplessness and nothingness, must approach the *guru* for instruction⁸⁴. Having no other interest than the attainment of the Lord⁸⁵ he takes refuge in Him with his whole mind and body⁸⁶ looking upon Him as a father, mother, friend and master, as knowledge, wealth and everything⁸⁷ serving him as a son serves his father, a friend his friend and a servant his master⁸⁸. There are six factors that constitute this self-

surrender. They are⁸⁹: (a) *ānukūlasya saṁkalpaḥ* (good will to all); (b) *prātikūlasya varjanam* (no ill will towards any being); (c) *rakṣiṣyati iti viśvāsaḥ* (faith that the Lord will protect); (d) *gopītvavaraṇam* (acceptance of him as the saviour); (e) *kārpaṇyam* (feeling of helplessness) and (f) *ātmanikṣepaḥ* (self-surrender). Of these, the principal factor (*angin*) is *ātmanikṣepaḥ*, the remaining five being only constituents (*aṁśas*).

When one surrenders oneself to the Lord in this fashion, the Lord is ever gracious to him⁹⁰. He protects him at all times from all harms and difficulties⁹¹. He regards him as his special ward and dear friend and never abandons him⁹², nay, leads him with his own hands to salvation, namely, the attainment of himself⁹³. This is the gist of the doctrinal position of *Prapannakalpavālī*.

The doctrine expounded in the *Mantrarahasyaśoḍaśī* (MR), on the other hand, is *gurūpasatti* "self-surrender to one's own *guru*". This seems to be a further development of the doctrine of *prapatti* expounded in the *Prapannakalpavālī*⁹⁴. Here the *guru* is considered to be the intermediary between the individual and the Lord, for, here one surrenders oneself completely, not directly to the Lord, but to one's own *guru*. It is the *guru* who leads the disciple to the Lord⁹⁵. This is considered to be the eternal and the hidden secret of all the truths.⁹⁶ In fact the *Mantrarahasyaśoḍaśī* is an exposition of the famous 18 syllables (*akṣara*) *gopāla mantra*⁹⁷, which could be considered the most secret *gurumantra*⁹⁸ imparted by the *guru* only to the worthiest of disciples⁹⁹.

Just as the sacrificial butter is first poured in a ladle and then offered to the fire, the disciple offers himself to the Lord through his self-surrender to the *guru*¹⁰⁰. Through such an offering, he becomes free from the fetters of the earthly existence and attains oneness with Brahman (*brahmasāyujyam*)¹⁰¹. All that the disciple has to do in order to attain liberation is only to dedicate himself, heart and soul¹⁰², together with his wealth¹⁰³, and his youth¹⁰⁴, to his *guru*, whom he must regard as his all in all and serve him as a servant, son and a beloved and intimate friend¹⁰⁵. He must not only obey him, but also learn the sacred *mantra* in the manner recommended by the *guru*¹⁰⁶. The *guru*, on his part,

is to impart the supreme, secret knowledge to his disciple alone and not to any one else¹⁰⁷.

Thus *Prapannakalpavalī* and *Mantrarahasyaṣoḍaśī* teach *prapatti* and *gurūpasatti* respectively as the unique means of salvation. These doctrines are not in contradiction with the position of the Saurabhakāra who accepts both the need of *Bhagavatprasāda*¹⁰⁸ and the importance of the *guru*¹⁰⁹ for *mokṣa*. But the Saurabha doctrines of *Bhagavatprasāda* and the need of a *guru* for liberation do not have all the implications of the developed doctrines of *prapatti* and *gurūpasatti*. The Saurabhakāra is a Vaiṣṇavabhāṣyakāra. Therefore he accepts the importance of the *guru* and the need of the *prasāda* of the Lord for liberation but they do not appear to have the developed meaning of *prapatti* and *gurūpasatti* as understood in the later Nimbārka Sects. For, according to the Saurabhakāra, the approach to a *guru* seems to be only a preliminary factor, in accordance with the ancient *Upaniṣadic* tradition, while according to *Mantrarahasyaṣoḍaśī* the self-surrender to a *guru* (*gurūpasatti*) is not only an essential factor, but also an independent means (*sādhana*) for the attainment of Brahman.

In the same way, the idea of *prasāda* contained in the Saurabha is far from the developed theory of *prapatti*. In fact the unique means for the attainment of Brahman expounded by the Saurabhakāra is *vidyā*¹¹⁰ obtained through *dhyāna*¹¹¹. The term *bhakti* found in the Saurabha¹¹² does not at all have the implications of *premarasa*, *kāntābhāva* etc. as understood in the later ages in the Nimbārka school. In the Saurabha the concept of *bhakti* means *upāsana* (meditation). In fact, according to the Saurabhakāra, Brahman becomes manifest or the direct vision of Brahman results from the prolonged and undistracted meditation on him¹¹³.

In reality, as pointed out by **Bhandarkar**¹¹⁴, the idea of *prapatti* and *gurūpasatti* as found in *PK* and *MRS* seems to be influenced by such doctrines well developed in the *viśiṣṭādvaita* school of Rāmānuja, especially in the *Tenkalai* tradition¹¹⁵. At any rate, such doctrines are not found in the Saurabha and *Kaustubha*. They might have come to the Sect at the time when the monastic discipline needed to be tightened up in order to face splits and revolts within the Sect.

Also to be noted is the fact that the Saurabhakāra does not speak of any secret *mantra* like the *gopāla mantra*. If the *gopāla mantra* contained the most secret and sacred essence of the *Nimbārka Vedānta*, the *Ācārya* could not at all have left it out in the *Saurabha*. At least he would have alluded to it.

It may incidentally be mentioned that while the Saurabhakāra denies to the *Sūdras*¹¹⁶ the right of *Brahma jñāna* – which is the only means of *mokṣa* according to him – the *MRS* and *PK* do not debar any group of people from *Brahma jñāna* through *gurūpasatti* and *prapatti*.

All these factors point out that both the *MRS* and *PK* denote a later stage of the *bhakti* development in the Nimbārka school of Vaiṣṇavism, which is not found in the *opus magnum* of Nimbārka. Therefore the attribution of these works to Nimbārka is unjustifiable.

(f) *DS* denotes post-Saurabha Vaiṣṇavism

Daśaślokī (*DS*), also known as *Sidhāntaratna* or *Vedāntakāmadhenu* is alleged to be another work by Nimbārka. It is said that he composed it for the sake of his immediate disciple, Śrīnivāsa, giving him in a nutshell the teaching of the *Saurabha*¹¹⁷. As the name *daśaślokī* indicates, it is a short work consisting of ten *śloka*s only. It has been commented upon by Puruṣottama¹¹⁸, Harivyāśadeva¹¹⁹ and Giridhara Prapanna¹²⁰. Today the *DS* has a prominent place in the Nimbārka Sect.

Since an evaluation of the content of the *DS* will help us to determine the authenticity of the claim of its being a work by Nimbārka, we undertake such an evaluation here. According to *DS* the highest Brahman is Kṛṣṇa¹²¹ attended by Rādhā¹²², who is to be meditated on at all times¹²³. There is no other means to salvation except the lotus feet of Kṛṣṇa¹²⁴. The *salvific* grace from him is extended to all those who have no qualification other than the awareness of their own helplessness¹²⁵. Through his grace, *bhakti* consisting of special love for him is generated¹²⁶.

The *DS* gives Rādhā a place of worship. It shows that the *DS* was composed only after Rādhā became an object of veneration which, as we have pointed out earlier, might have

taken place definitely, after the 10th century A.D.¹²⁷. The Saurabhakāra never mentions *Rādhā* and *Kṛṣṇa* by name. His *iṣṭadeva* is *Ramākānta Puruṣottama*, who is also called *Vāsudeva*. The means for the attainment of Brahman, according to the Saurabhakāra is *Brahmopāsana* consisting of meditation of him. Therefore the idea of *premaviśeṣalakṣaṇā bhakti* that is advocated in *DS*¹²⁸ is something foreign to the author of the *Saurabha*. The idea of *premaviśeṣalakṣaṇa bhakti* contained in *DS* 9 shows that it is composed at a later time as in the case of *PK* and *MRS*.

It may be pointed out against our position that Śrīnivāsa actually quotes *DS* 3, *DS* 4 and *DS* 7 in the *Kaustubha* 1.1.1, and therefore *DS* must be the work of Nimbārka. In our defence, we have to state the following facts. Even if the stanzas in question belong to the original *Kaustubha* (i.e., even if they are not later interpolations) they are borrowed by the Kaustubhakāra from some other work, because the Kaustubhakāra introduces them with the phrase *yathāhuḥ....iti*. Even if the entire *DS*, as it is understood today in its present form, was available for the Kaustubhakāra, it does not prove that they were composed by Nimbārka for the sake of teaching the essence of the *Saurabha*, because the doctrines of the *Saurabha* are quite different from those of the *DS* as we have pointed out above.

Secondly, if the entire *DS* in its present form was available to the Kaustubhakāra we cannot explain why he significantly omits the stanzas that deal with *Rādhā* cult and *premaviśeṣalakṣaṇā bhakti*. If it is an omission on his part, it could be a wilful omission, because nowhere in the entire *Kaustubha* he mentions *Rādhā* at all. It may also mean that *Rādhā* cult was not very popular in the Sect at that time.

Thirdly, as pointed out by Roma **Bose**, the entire seventh verse of *DS*¹²⁹, which is also quoted by the Kaustubhakāra, is devoted to uphold the doctrine of all cognitions of objects and the trinity of reals¹³⁰. When a concise work like *DS* devotes an entire verse out of the ten to defend the doctrine of the objectivity of all cognitions, it shows that there were some, who denied it — denied the reality of our ordinary perception and the plurality of objects of perception — and insisted on the sole unity and reality of the self. It may show

that the *DS* was composed only after the *advaitavāda* of Śaṅkara became popular.

It may be pointed out here that some scholars belonging to the Nimbārka Sect itself, are of the opinion that *Harivyāsadeva* is the actual author of the *DS*¹³¹. Be it what it may, one thing is certain that *DS* contains doctrines that are not found in the *Saurabha* and therefore the doctrines that are found in the *DS* are the later development within the school of Nimbārka.

The author of the *DS* is well acquainted with the advaita doctrine of Śaṅkara. If the Saurabhakāra were acquainted with *advaita* and the *māyāvāda* of Śaṅkara and the author of the *DS* and of the *Saurabha* were the same *ācārya* we would expect him to reject Śaṅkara on more solid grounds, the occasions for which are offered to him in the *Brahmasūtras* themselves rather than to compose a stanza in the *DS*. Here what is to be emphasized is that the *DS* cannot be a *condensation* of the *Saurabha* because *DS* contains some doctrines which are not at all dealt with in the *Saurabha*. Therefore the author of the *DS* cannot be the same as the author of the *Saurabha*.

(g) *The Saurabha is the only extant authentic work*

This leaves us with the only one authentic work of Nimbārka, which is available today. That is his *opus magnum*, his *vākyārtha* on the *Brahmasūtras*. The followers of Nimbārka believe that the *Ācārya* had written many more *vākyārthas* on other works like the Upaniṣads and the *Gītā*, but they are not available today. In fact, we find references to these lost commentaries (of Nimbārkācārya) in the writings of certain later *ācāryas* of the Sect. For example, Keśavakāsmīrin mentions in his *bhāṣya* on the *Bhagavadgītā*¹³² that Nimbarka wrote a *vākyārtha* on the *Bhagavadgītā*. Puruṣottama in his *Vedāntaratnamāñjūṣā* alludes¹³³ to a work called *Sadācāraprakāśā* attributed to Nimbārka. Sundarabhaṭṭa speaks of another work attributed to Nimbārka called *Prapatticintamaṇi*¹³⁴. The *AC*¹³⁵ mentions that Nimbārka wrote a commentary on the Vedas. We are unable to judge the authenticity of these works as long as these are not available for scrutiny and study. Be it as it may,

one thing is certain that there is no reference to any of these works by Nimbārka himself in the *Saurabha* or by Śrīnivāsa in the *Kaustubha*.

Thus when judged on the basis of the contents of *Vedāntapārijāta Saurabha*, the extant *opus magnum* of Nimbārka, the authorship of the other works attributed to Nimbārka, the *Saurabhakāra*, is not beyond doubt. These works seem to be of later development in the Sect and attributed to the *Ācārya* for the sake of gaining acceptance and authority for the doctrines contained therein.

3. Tradition on the date of Nimbārka

We shall, now, examine the traditional belief about the date of Nimbārka which is summarised in the AC. It gives two accounts¹³⁶, perhaps as a result of the amalgamation of various legends and traditions contained in the *Purāṇas* and the *Tantras*. A detailed account of these traditional beliefs on the date of Nimbārka is given in *NUS*¹³⁷, and the *Sāra*¹³⁸. The following verse from the *Bhaviṣyapurāṇa* contains the essence of the traditional faith:

sudarsānodvāparānte kṛṣṇajñāpto janiṣyati
nimbāditya iti khyāto dharmaglāniṃ hariṣyati¹³⁹

The staunchest defender of this traditional belief in modern times appears to be **Kathiyababa**¹⁴⁰, who holds that Nimbārka was born on *Kārtikapūrṇimā* in the year 15 of *Kaliyuga*¹⁴¹. **Kathiyababa** puts forth his arguments mainly from the following sources. They are (a) the *Paurāṇic* accounts of Nimbārka, (b) the calculations made on the basis of "the average" years of the "pontifical reign" of an *ācārya* in the list of *guruparamparā*, inferred from certain documents, (c) the birth chart of Nimbārka. We shall briefly evaluate these arguments.

(a) *Purāṇic references to Nimbārka are not historical documents*

Some of the later *Purāṇas* such as the *Bhaviṣya* and the *Naiṣṣakhaṇḍa* of the *Skandapurāṇa* contain references to Nimbārka. A.P. **Bhattacharya**¹⁴² examines these *Purāṇic* accounts and facts. According to him these accounts are later interpolations into these *Purāṇas*. At any rate these

Purāṇas are of very late origin and therefore their accounts of a very early origin of Nimbārka are doubtful. In his support **Bhattacharya** draws the attention to the fact that Nimbārka criticises the Bauddha and the Jaina philosophies in the *Saurabha* and therefore he cannot, on any account, be a pre-Buddha or a pre-Jain *Bhāṣyakāra*. **Kathiyababa**¹⁴³ counteracts these arguments of **Bhattacharya**. His arguments are quite traditional. According to him the same Vedavyāsa composed all the *Purāṇas* and the *Brahmasūtras* at the end of the *Dvāparayuga* and therefore they are ancient, authentic and historical¹⁴⁴. **Kathiyababa** asserts that the criticism of the Jaina and Buddha schools by Nimbārka does not warrant his being posterior to the Śākya muni or Mahāvīra¹⁴⁵. He draws support from the description of the earlier Buddhās. The Buddhists believe that there were 120 *Tathāgatas* before the present Buddha and there had been 800 million Buddhas in the beginningless *saṃsāra*. The Jainas also hold that their doctrines are beginningless and that at the beginning of each *Kalpa* the eternal Jaina doctrines are taught by a particular Jaina. Therefore Nimbārka could criticize the Buddhist and the Jaina tenets even if he had been a pre-Buddha or pre-Jaina commentator. **Kathiyababa** strengthens his position by stating that even Kapilamuni rejects the Bauddha doctrine in his *Sāṃkhyapravacanasūtra*. **Kathiyababa** wrongly believes that the original work of Kapilamuni is the *Sāṃkhyapravacanasūtra*. Today it is an accepted fact in the world of scholars that the *Sāṃkhyapravacanasūtra* is a very late composition¹⁴⁶. The earliest available written Sāṃkhya treatise is the *Kārikās* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Even if Kapila were a historical person and he wrote a Sāṃkhya treatise — there is nothing wrong in such a presumption — it is not yet traced. Therefore the argument of **Kathiyababa** and the “traditionalists” need no special refutation because it is based on the wrong presumption that *Sāṃkhyapravacanasūtra* is the original work of Kapila.

It must also be pointed out here that after all the *Vedāntapārijāta Saurabha* is a *vākyārtha* on the *Brahmasūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa. Therefore the author of the *Saurabha* cannot in any way be earlier than the *Brahmasūtras* themselves. Although there is a difference of opinion among modern scholars regarding the date of the *Brahmasūtras*,

nobody considers it to be earlier than 500 B.C.¹⁴⁷ and later than 450 A.D.¹⁴⁸. One thing is certain that the *Brahmasūtras* were composed only after the schism in the contemporary Buddhism into the Sects of *Hīnayāna* and *Mahāyāna*, for the *Brahmasūtras* clearly refer to the two schools of *Sarvāstivāda* and *Mahāyāna*¹⁴⁹. Besides the *Brahmasūtras* are clearly aware of the *Mīmāṃsā sūtras* of Jaimini and they presuppose the *sūtras* of Kaṇāda as well. After a critical study S.L. **Pandey**, has pointed out that the earliest date of the *Brahmasūtras* cannot be earlier than 200 B.C. Since Nimbārka is a commentator on these *Brahmasūtras* he could not possibly have existed before 200 B.C.¹⁵⁰. Therefore all the arguments that the Jaina, Buddha philosophies are eternal or that the *Pāśupata* and *Śākta* religions are pre-historical do not prove that the *vrttikāra* of *Brahmasūtras* called Nimbārka existed in the year 15 of Kaliyuga (Cir, 3100 B.C.) as being held by **Kathiyababa**. Besides the attempt of **Kathiyababa**, on the basis of following stanza in the AC.¹⁵¹

*dharmabhṛtām varīṣṭasya yudhiṣṭīrasya bhubhṛtaḥ
rājyād uttarakāle bhūd vajranābho nṛpottamaḥ!
sa śaśāsa mahābhāgo mathurāmaṇḍale mahim
tadā śrīnivācāryo gurūṇām śaraṇam gataḥ*

to prove that Nimbārka existed during the reign of *Vajranābha*, the grandson of Śrīkrṣṇa is futile. **Kathiyababa** presumes that the *Ācāryacaritam* is a historical document, written by Śrī Puruṣottama, the great-granddisciple of Nimbārka. But such a proposition is unacceptable. As pointed out earlier, the AC is written by Śrī Nārāyaṇa Śaraṇa devācārya (1700-1754 AD) and is a document of the faith of the Sect rather than a historical record of the deeds of the *Ācārya*. That the AC is not an historical document is evident from the fact that it assigns Śrīnivāsa to the reign of *Vajranābha*, the grandson of Śrīkrṣṇa. Such an earlier date for Śrīnivāsa is not possible because he actually quotes passages from Dharmakīrti, who existed in the second half of the seventh century A.D.¹⁵². For, even if the author of the AC is a Puruṣottama, he cannot be the fourth successor of Nimbārka, because the author of the AC is familiar with Śrībhaṭṭa (the 30th successor of Nimbārka) according to the list of *guruparaṃparā*¹⁵³. Therefore the author of the AC cannot be the fourth successor of Nimbārka.

We may conclude that the authenticity of the accounts of an earlier existence of Nimbārka as narrated in some of the later Purāṇas is not beyond suspicion. Nor can we accept the AC account as an authentic document concerning the historical data of the *ācāryas* of the Nimbārka school because it places Śrīnivāsa, who actually quotes from Dharmakīrti, (7th century A.D.) as a contemporary of Vajranābha, the grandson of Śrīkṛṣṇa. Besides Nimbārka is a *ṛttikāra* on the *Brahmasūtras*, which cannot be dated beyond 200 B.C. Therefore Nimbārka cannot be assigned to an era beyond 200 B.C.

(b) *The Guruparaṁparā and average life span are not objective*

Another means **Kathiyababa** employs to prove the date of Nimbārka to be the 15th year of Kaliyuga is the “average” years of the reign of the *ācāryas* in the Sect. Here he makes ample use of the findings of A.P. **Bhattacharya** based on some title deeds and donation plates connected with Śrī Parasurāma and others available at the headquarters of the present Nimbārka *pīṭha* at Salemabad (Rajasthan). **Bhattacharya** has established¹⁵⁴ that the time between the four *ācāryas* of the Nimbārka Sect namely from Keśavākāśmīri bhaṭṭa to Paraśurāmadeva was 452 years. **Kathiyababa** stretches¹⁵⁵ this evidence a little further. Here he takes support from some essays in Bhaktamāla (Saiṁvat 2017, pp. 506-507) a periodical published from Vrindāvana. According to it, the age of Keśavākāśmīri was 101 when one of the title plates was inscribed in the year Saiṁvat 1217 (i.e. 1161 A.D.)¹⁵⁶. The actual life span of these four *ācāryas* becomes stretched to 552 years, which would mean that the average life span of these four *ācāryas* was 138 years.

Now the rest of the arguments to settle the actual date of Nimbārka is a matter of mathematics for **Kathiyababa**. According to tradition Keśavākāśmīri is the 30th *ācārya* of the Sect. If the average life span of an *ācārya* is 138 years, the grand total for the 30 *ācāryas* will be $138 \times 30 = 4140$ years. If Keśavākāśmīri was born in saiṁvat 1117 (i.e. 1061 A.D.), the time of Nimbārka could be $4140 - 1061 = 3079$ B.C. According to **Kathiyababa** such a date is also supported by the *Bhaviṣyapurāṇa* account of “*Sudarśano dvāparānte*”¹⁵⁷.

Kathiyababa appears to be bent on proving by all means and at any cost that Nimbārka belonged to the year 3079 B.C. Since the life span of the four of the *ācāryas* he examined was a total of 552 years (i.e. an average of 138 years for each), he assumes that all the *ācāryas* lived a minimum of 138 years. According to him, it was possible because the *ācāryas* of the Nimbārka Sect were *naisthikabrahmacārins*. It is to be remembered that in order to get 3079 B.C. as the probable date of Nimbārka, it is not only necessary that each *ācārya* had lived an average of 138 years, but that he actually reigned on the "pontifical throne" of Nimbārka for 138 years. So they became *ācāryas* as soon as they are born, otherwise it would mean that when one *ācārya* was dead, the other was just born only, and had not succeeded the dead one on "the throne of authority".

In this context, it is to be noted that **Kathiyababa** himself accepts¹⁵⁸ that his own guru, Śrī Santadāsa was a married man for many years. It implied not only that Śrī Santadāsa was not a *naisthikabrahmacārin*, but also that there might have been similar cases in the lives of some *ācāryas* as well. Anyway Śrī Santadāsa reigned only for 25 years (far below the average of 138 years of reign.)

Vrajavallabha gives another list of ten generations of the *ācāryas*, who reigned on the throne of Nimbārka from the year 1670 Saṁvat to 2000 Saṁvat¹⁵⁹. It may be incidentally noted here that these ten *ācāryas* are the immediate successors of Paraśurāmadeva, who figures as the *terminus ad quem* in the list of the four *ācāryas* whose years of pontificate were discussed by **Kathiyababa** and to whom he has assigned an average span of 138 years. **Vrajavallabha** makes only a modest claim that the average life span of the *ācāryas* was only 33 years. The differences in the calculations of **Kathiyababa** and **Vrajavallabha** prove beyond doubt that the attempt to trace the date of Nimbārka on the basis of a list of succession cannot be accurate and objective. Besides, the list of *guruparaṁparā* is open to question. First of all, such a list presupposes that Nimbārka established an *ācāryapīṭha* and that there was an unbroken succession. Secondly it is presumptuous to assume that such lists, made centuries later are objective and chronological, containing

all the names of the *ācāryas* of the Sect, some of whom have not left any evidence for their existence either through their own work or through the work of their disciples¹⁶⁰.

At any rate, these attempts of **Kathiyababa** and **Vrajavallabha** serve at least one purpose, namely, they show that the inference made by **Bhandarkar** to fix the date of Nimbārka as 1162 A.D. leads us nowhere¹⁶¹. **Bhandarkar** himself was aware that on essential points, the manuscript, on which he based his calculations was not very clear. He states "this calculation of ours is of course very rough and, besides, the date of the manuscript No. 706, which is read as 1913 by some, but which looks like 1813, conflicts with this calculation, as nine more *ācāryas* flourished after Dāmodara. And if 1813 is the correct date, seven years cannot suffice for them, though 107 may, if the date is read 1913". It may be pointed out here that there is no mention of a Dāmodara Goswamin as a disciple of Harivyāsadeva, in any other lists of succession available among the followers of Nimbārka.

N.D. **Sharma**¹⁶² questions the very basis of **Bhandarkar** who considers Dāmodara, who according to the latter lived in the year 1750 A.D. as a successor to Harivyāsadeva, because among all the present day Sects and sub-sects belonging to Harivyāsadeva, there is no mention of a Dāmodara Goswāmin among the *ācāryas* belonging to 1750 A.D. as none of the 12 disciples of Harivyāsadeva was called Dāmodara. Besides, according to N.D. **Sharma** the existence of Paraśurāma, the immediate disciple of Harivyāsadeva, in the 16th century A.D. is well documented (Cf. *Kṛṣṇāgarhṛājya ke aitihāsika sūtra*, Nimbārka-sodha maṇḍala, Vrindavana p. 17). Therefore any list of succession that makes Harivyāsadeva belong to 17th or 18th century A.D. is unacceptable.

It might not, perhaps, be wrong for **Bhandarkar** to assign 18 years each for a generation in the matter of succession in the Madhva Sect, because the *ācāryas* of that Sect are generally married men. They ascend to "the throne of authority" only when they are advanced in age. The *ācāryas* of the Nimbārka Sect, on the contrary, are generally speaking *naiṣṭhikabrahmacārins*¹⁶³ and they have better chance of succession in a younger age, which also means a longer span

of years on the *ācāryapīṭha*. Therefore the truth may lie somewhere between the average of 18 years that **Bhandarkar** assigns and 30 years that **Vrajavallabha** assigns to each *ācārya* of the Sect¹⁶⁴. But even then a hypothetical inference made on the basis of a list of succession, conjured at a later date when conflicts and fights arose within the Sect for legitimacy and authority, need not be factual. In fact we must take these lists of *guruparamparās* with “a big pinch of salt” because we have no documentation for some of the *ācāryas* whose names figure in the lists, which are made by Sects and sub-sects within the school, in order to demonstrate their connection with Nimbārka. It is also possible that the chain of succession was broken under unfavourable religious and political conditions. Since the list of succession is made at a very late period there is also the possibility of leaving out the names of some legitimate *ācāryas* of the *Nimbārkapīṭha*. Therefore we may conclude that the calculations made on the basis of such *guruparamparās* by **Kathiyababa**, **Vrajavallabha**, **Bhandarkar**, etc. are not objective and conclusive.


(c) *The birth-chart of Nimbārka are expressions of faith*

The third type of proof brought by the traditionalists is based on the horoscope of Nimbārka, with the help of which they settle the star, the day, the month and the year of the birth of Nimbārka. The basis, on which the horoscope of Nimbārka is made, is the following passage in the *Bhaviṣyapurāṇa*¹⁶⁵

*atha sarvagunopete kāle paramaśobhane
kārtikasya site pakṣe pūrṇimāyām*¹⁶⁶ *vr̥ṣe vidhau
kṛttikābhe mahāramye uccasthe grahapañcake
sūryāvasānasamayē meṣalagne niśā mukhe
jayantyām jayarūpiṇyām jajāna jagadīśvaraḥ
yena sarvam idam viśvam vedadharme niyojitaṃ.*


There are various astrological *saṁhitās* that contains the future life and achievements of persons born on a particular star, at a particular moment, on a particular day and month. We have such details in the *Bhṛgusaṁhitā* and the *Rāvaṇasaṁhitā*¹⁶⁷. **Śrī Samkarṣanaji** of Kathmandu made a birth-chart in accordance with the *Rāvaṇasaṁhitā* on the

basis of the details given about the birth of Nimbārka in the *Bhaviṣyapurāṇa*. This birth-chart, reproduced in *NUS* by **Vrajavallabha**¹⁶⁸, is given below:




According to the judgement of M.D. **Pandit**, (Centre for Advanced Study in Sanskrit, University of Poona, Pune), this chart is absolutely wrong¹⁶⁹ because *śukra* and *sūrya* are given as being *śaḍaṣṭaka* yoga, which is impossible. *Sūrya* and *Śukra* at the most make an angle of 60° and never above 60° .

Kathiyababa got another birth-chart, made on the basis of the same *Bhaviṣyapurāṇa* account by **Haricarana Smṛti tirtha** of Bhātapādā. It has been read in accordance with the *Bhṛgusaṁhitā* by Pandit Umesh Chandra **Sharma** of Varanasi¹⁷⁰. It reads:




On the basis of this birth-chart, **Kathiyababa** and the traditionalists say that Nimbārka was born in the 15th year of *Kaliyuga* (Cir. 3085 B.C.). Now, the beginning of the *Kaliyuga* can be considered either *historically* (i.e. on the basis of the Paurāṇic descriptions) or *astronomically*: historically the scholars consider¹⁷¹ the end of the *Mahābhārata* war as the beginning of *Kaliyuga*¹⁷² and astronomically speaking a *yuga* starts after the *Pralaya* of the world.

Historically speaking the position of the various stars on the first day of the *Kaliyuga* can be established from the various astrological descriptions of them in the *Mahābhārata*. C.V. **Vaidya**¹⁷³ has made an elaborate study of these various descriptions and has made a chart showing the position of the various stars on the first day of *Kaliyuga*, as given below¹⁷⁴.



If this chart of **Vaidya**, made on the basis of the description of the stars in the *Mahābhārata* is correct then the horoscope of Nimbārka, made by **Haricarana Smrtitirtha** cannot be accepted. The time gap between the horoscope made for the first day of *Kaliyuga* by **Vaidya** and the one made for the 15th year of *Kaliyuga* by **Haricarana Smrtitirtha** must be more than 15 years. This would mean that either the description of the stars, given in the *Mahābhārata* is wrong or the horoscope of Nimbārka made by **Haricarana** is wrong. Granting that the positions of *Sūrya*, *Budha*, *Śukra*, *Mangala* and *Candra* are the same as given in the horoscope of

Nimbārka, made by **Haricarana** the position of Śani, Rāhu, Ketu and Br̥haspati will not tally with those given by the astrologer of Bhatapada. If the chart of the planetary positions on the first day of *Kaliyuga* made by **Vaidya**, on the basis of the various astrological descriptions in the *Mahābhārata*, is correct, then the planetary position in the 15th year of *Kaliyuga* will be as follows¹⁷⁵.



Neither can the horoscope of Nimbārka made by **Haricarana** be accepted because astronomically on the first day of every *yuga*, including the *Kaliyuga* all the stars are in the *mesarāśi* (initial stage). From this position the various planets move at the *madhyamāgati*. Their positions, after 15 years, will not be the same as proposed by **Haricarana**.

Therefore the birth-charts of Nimbārka made on the basis of the *Bhaviṣyapurāṇa* cannot be accepted as proving either historically or astronomically the date of Nimbārka to be the 15th year of *Kaliyuga*. In fact the very basis of these charts, namely, the *Bhaviṣyapurāṇa* account given above, is not beyond suspicion, because the account given by the *Bhaviṣyapurāṇakāra* seems to originate from his faith rather than from facts. He acknowledges Nimbārka as the *Jagadīśvara*, who has taken the human birth in order to bring back the world to the path of righteousness¹⁷⁶. Therefore he has to place the birth of Nimbārka at the best of the times¹⁷⁷. Consequently it must be said that the historical value of such accounts is uncertain and they cannot be the basis of an argument to prove the exact birth date of Nimbārka.

Conclusion

A critical evaluation of the traditional account on Nimbārka makes us accept that the Southern tradition about him appears to be more historical because it has less theological and religious considerations. Perhaps it may be possible to arrive at a more genuinely historical date of Nimbārka by divesting tradition of the mythological and theological elements.

Our study enables us to conclude that the *Saurabhakāra* cannot be considered as the author of all the other works traditionally attributed to him. Some of these works are spurious while others belong to a later stage of development in the *Vaiṣṇava bhakti* movement.

Finally it is also pointed out that the belief that Nimbārka lived in the year 15 of *Kaliyuga*, defended on the basis of certain Purāṇic references to Nimbārka as well as on the basis of certain horoscopes made on the basis of those references cannot be accepted. Nimbārka, a *vṛttikāra* on the *Brahmasūtras* cannot be assigned to a period prior to the composition of the *Brahmasūtras* themselves. It is also proved that the method of assigning an average life span to each of the *ācāryas* in the list of *guruparamparā* cannot give us any definite conclusions on the date of Nimbārka because there is no valid criterion to determine the *average life span*.

Chapter 3

MODERN SCHOLARS ON THE DATE OF NIMBĀRKA

Introduction

There is no unanimity among modern scholars on the date of Nimbārka. Some of them have attempted to solve the problem of his date with the help of *guruparaṁparā* and by assigning an average life span varying from 12 to 30 years for each of the *ācāryas* in the list of succession. None of them has seriously questioned either the authenticity of the various *guruparaṁparās* or the belief that the Saurabhakāra is also the author of the works attributed to him. As we have pointed out earlier these lists of succession cannot be accepted as true records of succession to the throne of Nimbārka. Nor can we accept the traditional position that the Saurabhakāra is also the author of other works like *daśaślokī* etc. It has also been pointed out above that these works contain not only doctrines that are not expounded in the *Saurabha* but also those that developed at later stages in the Vaiṣṇava schools. Overlooking these two drawbacks, many of the modern scholars have gone astray in their attempt in placing Nimbārka to a particular period in history.

1. Three views of the modern scholars

The opinions of modern scholars on the date of Nimbārka. can be roughly classified into three categories. The first

group places him posterior to Rāmānuja¹, the second group places him posterior to Bhāskara, and the third group, consisting mostly of the scholars belonging to Nimbārka tradition, places him prior to Śaṅkara.

2. The Saurabhakāra cannot be post-Madhva

Prominent scholars among the first group are R.G. Bhandarkar², Roma Bose³ and Dattatraya Dhundiraj Kavisvara⁴. Bhandarkar relies mostly on the *guruparaṁparā*, a list of which he got during his search for manuscripts⁵. We have sufficiently demonstrated that on the basis of the *guruparaṁparā* we cannot arrive at a convincing conclusion on the date of Nimbārka. Besides Bhandarkar seems to have made a hasty conclusion without making a thorough examination of the lists of succession in various Sects within the Nimbārka schools⁶. Roma Bose bases her arguments on two spurious works attributed to Nimbārka to settle the date of Nimbārka. We have already pointed out the spurious nature of *Saviśeṣanirviśeṣaśrīkṛṣṇastavarāja* and the non-existence of *Madhvamukhamardana* on which Roma Bose bases her arguments to show that Nimbārka must have existed after Madhva. Her position needs no special refutation because these are not Nimbārka's works. But some others like Dasgupta⁷ place Nimbārka after Madhva because of the fact that the *Sarvadarśana Saṅgraha* does not mention Nimbārka and his school. But it has to be pointed out that merely on that ground it does not necessarily follow that Nimbārka lived only after the Sarvadarśanakāra. In fact it means only that the school of Nimbārka was not popular in the surroundings of the Sarvadarśanakāra, so that he did not feel it necessary to include the system in his work, just as he did not include the *aupādhika bhedābhedavāda* of Bhāskara or the *ajātavāda* of Gauḍapāda. On that ground, nobody denies the antiquity of Bhāskara or Gauḍapāda to the *Sarvadarśanakāra*. In this context, it is to be noted also that the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* is not meant to be a history of philosophy. Nor has the author given any importance to historical priority and posteriority of the schools that he discusses there. He has chosen only those schools and *ācāryas* who appealed to his purpose. Perhaps the *Vṛtti* style of the *Saurabha* and the fact that it lacked any polemics

against other schools of Vedānta, deprived the *Saurabha* the chance of an explicit mention in the works of other schools. Indeed, the school of Nimbārka, came to be taken note of by others only when the school took to the path of polemics and controversies with other schools and systems.

3. The Saurabha not influenced by Rāmānuja

The modern scholars among the followers of Nimbārka, who accept that the Saurabhakāra is also the author of other works attributed to him, are unable to refute the allegation of **Bhandarkar** and others that Nimbārka is very much influenced by Rāmānuja. Concerning the alleged influence of Rāmānuja on Nimbārka, I would like to make a few distinctions. I accept that there might be some truth in their opinion that the ideas of *prapatti* and *gurūpasatti* found in *PK* and *MRS* would be a clear sign of the influence of the *Rāmānuja Vaiṣṇavism* on the *Nimbārka Vaiṣṇavism*.

But as I have mentioned earlier *PK* and *MRS* cannot be accepted as the works of the Saurabhakāra. Besides, the doctrines of *prapatti* and *gurūpasatti* are not at all found in the *Saurabha*, the *opus magnum* of Nimbārka. At the same time, it is difficult for me to agree with the contention of scholars like S.N. **Dasgupta** who state “an internal analysis of Nimbārka’s philosophy shows its great indebtedness to Rāmānuja’s system and even the style of Nimbārka’s *bhāṣya* in many places shows that it was modelled upon the style of approach adopted by Rāmānuja in his *bhāṣya*”⁸.

First of all, it is important to note that Nimbārka was a Vaiṣṇava commentator. As a Vaiṣṇava commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*, the *Saurabha* may contain a lot of concepts similar to those of other Vaiṣṇava commentaries on the *Brahmasūtras*, including the *Śrībhāṣya* of Rāmānuja. Yet it must be pointed out that there is no influence of the lengthy, logical and polemical style of the *Śrībhāṣya* on the *Saurabha*. The Saurabhakāra seems to be satisfied with short explanations of the *sūtra* in a few words, often with a quotation from the vedic literature or the *Bhagavadgītā* or one of the earliest Purāṇas or the *Mahābhārata*. He avoids all the polemics against the fellow *Vedāntins*.

Secondly, as shown earlier, Nimbārka was a *Bhāgavata*

Vāsudeva Vaiṣṇava and Rāmānuja was a *Pañcarātra Nārāyaṇa Vaiṣṇava*. While Rāmānuja attempts to establish that *Śrīman Nārāyaṇa* is the ultimate reality, Nimbārka considers *Ramākānta Puruṣottama Vāsudeva* as the Brahman. He avoids much of the sectarian mentality that is noticeable in Rāmānuja. Therefore, although both of them were *Vaiṣṇavas* there is a world of difference in their understanding of the concepts of Brahman, jīva and the world. The Saurabhakāra is unaware of a heaven called *Vaikunṭha* or *Goloka*. He speaks of it merely as *viśiṣṭasthāna*⁹ or in conformity with the Upaniṣadic tradition as the *Brahmaloka*¹⁰. To demonstrate that there are differences in their understanding of the basic concepts, in spite of the similarities, we may take as an example the *Bhāṣya* of Nimbārka and Rāmānuja on *BS 1-3.22 anukṛtes tasya*. The former takes this *sūtra* as referring to *Muṇḍaka 2.2.10* (Cf. also *Kaṭha 5.15*) *īam eva bhāntam anubhāti sarvam tasya bhāsā sarvam idam vibhāti*. Whereas the latter considers the *sūtra* as referring to *Muṇḍaka 3.1.3*. “*yadā paśyaḥ paśyate rukma-varṇam kartāram īśam puruṣam brahmayonim tadā vidvān puṇyapāpe vidhūya nirañjanaḥ paramam sāmānyam upaṁti*. Nimbārka's explanation amounts to the demonstration that there is dependence of the soul on the Lord for its activity in conformity with the more ancient tradition of the *Bhagavadgītā*. The individual soul is only an *anukartā*, a follower. The relation of the soul to the ultimate *Puruṣa* seems to be like the relation of the moon to the sun. When He shines the soul also shines after Him. We are just instruments in God's hands. Rāmānuja seems to consider soul as similar (*sāmānyā*) to god. That would mean that the soul can act like God in a small way. Therefore it can be said with certainty that there is no compelling reason at all to suspect any influence of Rāmānuja on the Saurabhakāra.

4. Rāmānuja criticises *bhedābhedavāda*

It may also be stated that while there is no reference whatsoever to the *Viśiṣṭādvaita* of Rāmānuja in the entire *Saurabha*, there are instances both in the *Vedārtha Saṁgraha* and in the *Śrībhāṣya* where Rāmānuja, in his polemics, attacks the *bhedābhedavāda* of Nimbārka. According to Nimbārka the relationship between Brahman and the jīva is

one of *bhedābheda* based on *aṁśāṁsī* relation. Nimbārka expounds this doctrine under *sūtras* 1.1.4; 2.1.13; 2.1.22; 2.3.42 and 3.2.27 and 28. Such a *bhedābheda* doctrine is not acceptable to Rāmānuja. He says:

*tr̥tīye'pi pakṣe*¹¹ *jīva*brahmṇorbhedavad abhedasya cābhyupagamāt, tasya ca tad bhāvāt saubharibhedavat svāvatārabhedavacca sarvasyeśvarabhedatvāt sarve jīvagatadoṣās tasyaiva syūḥ etad uktam bhavati īśvaraḥ svarūpeṇaiva suranara tīryak sthāvarādi bhedenāvasthita iti hi tadātmakatvavarṇanam kriyate tathā saty ekamr̥tpiṇḍārabdhaghaṭa śarvādigatānyudakāharaṇādīni sarvakāryāṇi yathā tasyaiva bhavanti evaṁ sarvajīvagata sukhaduḥkḥādi sarvamīśvaragatam eva syād itii. ghaṭakarakādi saṁsthānānupayuktamr̥d dravyam yathā kāryāntarānanvitam, evam eva surapaśumanujādi jīvatvānupayukteśvaraḥ sarvajñaḥ satyasaṁkalpatvādi kalyāṇaguṇākara iti cet — satyam, sa eveśvara ekenāṁśena kalyāṇaguṇākaraḥ sa evānyenāṁśena heyaguṇākara ity uktam, dvayor aṁśayor īśvaratvaviśeṣāt. dvāvaṁśau vyavasthitāvitī cet — kas tena lābhaḥ ekasyaivekenāṁśena nityaduḥkḥitvāt, aṁśantareṇa sukhitvam api neśvaratvāya kalpate. yathā devadattasyaiksmiṁ haste candanapankānulepaḥ keyurakaṭakāṅgulīyālāṁkāraḥ, tasyaivānyasmiṁ haste mudgārābhīghātaḥ kālānalajvālānupraveśasca, tad vad eveśvarasya syād iti brahmapjñānapakṣād apipāpījānayaṁ bhedābhedapakṣa¹².

The *bhedābheda* doctrine of the Saurabhakāra¹³ is specified by Śrīnivāsa as the *svābhāvika bhedābhedavāda*, perhaps to distinguish it from other types of *bhedābhedavāda* like the *aupādhika bhedābhedavāda* of Bhāskara. Rāmānuja finds fault with *svābhāvika bhedābhedavāda* when he says:

“*bhedābhedavāde tu brahmaṇyevopādhi saṁsargāt tatprayuktā jīvatā doṣā brahmaṇyeva syur iti nirastanikhilodoṣakalyāṇa guṇātmakabrahmātmabhāvopadeśā hi virodhād eve parityaktāḥ syuḥ svābhāvika bhedābhedavāde'pi brahmaṇaḥ svataḥ eva jīvābhāvābhyupagamāt guṇavad doṣas ca svābhāvika bhavyur iti nirdoṣa brahmatādātmopadeśo viruddha eva*”¹⁴.

From the above references it is evident that Rāmānuja seems to be posterior even to Śrīnivāsa, the subcommentator

on the *Saurabha*. It also appears that Nimbārka had already become an authority on religious matters by the 12th century A.D. for, Hemādri quotes the following passage alleged to be from *Bhaviṣyapurāṇa*¹⁵.

*"Nimbarko bhagavān yeṣām vāñchitārtha pradāyakaḥ udayavyāpīṇi grāhyā kule tithir upoṣane"*¹⁶.

In this context it may also be pointed out that the followers of Nimbārka claim¹⁷ that they have certain title deeds (*paṭṭa*) and inscriptions dated 1169 A.D., today preserved at the *Nimbārkapīṭha* Salemābad, on the basis of which it can be established that Keśavakāśmīrin Bhaṭṭa, the alleged 30th successor of Nimbārka lived in the 12th century A.D.¹⁸.

5. Even Bhāskara is aware of the *Saurabha*

Perhaps we need not dwell much longer to prove the pre-Rāmānuja date of the *Saurabha*¹⁹ because even Bhāskara seems to be aware of Nimbārka's *Saurabha*. An instance of such an awareness on the part of Bhāskara is evident in his interpretation of BS 1.1.32: *Jīvamukhyaprāṇa liṅgānneti cet nopāsātraividhyād āśritatvād iha tadyogāt*²⁰. He gives two alternative interpretations one of which is his own, modelled after the position of Śaṅkara. The second is identical to the one given by Nimbārka. Bhāskara acknowledges that this second view is of others. Let us compare them.

Nimbārka

....upāsakatāratamyena
brahmopāsanāyās
traividhyāj-jīvavargāntar -
yāmitvena prāṇādy
acetanāntaryāmitvena
tadubhaya vailakṣaṇyene
cānyatrāśritatvād ihāpi
tad yogāt.

Bhāskara

...apare tu trividham
upāsanam iha vivakṣitam
iti sūtrārtham varṇayanti.
prāṇopāsanam jīvopāsanam
brahmopāsanam iti. etad
uktam bhavati prāṇa -
dharmaṇa swardharmaṇa
tulyopāsyam iti...

A more convincing proof for the pre-Bhāskara existence of Nimbārka is provided by Bhāskara himself, at the end of his *bhāṣya* on BS 1.2.15: *Sukhaviśiṣṭābhidhānād eva ca*. But Bhāskara points out that some others who read an extra

sūtra: "ata eva ca tad brahma" here do it unnecessarily because it is already contained in the previous *sūtra*. Here is what he had to say: *atrāvasare 'ta eva tad brahmeti sūtram anye pathanti. tat punar gatārtham iti anyair nābhidiyate*.

Among the known Bhāṣyakāras only Nimbārka, Śrīnivāsa and Śrīkanṭha read the *sūtra* "ata eva ca tad brahma" here, while Rāmānuja following his Bodhāyāna tradition reads the *sūtra* as *ata eva ca sa brahma*. Thus there is a difference in the reading of the *sūtra* according to Bodhāyāna tradition. Now, among these bhāṣyakāras, it is universally accepted that Rāmānuja and Śrīkanṭha are post-Bhāskara commentators. Therefore until contrary evidences are brought forward, it can be taken as a matter of fact that Bhāskara is referring to Nimbārka and his tradition²¹, who alone read the *sūtra* as alleged by Bhāskara. It cannot be claimed that Bodhāyāna and his school are referred to by Bhāskara here, because the Bodhāyāna tradition contained in the *Śrībhāṣya* of Rāmānuja has, as we have said above, a different reading of the *sūtra*. Therefore it can be safely concluded that Bhāskara is a post-Nimbārka *bhāṣyakāra*.

We may reinforce our conclusion with another criticism of the Nimbārka tradition by Bhāskara under *sūtra* 2.3. 31: *nityopalabdhyanupalabdhiprasaṅgo' nyataraniyamo vā' nyathā*²². Nimbārka considers that this *sūtra* is meant to point out the defect in the doctrine of an all-pervasive soul. He says:

*sarvagatātmavāde ātmopalabdhyanupalabdhior bandhamokṣayor nityam prasaṅgaḥ syānnityabaddho vā nityamukto vā, tmety anyataraniyamo vā syāt*²³.

It is evident from the *Saurabha*²⁴ that the *sarvagatātmavādin*s for Nimbārka are the followers of Kapila. He does not show any awareness of any Vedāntins holding *sarvagatātmavāda*²⁵. Bhāskara on the other hand, considers the real nature of the *jīva* is *Sarvagata* (all-pervasive) although, due to the *upādhis* the *jīva* is atomic in the state of bondage²⁶. Since he is a *Sarvagatātmavādin* he has to defend the *sarvagatātmavāda*. He says: "*ātmavibhutvavādinām doṣakathanārtham sūtram iti vyākhyātaṁ tad ayuktam*". Accordingly he maintains that the purpose of the *sūtra* is the rejection of Buddhist theo-

ries²⁷. In his *bhāṣya* on this *sūtra* he seems to say that after all the *sarvagatātmavāda* is not that defective as Nimbārka would have it, if we accept the implications of the doctrine of *upādhi* on the *sarvagatātmavāda*²⁸.

Conclusion

The *Vedāntapārijāta Saurabha* of Nimbārka does not show any influence of fellow Vaiṣṇava commentators of the *Brahmasūtras* on him. On the contrary, these Vaiṣṇava commentators like Rāmānuja and Bhāskara seem to be aware of the doctrines expounded in the *Saurabha*. The above evidences point out that Bhāskara is aware of the position of the *Saurabhakāra* on a number of issues, which compels us to place the *Saurabhakāra* in the pre-Bhāskara period. But can Nimbārka be placed to a pre-Śaṅkara period? A comparative study of the *Saurabha* with the *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* will help us to determine the exact date of Nimbārka more accurately. Therefore such a study is taken up in the next chapter.

Chapter 4

NIMBĀRKA : A PRE-ŚĀMĶARA VR̥TTIKĀRA

Introduction

We have already seen that there are some strong reasons to assign the Saurabhakāra to a pre-Rāmānuja and even to a pre-Bhāskara era. In this chapter we examine whether Saurabhakāra is also a pre-Śāṁkara vṛttikāra.

It goes without saying that Śāṁkarācārya created a Copernican revolution in the interpretation of the Upaniṣads and *Brahmasūtras*. In the post-Śāṁkara period, no commentator intending to establish his own school could afford to ignore Śāṁkara because his *Advaitavāda* had, in fact, dethroned some of the contemporary powerful schools of thought in the country, and ever remained the subject of controversy and admiration as well among the intellectuals of the land. Therefore no founder of a school, after Śāṁkara had formulated his Advaita doctrine, could ever ignore him, even from the point of view of survival.

1. Nimbārka unaware of Śāṁkarite theories

The most striking aspect of the *Saurabha* is that it is completely unaware of any of the Śāṁkarite theories. This is all the more significant in those places where we would naturally expect him to take note of the Śāṁkarite theories, had he been a post-Śāṁkara commentator. But the fact is

that in such places he discusses some other theories of pre-Śāṅkara schools. Here we may examine an instance, namely, the commentary of Nimbārka on BS 2.3.49. *Ābhāsā eva ca*¹. Nimbārka interprets the *sūtra* as follows:

*paresām kapilādīnām vyatikara prasaṅgāt sarvagatātmavādās' cā'bhāsā eva*².

Nimbārka, like the other *bhāṣyakāras*, has been discussing the nature of the *jīva* in this *pāda*. After establishing that the *jīva* is an *aṇu*³ and is an *aṁśa* of *Brahman*⁴ Nimbārka points out that the *sarvagatātmavāda* of the opponents like Kapila and others is fallacious because in their view, there will result the confusions of the *Karmas* of the soul.

Under this *sūtra* Śāṅkara develops his famous doctrine of *pratibimbavāda*. Śāṅkara takes pain to explain that the doctrine of the all-pervasive-soul is not that defective after all, for he himself accepts such a doctrine with certain modifications. According to him the *jīva* is only a reflexion of *Brahman* on the illusory mirror of ignorance, like the reflexion of the sun on the water. Through the *pratibimbavāda* Śāṅkara seems to answer the objection of 'mingling of *Karmas*' that Nimbārka raised against the theory of the *sarvagatātmavāda*⁵. Śāṅkara's defence as well as the conclusion is that once we accept the *pratibimbavāda*, there is no fusion of *karmas* as Nimbārka charges against the upholders of the all-pervasive soul. In Śāṅkara's own words:

*ataś ca yathā naikasmin jala sūryake kaṁpamāne
jalasūryakāntaram kampate, evaṁ naikasmīṁ jīve
karmaphala sambandhini jīvāntarasya tat saṁbandhaḥ
evam apy avyatikara eva karmaphalayoh. ābhāsasya
cāvidya kṛtatvāt tad āśrayasya saṁsārasyā-
vidyākṛtatvopapattirīti, tad vyudāsena ca pāramārthikasya
brahmātma bhāvasyopadeśopapattiḥ*⁶

Later on Śāṅkara declares that the doctrine of the all pervasive soul as upheld by the Sāṅkhyas and the Vaiśeṣikas is defective. An important point to be noted here is that Nimbārka is unaware of the *pratibimbavāda* of Śāṅkara and his arguments against the theories of Sāṅkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas. According to Nimbārka the individual souls are atomic by nature and are parts of the all-pervasive being⁷. The

jīvas have all-pervasiveness as an attribute due to the attribute of knowledge, but they do not have all-pervasiveness as their nature⁸. It must be pointed out that, if Nimbārka had been aware of the *Bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara, he could have been influenced by the masterly criticism of the Sāṅkhya doctrines made here by Śaṅkara, and that he would not have limited himself to a mere statement that the doctrine of all-pervasive soul as held by the Sāṅkhyas causes confusion (*vyatikara prasaṅgaḥ*) of karma.

All the other major commentators like Rāmānuja, Bhāskara and Śrīkanṭha criticise the *pratibimbavāda* of Śaṅkara. Bhāskara "the non-believing follower", as it were, of Śaṅkara, attacks the Sāṅkarite doctrine of *pratibimbavāda*, when he says:

*"apare tvābhāsa eva cety ekavacanāntaṁ sūtram pathitvā
anyam arthaṁ varṇayanti paramātmābhāso jīvaḥ
pratibimbātmā saṁsāryāvidyāparikalpitaḥ tasya
parimitatvād asantateravyatikara iti. tad ayuktam...."*

Rāmānuja gives two readings of the *sūtra*, one in agreement with Śaṅkara (*ābhāsaḥ*) and the other with Nimbārka (*ābhāsā*). According to the first reading he rejects as a simple fallacy the theory that Brahman, whose nature is absolute intelligence is differentiated by limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*) or *avidyā*, which presupposes an obscuration of that essential nature. According to the second alternate reading of this *sūtra*, he demonstrates that the various reasons set forth by the adherents of that doctrine are all fallacious. Here Rāmānuja seems to borrow from Śaṅkara's criticism of the Sāṅkhya and applies the same against Śaṅkara himself. He interprets "*ca*" in the *sūtra* as pointing out that such a doctrine is in conflict with the scriptural texts, showing difference between Brahman and jīva⁹. Thus, in a three fold way, he rejects the Sāṅkarite theory of *pratibimbavāda*. As a final assault against the *pratibimbavāda* he declares that even if the difference is due to *upādhis*, which are the figments of nescience, there is no escaping the conclusion that the sphere of experience must be mixed up, since the theory admits that the thing itself with which all the limiting adjuncts connect themselves is one only¹⁰. Thus Rāmānuja directs all his energies to reject the Sāṅkarite theory of an illusory appearance of jīva.

Śrīnivāsa like his *guru*, Nimbārka, does not refute the Śaṅkarite theory of *pratibimbavāda*, because, as will be pointed out in the next chapter, the *Kaustubha* is not an independent commentary on the *BS*, but is meant to explain the doctrinal position of Nimbārka. According to him the *sūtra* means:

*"kapilakaṇḍādīnāṃ sarvagatātmavādās tu ābhāsā eva
nirmūlatvāt tatra sarvavyavahāravatīkaraprasaṅga ca.
ca śabdena teṣāṃ jagatvyāmohakatvam sūcitam"*

Perhaps the only influence of Śaṅkara on Śrīnivāsa is seen in the fact that he criticises the *Vaiśeṣikas* also as upholders of *sarvagatātmavāda* as done by Śaṅkara.

Thus among the major *bhāṣyakāras* Nimbārka alone uses this *sūtra* exclusively against the Sāṅkhya doctrine¹¹. Independent post-Śaṅkara commentators like Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, etc. make use of this *sūtra* to refute the Śaṅkarite theory of *pratibimba* rather than the Sāṅkhya theory, because their main opponents and the chief upholders of the doctrine of *ātmavibhuvāda* are Śaṅkara and his followers rather than the forgotten Kapila. We could expect Nimbārka to oppose Śaṅkara here, had he been a post-Śaṅkara *bhāṣyakāra*¹². One thing seems to be certain that Nimbārka is unaware of the controversy on *pratibimbavāda* between Śaṅkara and the later *bhāṣyakāras*, among whom Rāmānuja is the chief exponent.

It must be noted that not only is Nimbārka unaware of Śaṅkara and his theories but also that there are many instances where Śaṅkara seems to be aware of Nimbārka, especially where he seems to consider the doctrines so dear to Nimbārka as the *pūrvapakṣa*. We will now examine a few such instances.

2. Nimbārka is the Pūrvapakṣin of Śaṅkara

In the philosophical treatises of India, as is the case elsewhere also, the opinion of the *pūrvapakṣin* plays a very important role for a lucid exposition of the real doctrine of the *siddhāntin*. It is quite possible that occasionally the *bhāṣyakāras* create an imaginary *pūrvapakṣa*¹³ in order to

explain their own *siddhānta* in a more systematic, comprehensive and compact manner. As far as the *BS* is concerned, it is well known that the *Sūtrakāra* considered certain views as that of the *pūrvapakṣa*, although as far as the commentators are concerned, there is no unanimity in ascertaining the exact nature of the *pūrvapakṣa*, or the *siddhānta* that the *Sūtrakāra* has in mind¹⁴. This difference is often due to the sectarian conflicts within the different schools of the *Vedānta* system. In this respect Śaṅkara seems to be the first commentator to consider the opinion of some early *Vedāntins* as the *pūrvapakṣa*.

(a) *Pre-Śaṅkara vṛttikāras*

In almost all his commentaries Śaṅkara shows his familiarity with the earlier philosophers and their *vṛttis* on the *BS* and the *Upaniṣads*¹⁵. Some of them he considers as the *pūrvapakṣin* although they themselves were *Vedāntins* like himself¹⁶. That there were more than one *vṛttikāra* on *BS* before Śaṅkara is also clear from the writings of Padmapāda, his disciple¹⁷. Padmapāda refers four times to two pre-Śaṅkara *vṛttikāras*¹⁸. These may denote four former *vṛttikāras* as proposed by G.V. **Buddhakar**¹⁹ or only two as opined by S.L. **Pandey**²⁰. On the basis of Padmapāda's references one may even propose the existence of eight pre-Śaṅkara *vṛttikāras*. At any rate, there is no unanimity among the later followers of Śaṅkara about the identification of the pre-Śaṅkara *vṛttikāras*²¹. They in fact seem to be confused in their identifications²².

Scholars have attempted to identify some of these pre-Śaṅkara *vṛttikāras*. M. **Hiriyanna**²³ has reconstructed what he claims to be the philosophical tenets of Bhartṛprapañca from the stray reference to the doctrine of an earlier *vṛttikāra* by Śaṅkara in his *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya*. M.T. **Sahasrabuddhe**²⁴ and S.L. **Pandey**²⁵ have made a comprehensive survey of some of the pre-Śaṅkara *Vedāntins* and their doctrines from references made to them by Śaṅkara and the later *ācāryas*. Some of their identifications of the pre-Śaṅkara *vedāntins* could be wrong because first of all Śaṅkara does not identify any of these earlier *vṛttikāras* by name. Secondly, the commentators of the Śaṅkarite school, as we have mentioned earlier, are not unanimous in holding

that Śaṅkara was referring to a particular school or *ṛttikāra*. Thirdly, no original work of these earlier *ṛttikāras* is extant today. Fourthly, the account given by Śaṅkara of some of these *ṛttikāras* is not sufficient to reconstruct their philosophies with accuracy.

Although a complete identification of these *ṛttikāras* is not possible, we can have a comparatively fair knowledge of the philosophical schools of pre-Śaṅkara days, from Śaṅkara's own criticism of their doctrines in his various *bhāṣyas*. He normally offers a faithful and rational exposition of the views of his *pūrvapakṣins* before he actually throws their theories out on the basis of more compelling philosophical reasoning. As S.L. Pandey points out Śaṅkara has not dismissed the views of any vedāntin as nonsense and has tried his best to accommodate it in his own system. But this is not the spirit of the post-Śaṅkara commentators of the *Brahmasūtras*²⁶.

It appears that the controversies and conflicts within the *aupaniṣadic* system began with the *advaitavāda* of Śaṅkara. Firstly because the reconstructed philosophical systems like that of Bhartṛprapañca do not show that they were interested in controversies within the vedānta school, just as the *Brahmasūtrakāra* who seems to accommodate within the *Brahmasūtras* the diverse views of the earlier *vedāntins*. Secondly, it was not possible, humanly speaking, for any of the post-Śaṅkara vedāntins to ignore Śaṅkara and to propagate a new theory either without refuting and contraverting the *advaita* of Śaṅkara or without accepting the *advaita* doctrines with certain modifications. The *bhāṣyas* of Bhāskara and Rāmānuja illustrate and substantiate both these points. For example, Bhāskara, whose *aupādhika bhedābheda* seems to be an adaptation of the earlier *bhedābheda* in the light of Śaṅkara, states²⁷ in the beginning of his *bhāṣya* on *BS* that his aim is to refute those who, while hiding the real sense of the *sūtra*, have only expressed their own opinion. Therefore he attacks the *avidyāvāda* of Śaṅkara, even to the extent of accusing it of being Buddhism in disguise²⁸.

But in the case of the *Saurabha* of Nimbārka, as was pointed out earlier, it is completely free from all vedāntic controversies though conflicts with the non-vedāntic schools are not

lacking. Such a trait cannot be that of a post-Śaṅkara commentator. On the one hand Nimbārka does not criticise any of the doctrinal positions of Śaṅkara and there is nothing to show that he is aware of the Śaṅkarite theories like the *pratibimbavāda*, etc, and on the other hand Śaṅkara refutes views that are identical to the ones upheld by the *Saurabhakāra*. Unfortunately, however, neither Śaṅkara nor any of the later *bhāṣyakāras* who refute the opposing vedāntic schools mention the names of the opponents. In spite of this difficulty I intend to show in the following pages, through a critical study of the texts of Śaṅkara and of Nimbārka, that in many places the vedāntic *pūrvapakṣin* whose views Śaṅkara refutes in his *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* is none other than Nimbārka.

(b) *Criteria for the identification of the pūrvapakṣin*

In the absence of any definite historical evidence, what are the criteria that can be employed to ascertain the identity of a *pūrvapakṣin* of a particular *bhāṣyakāra*? Our work may be made less laborious if the *bhāṣyakāra* clearly states the doctrinal tenets of the *pūrvapakṣin*. In such cases we can at least be certain that a particular school of thought is rejected²⁹. But there are some instances where similar views are held by different schools within the vedānta system, such as the theory of the atomic nature of the soul, which is accepted by the *bhedābheda* school of Nimbārka and by the other *Vaiṣṇava vedānta* Sects. In such instances we cannot be certain about the identity of the *pūrvapakṣin*, whose view is refuted by Śaṅkara. It may be more probable that Śaṅkara is not merely refuting the opinion of one particular *pūrvapakṣin*, but is rejecting similar views held by many previous thinkers. Therefore, in similar situation, it is difficult to identify each and every *pūrvapakṣin* in a given *bhāṣya* like that of Śaṅkara.

As a first step we may eliminate all the philosophers and their views that are definitely posterior to the respective *bhāṣyakāras*. Thus Śaṅkara could not be attacking the views of Rāmānuja, although the former is attacking views that are similar to that of the latter. This shows that there had been views similar to those of Rāmānuja at the time of Śaṅkara. In that case we could also infer the possibility of

even Rāmānuja's acceptance of such views from earlier sources. What is to be noted here is that since Rāmānuja is aware of the criticism and even the rejection of such views already by Śaṅkara, he could bring in the necessary modifications and clarifications in his exposition of the same views refuted by Śaṅkara. Commentators who came after Rāmānuja were aware of and made ample use of the defence that he makes for the *Vaiṣṇava* doctrines against Śaṅkara. A pre-Śaṅkara *bhāṣya* has, therefore, a two fold characteristic. First of all, a pre-Śaṅkara *bhāṣyakāra* is unaware of the points that Śaṅkara raises against his doctrines. Secondly, a pre-Śaṅkara *bhāṣyakāra* is also unaware of the typical Śaṅkarite doctrines such as *Brahma Vivartavāda*, *Avidyāvāda*, *Pratibimbavāda* etc. against which he is unable to raise any objections, since he is anterior to Śaṅkara. Among the extant *vṛttis* on *Brahmasūtras* the *Saurabha* alone has this double characteristics.

A critical study of the *vṛtti* of Nimbārka and the *bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara also throws further light on the prior existence of the former, to the latter. Although Śaṅkara does not quote *verbatim* from the *Saurabha*, he shows that he is quite familiar with the doctrinal tenets identical with those of the *Saurabha*. In this connection it is worth noting that a *bhāṣyakāra* of Śaṅkara's calibre and ingenuity often tends to refine and systematize the views of the *pūrvapakṣin* thereby making the *pūrvapakṣin*'s view clearer. In such cases even though we may not find in the *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* *verbatim* quotations from the *pūrvapakṣin* still his ideas are clearly presented by Śaṅkara. Moreover our inference regarding the identity of the *pūrvapakṣin* of Śaṅkara becomes all the more conclusive when Śaṅkara quotes the same scriptural texts as presented by the *pūrvapakṣin* in support of the *pūrvapakṣa* theory. It means that Śaṅkara is aware that his *pūrvapakṣin* relies upon these particular scriptural texts as the basis of his doctrine. These points are very evident in the treatment of the *aṇutva* of the soul by Nimbārka and Śaṅkara in their respective commentaries on *BS* 2.3. 19 ff.

(c) *The aṇutva of the jīva*

According to Śaṅkara the *sūtras* 19 to 28 state the doctrine of the *pūrvapakṣin*, namely, that the *jīva* is *aṇu* (atom)

and the *sūtra* 29 states the *siddhānta* view: the *ātmavibhūtvavāda* (all pervasiveness of soul). Here Śaṅkara holds that the *aṇutva* (atomic nature) of the *jīva* is not the doctrine of the *sūtrakāra* but of the *pūrvapakṣin*. Therefore, whatever Śaṅkara states in *sūtras* 19 to 28 are the opinions of the *pūrvapakṣin* and not his own doctrine. Śaṅkara is merely quoting him in order to present the *pūrvapakṣa* in all fairness. Later under *sūtra* 29 Śaṅkara presents the *siddhānta* view according to him. A critical examination of the respective commentaries of Nimbārka and Śaṅkara on these *sūtras* dealing with the *aṇutva* of the *jīva* may help us to determine whether Nimbārka is the *pūrvapakṣin* for Śaṅkara in this section.

Sūtra 2.3.19: *utkrāntigatyāgatīnām*

Under this *sūtra* Nimbārka accepts the *jīva* as *aṇu* because the scripture speaks of its departure, going and returning. He gives a scriptural text each for the departure (*utkrānti* — *Brh* 4.4.2), going (*gati*-*Kauṣ* 1.2) and returning (*agati*— *Brh* 4.4.6) of the individual soul. Of these Śaṅkara accepts the last two texts to denote going and returning and adopts a more suitable scriptural passage (*Kauṣ* 3.3.) to denote departure.

Nimbārka

*anena pradyotanena eṣa
ātmā niṣkrāmati, cakṣuṣo
vā mūrdhno vā anyebhyo vā
śariradeśebhyaḥ (Brh 4.4.2)*

Śaṅkara

*sa yadā smāc charīrād
utkrāmati, sahaiwaikair
sarvair utkrāmati (Kauṣ 3.3)*

Thus by giving a better scriptural proof for the departure of the soul, Śaṅkara seems to strengthen the *pūrvapakṣa*. Yet he does not disregard the *Brhadāraṇyaka* (4.4.2) text quoted by Nimbārka, for he adds it in the subsequent *sūtra* (20). This shows that Śaṅkara is aware that his *pūrvapakṣin* considers *Brh* 4.4.2. as a support for the *aṇutva* of the *jīva*. It is the normal practice with Śaṅkara to give his opponent his due. This mentality of Śaṅkara enables him always to face his opponents bravely and even to accept their position in so far as it does not contradict his own doctrine.

It is significant to note here that Śrīnivāsa, the “disciple” of Nimbārka, often incorporates the texts that are newly presented by Śaṅkara. It seems to be his normal practice to summarize and to adopt whatever Śaṅkara has said over and above the exposition of Nimbārka in so far as there is no contradiction in the respective *bhāṣyas* of Śaṅkara and Nimbārka. It suffices here to note that Śrīnivāsa incorporates the above *kauṣītaki upaniṣad* text 3.3 brought in by Śaṅkara besides all the three upaniṣadic texts presented by Nimbārka.

Although Rāmānuja’s interpretation of this *sūtra* is more or less identical with that of Nimbārka, he is very familiar with the doctrinal position of Śaṅkara. He states: *vibhutve hy etā utkrānty ādayo nopapadyeran*³⁰. The significance of such a statement is clear only from the fact that in *sūtra* 29 below, Śaṅkara asserts the all-pervasiveness of the soul as the *siddhānta*. The entire *Saurabha*, on the other hand, is unaware of this doctrine of Śaṅkara. Śrīnivāsa, like Rāmānuja, appears to be familiar with the Śaṅkarite doctrine of the all-pervasiveness of the soul from the fact that he attempts here to refute the two alternatives to the atomic size of the soul, namely the middle size and the all-pervading size³¹.

Sūtra 20: *svātmanā cottarayoh*

Here there is a striking similarity between the *bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara and the *vṛtti* of Nimbārka. The phrase *grāma svāmy anivṛtti vat* appears to be originally of Nimbārka, because Nimbārka’s presentation and expression are more archaic while those of Śaṅkara are more refined and expressive. Compare:—

Nimbārka

*utkrāntiḥ kadācit
sthīrasyāpi
grāmasvāmy anivṛttivat
syāt. Uttarasyoḥ
svātmanaiva sambhavāj
jīvo’ṇuḥ*

Śaṅkara

*utkrāntiḥ kadacid acalato’pi
grāmasvāmy anivṛttivat
dehasvāmy anivṛttyā-
karmakṣayenā’ vakalpeta.
Uttare tu gatya āgatinā’ -
calataḥ sambhavateḥ*

It is significant to note that the *sūtra* itself does not demand the example of *grāmasvāmyanivṛtti*. Śaṅkara brings here *Brh* 4.4.2 text which he did not quote in *sūtra* 19 above, to substantiate the passing out of the *jīva* from the body. He further quotes *Brh* 4.4.1 and *Brh* 4.3.11 to show that the soul goes and comes within the body. According to him these scriptural passages also prove the atomic size of the soul. Here is a unique example of fairness on Śaṅkara's part to refine and to illustrate the *pūrvapakṣa* doctrine even better than what the opponent himself could do.

From the respective commentaries of Nimbārka and Śaṅkara on this *sūtra*, it appears that it is Śaṅkara who expands Nimbārka. Rāmānuja on his part does not bring in the simile of *grāmasvāmyanivṛtti*, but briskly explains in clear terms what Nimbārka and Śaṅkara do with the simile as evident from the following text.

*ca śabdo'vadhāraṇe yadyapi śarīraviyogarūpat -
venotkrāntiḥ sthirasyātmanaḥ kathamcid upapadyate,
gatya āgatī tu na kathamcid upapadyete atas te
svātmanaiva sampādye*³².....

Sūtra 21 : nāṇuratacchruter iti cen netarādhikārāt

Under this *sūtra* Śaṅkara besides quoting the only Scriptural text found in the *Saurabha* (*Brh* 4.4.22), reinforces the doctrine of the *pūrvapakṣa* with further Scriptural supports (*Brh* 4.4.22, *Tait* 2.1.1). By doing so he explains the doctrine better than Nimbārka. The later commentators including Śrīnivāsa make use of these refinements brought in by Śaṅkara.

Sūtra 22 : Svaśabdōnmānābhyāṁ ca

Under this *sūtra* Nimbārka proves the atomic nature of the individual soul on the basis of the *muṇḍaka* 3.1.9. and *Svet.* 5.9 texts. But Śaṅkara gives a more refined explanation than Nimbārka with greater clarity and with a further scriptural support (viz., *Śvet.* 5.8). Śrīnivāsa follows the lead given by him. The rearrangement that Śaṅkara makes in the exposition of his *pūrvapakṣin* is even clearer in the next *sūtra*.

Nimbārka

dehaika deśastho'pi
kṛtsnaṁ dehaṁ
candanabindur
yathā'hlādayati
tathā jīvo'piprakāśayati.
Ataḥ kṛtsnaśarīre sukhādy
anubhavo na virudhyate

Śaṁkara

yathā hi haricandana
binduḥ śarīraika deśa sambha-
dho'pi san sakaladeha -
svyāpinam āhlādaṁ karoti
evam ātmāpi dehaika
deśasthaḥ
sakaladehavyāpinīm
upalabdhiṁ kariṣyati. tuak
sambandhāc cāsiya
sakalaśarīragata vedanā na
virudhyate. tvagāt manor hi
sambandhaḥ kṛtsnāyām
tvaci vartate tvak ca kṛtsṇa
śarīra vyāpinīti.

While Nimbārka speaks of the experience of pleasure, etc, which seems to be an off-hand expression, Śaṁkara limits himself here to mere factual experience, which seems to be more proper and precise. He takes up other kinds of experiences in his explanations of the next sūtra³³ which mainly deals with the abode of the soul within the heart.

Sūtra 25

While Nimbārka reads the sūtra as *guṇād vā'lokavat*, various editions of the *Śaṁkarabhāṣya* present Śaṁkara as reading the sūtra as *guṇād vā lokavat*³⁴. But Śaṁkara's explanation of the sūtra goes in the line of *ālokavat* rather than *lokavat*, for he brings up the example of the light and room, etc. which can be considered to go against the reading of the sūtra as *lokavat*³⁵. Anyway, the explanation of Śaṁkara shows that he is aware that the *pūrvapakṣin* reads the sūtra as *ālokavat* in terms of the simile of the light and the room. Here are the respective texts of Nimbārka and Śaṁkara.

Nimbārka

Dehe prakāśo jīvaguṇād eva
koṣṭe dīpālokādivat.

Śaṁkara

...yathā loke maṇipradīpa-
prabhṛtīnām apavarakaika-
deśavartinām api prabhā'pa-
varakavyāpini sati kṛtsne
pavarake kāryaṁ karoti tadvat.

Sūtra 26

Nimbārka reads the *sūtra* as *vyatireko gandhavat tathā hi darśayati*, while Śaṅkara and Bhāskara break the *sūtra* into two *sūtras*³⁶ and change the phrase *tathā hi* into *tathā ca*. Although Rāmānuja does not break the *sūtra* into two distinct parts, he comes to that when he reads the *sūtra* as *vyatireko gandhavat tathā ca darśayati*.

Nimbārka quotes *kaṣṭhikā* 4.20 “*sa eṣa praviṣṭa ālomabhya ānakhebhyah*” which has nothing to do with *gandha*. By breaking the *sūtra* into two and placing the *Kaṣṭhikā* text in its proper place at the second *sūtra*, Śaṅkara has magnificently expressed the view of his *pūrvapakṣin*. Although the *Kaṣṭhikā* text is not a strong support for the *pūrvapakṣa*, and is incompetent to show how the attribute of knowledge can extend beyond itself, Śaṅkara, due to his universal outlook and fair play, accepts the text as claimed by the *pūrvapakṣin*.

Rāmānuja does not quote the *Kaṣṭhikā* text, which shows that the tradition he presents, namely, the school of Bodhāyana, did not regard this text as supporting the *siddhānta* of the Bodhāyana school. It also may perhaps point out that the *pūrvapakṣa* whom Śaṅkara is attacking here is not the Bodhāyana tradition, but another tradition that considers the *Kaṣṭhikā* 4.20 as supporting the *aṇutva* of the soul. As we have seen, Nimbārka belongs to such a tradition, which relies also upon the *Kaṣṭhikā* 4.20 in support of the *aṇutva* of the *jīva*.

Sūtra 27 : *prthag upadeśāt*

This *sūtra* deals with the difference between the individual self and its intelligence. Nimbārka expresses, this relation in terms of *dharmadharmabhāva*. Śaṅkara, besides quoting *prajñayā śārīram samāruhya* (*Kauṣ* 3.6) as done by Nimbārka, also quotes *tadeṣām prāṇānām vijñānena vijñānamādāya* (*Brh* 2.1.17). He explains the relation of the *jīva* and *vijñāna* in terms of *Kartṛkaraṇabhāva*.

Nimbārka (Saurabha 2.3.27) Śaṅkara (2.3.28)

*jīvataj jñānāyor
jñānatvāviśeṣo'pi*

*Prajñayā śārīram
samāruhya (Kauṣ 3.6) iti
cātmaprajñayoh*

*dharmadharmibhāvo yukta
eva kutaḥ? prajñayā
śārīram āruhya (Kauṣ 3.6)
ityādi prthagupadeśāt*

*karṭṛkaraṇabhāvena prthag
upadeśāc
cāitanyaguṇenaivāsya
śārīravypitā' vagamyate.
tadeśām prāñānām vijñānena
vijñānam ādaya (Brh 2.1.17)
iti ca kartuḥ śārīrāt
prthagvijñānasy opadeśa etam
evābhīprāyam upodvalayati
tasmād aṇurātṁ eti*

It is significant that, inspite of explaining the relation of jīva and its vijñāna in terms of karṭṛkaraṇabhāva, Śaṅkara speaks of vijñāna as a guṇa and not as a karaṇa when he states, "prthag upadeśāc cāitanye guṇenaivāsya śārīravypitā' vagamyate. Here, again Śaṅkara unwittingly admits that the original pūrvapakṣin considers the relation of the jīva and its intelligence in terms of dharma-dharmibhāva. Therefore the karṭṛkaraṇabhāva that Śaṅkara brings in appears to be an attempt at refinement.

A comparative study of the commentaries of Nimbārka, Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, Vallabha and Madhva on the above eight sūtras (nine according to Śaṅkara and Bhāskara) gives the impression that except Nimbārka, all the other commentators, who also accept the aṇutva of the jīva as the siddhānta along with Nimbārka, are aware of the Śaṅkarite doctrine of the vibhūtvā of soul as well as the refinements and clarity that Śaṅkara has given to the pūrvapakṣin's doctrine of aṇutva of the jīva. Nimbārka alone appears to be completely unaware of the refinements brought in by Śaṅkara. It is Śaṅkara who appears to make corrections to what Nimbārka has stated rather than Nimbārka attempting to summarise Śaṅkara.

Another point to be noted is the fact that Śaṅkara considers these sūtras as presenting the pūrvapakṣa. It means that someone before Śaṅkara had considered these sūtras as stating the siddhānta. Therefore Śaṅkara is trying to present the doctrine of a real pūrvapakṣin in the language and the style of the pūrvapakṣin himself. Here he is not expressing his own view, but that of an earlier commentator who accepted the aṇutva of the jīva. Besides, from Śaṅkara's

own *bhāṣya* it is clear that the *pūrvapakṣin* is an *aupaniṣadin* (i.e. vedāntin) who relies on the upaniṣadic texts to prove the doctrine of the *aṇutva* of the soul. Śaṅkara, true to his greatness, attempts to present the *pūrvapakṣa* in all fairness, incorporating all the Scriptural texts on which the *pūrvapakṣin* relies. Significantly all this is done by Śaṅkara, who does not himself subscribe to the doctrine of *aṇutva* of the soul.

What catches our attention first of all, when we compare the *bhāṣya* of Nimbārka and Śaṅkara in this section, is the striking similarity in their language, examples and scriptural texts. These striking similarities in this section of their commentaries would show that there was a deep influence of one upon the other. It is quite legitimate to doubt whether Nimbārka is summarizing Śaṅkara rather than the latter elaborating the former. The first alternative cannot be accepted because when one summarizes a more refined and scholarly work like that of Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on the *Bṛāhmasūtras*, he can ill afford to miss the more refined vocabulary, the logical clarity, the academic excellence and the scholarly perspective of the original work. He can never leave aside the more convincing and powerful illustrations as well as the apt scriptural texts of the one he is summarizing. On the contrary, the one who expands a short work tends to correct the archaic terms and to use more refined vocabulary. He can replace the misplaced texts, besides bringing more scriptural proofs. From these considerations it appears that Śaṅkara had the text of Nimbārka, so to say on his desk, while commenting on the aforesaid *sūtras*. A critical study of these *sūtras* gives us the impression that Śaṅkara has read Nimbārka very critically and therefore makes the necessary corrections even in stating the doctrine of the *aṇutva* of the soul, by changing a word here and there or by breaking the *sūtra* into two. Śaṅkara takes note of all the Scriptural texts that Nimbārka has put forward in his defence although some of them are not strong enough and could be neglected. Therefore he even goes to the extent of supplying his *pūrvapakṣin* with more proper and accurate *śrūti* texts. The archaic expressions and the rough corners of the language and the literary style of Nimbārka are refined by Śaṅkara, not only in this section but elsewhere also. A post-Śaṅkara

Nimbārka cannot leave aside these refinements and clarities that Śaṅkara has offered.

Our conclusion is further supported by another important fact that there is absolutely no trace of any criticism of any of the Śaṅkarite theories in the *Saurabha*. Since Śaṅkara has rejected the *aṇutva* of *jīva*, it is not probable that a post-Śaṅkara *jīvāṇutvavādin* could defend his doctrine by making a short, if not clumsy, summary of what Śaṅkara has said about it in his *bhāṣya*, without a word of criticism of Śaṅkara's own position of *ātmavibhūtvavāda*. Therefore it cannot be said that Nimbārka is here summarizing Śaṅkara, especially because the *jīvāṇutvavāda* is the *pūrvapakṣa* for Śaṅkara and he rejects it in his *bhāṣya* on the subsequent *sūtras*. Any post-Śaṅkara commentator, who wants to defend the *jīvāṇutvavāda* has to rise up against the *ātmavibhūtvavāda* of Śaṅkara. The entire *Saurabha* of Nimbārka is unaware of any Śaṅkarite doctrine of *ātmavibhūtvavāda*. Significantly the *Saurabhakāra* criticizes only the *ātmavibhūtvavāda* of Kapila in the *Saurabha* 2.3.49 and there is not a word against Śaṅkara under BS 2.3.28-31 where Śaṅkara develops his *siddhānta* of *ātmavibhūtvavāda*.

Nor can it be said that what Śaṅkara says on the *jīvāṇutvavāda* of the *pūrvapakṣin* is an original statement of Śaṅkara and that Nimbārka is summarizing him. Śaṅkara himself accepts that he is expressing the view of an *aupaniṣadic pūrvapakṣin* under *sūtras* 19-28 (according to his reading). Śaṅkara also takes care to present the doctrine of the *pūrvapakṣin* as faithfully and clearly as possible. When he quotes a *pūrvapakṣin* he normally retains the style and vocabulary of the *pūrvapakṣin* as far as possible. Therefore the similarity found in this section of the commentaries of Nimbārka and Śaṅkara points out that Śaṅkara is trying to present the doctrine of his *pūrvapakṣin* faithfully with necessary clarifications and that this *pūrvapakṣin* is the *Saurabhakāra*. This contention of ours is supported by the fact that the *Saurabhakāra* is completely unaware of Śaṅkara throughout the *Saurabha*. Therefore Nimbārka could not possibly have lived after Śaṅkara.

These findings are further strengthened by the respective commentaries of Śaṅkara and Nimbārka on the remaining *sūtras* of the section.

Sūtra 28: tadguṇasāratvāt tu tad vyapadeśaḥ prājñavat.

V.S. Ghate³⁷ translates the *sūtra* “but, on account of that quality (or those qualities or the qualities of that) being the essence, there is that designation (or the designation of that) just as in the case, for example with *prājña* (intelligent one)”.

Nimbārka takes this *sūtra* to explain how the soul, though really atomic by nature, has all-pervasiveness as a quality. Just as the intelligent one is Brahman (possessed of great attributes) on the ground of etymology (*Bṛh* + *man*), so also the individual soul is, designated at times in the scriptures, as “eternal, all-pervading” (*Muṇḍ* 1.1.6) because of its possessing great attributes. Brahman is great by its very nature as well as due to its attributes whereas the soul is atomic by nature, but has all-pervasiveness as an attribute. Thus the individual soul, though atomic in size, is all-pervading by reason of its attribute *prajñā*³⁸.

Śaṅkara, on the contrary, begins the *siddhānta* with this *sūtra*. He is very much preoccupied with the defence of his position. He takes great pains to refute the doctrine of the atomic nature of the *jīva*, and to establish the *vibhūtva* of the *jīva*³⁹. He rejects the position of Nimbārka that the atomic soul has all-pervasiveness as a quality. His argument is that if the intelligence of the soul pervades the whole body, the soul cannot be atomic, for intelligence constitutes the soul's proper nature, just as heat and light constitute that of fire. A separation of the two as quality and that which is qualified does not exist⁴⁰.

According to Śaṅkara the *jīva*, though identified with Brahman and therefore all-pervading, is called *aṇu* because the qualities of *buddhi*, the limiting adjunct, form its essence, in so far as the *jīva* is under the influence of *Samsāra*. It means that the *samsāritva* of the *jīva* consists essentially in its being limited by and possessing the qualities of the *buddhi*. The soul is said to be atomic because the atomic size of the *buddhi* is metaphorically attributed to the *jīva*.

An important question remains to be answered. And that

is "Is Śaṅkara justified in taking this *sūtra* (2. 3.28) introducing the *siddhānta* position as opposed to the doctrine presented so far in the previous *sūtras*? The word *tu* in the *sūtra* at first sight gives the impression that Śaṅkara is correct in considering the preceding *sūtras* as the *pūrvapakṣa* and this *sūtra* as stating the *siddhānta*. First of all, it must be noted that *tu* does not always denote the beginning of the *siddhānta* doctrine, even according to Śaṅkara⁴¹. Besides as **Ghate** points out⁴², an impartial evaluation of the preceding as well as the succeeding *sūtra*s show that the word *tu* here need not be in support of Śaṅkara. Above all, Śaṅkara's interpretation looks very far-fetched, because, as **Thibaut**⁴³ and later **Ghate**⁴⁴ point out, the meaning that Śaṅkara gives to the pronoun *tat* in the *sūtra* as *buddhi* is unwarranted and awkward, since there is no reference whatsoever to *buddhi* in the preceding *sūtras*. Therefore such an interpretation, according to them, appears to be "foreign" to the general trend of the *adhikaraṇa*. **Ghate** also finds fault with the explanation that Śaṅkara gives to the word *prājñavat* because Śaṅkara fails to make any real difference whatsoever between the *dr̥ṣṭānta* (illustration) and the *dār̥ṣṭāntika* (the illustrated)⁴⁵. The *jīva* is called atomic, etc. owing to the atomic size of the limiting adjunct called *buddhi*, just as, for instance, the *prājñā* or *paramātmān* is designated as being atomic, etc owing to the qualities of its *upādhis*. But it must be remembered that in the beginning of his commentary on this *sūtra*, Śaṅkara identifies Brahman and the *jīva*⁴⁶. Therefore, one naturally fails to understand how the one illustrates the other.

Although the literal interpretation of the *sūtra* by Rāmānuja is similar to that of Nimbārka, the implications are quite different. According to him the individual soul, though a knower, is at times predicated as knowledge, because it possesses knowledge as its essential attribute, just as the Lord, though a knower, is at times designated as knowledge. Rāmānuja here seems to emphasize that knowledge is only an *essential attribute* of the *jīva*, and not its essential nature⁴⁷.

These distinctions are necessary for a post-Śaṅkara Vedāntin, because under BS 3.2.18 Śaṅkara holds that knowledge is the essential nature of the *jīva*. Nimbārka, as

we have seen above, is unaware of any such distinctions and holds that though the soul is atomic by its nature, it is possessed of all-pervasiveness as an attribute by reason of its attribute of knowledge. Thus by the time of Rāmānuja the emphasis has slowly shifted from the attempt to explain how the atomic soul could be all-pervasive to that of explaining how the soul could be called knowledge even though it has knowledge only as an attribute. This is all the more clear from the fact that Bhāskara, as a *bhedābhedavādin*, on the one hand, is preoccupied with the task of reconciling the texts, dealing with atomicity and the all-pervasiveness of the soul; and on the other hand, labouring under the new situation caused by the doctrinal position of Śaṅkara, accepts that the atomicity of the soul is only a transmigratory phenomenon.

Thus among all the extant commentaries only the *Saurabha* remains totally untouched by the doctrines of Śaṅkara.

Sūtra 2.3.29 : *yāvad ātmabhāvitvāc ca na doṣās tad darsānāt.*

Under this *sūtra* Nimbārka shows that there is no contradiction in the occasional scriptural designation of the soul as all-pervasive because the all-pervading attribute of knowledge is always with the soul. In his own words:

jīvasya guṇa nibandhano vibhutva vyapadeśo na viruddhaḥ. guṇasya yāvad ātmabhāvitvāt, 'na hi vijñātur viparīlopo vidyate' vināśītvāt (Bṛh 4.3.30) āvinaśīvā are ayam ātmā (Bṛh 4.5.14) iti tad darsānāt.

Being an *upaniṣadin*, Nimbārka is aware that there are some references in the upaniṣads to the all-pervasiveness of souls. — The explanation of the *sūtra* here by Nimbārka does not warrant any knowledge of the Śaṅkarite doctrine of *ātmavibhuvāda*.

This is *sūtra* 30 according to Śaṅkara. Here he answers the objection raised by the *pūrvapakṣin*, perhaps of his own making, in order to explain his doctrine better. The objection is that the transmigrating condition of the soul will come to an end at the disjunction of *buddhi* from the soul, resulting in such a situation, in which the soul will be altogether undefinable and hence non-existing or rather non-existing

in the *saṁsāra* state. According to Śaṅkara there is no such difficulty because this connection of the *jīva* with *buddhi* lasts as long as the *jīva* continues to be in *saṁsāra* i.e. continues to be *jīva*.

Rāmānuja, on the contrary, continues with his discussion of knowledge as an attribute of *jīva*. According to him there is nothing wrong in the designation of the *jīva* by the attribute of knowledge, because this attribute is present wherever the *ātman* exists ...*viññānasya yāvad ātmabhāvir dharmatvāt tena tad vyapadeśo na doṣaḥ*....

Rāmānuja substantiates his interpretation by bringing the example of cows. He points out that the cows are called cows because of their possessing the generic character of the cows, irrespective of their horns or mutilated horns:— *tadā cakhaṇḍādayo yāvat svarūpabhāvigotvādi dharma śabdena gaur iti vyapadiśyamānā dr̥ṣyante, svarūpanirūpaṇa dharmatvād ity arthaḥ*. He finds a further support in the word *ca* in the *sūtra* and points out that application of the term knowledge to the *ātman* is suitable. On this account, just like knowledge, the *ātman* is also self-illuminated. "*cakārājjñānavad ātmano'pi svaprakāśatvena jñānam iti vyapadeśe na doṣa iti samuccinoti*.

It is quite clear that Rāmānuja here wants to encounter and refute the Śaṅkarite doctrine of knowledge as the essential nature of the soul.

Sutra 2.3.30 : puṁstvādivat tv asya sato'bhivyaktiyo gāt

The *bhāṣyakāras* make use of this *sūtra* to substantiate their respective doctrines. The general import of the explanation is the same although the purpose which they serve are different.

Nimbārka brings certain clarifications to his doctrine by stating that knowledge, as an attribute of the soul, is always existent along with the soul, although it may not be manifested always. The non-manifestation of knowledge in deep sleep, etc. does not mean that the attribute of knowledge ceases to be with the soul. In fact, it lasts as long as the soul lasts. It is like the case of virility, etc. which becomes manifest in youth, although they are very much existent in an unmanifest manner in childhood⁴⁸.

Śaṅkara makes use of the *sūtra* to explain that the non-manifestation of the connection of *buddhi* with the soul in deep sleep does not mean its absence in such a state. Otherwise he gives the same interpretation as Nimbārka with greater clarity and refinement⁴⁹. He points out that nothing can be assumed to spring up except from something existent, otherwise we have to accept that effects spring up without any cause. In the same way virility etc. do not originate from previous non-existence, otherwise they might originate also in eunuchs.

In his explanation Bhāskara follows Śaṅkara.

Rāmānuja explains further the example of virility, etc. and stresses the fact that these are essentially the attributes of the male being. On similar lines he concludes that to be a knowing subject is the essential character of the *jīva*, which is of atomic size. His opponent, basing himself on *Bṛh* 2.4.12⁵⁰ objects stating if that is so the departed soul may not have consciousness. Rāmānuja attempts to clarify his position by explaining that after death there is only the absence of such knowledge connected with the experience of birth, death, etc. which are caused by the connection of the *jīva* with the elements in the state of *Saṁsāra*.

Here again a comparative study of the various commentaries reveals that among all the commentators the language and style of Nimbārka are more archaic and free from all controversies.

Sūtra 2.3. 31: *nityopalabdhya anupalabdhi prasaṅgo'nyatara nityomo vā'nyathā*.

This is the last *sūtra* of the present *adhikaraṇa*.

Nimbārka takes the *sūtra* as rejecting the doctrine of an all-pervasive soul. We have no reason to assume that he has here Śaṅkara in mind because in *BS* 2.3.49 as we have noted above, Nimbārka identifies the upholders of the *ātma vibhuvāda* as the followers of Kapila. Besides here he is completely unaware of the *pratibimbavāda*, that is developed under this *sūtra* by Śaṅkara. The argument he brings against the *sarvagatātmavāda* is, that if the soul is all-pervasive by nature, it would mean that both perception and

non-perception as well as bondage and release are eternal⁵¹. This criticism of the all-pervasiveness of the soul by Nimbārka does not warrant any knowledge of Śaṅkara at all⁵², because the precise doctrinal position of Śaṅkara is that the ātman is not only all-pervasive but has knowledge as its essential nature.

Śaṅkara makes use of the *sūtra* to prove the existence of an internal organ, which on the basis of the differences in the modifications, is called by various names such as *manas*, *buddhi*, *viñāna* or *citta*. According to him, if there were no such internal organ the result would be that the jīva would always be perceiving or would never perceive⁵³.

Śrīnivāsa makes use of this *sūtra* to refute the advaita theory of the all-pervasive soul whose essential nature is *jñāna*⁵⁴. Rāmānuja too attacks Śaṅkara's theory of *Sarvagatva* and *jñānamātratva* of ātman, and upholds that the jīva can be only *aṇu*, otherwise there will result perforce the perception and non-perception always together or as a rule there would be either perception alone always or non-perception alone⁵⁵.

We may draw a few conclusions from our above study. Firstly, there is almost complete verbal similarity between Nimbārka and Śaṅkara in their respective explanations of *sūtras* 19-27 above, where Śaṅkara considers the *aṇutva* of the soul as a *pūrvapakṣa* doctrine, while Nimbārka considers such a doctrine as the *siddhānta* view. Secondly, Śaṅkara develops, against the *aṇutva* theory of the *pūrvapakṣin*, the *vibhūtva* of the ātman in *sūtra* 28 onwards. Thirdly, of all the extant commentaries only the *Saurabha* of Nimbārka shows complete ignorance of such a theory by any *vedāntin* before him. Fourthly, were Nimbārka aware of the *ātmavibhūtva* theory of any fellow *vedāntin*, he ought to have refuted it in order to uphold the *aṇutva* of the ātman as done by other post-Śaṅkara commentators, who accepted *ātmāṇutvavāda*. Now the complete absence of any awareness of the theories counter to *aṇutva* of ātman puts Nimbārka in a unique place among all the commentators advocating *aṇutva* of jīva.

(d) The goal of the jīva

To substantiate our contention that Nimbārka is a pre-

Śaṅkara vedāntin we shall examine a few more instances, among the many⁵⁶, where Śaṅkara seems to consider the opinion of Nimbārka as that of a *pūrvapakṣin*. One of such instances is their discussion on the journey of the soul to the ultimate goal. The third *pāda* of the fourth *adhyāya* deals with the fate of the soul. *Sūtras* 1-5 describe the path and the stations on the way to the ultimate goal. Nimbārka takes *sūtras* 6-15⁵⁷ as forming an *adhikaraṇa*, of which the first five state the view of the first *pūrvapakṣin* (Bādari) and the next three state that of the second *pūrvapakṣin* (Jaimini), while finally the last two *sūtras* state the *siddhānta* doctrine (Bādarāyaṇa). Śaṅkara, on the contrary, makes two *adhikaraṇas* of them. The opinion of Bādari, contained in the first five *sūtras* of the *adhikaraṇa* is the *siddhānta*⁵⁸ according to Śaṅkara while the opinion of Jaimini, contained in the next three *sūtras* is the *pūrvapakṣa*⁵⁹. Finally Śaṅkara makes a separate *adhikaraṇa* constituting the next two *sūtras*, which gives the doctrinal position of Bādarāyaṇa.

According to the doctrine of Bādari as propounded by Nimbārka, those who worship the *Kāryabrahman* (the effected Brahman) are led to the *Kāryabrahman*⁶⁰. Jaimini, the other *pūrvapakṣin*, holds, according to Nimbārka, the view that the troupe of light and the rest are leading the soul to the *Parabrahman* (the highest Brahman)⁶¹. The *siddhānta* view, according to Nimbārka is the position of Bādarāyaṇa, who holds that the light and the rest lead to the *Parabrahman* those who do not depend on symbols, but meditate on the *Parabrahman* as well as on their own imperishable nature as having Brahman for their essence. Nimbārka as a true *bhedābheda*vādin is trying to reconcile whatever is redeemable in his opponents (Bādari and Jaimini) by accepting whatever has the scriptural sanction.

Saurabha 4.3.14 The troupe of light and the rest "leads those who do not depend on symbols" i.e. those who meditate on the highest Brahman, as well as those who meditate on their own imperishable nature as having Brahman for its essence — to the highest Brahman. Why? "on account of fault in both ways". That is, on the view that it leads to Parabrahman only those who meditate on the effected Brahman, the following scriptural text will come to be contradicted,

viz. "Having risen from the body having attained the form of highest light" (*Chānd* 8.12.3). On the fixed rule, on the other hand, that it leads (to the Parabrahman) those only who meditate on the highest Brahman, the following Scriptural text will come to be contradicted viz. "Those who know thus and those who meditate on faith and penance in the forest — reach light" (*Chānd* 5.10.1). Hence in accordance with the scriptural text: Just as the intention a man has in this world, so alone does he become after departing (*Chānd* 3.14.1). "He whose intention is that attains that alone — this is the correct conclusion, the reverend Bādarāyaṇa thinks".

Here Nimbārka seems to say that the fault with his opponents (Bādari and Jaimini) is that their respective doctrinal positions go against Scripture. For, Scripture declares that each one attains, what he has been striving for, when it states, "just as the intention a man has in this world, so alone does he become after departing hence." (*Chānd* 3.14.1).

Significantly Nimbārka and Śaṅkara are in complete agreement in holding that the first eight *sūtras* (i.e. the opinion of Bādari and Jaimini) deal with Brahman, the goal to be reached, although there is a difference in their respective understanding of Brahman. Rāmānuja, on the contrary, considers these *sūtras* as dealing primarily with the type of worshippers, who are led to Brahman by the path described in earlier *sūtras*. Nimbārka and Śaṅkara consider Bādari as holding the ultimate goal to be the *Kāryabrahman* and Jaimini as holding it to be the *Parabrahman*. Rāmānuja, on the other hand, gives importance to the *worshippers* of the *Kāryabrahman* and of the *Parabrahman* respectively. This shift of emphasis from Brahman to the worshipper of Brahman by Rāmānuja prompted **Ghate** to point out that Rāmānuja is "out of track" here⁶². But Rāmānuja appears to me, to re-read the *sūtras* under the light of his own commentary on *sūtra* 14 "*apratikālarṁbanān nayaṭītibādarāyaṇa ubhayathā ca doṣāttat kratuśca*" (Rāmānuja's version), which is also the *siddhānta* doctrine according to Rāmānuja. This *sūtra* speaks of those worshippers who do not depend on symbols. Perhaps he realized that if he considered these ten *sūtras* as forming one *adhikaraṇa* as Nimbārka had done,

and accepted the position of Bādarāyaṇa as the *siddhānta* doctrine, he had to re-interpret the eight preceding *sūtras* in the light of the *siddhānta*. Therefore he cannot be considered to be "out of track" when he interprets the *sūtras* as dealing with the type of worshippers. One of the other alternatives would have been to follow the method of Śaṅkara and to make two *adhikaraṇas* out of the ten *sūtras*. In that case, in order to be more faithful to the method of interpreting the *Brahmasūtras*, he had to accept the position of Bādari as the *Pūrvapakṣa* and the position of Jaimini as the *siddhānta* doctrine. It would be ridiculous for a *Brahmasūtra bhāṣyakāra* to do so.

At any rate, accepting the view of Bādari stated in the earlier *sūtras* of the *adhikaraṇa* to be the *siddhānta* doctrine, as done by Śaṅkara, is really "out of track". Śaṅkara is fully aware that he is going against the general principle of interpretation within the vedānta school. For, he acknowledges that others, in accordance with the general principle that the earlier *sūtras* set forth the *pūrvapakṣa* view, while the later ones contain the *siddhānta* view, maintain that the passages about the journey of the soul fall within the sphere of higher knowledge⁶³. Being aware that he is going away from the general principle of interpretation, Śaṅkara takes great pains to defend his way of interpreting the *sūtras*.

What had prompted Śaṅkara to give up such a fundamental principle? He could have changed the order of the *sūtras* as Rāmānuja does in a few instances elsewhere⁶⁴. Śaṅkara seems to have understood that these *sūtras* contain very fundamental doctrinal implications and that no "short hand" methods would help him here. For, the view of Bādarāyaṇa contained in *BS* 4.3.14⁶⁵ seems to imply the *bhedābheda* doctrine. Incidentally it may be mentioned that there is a minor difference between the readings of this *sūtra* by Nimbārka, Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. Nimbārka reads the *sūtra*...*ubhayathā doṣāt*, while Śaṅkara reads that portion as ...*ubhayathā'doṣāt*. Rāmānuja adds a *ca* after *ubhayathā* in order to remove the possibility of ambiguity in the text. Therefore according to him the *sūtra* must read "...*ubhayathā ca doṣāt*." It goes without saying that the reading of the *sūtra*

by Nimbārka appears to be unaffected, and, besides, his interpretation of it is free from all polemics and prejudices.

In his *adhikaraṇa*, as also elsewhere in his commentary, Śaṅkara is at pains to defend a two fold distinction of Brahman into a higher and a lower level, as well as a corresponding distinction of higher and a lower knower. The opinion of scholars like **Ghate** that such a distinction is far-fetched, if not unfounded⁶⁶, seems to be correct especially from the fact that the last *sūtra* of the *Brahmasūtras* 4.4.22 "*anāvṛttiḥ śabdād anāvṛttiḥ śabdāt*" refers to "the inferior knowers" only who are proclaimed to return no more. But, Śaṅkara as an *advaitin* upholding the identity between *jīva* and Brahman, has to show that the difference between them is due to some sort of *avidyā*. In that case there is no possibility of the soul's going to the ultimate highest Brahman, who is present everywhere, is within everything and is the self of everything. For, Śaṅkara says we do not go to what is already reached; ordinary experience rather tells us that a person goes to something different from him⁶⁷. Therefore an *advaitin* has to explain away all the scriptural texts, speaking of the soul's going to Brahman as referring to the lower Brahman, distinguished by *avidyā*⁶⁸. On the contrary, the *bhedābhedavādin* who accepts both identity and difference between Brahman and the *jīva* can uphold the going of the soul to the ultimate Brahman. For him, the doctrinal position of Bādarāyaṇa at its face value is the *siddhānta* as is defended by Nimbārka.

In his shrewd polemics on the *sūtra* 14, Śaṅkara gives ample evidence that here he considers his opponent as a *bhedābhedavādin*, who, accepts Brahman as the final destination of the soul in so far as "it is possessed of all kinds of powers. This may be compared to a child's obtaining the adult state, which in reality belongs to the child's identical self, but is qualified by a difference of time." Besides, this *pūrvapakṣin* also holds that "*the works of permanent obligation and works to be performed on special occasions are undertaken to the end that harm may not spring up, such works as are due to special desires and such as are forbidden, and eschewed, in order that neither the heavenly world nor hell may be obtained, and those works whose fruits are*

to be enjoyed in the *current bodily existence are exhausted by just that fruition*. Hence, as after the death of the present body, there is no cause for the origination of a new body, that blessed isolation which consists in *the soul's abiding within its own nature* will accomplish itself for a man acting in the way described above, even without the cognition of his self being identical with Brahman's self—all this is inadmissible⁶⁹. A critical study of the *Saurabha* substantiates the fact that almost all these points of the criticism by Śaṅkara of some earlier vedāntins are contained in the *siddhānta* of the *Saurabha*.

(e) *The role of karmas for liberation*

The attack of Śaṅkara on the early Vedāntin, who gives importance to *karma* appears to be against the *Saurabhakāra*, who teaches that the enquiry into Brahman is to be undertaken by the one who has studied the vedas with its six ancillary parts.

He says:—

*athādhiṭa ṣaḍaṅgavedena karmaphalakṣayākṣayatva
viṣayaka viveka prakāra vākyārthajanyasārṣayāviṣṭena
tata eva jijñāsita dharmamīmāṃsāsāstreṇa tan ni ścila
karma tatprakāra tat phala viṣayaka jñānavatā*⁷⁰.....

The *Saurabhakāra* gives due weight to the study of the *pūrvamīmāṃsā* with its ceremonial observation on various occasions for special results. The controversy concerning the relative importance of *karma* and *jñāna* has come to the fore with Śaṅkara and it remains a major point of discussion and dispute among the later *bhāṣyakāras*. Śaṅkara seems to be the first to hold that there is no need for a prior *dharmajijñāsā* to qualify a person for *brahmajijñāsā*. According to him the only pre-requirement for any meaningful *brahmajijñāsā* is the famous *sādhana catuṣṭayam*, namely the discrimination of what is eternal and what is non-eternal, the renunciation of all desires to enjoy the fruit (of one's action) both here and hereafter, the acquirement of tranquillity and self restraint, and lastly, the intense desire for final release⁷¹.

In *Saurabha* 4.1.16 Nimbārka asserts that works of permanent obligations and duties of special occasions are to

be undertaken even after the attainment of knowledge. Says he:

*vidyayā'gnihotradānatapa ādīnāṃ svāśramakarmaṇāṃ
nirvṛtti śaṅkā nāsti, vidyāpoṣakatvād anuṣṭheyāṇy eva.
yajñādi śrutau teṣāṃ vidyotpādakatvam darśanāt.*

In his commentary on BS 3.4.32-35 Nimbārka considers that such duties are to be performed by every one, even by the *vidvān* because such righteous deeds are helpful in overcoming sins.

Śrīnivāsa, Nimbārka's commentator, clarifies the doctrinal position of Nimbārka, by raising a doubt whether the daily and occasional duties like the *Agnihotra*, etc. are to be performed by a knower or not. He comes to the conclusion that these daily and occasional duties incumbent on one's own stage of life are to be performed by a knower as long as life lasts⁷². In *Saurabha* 4.1.15 Nimbārka established on the basis of *Chānd* 6.14.2 that on the attainment of *vidyā*, only the previous *apavṛttaphala pāpapuṇya* perish, and that the salvation arises only after the fall of the body. Clarifying this point further, Śrīnivāsa, the commentator on the *Saurabha* says, "the former good and bad deeds, the effects of which have not begun yet, alone perish through knowledge, but not those the effects of which have already begun⁷³. According to Nimbārka the knower destroys the good and evil deeds, the effect of which have already begun by "fruition" (*bhoga*), and attains Brahman⁷⁴. In *Saurabha* 3.3.27 Nimbārka upholds that at the time of the departure from the body, the soul completely abandons its merits and demerits. The reason why he forwards such a doctrinal view is that after the separation from the body there is no more any *bhoga* (experience) because this soul has completely abandoned its merits and demerits at death. Therefore there is no more any experience to be undergone. The decay of works actually take place at the time of the soul's departure from the body although it is recorded to take place after the soul crosses the river Virajā in *Kauṣ* 1.3.4⁷⁵.

Here Nimbārka seems to say that *aśarīratva* (absence of the body) implies *karmābhāva*, (absence of karma) because it, in turn, implies *bhogābhāva* (absence of experience). In this context it must be pointed out that according to Śaṅkara

karma can be destroyed by *jñāna* only. Therefore according to him the only criterion for *karmābhāva* is that there is *jñānabhāva*. Thus in 4.3.14 of his *bhāṣya* he rejects the position of Nimbārka in order to uphold his own theory of *Jñāna* as the only means of liberation⁷⁶.

(f) Śaṅkara refutes *bhedābheda*vāda

1. The last portion of the criticism of Śaṅkara in BS 4.3.14 referred to above, about the nature of the final salvation, again, appears to be against the doctrine of the *Saurabhakāra*. According to the *Saurabhakāra* there is a natural difference and non-difference (*svābhāvika bhedābheda*) between *jīva* and Brahman, both during the earthly existence and in the state of liberation⁷⁷. The *jīva*, which is by nature atomic in size, is in liberation similar to Brahman⁷⁸, although unlike Brahman, who is all-pervasive, it cannot ever be the lord of all, the sentient and the non-sentient, nor be their creator, supporter and destroyer⁷⁹. In liberation according to Nimbārka, the soul does not lose its identity. In fact, having attained the highest, it becomes manifest in its own natural form⁸⁰ in accordance with *Chāndogya* 8.12.3 “*paraṁ jyotir upasaṁpadya svena rūpeṇābhiniṣpadyate*”. Śaṅkara is aware that elsewhere also this *Chāndogya* text is used by the *bhedābheda*vādīn in his support⁸¹. This text supports the view that in *mokṣa* the *jīva* retains its own real nature, thereby also retaining its individuality. According to the *Saurabhakāra* *mokṣa* means a full development of one's own individuality⁸². It is an experience in which the *jīva* realizes that it is both one with, and at the same time, different from Brahman. Says Nimbārka: *muktaḥ paramād ātmānaṁ bhāgāvirodhinā vibhāgenānubhavati. tattvasya tadānām aparokṣato drṣṭatvāt śāstrasyāpy evam drṣṭatvāt*⁸³.

2. In fact the real attack on the *bhedābheda* philosophy of Nimbārka by Śaṅkara is on what the former establishes under BS 3.2.27⁸⁴ and BS 3.2.28⁸⁵. The exposition of these *sūtras* by Nimbārka are unique among the *bhedābheda*vādīns⁸⁶. He considers these *sūtras* as establishing the *siddhānta* doctrine. In the *bhāṣya* on BS 3.2.27 Nimbārka comments. “The view that the *mūrta* (corporeal) or the *amūrta* (incorporeal) are never negated by Scripture is

being confirmed here. The universe (*viśwam*), consisting of the *mūrta* and the *amūrta* abides in its own cause viz. Brahman, in a relation of *bhīṇābhīna* (difference-non-difference), on account of the designation of both *bhedā* (difference) and *abheda* (non-difference), like the case of the serpent (*ahi*) and the coil (*kuṇḍala*).

Nimbārka being a *satkāryavādin* takes the example of *ahikuṇḍala* as an expression of *satkāryavāda* (doctrine of the pre-existence of the effect in the cause). The serpent (*ahi*) is the material cause of the coil (*kuṇḍala*), while the coil itself is an effect. The example of *ahikuṇḍala* also substantiates the doctrinal position of Nimbārka that there is a relation of "part and whole" between the soul and Brahman. In fact there is a *bhedābheda* relation between the cause i.e. the whole (here the serpent) and the effect, i.e. the part (here the coil). Thus the *drṣṭānta* of *ahikuṇḍalavat* substantiates the *bhedābheda* relation between Brahman (the cause) and the universe (the effect). Just as the serpent is independent while the coil is dependent on the serpent, so also this corporeal and incorporeal universe is dependent on Brahman, the cause, in a relation of difference and non-difference between them.

Nimbārka makes use of the next *sūtra* (2.3.28) "*prakāśāśrayavad vā tejastvāt*" to explain the *bhedābheda* relation of Brahman and the soul in terms of *substratum* and its *attributes*. He explains: "There is such a relation of (*bhedābheda*) between the *jīva* and the *Puruṣottama* as well, on account of the designation of both — as between light and its substratum (*prabhā tadvatoriva*). Hence it is not to be supposed that there is an absolute difference (*kevala bheda*) between the two on the ground of the aphorism" *Ato'nantena* (hence with infinite) (BS 3.2.26). This is the sense⁸⁷.

While in *Saurabha* 3.2.27 Nimbārka denied absolute identity between the cause (Brahman) and the effect here in 3.2.28 he denies absolute difference between them. In his brief explanation here he points out that just as there is a difference between the snake and its coil or the sun and its rays on the one hand, there is also an equal non-difference between them on the other hand. Nimbārka establishes his doctrine of *bhedābheda* on solid scriptural foundation⁸⁸.

This doctrinal position of Nimbārka is considered to be that of a *pūrvapakṣin* by Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, Vācaspati Miśra and Rāmānuja, in their respective *bhāṣyas* on *sūtras* 3.2.27-29. Śaṅkara considers the examples of *ahikuṇḍala* and *prakāśāśraya* as supporting the identity of Brahman and the world. According to him only identity is essential while the difference is due to *māyā*. After giving a set of scriptural passages supporting difference and identity between Brahman and *jīva* he points out in his *bhāṣya* on *sūtra* 3.2.27:

....tatrevam ubhaya vyapadeśe sati yady abheda evaikāntatogrhyate bhedavyapadeśonirālambana eva syāt. ata ubhaya vyapadeśa darśanād ahikuṇḍalavad atra tattvaṁ bhavitum arhati yathāhir ityabhedaḥ kuṇḍalā bhogaprāśūtvādīnīti tu bheda evam ihāpīti.

Here he acknowledges that both *abheda* and *bheda* are equally vouched for by Scripture. Therefore he considers the relation between the highest self and the soul as analogous to that of *ahikuṇḍala*. Viewed as a whole, the snake is one, non-different, while an element of difference appears if we view it with regard to its coil, hood, erect posture etc. He has similar explanation for *sūtra* 3.2.28, where he states:

athavā prakāśāśrayavad etat pratipattavyam. yathā prakāśaḥ sāvitrāś tadāśrayaś ca savitā nātyanta bhinnāv ubhayaor api te jastvāviśeṣāt. atha ca bhedāvyapadeśabhājavau bhavata evam ihāpīti.

Here he points out that although there cannot be an absolute difference between the sun and its rays since both consist of fire, yet they can be spoken of as different. Similarly he considers the relation between Brahman and the *jīva* as one of identity and difference.

An *advaitin* cannot give any better interpretation than what Śaṅkara has done, for these *sūtras* positively state a distinction between the snake and its coil and the ray and its substratum. Śaṅkara, in all fairness, does not twist the *sūtra* nor does he attack Nimbārka under these two *sūtras*, but under the next *sūtra* (BS 3.2.29) *pūrvavadvā*⁸⁹ where he also draws the attention of the *bhedābheda* *vādin* to certain implications of his doctrine, and points out that the relation

between Brahman and the world must be interpreted in the way he has done under BS 2.2.25.

According to him:

“If the bondage of the soul is due to nescience **only**, final release is possible. But if the soul is really and truly **bound** — whether the soul be considered as a certain condition or state of the highest self as suggested in *sūtra* 27 or as a part of the highest self as suggested in *sūtra* 28— its real bondage cannot be done away with, and thus the scriptural doctrine of final release becomes absurd — Nor, finally can it be said that *śruti* equally teaches difference and non-difference. For, non-difference only is what it aims at establishing, while, when engaged in setting forth something else, it merely refers to difference as something known from other sources of knowledge (viz. perception, etc.)⁹⁰.

Thus, as a matter of fact, Śaṅkara considers what is stated under the *sūtras* 27 and 28 as *pūrvapakṣa* and the real *siddhānta* view contained in *sūtra* 25⁹¹ above is reaffirmed in *sūtra* 29. Under *sūtra* 25, Śaṅkara has explained how Brahman appears dual through the limiting adjunct of meditation and so on, although Brahman is really one without a second. The distinction is made just for the sake of meditation. There is no real difference between Brahman and jīva, just as the rays of the sun appear crooked, straight and so on, in accordance with the shape and the position of the fingers and the like through which they are passing, but the real sun remains what it really is.

Nimbārka considers the *sūtra* 29 above as referring to *sūtra* 2.1.25 *kṛtsna prasaktir niravayavatva śabdakopo vā* wherein objections like the consequence of the entire transformation of Brahman and its having parts etc. have been refuted. He is also unaware that Śaṅkara refutes his *bhedābheda* doctrine under BS 3.2.29. In the same way it is not known to the Saurabhakāra that Śaṅkara considers *sūtra* 3.2.29 as referring to *sūtra* 3.2.25. Similarly it is significant that the Saurabhakāra is completely unaware of the advaitic interpretation of *sūtra* 3.2.25 by Śaṅkara. Nimbārka's interpretation of BS 3.2.25 is very primitive, if not naive, for he says: “Just as there is manifestation of the

sun, fire and the like through the repetition of the means resorted to by those who long for them, so there is "non-difference" in the case of Brahman too, i.e., there is manifestation of Brahman. The sense is that the direct vision of Brahman results from the repetition of the *Śādhana*s or the means consisting in perfect meditation".

Incidentally, it may be noted here that Rāmānuja and Bhāskara show clear influence of Śaṅkara in their respective commentaries on these *sūtras*. This is evident from a comparative study of their *bhāṣya* on *sūtra* 3.2.25. But there is no such influence on Nimbārka. Rāmānuja too considers BS 3.2.27⁹² as constituting a *pūrvapakṣa* view regarding the relation between the non-sentient (i.e. *acit*) and Brahman and interprets it to mean that the non-sentient is a particular state (*saṁsthānaviśeṣa*) of Brahman, just as the coil is of the serpent. He considers *sūtra* 3.2.28 as criticizing the preceding view by pointing out that if the non-sentient world be a state of Brahman, as the coil is of the snake, then the world will become non-different from Brahman, since the coil is nothing but the snake itself. This second view is also a *pūrvapakṣa* view, which regards the relation between the non-sentient world and Brahman as the relation between the rays and the sun. It considers that the world is a form (*rūpa*) of Brahman and is different from Brahman.

Rāmānuja, like Śaṅkara, considers *sūtra* 3.2.29 *pūrvavad vā* as stating the correct conclusion. He points out that the *pūrvapakṣa* views taught in the previous two *sūtras* implicate Brahman as partaking of the faults of the non-sentient world. Nor is Rāmānuja in favour of considering Brahman as a mere abstract generic character because the teachings of *śruti* and *smṛti* are against it. Therefore, the right view, according to him, is that the non-sentient matter stands to Brahman in the same relation as the one previously proved with regard to the individual soul in *sūtra* 2.3.42 (*aṁśo nānāvya-padeśād anyathā cāpi dāśakitavāditvam adhiyata eke*) and 2.3.45 (*prakāśādivat tu naivam paraḥ*) namely, a relation between attributes and substance. The conclusion is that just as the individual soul is a part as well as an attribute of Brahman, and as such different from him, the insentient matter is also on the one hand, both a part and an

attribute of Brahman, and, on the other hand, is different from him⁹³.

Thus both Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja reject the *bhedābheda* doctrine of Nimbārka on different grounds. On the contrary, Nimbārka is unaware of the doctrines of Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, etc. and of the logical refinements of their language, the philosophical implications of their argument, the subtleties of their expressions and the accurateness of their ideas, not only in their mutual disputes, but even against the *bhedābheda* itself, which Nimbārka upholds as the essence of the Vedānta philosophy. If Nimbārka had been a post-Śaṅkara, and much more a post-Rāmānuja, originator of a system or school he should have taken these factors into account.

(g) *The Gāyatri*

I may briefly point out a few more instances where Śaṅkara considers as the *pūrvapakṣa* the doctrinal positions that are held by Nimbārka. In his *bhāṣya* on BS 1.1.25⁹⁴ "*chando'bhidhānān neti cen na tathā ceto'rpaṇanigadāt tathā hi darśanam*", Śaṅkara points out in his alternate interpretation that another commentator is of the opinion that *Gāyatri* directly denotes Brahman on account of the equality of number. For just as the *Gāyatri* metre has four feet consisting of six syllables each, so Brahman also has four feet. Here Śaṅkara seems to explain what Nimbārka in his unique style states briefly. Incidentally it must be pointed out that Śrīnivāsa gives two interpretations of the *sūtra*. They appear to be a summation of the two interpretations given by Śaṅkara, one of which agrees with that of Nimbārka.

(h) *The reality of jīva*

Another instance where Śaṅkara shows his awareness of an earlier vedāntin, whose views are identical to that of Nimbārka is in BS 1.3.19 when he states *apare tu vādinaḥ pāramārthikam eva jīvaṁ rūpam iti manyante asmadīyās' cakecit*. It is to be noted that Nimbārka accepts the reality of the individual soul both in bondage and in liberation. Under this *sūtra*, Śaṅkara takes pains to explain his position at length against some fellow vedāntin and asserts that the *jīva* as such does not have any reality; it is real only in so far as

it is identical with Brahman. Here he makes his usual remark that wherever a difference between *jīva* and Brahman is denoted by the *Sūtrakāra*, he does not mean a difference in reality, but only wants to remove all the false popular notions due to which people attribute the limited nature of *jīva* to Brahman (*vide Śāṅkarabhāṣya* 1.3.19). Significantly, by such a remark Śāṅkara betrays his consciousness of the fact that the *Sūtrakāra*, as well as some earlier Vedāntins, refer here to a difference between the *jīva* and Brahman.

(i) *The agentship of jīva*

In *Saurabha* 2.3.39 Nimbārka accepts the *svābhāvika kartṛtva* of the individual self. According to Nimbārka the main thrust of the *sūtras* 2.3.32-39 is to establish the *svābhāvika kartṛtva* of the *jīva*. Therefore he interprets *sūtra* 2.3.39 *yathā ca takṣa ubhayathā*⁹⁵ in a straight forward manner, and asserts, *against the Sāṅkhyas*, that the soul is an active agent and has the freedom to be active or not. Here is what he had to say:

ātmecchayā yathā takṣa (tathā) karoti na karotīty ubhayathā vyavasthā sidhyati, buddheḥ kartṛtve icchā'bhāvād vyavasthā'bhāvaḥ.

Śāṅkara denies the *svābhāvikakartṛtva* of the soul when he says: *yad uktam śāstrārthavatvādibhir hetubhiḥ svābhāvikam ātmanaḥ kartṛtvam iti tan na...* He goes back to the previous seven *sūtras* and refutes all that he seemed to have accepted there. His conclusion is that *karṛtva* is only a *super imposition* on the soul due to its connection with the limiting adjuncts. **Ghate**⁹⁶ rightly points out that the *sūtra* cannot at all mean what Śāṅkara wants it to. First of all, the particle, 'ca' in the *sūtra* goes against him. Even Śāṅkara is aware of it; therefore he has to say "*tvartham cāyam pathitaḥ*". Secondly, the example of the *takṣa* (the carpenter) in a straightforward way establishes the *karṛtva* of the self, rather than a superimposed agentship. **Ghate** is right in pointing out that Śāṅkara has failed to substantiate his own theory of a superimposed agentship of the *jīva*, for the carpenter is, as a matter of fact, active through his body too, as much as the tools, because the tools cannot act at all, unless the body does.

Significantly the Sāṃkhyas do not accept any real agentship of the *jīva*. They attribute it to the medium of *buddhi*, which Nimbārka rejects here and establishes the natural agentship of the *jīva*. Therefore the *studied* attempt of Śaṅkara to deny the agentship of the *jīva* seems to be against the position of Nimbārka.

(j) *Ubhayalingatva of Brahman*

Similarly, Śaṅkara criticizes under *sūtra* 3.2.11 (*na sthānato'pi parasyobhaya lingaṁ sarvatra hi*) the doctrine of a *pūrvapakṣin* who in conformity with the scriptural passages, ascribes a double character to Brahman. That *pūrvapakṣin* appears to be Nimbārka, who accepts such a doctrine⁹⁷.

(k) *Dreams*

I may also point out the discussion on dreams and dream objects under BS 3.2.1-6 as another instance where Śaṅkara seems to consider Nimbārka as the *pūrvapakṣin*. Here the *siddhānta* doctrine according to Nimbārka is that the dream objects are real and are created by the Lord. A critical perusal of the *bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara on these *sūtras* gives the impression that his *pūrvapakṣin* is Nimbārka, because what Nimbārka considers as the *siddhānta* is taken as the *pūrvapakṣa* view by Śaṅkara. According to Śaṅkara the *siddhānta* is that the dream and the dream objects are illusory, yet they may indicate real objects or future happenings. They are in fact created by the individual soul itself and not by the *Paramātmān* (as alleged by the *pūrvapakṣin*), even though the *Paramātmān* is active as the controller of the souls even in dream state.

Interestingly Bhāskara, the "unbelieving disciple" of Śaṅkara accuses him here of both deluding the people by teaching the objects of waking state as illusory and misinterpreting the *sūtrakāra*⁹⁸. Rāmānuja, who accepts a view very similar to that of Nimbārka, on the contrary, interchanges the order of the *sūtras* (from the order given by Nimbārka and Śaṅkara). Therefore there is no need for Rāmānuja to attack Śaṅkara as done by Bhāskara. He also takes into consideration the arguments advanced by Śaṅkara and attempts a refutation of Śaṅkara. According to him the

texts like "there are no chariots etc." mean only that in a dream there are no chariots and horses to be perceived by any other person but the dreamer. The supreme person creates these dream objects only to be perceived by the dreamer and that too for a certain limited time only. Therefore these dream objects are called wonderful. The creation of such wonderful things is possible for the supreme person, who can immediately realize all his wishes⁹⁹.

(I) *The departure of the jīva*

Let us examine another instance, a comparative study of which may throw some more light on the chronology of the various commentaries themselves. The instance is the description of the successive steps by which the soul passes out of the body. It is contained in *BS* 4.2.1 ff. Nimbārka and Śaṅkara agree that *sūtra* 4.2.1 "*vāñmanasi darśanacchabdācca*" alludes to *Chāndogya* 6.8.6 "When a man departs from hence his speech merges in his mind, his mind in his breath, his breath in fire, fire in the highest deity"¹⁰⁰.

Nimbārka accepts the merging of the organ of speech in the mind, because, besides the scriptural declaration it is found that the function of the mind continues even when the organ of speech has ceased to function. He says in *Saurabha* 4.2.1: *vāñmanasi saṁpadyate (Chānd 6.8.6) iti vāg-indriyasya manasi saṁyogarūpa*¹⁰¹ *saṁpattir ucyate. Vāg-indriye uparate'pi maṇahpravrttidarśanāt vāñmanasi saṁpadyate (Chānd 6.8.6) iti śabdācca*.

Significantly this view of Nimbārka corresponds to the *pūrvapakṣa* view as enunciated by Śaṅkara. In the beginning of his *bhāṣya* on this *sūtra*, Śaṅkara poses a doubt whether the *sūtra* means to say that speech itself, together with its function, is merged into the mind, or only the function of speech. According to him the *pūrvapakṣin* maintains that speech itself is merged in the mind. For, this is the only explanation that is in agreement with the direct statement of the scripture, while the other alternative compels us to have recourse to an implied meaning. Now, wherever direct enunciation and implied meaning are in

conflict, the preference has to be given to the former and we therefore maintain that speech itself is merged in the mind.

tatra vāg eva tāvan manasi saṁpadyata iti prāptaṁ tathā hi — “śrutir anugṛhitā bhavati. itarathā lakṣaṇā syāt. śruti lakṣaṇāviśaye ca śrutir nyāyyā nā lakṣaṇā. tasmādvāca evāyam manasi pralaya iti...

Thus Śaṁkara in fact presents the *pūrvapakṣin* more systematically and forcefully than the *pūrvapakṣin* probably could do. Śaṁkara maintains that the attitude of his *pūrvapakṣin* here is rather puerile. Although the *sūtra* speaks of the merging of the speech in the mind, Śaṁkara points out that this *sūtra* must be interpreted in the light of the entire *pāda*. Basing himself on *sūtra* 4.2.16 *avibhāgo vacanāt*, he emphatically asserts that only the function of speech is merged in the mind, because the present *sūtra* means only the mere cessation of the function of speech¹⁰². Moreover if the intention of the present *sūtra* was to express absorption of the organ of speech itself, there would be *non-division* in all the cases. And, therefore, for what reason should “non-division” be specifically stated in another case in *sūtra* 16?

Śaṁkara offers a basic metaphysical argument in his support. The organ of speech cannot be absorbed into the mind because the mind is not the causal substance of the organ of speech. He says:

yasya hi yata utpattis tasya tatra pralayo nyāyyo mṛdīva śārāvasya. naca manasovāgutpadyata itikiñcana pramāṇam asti. vṛtty udbhavābhibhavau tvaprakṛti samāśrayāvapi drśyete....

On the other hand, functions originate and are retracted even where they do not inhere in causal substance, for example the function of fire, which is of the nature of heat, springs from fuel, which is of the nature of earth and is extinguishable in water (*pārthivebhyo hīndhanebhyas taijasy-āgner-vṛttir-udbhavaty apsu copasāmyati*).

Since Śaṁkara is fully aware that the scripture clearly states that the speech is merged in the mind, he asserts that the scriptural statement can be reconciled with his own interpretation in so far as the function and the thing to which the function belongs are viewed as non-different¹⁰³. Perhaps

such a clear cut distinction of the function and the thing to which the function belongs is a refinement of the vague distinction that Nimbārka makes between the *vāgindriya* (organ of speech) which merges into the mind and *manah pravṛtti* (the function of the mind) which continues to exist¹⁰⁴.

A post-Śaṅkara commentator normally should take into account these arguments and corrections made by Śaṅkara. This is precisely what is done by Śrīnivāsa, the follower of Nimbārka. He on the one hand, makes a strong defence of Nimbārka and stresses that the merging of speech in the mind is a matter of scriptural declaration, and on the other hand, finds himself weak before Śaṅkara's argument, so much so he modifies his own position¹⁰⁵. According to him the word *sampatti* (merging) means only a mere connection and no absorption. (*Sampattir iha samyogarūpā jñeya, natu layarūpā*)¹⁰⁶. He accepts the argument of Śaṅkara that the mind is not the material cause of speech. Therefore a real absorption of speech into the mind is not possible at all¹⁰⁷.

Rāmānuja, on the contrary, considers the doctrinal position of Śaṅkara as the *pūrvapakṣa*. Although he does not name the opponent, his allegation that according to the opponent the function of speech alone is merged in mind because the mind is not the causal substance of speech¹⁰⁸, fairly shows that his opponent is Śaṅkara. Rāmānuja rejects the view of the opponent with a bold statement that when the function of speech comes to an end, there is no other means of knowledge to assure us that the function only has come to an end and that the organ itself continues to have an independent existence¹⁰⁹.

In the subsequent *sūtras* also Śaṅkara clearly follows his known stand, namely, that it is only the function of the various organs that merges and not the organs themselves.

Śaṅkara's *bhāṣya* on BS 4.2.3 gives the impression that he has read Nimbārka. It seems that it is the doctrinal position of Nimbārka that he considered as the *pūrvapakṣa* view. Śaṅkara acknowledges that the position of the *pūrvapakṣin* agrees with the scriptural declaration. He, as is his normal practice, reinforces, in all fairness, the position of the *pūrvapakṣin* with a "*tathāhi*" statement. He says:

tathāhi annamayam hi somya mana āpomayaḥ prāṇaḥ
(Chānd 6.5.4) *ity annayoni mana āmananty abyonim ca*
prāṇam. "āpas cānnam asṛjanta" (Chānd 6.3.4) *iti*
*śruteḥ*¹¹¹

Through these clarifications and more adequate scriptural texts Śaṅkara presents his *pūrvapakṣin* in a stronger position than the *pūrvapakṣin* actually could present himself. Śaṅkara's own *siddhānta* view is that the mind, after having absorbed the functions of the outer senses within itself, is merged in breath only, in so far as the function of the mind is merged in the function of breath¹¹². He outrightly rejects any real merging of mind as such in breath, because he insists that the breath cannot be the causal substance of the mind.

It is Rāmānuja who replies to Śaṅkara. He explains:

tat sarvendriya samyuktam manaḥ prāṇe saṁpadyate
prāṇena samyujyate. . na mano vṛtti mātram...
manaḥprāṇāyor annenādbhiścāpy āyanamucyate na
talprakṛtiḥ, ahaṁkāratvānmanasā ākāśa vikāratvāc
*ca prāṇasya, prāṇaśabdenāpāṁ lakṣaṇā ca syāt*¹¹³.

Thus according to Rāmānuja the scriptural declaration that "mind is made of food" and "breath is made of water" means only that the mind and the breath are nourished and sustained by food and water, and not that these latter are the causal substances of the former respectively. He points out that it is impossible for food and water to be their causal substances because the mind consists of *ahaṁkāra* and breath is a modification of ether and other elements.

In the next *sūtra* 4.2.4 *so'dhyakṣe tadupagamādibhyaḥ* Nimbārka follows the scripture faithfully. According to him the *prāṇa* united with the individual soul is finally merged in fire. Such a doctrine is supported by the scripture¹¹⁴, and is alluded to in the first *sūtra* of the present *pāda*¹¹⁵.

Śaṅkara considers a position, identical to the conclusion of Nimbārka¹¹⁶ as that of the *pūrvapakṣin*, who on the basis of scripture again upholds that the *prāṇa* (the vital breath) is merged in fire (*tejasī*). Here Śaṅkara is aware that the scripture asserts the merging of *prāṇa* in fire and therefore there is no room for doubt. According to Śaṅkara:

*idam idānīm prāṇas tejasīlyatra cintyate — kim yathā śruti prāṇasya tejasya eva vṛtty upasamhāraḥ kim vā dehendriya pañjarādhyakṣe jīva iti. tatra śruter anatisankyatvāt prāṇasya tejasya eva sampattiḥ syāt, aśrutakalpanāya anyānyatvād iti evam prāpte...*¹¹⁷

Thus according to Śaṅkara the *prāṇa* under discussion persists in the *adhyakṣa*, i.e., the *viññānātman*, because there are scriptural statements supporting the going of the *prāṇa* towards him. He points out that we have to make this addition because the soul is the chief agent in the process of departure.

On the one hand Nimbārka seems to be unaware of the reasons advanced by Śaṅkara in support of the *sūtra* and, on the other hand, Śrīnivāsa seems to be fully aware of them. Although he accepts much of what Śaṅkara says here, his final conclusion is that of Nimbārka namely that there is the merging of *prāṇa* and not merely the function of *prāṇa* as held by Śaṅkara. It must also be pointed out that he is here unaware of the beautiful simile presented by Rāmānuja to illustrate the merging of the *prāṇa* with fire, namely, that in ordinary talk we say Yamunā is flowing towards the sea, although in reality it is the Yamunā joined with the Gaṅgā that flows to the sea¹¹⁸.

In *sūtra* 5, *bhūteṣutac chruteḥ*, the discussion is about the final union of this *prāṇa* which is united with the *jīva*, taking place with the ultimate elements. Nimbārka brings Bṛh 4.4.5 in his support. Says he:

sā ca jīva samyuktasya tejah sahiteṣu bhūteṣu bhavati. Prthivīmayaḥ āpomayo vāyumayaḥ ākāśamayas tejomayaḥ (Bṛh 4.4.5) iti samcarato jīvasya sarvabhūtamayatva śravaṇāt.

Śaṅkara on the contrary, reserves the Bṛh 4.4.5 text for the next *sūtra*. Here he sticks to the original *Chāndogya* 4.8.6 with which the discussion commenced in the first *sūtra*. He uses a beautiful simile to illustrate the union of *Prāṇa-jīva* with the elements. He says, "of a man who first travels from Srughna to Mathura and from Mathura to Pataliputra we may say *in short* that he travels from Srughna to Pataliputra"¹¹⁹.

The philosophical outlook of the commentator determines his approach towards the *sūtras* 6-11. On the whole Nimbārka appears to be completely unaware of the special twist that Śaṅkara gives to the *sūtras* 6-11. We leave aside these *sūtras* and come to *sūtra* 12, which reads *pratiṣedhād iti cen na śārīrāt spaṣṭhy ekeṣām*. Nimbārka considers this *sūtra* as one, the first part of which states an objection, which is replied to in the second part. On the basis of *Brh* 4.4.6 "athākāmayamāno yo'kāmo niṣkāma āptakāma ātmakāmo na tasya prāṇā utkrānti" the *sūtra* itself contains a *prima facie* objection, denying the departure of the sense organs of a knower from the body. The reply of Nimbārka¹²⁰ is that there is no such contradiction, since it is only a denial of the departure of the sense organs from the embodied soul that is the topic of discussion. It is clear from the reading of the text according to another branch of vedic tradition, viz. "from him the vital breath does not depart. (*Śat Br* 14.7.2.8). Therefore it can be concluded that scripture denied the departure of the sense organs from the embodied soul¹²¹.

Śaṅkara breaks the *sūtra* into two and considers the first part consisting of *pratiṣedhāt...śārīrāt* as the *pūrvapakṣa* and the second part as the *siddhānta*. Thus by dividing the *sūtra* into two, he arrives at a conclusion, which is exactly the opposite to that of Nimbārka. Here again Śaṅkara considers a doctrine identical to that of Nimbārka as the *pūrvapakṣa*. In *sūtra* 7 above, Śaṅkara has already made a distinction between relative and absolute immortality, resulting from lower and higher knowledge respectively. He considers *sūtra* 12-14¹²² as referring to the higher knower.

Śaṅkara firmly asserts that *Brh* 4.4.6 denies the departure of the *prāṇāḥ* out of the body of the higher knower. He puts into the mouth of the *pūrvapakṣin* a statement to the effect that the passage quoted does not deny the departure of the *prāṇāḥ* from the body but from the embodied soul. This is precisely the doctrine of Nimbārka. Śaṅkara explains it better than Nimbārka. Śaṅkara explains that the *Brh.* text quoted does not deny the departure of the *prāṇāḥ* from the body but from the embodied soul is known from the fact that in another *śākhā* we have not the genitive case (*śaṣṭhi*) *tasya* (his), but the ablative case (*pañcamī*) *tasmāt*, "(from him) the

prāṇāḥ do not depart". For, the genitive case which expresses only a relation in general, is determined towards some special relation by the ablative case met within another *śākhā*. And as the embodied soul, which has a claim as the exaltation and the bliss is the chief topic of the *adhikaraṇa* we construe the words *tasmāt* to mean "not from the body" but "from the embodied soul". The sense, therefore, is that from that soul when about to depart the *prāṇas* do not depart, but remain with it. The soul of him who dies therefore passes out of the body together with the *prāṇāḥ*¹²³.

Śaṅkara rejects this doctrine of the *pūrvapakṣin* based precisely on the *Mādhyandina* recension, in the second part of the *sūtra*¹²⁴. He takes *sūtras* 12-14 as referring to the higher knowers of Brahman and arrives at an exactly opposite conclusion to that of Nimbārka. He explains the various *śruti* passages¹²⁵ as denying the departure of him who knows and as establishing the same for him who does not know. He accepts that the main subject in the passage he quotes in his defence is the *jīva*, yet he tries to find his way out by asserting that the embodied soul and the body have been viewed as non-different¹²⁶. According to Śaṅkara those who meditate on the qualified Brahman go out of their bodies and travel through the path of gods. Śaṅkara concludes that for a higher knower there is not even the question of possibility of the departure because the higher knower has become the self of the omnipresent Brahman¹²⁷.

Like Śaṅkara, Śrīnivāsa too begins his *bhāṣya* with a reference to *sūtra* 7 of the *pāda*. Perhaps in the light of Śaṅkara's criticism of the doctrine of Nimbārka, Śrīnivāsa reinforces the arguments of his *guru* with more scriptural supports. Here is what he has to say:

....*śārīrādayamukkrāntipraṭiṣedho na bhavati 'atha' kāmaya mānaḥ' iti prakṛtam śārīraṁ tacchabdena parāmrśya "na tasya prāṇā utkrāmantī" ty anena vākyena śārīrāj jīvāt teṣāṁ utkrāntiḥ praṭiśidhyate. tasyeti saṣṭhyā prāṇasaṁbandhitvenāprakṛtasya nirdeśabhāvāt*¹²⁸

Thus according to Śrīnivāsa, the denial of the departure that *Bṛh* 4.4.6 seems to indicate, as opined by Śaṅkara, is not a denial of the departure of the soul from the body. He points out that having referred to the embodied soul, the

topic of discussion by the word "him" in the text "now he who does not desire", the text goes on to deny the departure of those sense organs "from the embodied soul" by the clause "his sense organs do not go out". Here the sixth case *tasya* does not refer to the body, which is not mentioned before as connected with the sense organs. What is in fact denied in *Brh* 4.4.2. and *Brh* 4.4.4 is only the departure of the sense organs of the *jīva* in the state of the transmigratory existence in order that there may be the origin of a new body. Further, a separation from the material body does not mean a separation from the sense organs. That means the sense organs accompany him as he proceeds through the path of gods until he attains Brahman. Hence, he asserts against Śaṅkara that what is in fact denied in the reading of some branches is the explicit denial of the separation of the sense organs¹²⁹.

Rāmānuja¹³⁰, on the other hand, following the interpretation of Nimbārka, and drawing support for his own doctrinal tenet even from the same scriptural text on which Śaṅkara depended for his doctrine faces the criticism of Śaṅkara. According to him the first part of the *sūtras* denies precisely the view of Śaṅkara (he does not name Śaṅkara, but his doctrine), who bases his arguments on *Brh* 3.2.10-11, containing the discussion between Ārthabhāga and Yājñavalkya. Rāmānuja successfully argues that these texts deny only the moving away of the *prāṇāḥ* from the embodied individual soul, and not from the body. In his lengthy *bhāṣya*, he further denies that the scriptural passages, quoted by his *pūrvapakṣin* (i.e. Śaṅkara) from the discussion of Ārthabhāga, deal with the knowledge of Brahman as presumed by Śaṅkara.

Thus, the detailed polemics of Śaṅkara, Śrīnivāsa and above all Rāmānuja make it amply clear that Nimbārka alone is unaware of the issues they have raised in the discussion. It also makes it evident that the *Saurabha* is one of the pre-Śaṅkara *vṛttis* on the *Brahmasūtras*. It must also be pointed out that, although there is similarity in the doctrinal position of Nimbārka and Rāmānuja in this section of the *pāda*, a comparative study of their *bhāṣyas* makes it very clear that there is no valid reason to raise the question of any kind of

influence of Rāmānuja on Nimbārka as alleged by some scholars. For, it is less reasonable for Nimbārka or Śrīnivāsa, if they were post-Rāmānuja commentators, to leave aside the insights that Rāmānuja throws while refuting the arguments of Śaṅkara, especially of the question of Ārthabhāga as referring to the possessor of true knowledge.

Conclusion

Our study has shown that the *pūrvapakṣin* that Śaṅkara refutes in a number of places cannot be any other known *ṛttikāra* than Nimbārka. We have also seen that in these instances Nimbārka could not possibly be summarizing Śaṅkara, because if that had been the case he could not afford to leave aside the refinements and insights brought by Śaṅkara. No post-Śaṅkara commentator can defend his theory by making a mere clumsy summary of what Śaṅkara presents as the *pūrvapakṣa*. Nor could he possibly begin a new school of thought without refuting Śaṅkara in those instances. A post-Śaṅkara founder of a school has to take into account the *bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara. In fact, the *aupādhika bhedābheda*vāda of Bhāskara and the *viśiṣṭādvaita*vāda of Rāmānuja seem to be scholarly attempts under the influence of Śaṅkara to re-interpret the ancient *bhedābheda*vāda. Our examination of the *bhāṣyas* of Nimbārka, Śaṅkara, Śrīnivāsa and Rāmānuja leads us to accept that Nimbārka is the earliest and the most ancient commentator among them. Furthermore, a comparative study of *Kaustubha* of Śrīnivāsa and the *Śrībhāṣya* of Rāmānuja on the above *sūtras* shows that the Kaustubhakāra is unaware of the insights brought by Rāmānuja as well as the answers he makes to the criticism of Śaṅkara.

Chapter 5

ŚRĪNIVĀSA : A POST-ŚAMKARA BHĀṢYAKĀRA

Introduction

While discussing the pre-Śaṅkara nature of the *Saurabha* in the last chapter, we have pointed out that Śrīnivāsa, the Kaustubhakāra, seems to be influenced by Śaṅkara in a number of places. This fact goes against the traditional belief which considers Śrīnivāsa, regarded as the first disciple of Nimbārka¹, to be a contemporary of Vajranābha, the great-grandson of Śrīkṛṣṇa². Therefore a detailed study of Śrīnivāsa is being undertaken in this chapter.

According to the AC his parents are Ācāryapāda and Lokamati³. It is also said that Śrīnivāsa was born and brought up at the hermitage of Nimbārka, who took special care for his education. He is also said to be the author of the *Laghustavarājastotra*, a small work consisting of 40 verses glorifying Nimbārka. According to the AC, he had also written a commentary on the *Bhagavadgītā* and the *Upaniṣads*⁴. N.D. Sharma attributes a few more works to Śrīnivāsa, on the basis of the writings of later scholars. According to him⁵ there is a reference to Śrīnivāsa's *Khyātinirṇaya* and *Pārijāta-Saurabhabhāṣya* in the *Setu* of Sundarabhaṭṭa, to his *Kāthopaniṣadbhāṣya* in the *Upaniṣadprakīrṇikī* of Pd. Mānadāsa and to his *Rahasyaprabandha* in *Pañcakālānuṣṭānamīmāṃsā*. Since none of these works is extant today, their authenticity can not be verified.

After a careful study of the *Vedāntakaustubha* some of the modern scholars among the followers of Nimbārka, e.g. A.P. **Bhattacharya**⁶ and **Vrajavallabha**⁷ do not consider Śrīnivāsa to be a contemporary of Vajranābha. They point out that such an early existence of Śrīnivāsa cannot be accepted since he actually quotes from Dharmakīrti (7th century A.D.). While refuting the Yogācāra school of Buddhism, Śrīnivāsa quotes the following passage from Viprabhikṣu. He explains:

*uktaṁ ca viprabhikṣuṇāpi:
apratyakṣopalambhasya nārthadrṣṭiḥ prasiddhyati
avibhāgo'pi buddhyātmā viparyāsitarśanaḥ
grāhyagrāhaka saṁvitti bhedaṁ iṣa lakṣyate iti*⁸

Of these lines, the first is attributed to Dharmakīrti by Madhvācārya in his *Sarvadarśana Saṁgraha*⁹ and the last two lines form the verse 354 of the second chapter called *pratyakṣapariccheda* of *Pramāṇavārttikam*¹⁰, a work universally accepted as that of Dharmakīrti. From the above references the identification of Viprabhikṣu with Dharmakīrti can be made with certainty¹¹. This Dharmakīrti is said to have lived in 650 A.D., and is considered to be a contemporary of Ācārya Śiṣabhādra of Nalanda. Obviously Śrīnivāsa, who quotes from Dharmakīrti cannot be a contemporary of Vajranābha, as claimed by AC¹².

1. The *Vedāntakaustubha* is not an independent work

Although modern scholars among the followers of Nimbārka do not consider Śrīnivāsa to be pre-Dharmakīrti commentator, they, nevertheless, consider him to be pre-Śaṅkara mainly on the ground that Śrīnivāsa does not refute any of the theories of Śaṅkara¹³. According to them if Śrīnivāsa had been a post-Śaṅkara *bhāṣyakāra* he would have defended the *caturvyūhavāda* of the Vaiṣṇavas against Śaṅkara¹⁴.

We have to examine the problem in detail. First of all, it must be pointed out that as a commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*, the *Vedāntakaustubha* is not an independent work as such. The *raison d'être* of the *Kaustubha* is to explain the *Vedāntapārijāta Saurabha* of Nimbārka. In

Kaustubha 1.1.1. Śrīnivāsa himself states his objective in writing the *Kaustubha* in the following words:

*atha tu tadājñayā taduktavartmanā tadanugraha kāmēṇa
tacchiṣyeṇa mayā mṛdumitapado vedāntakaustubhas
tadbhāvārthaprakāśako viduṣām upakārāya viracyate.*

Thus the primary aim of the *Kaustubha* is to explain the sense of the *Vedāntapārijāta Saurabha*. Therefore the mere fact that Śrīnivāsa does not refute any of the rival schools of Vedānta does not mean in itself that he is unaware of them. Since Nimbārka does not criticize any of the rival Vedānta schools, it was also not within the purview of Śrīnivāsa either to do so, because his main concern was only the exposition of the doctrine of Nimbārka. Nothing prevents him, on the contrary, to make use of the better insights that he finds in the *bhāṣyas* of other *ācāryas* for the sole purpose of explaining the doctrine of Nimbārka better.

This being the *raison d'être* of the *Kaustubha* we cannot expect its author to make a defence of the *vyūhavāda* against Śaṅkara, because as we have already pointed out Nimbārka does not bother to bring in the *vyūhavāda* under BS 2.2.42-45, but he directs his energies against the *Śāktas*. How can we expect Śrīnivāsa to go all the way out to make a defence of the *vyūhavāda*, not found in the *Saurabha*? Therefore though Śrīnivāsa was a *Vaiṣṇavabhāṣyakāra*, it was not necessary for him to defend the *vyūhavāda*, even if he had been a *post-Śaṅkarabhāṣyakāra*. Besides, we have noted in chapter one, *vyūhavāda* was a doctrine of Pañcarātra Vaiṣṇavism, while Nimbārka was a Bhāgavata Vaiṣṇava. Those who consider Śrīnivāsa to be a pre-Śaṅkara Vedāntin appear to be led by two main assumptions. Firstly, they take for granted that all the references to the *bhedābheda* found in the writings of Śaṅkara are references to Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa. Secondly, they also seem to presume that Śaṅkara, who appears to be aware of Nimbārka must also be aware of Śrīnivāsa, who is regarded as the immediate disciple of Nimbārka. This second presumption is based on the fact that *guruparamparās* present Śrīnivāsa invariably as the immediate disciple of Nimbārka. Thue, Śrīnivāsa also claims himself to be a disciple of Nimbārka as we have seen above. But in the face of contrary evidences, we need not give

undue significance to this claim than to the claim of Nimbārka that his *guru* is Nārada¹⁵. It means that Śrīnivāsa belongs to the tradition of Nimbārka. It does not mean that he must be the immediate disciple of Nimbārka, as claimed by the *guruparamparās* written down centuries later.

2. Is Śaṅkara influenced by Śrīnivāsa?

Now, according to some modern followers of Nimbārka¹⁶ the *pūrvapakṣa* that Śaṅkara raises in 2.1.14 is what Śrīnivāsa establishes as *siddhānta* in 2.1.13. They assert that both the letter and the spirit of the *bhāṣya* confirm that Śaṅkara is refuting Śrīnivāsa. But our study of the respective commentaries of Nimbārka, Śaṅkara and Śrīnivāsa strongly shows that Śrīnivāsa was influenced by Śaṅkara rather than Śaṅkara by him. *Sūtra* 2.1.13 reads *bhoktrāpatter avibhāgaś cet syāl lokavat*. As pointed out by **Ghate**, the difference in the interpretations of this *sūtra* by the various *bhāṣyakāras* mainly turns on the understanding of the word *bhoktrāpatti*¹⁷.

A comparative study of the *Saurabha* and the *Kaustubha* reveals that there is a deviation in the interpretation of Śrīnivāsa from that of his *guru*. Under this *sūtra* Nimbārka attempts to answer as to how there can still be a distinction between Brahman (the inner controller) and the *jīva* (the controlled) if Brahman is accepted as the sole *upādānakāraṇa*¹⁸. He resolves the mystery by a mere statement that in spite of there being a non-difference there is a difference as well between the two, as between the sea and the wave, or between the sun and its rays. Here are his words: *Brahmaṇojagad upādānate jīvarūpeṇa brahmaṇa eva sukha duḥkhabhoktrtvāpatter vedaprasiddho bhoktrṇiyantrvibhāgo na syād iti cet. avavibhāge'pi samudra taraṅgayoriva surva tat prabhayor iva tayor vibhāgaḥ syāt*.

According to Śrīnivāsa, on the contrary, the primary objection of the opponent is that if Brahman is accepted as the *upādānakāraṇa*, then there must be no distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed. The implications of such an objection, according to him, is that all effects whatsoever being non-different from their cause the enjoyer, i.e. the *jīva*, will become the object enjoyed, and the object

enjoyed, i.e. the body, the sense organs, and the sense objects will become the enjoyer.

Thus Śrīnivāsa interprets the *sūtra* differently from Nimbārka, the exposition of whose *bhāṣya* is the only avowed purpose of Śrīnivāsa's work. Śrīnivāsa does not forget his duty. He explains the position of Nimbārka with further details in an additional interpretation¹⁹.

It is difficult to explain why Śrīnivāsa gives a different interpretation of the objection as the primary one and the interpretation of Nimbārka as an additional one. One thing is certain that his first interpretation is identical to the one given by Śaṅkara. According to Śaṅkara the objection here is against the non-difference of the world from Brahman, which is the *Upādānakāraṇa*. The objector, according to Śaṅkara, points out that the distinction of enjoyer and objects of enjoyment is well known from ordinary experience and such a distinction would be destroyed if the enjoyer passed over into the object of enjoyment and vice-versa. Such a passing over results due to the acceptance of the non-difference between the world and Brahman, which is the *Upādānakāraṇa* of the world²⁰.

Thus, one of the two interpretations of the objection by Śrīnivāsa agrees with that of Śaṅkara, namely that the word *bhoktrāpatteḥ* means *because the enjoyer will become the object enjoyed and the vice-versa*. His second interpretation agrees with Nimbārka, namely that the word *bhoktrāpatteḥ* means *"because the enjoyer will become controller and vice-versa*. In this context, it may be pointed out that the avowed purpose of Śrīnivāsa, namely, the exposition of the philosophy of Nimbārka cannot in any way prevent him from adopting the better interpretations of the *sūtras* by others. Perhaps that is what he does here, for here he considers not only the *bhedābheda* relation between Brahman and the *jīva* as Nimbārka does but also between the *jīva* and the *jagat* (the world) as well. Hence, Śrīnivāsa goes a step forward over Nimbārka and defends the *bhedābheda* relation on two fronts viz., between the *jīva* and the Brahman on the one hand, and the *jīva* (the enjoyer) and the world (enjoyed) on the other²¹. He brings the example of the pots, dishes, etc., and the lump of clay as their material cause; bracelets, earrings, etc, and

gold as their material cause; leaves, fruits, etc., and tree as their material cause. In all these instances, he points out, there is both a difference and non-difference between the various causes and their respective effects. In the same way, there is also a *mutual distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed*, although they are non-different from Brahman, their material cause. Similarly, in spite of their non-distinction there may still be *a distinction between the enjoyer and the controller* just as pots, jars etc., though by nature non-different from the clay, as having no existence and activity apart from the clay, are yet by nature different from clay, possessing as they do their own peculiar attributes which the clay lacks²².

Śaṅkara too, as we have seen earlier, considers that the objection contained in the *sūtra* is against Brahman's being the *upādānakāraṇa*. Now the solution he proposes here is based on the example of the sea and its waves. He says that even in advaita philosophy, a distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed may exist, just as the waves, foam, bubbles and other modifications of the sea, although are not different from the water of the sea, nevertheless exist, sometimes in the state of mutual separation, sometimes in the state of conjunction. Thus, on the one hand, they are non-different from the sea and on the other hand, they are different from each other. On the basis of the example of the sea and the waves Śaṅkara develops his peculiar *advaita* theory about the relation of *jīva* and Brahman, in which the distinction is due to illusory limiting adjuncts²³. In reality there is *ananyatva* between the cause and the effect²⁴.

That takes us to *sūtra* 2.1.14 which reads *tadananyatvam ārambhaṇa śabdādibhyaḥ*. It forms the first *sūtra* of the *arambhadhikaraṇam*²⁵ according to Nimbārka, Śaṅkara and Śrīnivāsa. Under this *sūtra*, Nimbārka denies any absolute difference between the effect and the cause on the basis of the *Chāndogya* texts "*vācārambhaṇaṁ vikāro nāmadheyam mr̥ttiketyeva satyam*. (Chānd 6.1.14), *aitadātmyam idam sarvaṁ tat satyam...tattvam asi* (Chānd 6.8.7, 6.9.4, 6.10-3, 6.16.3) *sarvam khalv idam brahma* (Chānd 3.14.1). He understands the word *ananyatva* in the sense of *na atyanta bhinnatva*.

This interpretation of Nimbārka naturally determines the line of interpretation for Śrīnivāsa. He has to show the non-difference of the effect from the cause. Therefore he considers the *asatkāryavādins*, the *Vaiśeṣikas*, as the opponents against whom this *sūtra* is directed, because the *Vaiśeṣikas* uphold an absolute difference between the cause and the effects²⁶. He therefore, interprets the word *ananyatva* in the sense of non-difference²⁷. He, interprets also the word *ārambhaṇa* to show that the effects originating from Brahman, the causes are non-different from the cause²⁸. Here he does not seem to be concerned with the *satkāryavāda* schools, whose understanding of the *satkāryavāda* varies from his own.

Śaṅkara is also a *satkāryavādin*. He takes the term *ananyatva* of the *sūtra* in the sense of absolute identity. Unlike the other *satkāryavādins* he does not accept *brahmapariṇāmavāda*. His doctrine is known as *brahmavivartavāda*²⁹. In connection with the *sūtra* under consideration, he develops at length the theory of *vivarta*, on the basis of the word *vācārambhaṇam*. It is well known that most of the pre-Śaṅkara Vedāntins accepted *brahmapariṇāmavāda* and upheld the reality of the created world, of which Brahman is the *Upādānakāraṇa*. Under this *sūtra*, therefore, Śaṅkara criticizes such a view. Who is this *pūrvapakṣin* of Śaṅkara? Is Śrīnivāsa, who also teaches such a view in similar language under *sūtra* 13 the *pūrvapakṣin* of Śaṅkara? Below we give their respective doctrinal positions.

Śrīnivāsa

"In ordinary life although pots, dishes and the rest, having the lump of clay as their material cause; bracelets, earrings and the rest, having gold as their material cause; foams, waves and the rest, having the sea as their material cause; and leaves, fruits and the rest, having the tree as their material cause; are all non-different from their respective causes, there is still a mutual distinction among the particular effects themselves. In exactly the same manner, there may be a mutual distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed although they are non-different from Brahman,

having Brahman as their material cause. Similarly inspite of their non-distinction, there may still be a distinction between the enjoyer and the controller, just as pots, dishes and the rest though by nature non-different from the clay, as having no existence and activity apart from the clay, are yet by nature different too, from the clay possessing as they do their own peculiar attributes which the clay lacks. Likewise, there is a natural relation of difference-non-difference between Brahman and the individual soul. There is, indeed, no inconsistency here. Hence it is established that the doctrine of the causality of Brahman is not open to the above objection."

Śaṅkara

"So this manifold world with its objects of enjoyment, enjoyers and so on has no existence apart from Brahman. But it might be objected. Brahman has in itself elements of manifoldness. As the tree has many branches, so Brahman possesses many powers and energies dependent on those powers. Unity and manifoldness are therefore both true. Thus, a tree considered in itself is one, but it is manifold if viewed as having branches, so the sea in itself is one, but manifold as having waves and foam, so the clay in itself is one, but manifold if viewed with regard to the jars and dishes made of it. On this assumption, the process of final release resulting from right knowledge may be established in connection with the element of unity (in Brahman) while the two processes of common worldly activity and of activity according to the Veda— which depend on the *Karmakāṇḍa* — may be established in connection with the element of manifoldness. And with this view the parallel instances of clay etc agree very well."

From the above comparison it is clear that while Śrīnivāsa is trying to establish that *Brahmakāraṇavāda* is not subject to the objection of non-distinction between the enjoyer and the enjoyed³⁰, Śaṅkara is trying to project the *anekātmakatvavāda* of Brahman, the doctrine of the *pūrvapakṣin*. They base their arguments on similar examples to prove their respective position. It is probable that they got these examples from some earlier common source.

Here the interpretation of the *sūtra* by Śrīnivāsa differs from that of Nimbārka³¹. Therefore it is more probable that he got these examples of tree, its leaves and fruit from some other source. These examples are not found anywhere in the *Saurabha*³².

Nimbārka was a supporter of *aṁśāṁśī saṁbandha* (the relationship between the part and the whole) or *guṇaguṇī saṁbandha* (the relationship between the attributes and the substance). The *drṣṭānta* he brings in support of his theory is *samudrataraṅga* (the ocean and the waves) and *sūryatadprabhā* (the sun and its rays) respectively. The relation between the leaves, fruits and the tree is merely a biological or a physical one, and that cannot be considered to be an adequate example in support of the above metaphysical doctrine of *aṁśāṁśī saṁbandha*. In *aṁśāṁśī* relation the *aṁśa* (part) does not mean merely a physical part. It has a metaphysical connotation. Similarly *aṁśin* (whole) is not merely the sum total of the *aṁśas*, otherwise Brahman (the *aṁśin*) will turn out to be the sum total of all the finite beings (*aṁśas*). In which case, the transcendence and "the otherness" of Brahman, which Nimbārka defends at all costs, will be in jeopardy.

Also, the respective doctrinal perspectives of Śrīnivāsa and Śaṅkara in the above text is different. As is evident from their respective texts given above the similarity in the use of language and style is so insignificant. Therefore it cannot be conclusively proved that Śaṅkara is influenced by Śrīnivāsa, rather than the latter by the former.

Besides, even if Śaṅkara is influenced by Śrīnivāsa, he is not making a direct *verbatim* quotation from Śrīnivāsa, as for example, the latter had done from Viprabhikṣu, which we discussed earlier. Therefore, just on the basis of doctrinal similarity alone, and in the absence of further substantiating evidences, we cannot conclude that Śaṅkara is influenced by Śrīnivāsa. On the other hand, the influence of Śaṅkara could be on Śrīnivāsa in so far as the latter differs from Nimbārka, the exposition of whose doctrine is the explicit *raison d'être* of the *Kaustubha*.

Lastly, there are many other instances in the *bhāṣya* of Śrīnivāsa, which show a clear influence of Śaṅkara on him,

so much so he appears to adopt the better interpretation given by Śaṅkara on many *sūtras* as the first alternative while explaining the interpretation of Nimbārka as a poor second alternative. We will discuss some of these instances later on. Such a procedure, it must be pointed out, on the part of the *Kaustubhakāra* shows that his primary concern, namely, the interpretation of the *Saurabha* did not hinder him from adopting certain better insights from the earlier *bhāṣyakāras* provided these insights did not contradict the *bhedābheda* doctrine of the *Saurabha*.

So, the position of the followers of Nimbārka that the *pūrvapakṣa* in the *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* 2.1.14 is what Śrīnivāsa states as the *siddhānta* in the *Kaustubha* 2.1.13 is a bit presumptuous. For, it could very well be an adaptation of the finer points by Śrīnivāsa from Śaṅkara. We find in a number of places Śrīnivāsa accepting the interpretation of Śaṅkara as an alternative to the interpretation of Nimbārka. Below we consider a few such instances:

3. Śrīnivāsa adopts Śaṅkara's interpretation

Under the *sūtra* 1.1.19 "*kāmāc ca nānumānāpekṣā*" Śrīnivāsa gives two interpretations. The first part of the *bhāṣya* of Śrīnivāsa on this *sūtra* seems to be an adaptation of Śaṅkara (according to whom it is *sūtra* 18 of the *pāda*), while the second part that of Nimbārka.

Nimbārka

"If the individual soul be admitted to be the cause, it must depend on a material cause, viz. on *pradhāna* which is an (object of) "inference" just as a potter has to depend on clay and the rest in creating pots and the like. But the highest person, omnipotent and non-material, consisting of bliss, has to depend on nothing. Why? On account of desire i.e. on account of intention as declared by the scriptural text: He desired : May I be many (*Tait* 2.6). Hence that which consists of bliss is different from that (Viz. the individual soul)."

Śaṅkara

"Since in the passage "he desired, may I be many, may I grow forth", which occurs in the Chapter treating of the

ānandamaya (Tait 2.6), the quality of feeling desire is mentioned, that which is inferred, i.e. the non-intelligent *pradhāna* assumed by the Sāṅkhyas cannot be regarded as being the self consisting of bliss and the cause of the world. Although the opinion that the *pradhāna* is the cause of the world, has already been refuted in the *sūtra* 1.1.5, it is here, where favourable opportunity presents itself, refuted for a second time on the basis of the scriptural passage about the cause of the world feeling desire, for the purpose of showing the uniformity of view (of all the scriptural passages)."

Śrīnivāsa

"...The term "consisting of bliss" contains no "reference" to "inference" i.e. to that which is inferred, viz. *pradhāna*. Why? "on account of desire" i.e. because the text, which refers to that which consists of bliss viz. He desired: "May I be many" (Tait 2.6), mentions one who desires. The sense is that desire means volition, and that is not possible on the part of the non-sentient *pradhāna*, but is possible on the part of the omniscient Lord of all. Although *pradhāna* has already been set aside by the aphorism "Because (the creator) sees, not, non-scriptural" (BS, 1.1.5), it is once more set aside here with a view to confirming the "universality of knowing" and hence there is no fault of repetition.

Or else, (an alternative explanation of the *sūtra*) – if the individual soul be denoted by the term "consisting of bliss" the topic of the present discussion, it must be the cause of the world as well, and in that case, just as potters have to depend on clay and the rest for creating pots, etc. So the individual soul too must depend on *pradhāna*, which is a synonym for inference. But if the omnipotent Brahman be the cause of the world, no such fault arises – this is the sense."

b) Another instance where Śrīnivāsa gives two interpretations is under the *sūtra* 1.3.10 *akṣaram ambarāntadhr̥teḥ*. Here also his first alternative seems to be a reasonable adaptation of the interpretation of the *sūtra* by Śaṅkara while the second alternative seems to be an expansion of what Nimbārka says about the same *sūtra*.

Nimbārka does not bring up any *pūrvapakṣin* in order to

explain his position on the *sūtra*. His interpretation is a "matter of fact" statement. He says:

"akṣaram brahma, kutaḥ? kāla trayavarttikāryādhāratayā nirddiṣṭasyākāśasya dhāraṇāt.

Samkara, on the other hand, proposes a *pūrvapakṣin* who maintains that the word *akṣara* means *varṇa* (syllable) which is the settled meaning. The *siddhānta* position according to him is that the *akṣara* means *parameśvara*.

According to Śrīnivāsa the real issue at stake is whether *akṣara* means *pradhāna* or *jīva* or Brahman. Naturally the *siddhānta* view is that *akṣara* is the supreme Brahman. He gives two alternative views³³ of the *siddhānta*. The first alternative interpretation of Śrīnivāsa tallies with that of Śaṅkara and also of Bhāskara³⁴. Surprisingly Śrīnivāsa gives only secondary importance to what Nimbārka has said on this *sūtra*. Śrīnivāsa expands the interpretation of Nimbārka when he says:

"yadvā'ambarasya vāyumata-ākāśasyāntaḥpārabhūtaṁ kāraṇam avyākṛtaṁ pradhānaṁ tasya dhr̥ter dhāraṇād ityarthaḥ. yad ūrddham (Br̥h 3.7.7) ityārabhya kālātrayavarttikṛtsna vastvādhāratayā nirddiṣṭasyākāśasabda vācyasyā vyākṛta sūkṣma pradhānādi nāmadheyasyādhāratayocyamānam etad akṣaraṁ na pradhānam api tu brahmaiv ety arthaḥ".

It may be too presumptuous to consider on the basis of the above findings alone, that Śrīnivāsa is influenced by Śaṅkara, for wherever the alternative interpretations, given by Śrīnivāsa, tally with the interpretation of the same *sūtra* by Śaṅkara³⁵ it means only that one of them might have been influenced by the other. But we have to go a step further to say that the influence seems to be of Śaṅkara on Śrīnivāsa rather than of Śrīnivāsa on Śaṅkara. Here we are helped by the fact that throughout the *Kaustubha* Śrīnivāsa seems to summarize the *bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara wherever there is no doctrinal controversy between Nimbārka and Śaṅkara³⁶. There are also cases when Śrīnivāsa tries to interpret Nimbārka under the better light shown by Śaṅkara's interpretation in spite of the doctrinal difference between Nimbārka and Śaṅkara. Let us examine a few such instances.

4. Śrīnivāsa is influenced by Śaṅkara

While discussing the two-fold characteristic of Brahman under *sūtras* 3.2.11-21, the *sūtrakāra* brings up the *drṣṭānta* of the sun and its reflexion in the water under *sūtra* 18 “*ata eva copamā śūryakādivat. Sūtra* 19 “*aṁbuvad agrahaṇāt tu na tathātvam*” poses a *pūrvapakṣa* view, which is overruled by *sūtra* 20 “*Vṛddhihrāsabhāktvam antarbhāvād ubhaya samanjasyād evam*”. This is how Nimbārka, Śaṅkara and Śrīnivāsa take the *sūtras*, yet there is a difference in their understanding and the interpretations of the *sūtras*. According to Nimbārka the *pūrvapakṣa* view is that on account of the apprehension of water to be remote from the sun, but not so the place (i.e. the individual soul in which the Brahman dwells as the *antaryāmin*) from the whole (i.e. from Brahman) the example cited is not to the point³⁷.

According to Śaṅkara the *pūrvapakṣa* objection is based on the reason that there is no apprehension of any substance comparable to the water, in the case of Brahman and therefore no parallelism between Brahman and the reflected images of the sun is possible. In the case of the sun and other material luminous bodies there exists a separate material substance occupying a different place, for example the water, on which the light of the sun may be reflected. The self, on the other hand, is not a material thing, and as it is present everywhere and everything is identified with it, there are no limiting adjuncts different from it, and occupying a different place — therefore the instances are not parallel³⁸.

Nimbārka interprets the *siddhānta* in the following manner:

*tatrāha: sthāninaḥ sthānāntarbhāvāt tat prayukta vṛddhihrāsabhāktvam drṣṭāntena nirākriyate, ubhayasāmañja syād evam vivakṣitāṁśamātram grhyate*³⁹

A closer examination of the interpretation of the *sūtra* 3.2.20 “*vṛddhihrāsabhāktvam antarbhāvād ubhayasāmañjasyād evam*” by Nimbārka points out that he bluntly denies what seems to be asserted by the *sūtra* itself. It appears that Nimbārka has to take such an extreme step due to a genuine “misunderstanding” in his comprehension of the point of comparison in the examples and the exemplified. He takes the *antarbhāvatva* of both Brahman and the

sun as the point of comparison, and not their participation in the increase and the decrease in the reflected objects, which seems to be suggested by the *sūtra* itself.

Śaṅkara finds it difficult to accept the *antarbhāvatva* as the point of comparison as Nimbārka would have us understand, because the sun in the example is in fact *dūrastha* and therefore the answer that Nimbārka gives against the *pūrvapakṣa* is not strong enough and far from convincing. Śaṅkara finds it difficult also to accept the *sūtra* at its face value. Therefore he reads *evam* in the *sūtra* as *iva* and with this magic wand he interprets the *sūtra* differently.

In his interpretation Śaṅkara seems to say that he had to accept the *drṣṭānta* of the sun and its reflection in the water because it is a scriptural *drṣṭānta*. Yet he points out that there is no complete equality of the two compared objects in all points. The point of comparison according to him is *the participation in the increase and decrease and so on*. He, however, understands that the *sūtra* cannot be explained literally. Therefore he adds an *iva* to the explanation with the result that the participation of Brahman in the attributes and the states of the body becomes unreal. Śaṅkara's explanation is a very cleverly thought out answer to the *pūrvapakṣin*.

Śrīnivāsa seems to adapt this interpretation of Śaṅkara in order to explain the position of Nimbārka better and at the same time to refute Śaṅkara. Realizing that the interpretation of Nimbārka goes against the letter of the *sūtra* Srinivasa says that the word *na* is to be supplied to the *sūtra* from the preceding *sūtra*. He denies on the part of Brahman, who is one only and who abides as manifold in the sentient and non-sentient objects as their inner controller, any participation in their increase and decrease, or any division by their respective differences or any pollution due to their respective faults. His final remarks that "the resultant meaning is that there can be no relation of example and the exemplified between two objects when the example proves the exemplified to possess contrary qualities" (*yeṇa drṣṭāntena-dārṣṭānta vaigunyaṁ syānna tayor drṣṭāntadārṣṭāntabhāva iti phalito'rthaḥ*) appears to be a reference to Śaṅkara's position that Brahman, although in reality uniform and never changing participates

as it were in the attributes and states of the body and the other limiting adjuncts within which It abides. It grows with them as it were, decreases with them as it were, and so on. (*evaṁ paramārthatō'vikṛtam ekarūpam api sad brahma dehādyupādhy antarbhāvād bhajata-iv-opādhi dharmān vṛddhihrāsādīn*).

Śrīnivāsa also interprets the word *ubhayaśāmānyāt* of the *sūtra* as "on account of the appropriateness of the two examples of the sun etc." namely, the sun and the water and the ether and the pot which he brings in support of his explanation. He too explains with the help of these two examples, how there is non-participation of Brahman in the changes that occur in the objects in which He indwells. Just as there is the non-participation of the (universal) ether in the faults of the receptacles on which it is reflected on, Brahman too does not participate in the changes that the *jīva* and the *jagat* undergo.

b) Another place where Śrīnivāsa shows an awareness of Śaṅkara is in his *bhāṣya* on BS 3.4.32-35⁴⁰. Here Nimbārka, Śaṅkara and Śrīnivāsa discuss the role of works of permanent obligation such as sacrifices, etc.

Śrīnivāsa develops the *sūtra* 3.4.32 like Śaṅkara with a clear reference both to BS 3.4.26 "*sarvāpekṣā ca yajñādiśruter aśvavat*", which has established that the sacrifices etc. are subsidiary parts of *Brahmavidyā*, and to Brh 4.4.22 "*tam etam vedānuvacanena brāhmaṇā vividiṣanti yajñena*". He develops a *pūrvapakṣa* which denies the need of the *āśramakarmans* like sacrifice etc. on the part of **one** who does not desire knowledge.

The influence of Śaṅkara on Śrīnivāsa is more evident in his *bhāṣya* on *sūtras* 33 and 35 of the same *pāda*. Below are the relevant portions.

BS 3.4.33.

Nimbārka

"Since sacrifice and the rest are enjoined "also as auxiliary" to knowledge in the text. "The Brahmanas desire to know by sacrifice" (Brh 4.4.22), they are to be performed also by one who is desirous of salvation, a double purpose being

possible in accordance with the maxim of conjunction and separateness."

Śaṁkara

"Those works are also co-operative with knowledge just because they are enjoyed as such, viz., in passages such as "Him the Brāhmaṇas seek to know by the study of the Veda etc. This has been explained under *sūtra* 26.

Therefore texts stating the cooperation of works (with knowledge) have to be interpreted as stating that works as means for the origination of knowledge. We need not fear that thus there arises a contradiction of permanent and non-permanent connection. For, there may be difference of connection even where there is no difference of works. One connection is permanent, resting on the texts about the life-long performance of the *agnihotra* and so on; of this knowledge is not the result. The other connection is non-permanent, resting on texts such as "Him the Brāhmaṇas seek to know" etc; of this knowledge is the result. The case is analogous to that of the one *Khadira*, which through a permanent connection serves the purpose of the sacrifice, and through a non-permanent connection the purpose of man."

Śrīnivāsa

"To the objection viz. If this be so, then sacrifices and the rest cannot be auxiliaries to knowledge – the author replies:

Since sacrifice and the rest are enjoined "also as auxiliary" to knowledge, by way of bringing about its origination, in the passage "Him the Brāhmaṇas desire to know by sacrifice" (*Brh* 4.4.22) and so on, works like sacrifices and the rest are to be performed also by one who is desirous of salvation. If it be objected that the same works cannot serve the purpose of a stage of life and that of knowledge – we reply: that is not so, because even the same works may serve different purposes, in accordance with the maxim "but with regard to one and the same thing being both, there is conjunction and separateness" (*Pūva Mīmāṃsā Sūtra* 4.3.5). Just as the same quality of being made of the *Khadira* wood is laid down as serving the purpose of sacrifices in the passage. "The sacrifi-

cial post is made of the *Khadira* wood" and is, again laid down as serving the purpose of men in the passage. "For one desiring power, let one make a post of the *Khadirawood*" so is the case here."

In the above texts Śrīnivāsa also makes use of the example of *Khadira* wood like Śaṁkara⁴¹. Śaṁkara brings the example of *Khadira* wood to substantiate that one and the same work can have a permanent and non-permanent connection. Śrīnivāsa makes use of the same example to show that one and the same *Khadira* wood can have different purposes, because Nimbārka has said in his *bhāṣya* that one and the same work could have a *double purpose*.

c) Similarly the *bhāṣya* of Śrīnivāsa on *sūtra* 35 of the same *pāda* shows a significant influence of Śaṁkara:

BS 3.4.35

Nimbārka

"The scriptural text "By means of religious observance one removes one's sins" (*Mahānārāyaṇa* 22.1) shows the non-overpowering of knowledge through the removal of sins — which are the causes of the overpowering of knowledge — by the very same sacrifices and so on, celebrated in the scripture."

Śaṁkara

"This *sūtra* points out a further indicatory mark fortifying the conclusion that works co-operate towards knowledge. Scripture also shows that he who is furnished with such means as *Brahmacārya* etc, is not overpowered by such afflictions as passion and the like. Compare the passage, "that self does not perish which they find out by *Brahmacārya*" (*Chāṇḍ* 8.5.3). It is thus a settled conclusion that sacrifices etc. are works incumbent on the *āśramas* as well as conducive towards knowledge."

Śrīnivāsa

"The scriptural text "For the self which one finds out through the life of *Brahmacārya* does not perish" (*Chāṇḍ* 8.5.3) shows the non-overpowering of the knowledge of the

self by the duties incumbent on the stages of life, such as the life of a religious student and so on. The phrase "The self does not perish" means that the self is not forgotten. Sacrifices and the rest, performed as the mere duties incumbent on the stages of life, lead to the attainment of heaven and so on; those very sacrifices and the rest, performed as auxiliaries to knowledge, give rise to knowledge. Hence there is difference of application, but not difference of works. Hence it is established that the same things are to be performed by both one who is desirous for salvation and one who is not".

As is evident from his *bhāṣya*, Nimbārka considers the *sūtra* as referring to the passage "*dharmena pāpam apānudati*" (*Mahānārāyaṇa* 22. 1). But Śrīnivāsa prefers the *Chāndogya* 8.5.3 passage *śamādibhir eṣa hy ātmā na naśyati yaṁ brahmacaryeṇānuvīdati*, as referred to by Śaṅkara. The reason seems to be that the text quoted by Nimbārka is a misfit for the *sūtra* in comparison to the text quoted by Śaṅkara for the *sūtra* "*anabhibhavam*" (non-overpowering). Śrīnivāsa rejects the text of Nimbārka and accepts the text quoted by Śaṅkara. Here two points are worth noting. First of all, Śaṅkara seems to refine Nimbārka in his explanation and brings a better text to substantiate the *sūtra*. Secondly, Śrīnivāsa follows Śaṅkara rather than Nimbārka⁴².

5. Śrīnivāsa prefers Śaṅkarite theory

a) I bring one more instance where, in spite of the similarity of interpretation between Nimbārka and Śaṅkara, Śrīnivāsa agrees more with Śaṅkara. Under BS 3.4.40-43⁴³ Nimbārka, Śaṅkara, and Śrīnivāsa discuss the fate of the *Naisthika brahmacārins*. Śaṅkara and Śrīnivāsa agree with Nimbārka, in considering *sūtra* 3.4.42 as stating the *pūrvapakṣa* view that the failing of a *naisthikabrahmacārī* in his vows is only a minor sin and therefore there is a possibility of purificatory rites for the sins. There is a general agreement between Nimbārka, Śaṅkara and Śrīnivāsa, in the interpretation of *sūtra* 3.4.40-42, although the *bhāṣya* of Śrīnivāsa seems to be more of a summary of the *bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara. But the *siddhānta*, according to Nimbārka is that falling out from such an exalted state of life is not allowed. In case if someone has the misfortune of deviating from such a

state of life, there is no possibility of an expiation for him. Śrīnivāsa seems to abandon the opinion of Nimbārka when he comes to the *śiḍdhānta* (BS 3.4.43) and accepts the interpretation of Śaṅkara, as is evident from the following texts.

BS 3.4.43

Nimbārka

“Whether the deviation of perpetual religious students from their own stage of life be a major or a minor sin “in either case even” they are “outside” the right to the knowledge of Brahman, on account of the *Smṛti* passage: “I do not see any expiation whereby he, the killer of himself, may be purified” (*Agnipurāṇa* 265. 24b) and on account of the conduct of the good (*śiṣṭācārāt*).”

Śaṅkara

“But whether lapses from the duties of one’s order, committed by those who are bound to chastity, be mortal sins or minor sins, in either case, such persons are to be excluded by honourable men (*śiṣṭas*). For *Smṛti* refers to them in terms of the highest reproach; passages such as the one quoted under *sūtra* 41, and the following one “he who touches a Brāhmaṇa that has broken his vow and fallen from his order, or a hanged man or one gnawed by worms must undergo the *Candrāyāṇa* penance”. And good custom also condemns them, for good men do not sacrifice, study or attend weddings with such persons.”

Śrīnivāsa

“Whether the deviation of those who are bound by chastity from their own stage of life be a major or a minor sin “in either case even” they are to be kept “outside” indeed by the good. Why? “On account of *Smṛti* and on account of conduct” i.e. on account of the *Smṛti* passage censuring such a deviation, viz. ‘I do not see any expiation whereby he, the killer of himself, may be purified’ (*Agnipurāṇa* 165, 24b). “If one sees a Brāhmaṇa who ascended (to a high stage) has fallen (there from), one should undergo the *Candrāyāṇa* penance”, and

on account of the conduct of the good who always shun one who has deviated from the vow of chastity. Hence it is established that those who have deviated from their stages of life are not entitled to the knowledge of Brāhmaṇ.

In the above passage, we notice that Śrīnivāsa takes a stand against Nimbārka and supports the view of Śaṅkara. According to Nimbārka, irrespective of the fact whether the deviation of a *naiṣṭhika brahmacārin* is a major or a minor sin, he is excluded from the right to the knowledge of Brahman. It implies that he has no right to salvation. Śaṅkara, on the other hand, does not advocate such an extreme step against such sinners. According to him, irrespective of the major or minor nature of their lapses such sinners are to be shunned by good people. This is the line of thought that Śrīnivāsa takes against the failings of the *naiṣṭhika brahmacārins*. Significantly, the vocabulary of Śaṅkara and Śrīnivāsa are so much identical that it looks as if one had the text of the other "on his desk". Besides, if there is an influence of one over the other, it must be the influence of Śaṅkara over Śrīnivāsa because it is Śrīnivāsa who deviates from the "trodden path" of Nimbārka and advocates a more lenient attitude towards the sins of the *naiṣṭhika brahmacārins*. By taking such a stand, under the influence of Śaṅkara, Śrīnivāsa goes a bit astray from his initial intention of only explaining the doctrine of the *Saurabha*.

b) Again a comparative study of the commentaries of Nimbārka, Śaṅkara and Śrīnivāsa on BS 1.2.11 "*guhām praviṣṭāvātmānau hi tad darśanāt*" shows that Śrīnivāsa is very much influenced by Śaṅkara. Nimbārka explains the *sūtra* in a matter of fact manner, without even raising a *pūrvapakṣin* but goes straight to the *Kaṭha* texts 3.1.2.12 and 4.7 as his basis and asserts that "*the two entered the cave*" should be understood as the individual soul and the supreme soul⁴⁴.

Śaṅkāra⁴⁵ and Śrīnivāsa⁴⁶, on the contrary, raise two sets of doubts whether 'the two entered the cave' refer (a) to *buddhi* and the individual soul or (b) to the individual soul and the supreme soul. Śaṅkara throws away the first set of doubts on the ground that the two are said to drink i.e. to enjoy the fruit of their works in the world. Only an intelligent

being can drink, for the dual verbal from *pibantau* shows that both are drinking⁴⁷. Śrīnivāsa too asserts that the souls entered into the cave are the two sentient beings alone⁴⁸. It is also the doctrinal position of Nimbārka, but he does not base his doctrine on reasoning, but on the authority of *śruti* alone. In fact, Nimbārka seems to be unaware of the new dimension that Śaṅkara brought here, which Śrīnivāsa adopts as well.

Śaṅkara makes a strong defence of the second possibility, namely, that the two entered the cave refer to the individual soul and the supreme soul alone, although only one of them (i.e. the individual soul) actually *drinks*. In his defence, he brings an analogous example: "just as we see that in phrases such as *chatrīṇo gacchanti* (men with umbrellas are walking) this attribute of being furnished with an umbrella which properly speaking belongs to one man only, is secondarily ascribed to many. So here two agents are spoken of as drinking although only one of them is really drinking⁴⁹. He gives another reason for attributing "drinking" to both the sentient beings, although only the individual soul "drinks", namely, that the Lord makes the soul "to drink"⁵⁰. Thus both the prompting agent and the prompted agent have connection with the action of drinking.

Śrīnivāsa accepts both these arguments of Śaṅkara and develops his defence in similar lines as is clear from:

*chatrīṇo yāntītivadṛtaṁ pibantāv iti nirdeśasya sambhavāt jīvaḥ pibati tam aparaḥ pāyayatīti prayojakakartṛtva sambhavāc ca*⁵¹.

Another argument that Śaṅkara and Śrīnivāsa bring against the *pūrvapakṣin* in defence of their own *siddhānta* is that "the two entered the cave" refer to individual soul and the highest self, on the basis of the fact of their being is of the same nature since both are intelligent selves.

Śaṅkara

*vijñānātmaparamātmānāv
ihocyetātam. kasmāt.
ātmānau hi tāv ubhāv api*

Śrīnivāsa

*kiṁ ca'ṛtaṁ pibantāv'ityatra
karmaphalabhokṛtvēnaikasmīn
cetane niścite sati*

cetanau samānasvabhāvau.
 saṁkhyāśravaṇe ca
 samānasvabhāveṣu eva loke
 pratītir drśyate. asya
 gordvītyo 'nveṣṭavya ity
 ukte gaur eva
 dvitīyo'nviṣyate, nāsvaḥ
 puruṣo vā. tad iha
 ṛtapānena lingena niścīte
 vijñānāt manī dvitīyānveṣa-
 nāyām samānasvabhāvaś
 cetanaḥ paramātmāiva
 pratīyate⁵².

dvitīyenāpi cetanenaiva
 bhāvyam. saṁkhyāśravaṇe
 sati saṁkhyāvator hi
 samānajātiyatvasya loke
 darśanād ity arthaḥ. tad
 yathā'asya gor
 dvitīyo'nveṣṭavyaḥ ity ukte
 gaur evānviṣyate nāśvo na
 gardabhaḥ'iti mahābhāṣye
 sthitam⁵³.

Here they point out that in ordinary life whenever a number is mentioned without specification it stands for the members of the same class. For example, they say, when someone orders *asya gor dvitīyo'nveṣṭavya* (look out for a second for this bull) people look out for a second bull, not for a horse or for a donkey or for a man. Similarly the mention of the fruition of rewards enables us to determine that the individual soul is meant. Since two intelligent selves" are said to drink (*ṛtaṁ pibantau*) two such selves are required. Therefore we understand immediately that besides the individual self, the highest self is also to be inferred here, for the highest self is the only other intelligent self. Therefore the highest self is to be understood here. Besides, this highest self is of the same nature as the soul.

The *pūrvapakṣin's* objection against the entering of the omnipresent highest self into the limited space like the cave of the heart is answered by Śaṁkara with an appeal to scriptural statement to that effect. Śrīnivāsa, significantly seems to elaborate the arguments of Śaṁkara. According to him there is no possibility of an objection against the entering of the individual soul into the cave because it is atomic in size, but he accepts that an objection can be raised against the entering of the supreme soul, because he is all pervasive. Like Śaṁkara, he too rejects the objections on the basis of the scriptural support.

....nanūktam guhāhit-
atvadarśanān na
paramātmā praty etavya
iti, guhā hitatva darśanād
eva paramātmā
praty etavya itivadāmaḥ.
guhāhitvarṇituśrutismṛtiṣv
asakṛtparamātmāna eva
dr̥ṣyate. 'guhāhitam
gahvareṣṭham' purāṇām
(Kaṭha 1.2.12) 'yo veda
nihitam guhāyam parama
vyoman (Tait 2.1)
ātmānamanviccha guhām
praviṣṭam ity ādyāsu.

...guhām hr̥dayalakṣaṇām praviṣṭau
ātmānau hi cetanau eva. nanu
jīvātmano' nūtena praviśo yuktaḥ,
paramātmāno vibhuparimāṇasya
tuguhāpraveśo na saṁgacchate iti
pūrvoktadoṣas tad avastha ii cen
na, tad darśanāt. vyāpakasyāpi
tasya paramātmānaḥ
svānanyājanecchayā' syām
evopaniṣadi 'anguṣṭhmātraḥ puruṣo
madhye ātmani tiṣṭhati, iśāno
bhūtabhavyasya (Kaṭha 1.4.12) iti
svānanyajanaguhāyām darśanavi-
dhānāt. "guhāhitarṅgahvareṣṭham"
(Kaṭha 1.2.12) yo veda nihitam
guhāyām (Tait 2.1) iti tad darśanāc
ca. "yā prāṇena saṁbhavatyaditir
devatāmayī guhām praviśya
tiṣṭhanṭī sā bhūtebhir vyajāyate"
(Kaṭha 1.4.7) itijīvasyaguhāpraveśa
vyapadeśāc ca.

6. Śrīnivāsa refutes Śaṁkara's theory

Our study clearly proves that Śrīnivāsa is very much influenced by the *bhāṣya* of Śaṁkara. In order to explain the doctrine of Nimbārka better, he makes use of the insights offered by Śaṁkara. Occasionally it carries him off the track, from "the trodden path of Nimbārka"⁵⁴ or to make compromises with Śaṁkara⁵⁵ or to offer an interpretation which on the one hand, differs from the one given by Nimbārka and, on the other hand, agrees with Śaṁkara⁵⁶. The significance of these influences on Śrīnivāsa and the resulting change in his outlook is all the more important when we consider that the avowed aim of the work of Śrīnivāsa is the explanation of the doctrines set forth in the *Saurabha*. Since the very purpose of the *Kaustubha* is an exposition of the doctrine contained in the *Saurabha*, we cannot expect the *Kaustubhakāra* to refute theories that the *Saurabhakāra* himself did not pay any attention to mostly due to the *Saurabhakāra*'s own unawareness of them⁵⁷. Therefore we

may assume that the disputes, if any, that the Kaustubhakāra engages in with any of the rival schools are entered into *inadvertently* by him⁵⁸. That accounts for the paucity of such instances. Below we examine a case, namely, *Kaustubha* 2.3.31, where Śrīnivāsa seems to dispute with Śaṅkara and fellow Vedāntins. Before entering into the details, it may be pointed out that the following commentary of Nimbārka on BS 2.3.31⁵⁹ "*sarvagatātmavāde ātmopalabdhyanupaladhyor bandhamokṣayor nityaṁ prasangaḥ syān nityabaddho vā nityamukto vā'tme'tyanyatara niyamo vā syat*" is meant to throw out the theory of the *sarvagatātmavāda* (the theory of the all-pervasiveness of the soul). Later on in BS 2.3.49 "*ābhāsā eva ca*" Nimbārka identifies the *sarvagatātmavādin*s as Kapila and others⁶⁰.

It is to be pointed out that, although the criticism of the *sarvagatātmavāda* by Nimbārka is equally valid against any Vedāntin who accepts such a theory, the general purpose and context of the *Saurabha*'s criticism shows that it is solely directed against the Sāṅkhya. It is all the more clear from the fact that Nimbārka criticises the Sāṅkhya theory of attributing agentship of the *Puruṣa* to *buddhi* in the next *adhikaraṇa* (*sūtras* 32-39) and identifies the *sarvagatātmavādin* as Kapila and his followers in *Saurabha* 2.3.49. Besides, as was pointed out in the last Chapter, Nimbārka is totally unaware of Śaṅkara or of any Vedāntin accepting the *sarvagatātmavāda*. Since Nimbārka's arguments against *sarvagatātmavāda* are equally valid against the Vedāntins accepting such views the latter have to make a defence of the *sarvagatātmavāda*. Bhāskara does so here. He seems to say that the *sarvagatātmavāda* is not defective if we accept the distinctions and implications involved in the doctrine of *upādhi*⁶¹.

Bhāskara points out in BS 2.3.32 that the *sūtra* is not against all types of *sarvagatātmavāda*. Although Bhāskara himself accepts 'atomicity' of the *jīva* as pointed earlier he does not accept it as the real nature of the *jīva*⁶², whereby he means that the real nature of the soul is *vibhūtvā*. He follows Śaṅkara in his interpretations of these *sūtras* on the all-pervasive nature of the *jīva*.

The interpretation of BS 2.3.31 by Śrīnivāsa seems to be

a clarification of the explanation of Nimbārka. Nimbārka has pointed out the flaws in the doctrine of *sarvagatātmavāda* here. Bhāskara says “*yat punar ātma vibhutvavādinām doṣakathanārtham sūtram iti vyākhyātāṁ tad ayuktam. sarvagatatve’pi śārīradeśe bhogotpatteḥ karmanimittatvāt tasya*.” Śrīnivāsa clarifies the point. He says *cetanabhūtātma-vibhutvavādimate doṣakathanārtham sūtram*⁶³. Some of the scholars of the Nimbārka school⁶⁴ would like us to see the controversy the other way. According to them, the statement of Bhāskara is an actual *verbatim* quotation from Śrīnivāsa, as well a refutation of the position of Śrīnivāsa. It must be pointed out here that Bhāskara actually refutes only the interpretation of the *sūtra* by some one who asserts that the *ātmavibhutvavāda* is full of flaws. He could be Nimbārka as well⁶⁵. If, on the other hand, Bhāskara were making an actual quotation from Śrīnivāsa the text should have been “*yat punas cetanabhūtātma-vibhutvavādinām doṣakathanārtham....instead of yat punar ātmavibhutvavādinām doṣakathanārtham*. Therefore, it is not an actual *verbatim* quotation from Śrīnivāsa.

Therefore the question of who is quoting whom is an open one. If so, then there are two possibilities. Either Bhāskara is quoting Śrīnivāsa or Śrīnivāsa is refuting Bhāskara. The latter seems to be more probable from Śrīnivāsa’s own statement “*anyathā jñātrtvādyātmadharmako jñānasvarūpo’nu parimāṇaka ātmyety asmad pakṣād anyaprakārake jñānamātrasarvagatātmavāde...*” This refutation seems to be against the position of Bhāskara who accepts that the real nature of the *jīva* is *sarvagatatva* although in the state of bondage it is *aṇu*⁶⁶. If Śrīnivāsa is refuting Bhāskara, he is also definitely post-Śaṅkara. Besides, the phrase “*cetanabhūtātma-vibhutvavāda*” seems to be alluding to the *vedāntins* who advocate *caitanasvarūpaiva* of the *ātman*⁶⁷ which is *vibhu*⁶⁸.

Therefore this *cetanabhūtātma-vibhutvavādin* or *jñānamātrasarvagatātmavādin* for Śrīnivāsa seems to be Śaṅkara. This strengthens our findings that in a number of places in the *Kaustubha* Śrīnivāsa seems to be aware of the *Śaṅkarabhāṣya*. Besides, he quotes a text, now forming the

seventh verse of *Daśaślokī*, which seems to be directed against Śaṅkara. The text reads:

yathāhuḥ:-

*sarvaṁ hi vijñānam ato yathārthakam
śrutismṛtibhyonikhilasya vasthunaḥ
brahmātmakatvād iti vedavinmatam
trirūpatā'pi śruti sūtra sādhitā*⁶⁹.

The stanza makes it evident that it is meant to uphold the doctrine of the objectivity of all cognitions against the *advaita* of Śaṅkara⁷⁰. If so, Śrīnivāsa is familiar with the doctrines of Śaṅkara.

7. Śrīnivāsa quotes BVP a post-Śaṅkara Purāṇa

We may also adduce an additional proof for the posteriority of Śrīnivāsa to Śaṅkara. Śrīnivāsa quotes a passage from *BVP* while discussing the destruction of all the previous and the consequent sins on the part of the knower in *Kaustubha* 4.1.13. Śrīnivāsa raises an objection there based on an actual quotation from *BVP* 2.26.70,⁷¹ that the consequence of a work done must necessarily be experienced and therefore the destruction of results of work is not possible. Such an objection is thrown out on the basis of *Chāṇḍ* 4.4.13, 5.24.3 and *Muṇḍ* 2.2.8 and it is asserted that the non-clinging and destruction of subsequent and prior sins for a knower are not meaningful if they pertain to the destruction of only those works, whose consequences are already undergone, since such a destruction holds equally good in the case of a non-knower as well⁷². Therefore Śrīnivāsa explains *BVP* 2.26.70 as referring to the case of a non-knower and to work which have begun to produce consequences⁷³.

What is significant here is the fact that the entire *Kaustubha* 4.1.13 is built on the objection based on *BVP* 2.26.70 and therefore this *BVP* passage cannot be thrown away as an interpolation at all.

Since Śrīnivāsa relies on *BVP* passage and quotes it twice, he cannot be earlier than *BVP*. The actual date of *BVP* is in fact undeterminable, as H.H. Wilson⁷⁴ admits that some legends in *BVP* might be relatively of ancient origin, the *Purāṇa* as a whole might have originated about the time of

Vallabhācārya and the Goswāmins of Gokula⁷⁵. R.C. **Hazra** feels that *BVP* was most probably first composed in the eighth century A.D. with various revisions and additions down to the sixteenth century⁷⁶. C.M. **Brown** in his extensive study of *BVP*⁷⁷, on the basis of the study so far made on *BVP* and with the help of the particular references to *BVP* in other Purāṇas like *Mat P.* 53.55-55, 53.67-68, *Pad.P* 6.263, 81-85, *Nad.P.* 1.101.1-3 and *Nar PR* 2.7.30-31, has amply demonstrated that the extant *BVP* for most part is a very different work from the *original* referred to among the 18 *Mahāpurāṇas*, for example, in *VIP.* 3.6.19-21 and other earliest Purāṇic lists. He points out there that the original *BVP* was a product of the Brahmā cult, but has undergone changes at the hands of the Kṛṣṇaite Vaiṣṇavas and the Śaiva Sect⁷⁸.

We may sum up the findings of the scholars on *BVP*. The *BVP* is mentioned among the 18 *Mahāpurāṇas* in *VIP.* 3.6.19-21. C.M. **Brown** points out that this mention in *VIP* must be older than the eleventh century A.D., and **Alberuni** has taken it down from *VIP*⁷⁹. It may be incidentally mentioned that the number 18 seemed to be sacred and the *Purāṇas* were considered to be 18 at least from the beginning of the seventh century A.D.⁸⁰, but that does not mean that there was any unanimity of names in the various lists. **Hazra** considers that the earliest version of *BVP* was first composed in the eighth century A.D., although the extant *BVP* with its present contents was not known to writers even up to the sixteenth century⁸¹. C.M. **Brown** after examining all the available evidences comes to similar conclusions⁸². Significantly, no Purāṇic scholar⁸³ has placed the earliest possible version of *BVP* to an earlier date than that of Śaṅkara. All of them are unanimous that *BVP* is a post-Śaṅkara work.

As we have seen above, Śrīnivāsa bases his arguments in *Kaustubha* 4.1.13 on the actual text of *BVP* 2.26.70 "*avaśyam eva bhoktavyaṁ kṛtam karma-śubhāśubham*" which shows he is familiar with the *BVP*⁸⁴. Therefore he could have existed only after the 8th century A.D., which is considered to be the earliest date of the earliest form of *BVP*. If Śrīnivāsa lived after the earliest form of *BVP*, had been composed, he must have been a post-Śaṅkara *Bhāṣyakāra*. It may be pointed out

that *BVP* mentions Śaṅkara at least thrice. Since the earliest form of *BVP* is later than Śaṅkara, it does not matter at what stage in the development of *BVP* these verses about Śaṅkara found their place in the *BVP*. These verses are:

1. *kārāgare ca saṁsāre durvahanṁ nigaḍaṁ param
acchedyaṁ jñānakhadgaś' ca mahadbhiḥ śaṅkarādibhiḥ*⁸⁵
2. *yam anirvacanīyaṁ ca yogīndraḥ śaṅkaro vadet
svayaṁ vidhātā pravadet kāraṇānāṁ ca kāraṇam*⁸⁶
3. *nyāyo nirvacanīyaṁ ca yaṁ mataṁ śaṅkaro vadet
nityaṁ vaiśeṣikāśca' dyaṁ taṁ vadanti vicakṣaṇaḥ*⁸⁷

The obvious conclusion is that Śrīnivāsa must be a post-Śaṅkara *Bhāṣyakāra*, because the earliest form of *BVP* cannot be dated to a period earlier than that of Śaṅkara. Besides, the extant *BVP* itself has references to Śaṅkara. Therefore Śrīnivāsa who builds up his *bhāṣya* on *BS* 4.1.13 on the basis of *BVP* text cannot be earlier than Śaṅkara.

Conclusion

Our study of Śrīnivāsa is made on the basis of his undisputed work called *Vedānta-Kaustubha*. It is not an independent work because the primary aim of its author is to explain the doctrine of *Bhedābheda*vāda already expounded by Nimbārka, whom Śrīnivāsa considers his *guru*. The *Vedāntapārīṣāda Saurabh* of Nimbārka is devoid of any controversies with the fellow Vedāntins. Therefore the *Kaustubha*, meant to explain the doctrine of the *Saurabh* *ipso facto* need not engage in controversies with the fellow Vedāntins. Such disputes and controversies with the fellow Vedāntins could be expected in a polemic treatise of the school like *Parapakṣagīrivajra* of Mādhvamukunda⁸⁸ or in an independent *bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtra* like the *siddhānta-jāhnavi* of Devācārya. Therefore the mere absence of any major dispute with Śaṅkara in the *Kaustubha* in itself does not mean that the *Kaustubhakāra* is *pre-Śaṅkara*. Yet it must be pointed out that there are some passages in the *Kaustubha* that appear to be the refutation of certain Śaṅkarite doctrines, which the *Kaustubhakāra* has, so to say, "accidentally" entered into. We have discussed some of these instances.

Śrīnivāsa seems to be familiar with the commentary of Śaṅkara. Much of his *bhāṣya* appears to be a summary of the *bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara wherever there is no doctrinal conflict between Nimbārka and Śaṅkara. As we have pointed out, he accepts the insights Śaṅkara offers on many of the *sūtras* of BS. In certain cases, where there is a difference of outlook in the interpretations of Śaṅkara and Nimbārka, Śrīnivāsa accepts both the interpretations as alternatives. In a few such instances he gives priority to the line of interpretation offered by Śaṅkara and gives only a secondary place to the one offered by Nimbārka. Nay, on BS 3.4.43 on the fate of the fallen *naiṣṭhikabrahmacārins* he takes a lenient stand along with Śaṅkara, contrary to Nimbārka's out-right condemnation of them by debarring them from the right to *Brahmavidyā*. Added to all these, is verse seven of the present day *Daśaśloki*, quoted by Śrīnivāsa in *Kaustubha* 1.1.1.1 containing a condemnation of some of the Śaṅkarite doctrine which proves the familiarity of Śrīnivāsa with the philosophy of Śaṅkara.

A further support for the post-Śaṅkara nature of the *Kaustubha* comes from the fact that the *Kaustubhakāra* quotes BVP 2.26.70. No modern scholar has assigned even the earliest and the most original form of BVP to pre-Śaṅkara times. Irrespective of the fact whether the stanzas, referring to Śaṅkara belong to the original form of BVP or not, BVP is a post-Śaṅkara *Purāṇa*. The obvious conclusion is that Śrīnivāsa who offers his arguments in BS 4.1.13 on the basis of BVP 2.26.70 must be a post-Śaṅkara-*bhāṣyakāra*.

Further, the assumption that the *Kaustubha* 2.1.13 is the *pūrvapakṣa* in *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* 2.1.14 is untenable. It is more likely that Śrīnivāsa who seems to be well aware of the *bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara and makes use of the insights and refinements brought in by Śaṅkara elsewhere, does the same here. Our examination of the said passage (*Kaustubha* 2.1.13) above has shown that there is nothing compelling us to accept that Śaṅkara is quoting from Śrīnivāsa. It could be on the contrary, another example where Śrīnivāsa makes use of the refinements and insights that Śaṅkara offers on the *bhedābheda* *vāda* both in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 2.1.14 as well as *Bṛhadāraṇyakabhāṣya* 5.11. It is quite possible,

because, as we have pointed out earlier, Śrīnivāsa in his mission of explaining the *Saurabha* goes to the extend of borrowing much from others, which shows that he is prepared to accept the refinements and insights that Śaṅkara offered on the *Brahmasūtras*, especially on the *bhedābheda*vāda. As we know the *bhedābheda* doctrine is a pre-Śaṅkara doctrine, as is evident from the references examined above.

Finally, the claim⁸⁹ that Śrīnivāsa makes in the *Kaustubha* that he is a disciple of Nimbārka and that he is writing the *Kaustubha* at the command of his *guru*, need not mean that he is the immediate disciple of Nimbārka as alleged by the AC and the *guruparaṁparās*⁹⁰. In fact, we need not give it any more importance than the claim of Nimbārka that he is the disciple of Nārada⁹¹. It means only that he belongs to the tradition of *bhedābheda* school of Vedānta propounded by Nimbārka⁹². Therefore neither the accounts of AC nor the various *guruparaṁparās*, written down centuries later, can give any definite solution to the historical and chronological problems. All that we can deduce with certitude is that the *Kaustubha* of Śrīnivāsa is influenced to a great extent by the *bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara on the *Brahmasūtras*, even though there is no major controversy in the *Kaustubha* against the Śaṅkarite doctrines.

Chapter 6

THE PROBABLE DATE OF NIMBĀRKA

Introduction

Our discussion in chapter four has led us to conclude that Nimbārka, the author of *Vedāntapārijāta Saurabha*, was a pre-Śaṅkara *vr̥ttikāra*. But are we able to place Nimbārka to a definite period in pre-Śaṅkara days? Does the *Saurabha* again help us to arrive at any definite conclusion about the probable date of Nimbārka? Let us again go back to the *Saurabha*. There, Nimbārka's treatment of the Sāṃkhya and the Śākta schools catch our special attention.

1. Nimbārka's criticism of Sāṃkhya

According to Nimbārka the Sāṃkhya doctrine is propounded by Kapila¹. These Sāṃkhyas hold 25 principles beginning with Pradhāna². Commenting on BS 1.4.11 “*na saṃkhyopasaṃgrahādapi nānābhāvādātirekācca*” Nimbārka says “*na ca yasmin pañcajanā ākāśāca pratisthitāḥ (Brh 4.4.17, Śat Br. 14.7.2.19) iti saṃkhyopasaṃgrahād api pradhānādīnāmpañcaviṃśatipadārthānān śrūtimūlakatvam asti...*” Here he points out that Sāṃkhyas cannot claim that the 25 principles beginning with *pradhāna* (*Pradhānādi*) are based on *Śruti*. Here it is not clear whether the *Puruṣa*, who is presented as above the *avyakta*³ is included in this list of 25 principles. Since he says that “the 25 principles beginning

with *pradhāna*," it means that the first among them is *pradhāna* and the other 24 principles follow the *pradhāna*, because it is the *ādi* of them (*pradhānādinām pañcaviṃśatipadārthānām*). It seems that the 24 principles are the evolutes of the *pradhāna* and that the *Puruṣa* is not included in this list of 25. Therefore it raises the question whether Nimbārka is aware of the Sāṅkhyas who accepted 26 principles. If *Puruṣa*, as held by the Sāṅkhyas is above the *pradhānādinām pañcaviṃśatipadārthāni*, then Nimbārka seems to be aware of the Sāṅkhyas holding more than 25 principles. Nimbārka makes a clear distinction⁴ between the *pradhāna* which the Sāṅkhyas call *avyakta* as noted in *Saurabha*, 1.4.1 and the *Puruṣa*, which Nimbārka occasionally calls the *jīva*⁵ or the *ātman*⁶.

Nimbārka does not elaborate which the 25 principles of the Sāṅkhya are. But while speaking of the origin of various material elements and categories from Brahman he mentions the following. (1) ether⁷, (2) air⁸, (3) fire⁹, (4) water¹⁰, and (5) earth¹¹. He does not accept any fixed order of creation. It seems that he considers that there are two types of material elements when he speaks of the *sūkṣmabhūtas* (subtle elements)¹² and the *mahābhūtas*¹³ (the great elements). Elsewhere he considers the *sthūla* state as a transformation of the *sūkṣma* state¹⁴. Thus he makes a clear distinction between them. Therefore we may consider that both the categories of *sūkṣma* and *mahābhūtas* are known to him. Both the *sūkṣma* and *sthūla bhūtas* known to Nimbārka may constitute 10 of the 25 principles of the Sāṅkhya. According to the *Saurabhakāra* other material elements like the vital breath, the mind, the sense organs, the *avyakta*, the *mahat*, and the *aharṅkāra*¹⁵ take their origin from Brahman¹⁶. Of these the sense organs are eleven including the mind¹⁷, while the *prāṇa* (the vital breath) is not a mere air, nor a function of the senses¹⁸. It is a special instrument of the *jīva* in holding up the body through its fivefold modes like *apāna*¹⁹. Thus the 25 principles beginning with *pradhāna* are *pradhāna* or *avyakta*, (1) *mahat* (2) *aharṅkāra* (3) the *mind* and the 10 senses (4-14) the *sūkṣmabhūtas* (15-19) the *mahābhūtas* (20-24) the *prāṇa*. (25). Over and above these 25 principles given above, Nimbārka also accepts the *jīvātman*, which according to him, does not originate²⁰. It is the very *aṁśa* of

Brahman²¹. Besides the *jīva* or *Puruṣa* as noted above, Nimbārka has on different occasions, explained 25 principles which are material in nature. Nimbārka is prepared to accept the theory of *pradhāna* provided that the *Pradhāna* is dependent on Brahman. He calls such a *Pradhāna* the *upaniṣadika pradhāna*²². According to him the *pradhāna* of the Sāṃkhya and its evolutes originate from Brahman or rather they are *Brahmātmikā* (having Brahman as their inner soul), meaning that they share in the ontological essence of Brahman²³. Here he also points out that Brahman transcends them all. The origin of these elements in no way brings in any mutations in Brahman. Brahman transcends all the material creation although He is very much their essence and existence because everything is *brahmātmaka*.

The fundamental reason why Nimbārka rejects the Sāṃkhya doctrine is that it is not based on the *śruti*²⁴. Terms like *avyakta*²⁵, *mahat*²⁶ etc. mentioned in '*śruti*' do not denote the Sāṃkhya categories. They are found to be applied to other realities in the *śruti*²⁷. The scriptural declaration of the ultimate cause as *asat*, *avyakta* etc. is the Brahman and not the *acetanapradhāna* of the Sāṃkhya²⁸. The *acetanapradhāna* cannot be denoted by terms like the *Sat*²⁹, imperishable³⁰, the source of being, the support of heaven and the earth³¹, because no body can obtain liberation by relying on a unconscious principle since liberation is declared to be the attainment of the nature of the principle (*tad bhāvāpatti*) on which one has relied for liberation³². Liberation according to Nimbārka is the attainment of *Brahmabhāva* or *paramaṃ sāmyam*³³ with Brahman³⁴.

Nimbārka also points out that the Sāṃkhya doctrines contradict not only the *śruti* texts but also the other *smṛtis*. While Sāṃkhya advocates an *acetanakāraṇa*, the other *smṛtis* in unison support the *śruti* doctrine of the *cetanakāraṇa* for the world³⁵.

The third reason for the rejection of the Sāṃkhya doctrine is that it contains inner contradictions³⁶, especially concerning its theory of causality. Therefore he attacks, from all fronts, the causality of the *acetanapradhāna*. First of all the scripture declares the cause of the world as a *cetana* prin-

ciple³⁷. Therefore the *Sāṃkhyapradhāna* is not found in the scripture at all³⁸. Secondly the *acetanapradhāna* is not acquainted with the varied arrangements involved in creating this universe³⁹. Thirdly, no spontaneous activity is possible on the part of an *acetana* principle⁴⁰, more specially, because there is no other accessory principle acceptable to the *Sāṃkhya*⁴¹. He points out that no grass eaten by a bull turns into milk⁴². If the milk turns itself into curd, it is due to its being *brahmātma*. The milk has Brahman as its inner controller. Fourthly, the *Sāṃkhya* cannot explain satisfactorily how the state of equilibrium (*sāmyāvasthā*) of the *acetanapradhāna* is disturbed and how the *guṇas* enter into a relation of *aṅgāṅgībhāva*⁴³. The *Sāṃkhya Puruṣa* is devoid of any form of activity. It is unable to do anything. Therefore the similes of the lame leading the blind or the magnet attracting the iron are not suitable. If the *Sāṃkhya* accepts an active *Puruṣa* their *pradhāna* cannot be the primary cause of the world⁴⁴. Fifthly, Nimbārka points out that there cannot be any purpose of set goals for an *acetana* principle⁴⁵.

As pointed out earlier, Nimbārka is prepared to accept a theory of *pradhāna* if it is presented as depending on the *Paramakāraṇa* because such a theory is meaningful⁴⁶. Under the influence of the Supreme prime Mover, evolution from the primary *prakṛti* is possible like the transformation of milk into curd under the influence of Brahman the inner inciter⁴⁷. All that Nimbārka is opposed to is the doctrine of an *acetanapradhāna*, not superintended and directed by an intelligent principle⁴⁸. But if there is such an intelligent principle superintending the *pradhāna*, then the *pradhāna* can no more be the primary cause of the world⁴⁹.

His criticism of the Pāśupata doctrine⁵⁰ as well as the Śāktavāda⁵¹ will make it clear that Nimbārka is not prepared to accept any theory that makes a distinction between the *upādānakāraṇa* and the *nimittakāraṇa*⁵².

Nimbārka is also aware that the *Sāṃkhyas* accept the doctrine of the all-pervasiveness of the *jīva* (*Puruṣa*)⁵³. They also held the doctrine of the plurality of the all-pervasive *jīvas*⁵⁴. According to them even the senses of the *jīvas* are also all-pervasive⁵⁵. It was pointed out in Chapter Four, that Nimbārka's criticism of the all-pervasiveness of the soul is

against the Sāṃkhyas. Under *Sūtras* 2.3.49 Nimbārka points out the untenability of the doctrine of the all-pervasive soul as taught by Kapila. According to him the *sūtra* 2.3.50 shows that the *vyatikara* (mixing of karmas) cannot be avoided even if one were to take recourse to the *adrṣṭa* because there is restriction (*aniyama*) with regard to the *adrṣṭa*. Now, under *sūtra* 2.3.51, the Saurabhakāra says “*aḥam idaṃ kariṣye idaṃ neti Sāṃkalpādiṣvapy evaṃ aniyamaḥ*”. Thus Nimbārka seems to understand that the faculty of making a decision belongs to the *jīva* (*Puruṣa*). But in the classical Sāṃkhya as presented by Īśvarakṛṣṇa, the *Puruṣa*, as pointed out by **Larson**, “is individual, but not personal. The personal ego or self consciousness is included in the notion of *buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra* and *manas*. Thus, what is commonly considered to be self-consciousness or ego is understood in the classical Sāṃkhya to be other than the *Puruṣa*, although *Puruṣa*’s presence is required for these dimensions of human experience to appear. The *Puruṣa* in itself, then, is apart from all knowledge, emotion or self-awareness. It is likewise apart from all action and willing”⁵⁶.

2. The gradual development of the Sāṃkhya

It makes us examine whether the criticism of the Sāṃkhya system by Nimbārka warrants any awareness of the latest systematization of the Sāṃkhya thought by Īśvarakṛṣṇa⁵⁷. Does the above criticism of the Sāṃkhya warrant any extra knowledge of a developed Sāṃkhya on the part of Nimbārka than that of the *Sūtrakāra*⁵⁸? Therefore it is within our interest to draw in the findings of the scholars on the origin and development of the Sāṃkhya thought. Sāṃkhya has a long history of development stretching out at least from the early Vedic period⁵⁹. E.H. **Johnston**⁶⁰ points out on the basis of certain Chinese references that there were eighteen Sāṃkhya schools in ancient times. Scholars have attempted to see various stages and phases in the development of Sāṃkhya thought, and on the basis of their findings they have attempted to make certain classification. **Johnston**⁶¹ sees five successive phases in the development of Sāṃkhya. Erich **Frauwallner**⁶² is of the opinion that the Sāṃkhya thought passed through four distinct stages of development. **Larson**⁶³ also classifies these stages as four.

Basing himself on the findings of the early scholars, **Larson** points out that the early formulative period of Sāṃkhya is found in the Vedas and the oldest Upaniṣads. According to him this period extends from eighth or ninth century B.C. down through the period of Jainism and the early Buddhism. **Larson** calls the second phase the period of the proto-Sāṃkhya speculations. He considers that the Sāṃkhya found in the *Katha*, the *Śvetāśvatara* and the *Maitri* Upaniṣads belongs to this period. Besides, the *Cāraka Saṃhitā*, *Pañcaśikhavākya* of the *Mbh.* (Cr.Ed.XII, 211-212), *Buddhacarita* of Asvaghosa, *Mokṣadharma* and the *Bhagavadgītā* are also placed in this period, which stretches from fourth century B.C. to first century A.D. The third phase, according to **Larson** begins in the first century A.D. and ends by the tenth or the eleventh century A.D. According to **Larson**⁶⁴ the Sāṃkhya system of philosophy was a dominant one in the first century A.D. which seems to be also the period of the composition of *Brahmasūtras*.

Larson calls the period extending from the first to the tenth century A.D. as the classical period. The Sāṃkhya thought of this period is contained in the *Śaṣṭitantra* and in the teaching of the Sāṃkhya *ācāryas* like Pañcaśikha, Vārṣaganya etc. We have only certain references to them in the later works on Sāṃkhya. According to **Larson** this classical period comes to its culmination with the *Sāṃkhyakārikās* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. **Larson** places the related commentaries of the *Sāṃkhyakārikās* and the *Yogasūtras* to this period. The Sāṃkhya doctrine which was the *pradhānamalla* for Śaṅkarācārya seems to have suffered heavily in post-Sāṃkara days, which also saw a decline of the Sāṃkhya renaissance brought about by Vijñānabhikṣu and others in the 16th century. **Larson**⁶⁵ places the *Tattvasamāsaśūtra* also to this period. As will be pointed out later, many other scholars are of the opinion that *Tattvasamāsa* belonged to a period earlier than that of the *Kārikās* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa⁶⁶.

3. Śaṣṭitantra and pre-Kārikā Sāṃkhya

If we go through the *Saurabha* carefully we notice that the *Saurabhakāra* refers to the *Sāṃkhyas* mostly as the

Tāntrikas. The term *tantra* generally means doctrine⁶⁷. In various *bhāṣyas* we come across such usages as "*sāṃkhyatantra*", "*yogatantra*", "*tantrāntara*", "*samānatantra*", etc. Here the term, in a general way, denotes a system or a doctrine. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa uses the term in this general sense when he names his *Vārttika* as *Tantravārttikam*. Besides this general sense, the word *tantra* is also used in a specific sense to denote the Sects practising some forms of esoteric cult and rituals such as the Vāmācārya-śaivas or Kulācāraśāktas or the Bauddhatāntrikas, etc⁶⁸. But the Saurabhakāra reserves the term *Tāntrikas* exclusively for the Sāṃkhyas. This peculiar use of the term *Tāntrikas* is found in the *Saurabha* 1.4.4, 1.4.11, 1.4.16 etc.

On BS 1.4.4.⁶⁹ Nimbārka points out that the world *avyakta* does not denote the Pradhāna of the *Tāntrikas*. From *Saurabha* 1.4.11 it is all the more clear that the *Tāntrikas* for Nimbārka are the Sāṃkhyas. He says:

"Even on account of the collection of number" in the text "In whom the five-five people and the ether are based" (*Brh* 4.4.17 *Śat. Br.* 14.7.2.19) it is not to be said that the twenty-five principles, beginning with *pradhāna*, are based on scripture, so what disputes can there be regarding the knowability of the *pradhāna* from scripture? Why? "On account of diversity" i.e. because the object which are based on Brahman, established in scripture and denoted by the term "in whom" are different from the objects established in the *Tantra* since the former are found to have Brahman for their soul: "and on account of the excess" of Brahman, the support and like-wise of the ether.

He also refutes the view that the *Puruṣa* of the *Tāntrikas* is based on scriptures. In *Saurabha* 1.4.16 he says:

"It is not to be supposed that in the text "he verily, O Bālāki, who is the maker of these persons (*Puruṣāṇām*), this is the work" (*Kauṣ* 3.9), the object to be known is the *Puruṣa* mentioned in the *Tantra* and the enjoyer of the fruits of merits and demerits. None but the Supreme soul is here indicated as "the object to be known", Why? Because Brahman is the topic, as known from the texts "Let me declare Brahman to you" (*Kauṣ* 4.1) because the word "work" (*Karma*) meaning "something that is done (*kriyate yat tat karma*)

denotes the world, which is an effect, because by the pronoun *this* "the world", established by the evidences of perception and the rest, is suggested, and, lastly, because the *Puruṣa* mentioned in the *Tantra* is not the topic here".

It is more probable that Nimbārka is referring to the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* when he calls the Sāṅkhya system as the *tantra* and the followers of Sāṅkhya as the *Tāntrikas*. Īśvarakṛṣṇa (Cir. 500 A.D.) claims that the *Kārikās* which he composed is the abridged form of the huge literature of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*⁷⁰. It is impossible to determine the exact content of the original *Ṣaṣṭitantra* or its author. The various studies made by scholars have led them to conclude that the *Sastitantra* represented an old Sāṅkhya tradition, the content of which was summarized by Īśvarakṛṣṇa⁷¹. The question whether the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* is the proper name of the system or the name of a huge literature is hard to settle⁷². **Chakravarti**⁷³ thinks that the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* is the first systematic treatise on Sāṅkhya. Ram Suresh **Panday**⁷⁴ identifies this ancient systematic *Ṣaṣṭitantra* treatise as the *Tattvasamāsa*. He points out that many great scholars like **Hiriyanna**, **Radhakrishnan**, **Keith** and **Dasgupta** mistook the *Tattvasamāsa* as a late work solely on the basis of the fact that the commentaries on the *Tattvasamāsa* are of late origin. According to him the gap between *Tattvasamāsa* and its extant commentaries is more than one thousand years. G.J. **Larson**⁷⁵ also concedes that the Sāṅkhya ideas contained in *Tattvasamāsa* may go back to an earlier stage.

It seems, however, more probable that *Ṣaṣṭitantra* may not be a single work. The *Kārikās* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa need not be a mere summary of a single work called *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, but an attempt at systematizing the Sāṅkhya speculations, treatises and discourses upto his days. There seems to have existed more than one work connected with *Ṣaṣṭitantra* because on the one hand Vācaspati Miśra considers⁷⁶ Varṣaganya as the author of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, while the unknown author of the *Jayamangalā* considers⁷⁷ Pañcasikha as its author. Besides all these, as **Keith**⁷⁸ points out, Guṇaratna in his *Tarkarahasya dīpikā* mentions another work called *Ṣaṣṭitantradhāra*. Therefore he is of the opinion that the pre-*Kārikā* Sāṅkhya is called *Ṣaṣṭitantra*⁷⁹. He bases his

opinion on the fact that the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* is mentioned along with the system of Kapila as *Kāvilam* and *Ṣaṭṭhitantam* in the Jaina work called *Anuyogadvāra sūtra* by Guṇaratna⁸⁰. He also points out that the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* is mentioned as *Kavila* and the *Sāṃkhyayogī* in the *Aupapātikasūtra*. Therefore it would not be proper to hold that what does not tally with the *Kārikās* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa is not Sāṃkhya at all⁸¹.

4. Nimbārka seems to be familiar with pre-Kārikā Sāṃkhya

The identification of the Sāṃkhya as the *Tantra* by Nimbārka may point out that he is very familiar with the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* tradition of the pre-Kārikā days. The mere fact that Nimbārka calls the Sāṃkhyas the *Tāntrikas* does not make him a pre-Kārikā commentator of the *BS* because even Bhāskara, a post-Sāṃkara commentator of the *BS* does the same⁸². But as we have noticed above the criticism of Sāṃkhya by Nimbārka in no way demands any more awareness of the Sāṃkhya philosophy than the awareness the Sūtrakāra himself had of this system. First of all, Nimbārka does not refer to any *Kārikās* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Secondly, he is not very familiar with the special terminologies of the *Kārikā* such as *tanmātras* for what he calls *sūkṣmabhūtas*. For Īśvarakṛṣṇa the *sūkṣma* elements include *mahat*, *ahamkāra* etc⁸³, while for Nimbārka as we have pointed above, the *sūkṣmabhūtas* are the causal state of the *sthūlabhūtas*. According to him the *sthūla* state is a transformation of the *sūkṣma* state⁸⁴. That would mean that Nimbārka employs the term *sūkṣmabhūta* to denote what the classical Sāṃkhya of Īśvarakṛṣṇa calls *tanmātras*. Nimbārka upholds⁸⁵ the *trivṛtkaraṇa* (tripartition) the process of evolution which is a more ancient theory of creation⁸⁶ than that of the *Kārikās*. His idea of the *sūkṣma śarīra* which finally merges in Brahman⁸⁷ seems to be less of a complicated composition⁸⁸ than that of the one proposed by Īśvarakṛṣṇa⁸⁹. Nimbārka's awareness of the *sarvagatātmavāda* as a doctrine propounded by Kapila⁹⁰ does not seem to be obtained from the *Kārikās* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. Similarly, the doctrine of the *parasparāṅgāṅgibhāva* of the *guṇas* as the source of the evolutionary process⁹¹ is also not in terms of the *Kārikā*

terminologies. Nimbārka is a man of a few words. Therefore these few references he makes to the Sāṃkhya have to be taken into consideration. They point out that he is not indebted to the *Kārikās* for his awareness of the doctrines of Kapila.

Nimbārka's awareness of an atheistic Sāṃkhya⁹² does not demand that he must be aware of the *Kārikās* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa because some of the pre-*Kārikā* works, like the *Buddhacarita* and *Tattvasamāsa* contain Sāṃkhya of an atheistic nature. A theistic version of the pre-*Kārikā* classical Sāṃkhya is found in the *Ahīrbudhnya Saṃhitā*⁹³ which also describes the Sāṃkhya as the *Tantra*⁹⁴. While the Sāṃkhya of *Ahīrbudhnya Saṃhitā* is influenced by the *Pañcarātras*⁹⁵, the *Buddhacarita* of Aśvaghoṣa is very much influenced by the Buddhist way of thinking⁹⁶. The existence of an atheistic Sāṃkhya in pre-*Kārikā* days can be proved from the very claim of Īśvarakṛṣṇa that his *Kārikās* are the systematized summary of the *Śaṣṭitantra* because the *Kārikās* themselves are atheistic in nature. Besides, the *Śaṣṭitantra* account of the *Rājavārttika*, quoted by Vācaspati Miśra on *Kārikā* 63 is also atheistic in outlook.

Thus, there is nothing to prevent us from placing the *Saurabhakāra* in a pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa period. Yet, we have not yet got sufficient and compelling reasons to assign him to a definite period. Our above study has shown only that it is quite probable that Nimbārka belonged to a pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa period. Such a view is also supported by Nimbārka's criticism of the *Śāktavāda* under BS 2.2.42-45.

5. The Śāktavāda as known to Nimbārka

As we have seen in Chapter One, Śaṃkara and Rāmānuja discuss the pros and cons of the *vyūhavāda* of the *Pañcarātra* school under BS 2.2.42-45, while Nimbārka and Madhva make use of these *sūtras* to refute the *Śāktavāda*. It is to be noted here that BS 2.2.42-45, themselves do not name the doctrine or the school that the *Sūtrakāra* has in mind. The *sūtras* themselves are vague. Since these *sūtras* come within a *pāda* that is dealing with the doctrines unacceptable to the *Sūtrakāra*, Nimbārka, Śaṃkara and Madhva are justified in considering them as referring to a *pūrvapakṣa* doctrine. But

on the other hand, as these *sūtras* come at the end of the *pāda* that has been rejecting many other schools and doctrines that are named in the *sūtras* themselves, Rāmānuja may be justified in considering these last *sūtras* as referring to the *siddhānta*, unnamed in the *sūtras*⁹⁷. At any rate, these *sūtras* in themselves do not show that the doctrine at stake is the doctrine of the *vyūhavāda* of the *Pañcarātras* or the *śāktavāda*⁹⁸.

Here it may be pointed out that there must be some compelling reason for a commentator to consider this type of “uncommitted *sūtras*” as referring to a particular school or doctrine, either as accepted or rejected. One of the compelling reasons seems to be the prevalence of certain theories and schools of thought in his contemporary times. Perhaps the popularity of the *Pañcarātra* school in his surroundings prompted Śaṅkara to make use of these *sūtras* to refute the *Pañcarātra* system⁹⁹. Since Śaṅkara has already rejected the *Pañcarātra* doctrine of the *vyūhavāda*, the option for the later *vyūhavādins* is already determined. Therefore they were forced to some extent to make use of these *sūtras* to defend *vyūhavāda*¹⁰⁰. But as seen in Chapter Four above, Nimbārka is a pre-Śaṅkara vedāntin¹⁰¹. If he were a post-Śaṅkara *Pañcarātrin*, we would naturally expect him to defend the *Pañcarātra* tenets against the onslaughts of Śaṅkara. In post-Śaṅkara days the *vyūhavāda* had become one of the important tenets of Vaiṣṇavism and the distinction between *Pañcarātra* and *Bhāgavata* type of Vaiṣṇavism seems to have evaporated as they got completely merged¹⁰² by then. Therefore it would have been a moral obligation on the part of a post-Śaṅkara Vaiṣṇavite *bhāṣyakāra* to defend the *Pañcarātras*.

6. Nimbārka and Madhva on the Śāktamata

The fact that Nimbārka and Madhva find it necessary to refute Śāktism under these *sūtras* show that the doctrine was prevalent in their particular surroundings. Every *bhāṣyakāra* is a creature of his time and place. His *pūrvapakṣins* normally include his contemporaries holding contrary doctrines. It is well known that the Śāktas worship an exclusively female principle as the Supreme deity, who is the personification of the primordial energy and thus is the

source of all "Spiritual" and material evolution¹⁰³. Nimbārka rejects the *Śaktivāda* on the ground that the origin of the world from *Śakti* without the *Puruṣa* is impossible¹⁰⁴ and, therefore, the *Śākta* doctrine that maintains *Śakti* as the sole cause of the world is not acceptable¹⁰⁵. Besides, there can be no connection between the *Puruṣa* and *Śakti* precisely because prior to such a creation, on the part of the *Puruṣa* there is no sense organ, the means of contact — which is one of the products of the creative process¹⁰⁶. If on the contrary, *Śakti* is endowed with the natural attributes like knowledge etc, this cannot be but the Brahman of the Vedāntins¹⁰⁷. The sacred texts, both the *śruti* and the *smṛti* declare the ultimate Principle endowed with all the attributes to be the Brahman, which is the Vedānta position. Therefore Nimbārka rejects the *Śākta* doctrine as unauthoritative¹⁰⁸.

As already pointed out, Madhva too takes these *sūtras* as rejecting the *Śāktavāda*. An examination of the *bhāṣyas* of Madhva and Nimbārka reveals that Madhva is well aware of the later developments of the *Śākta* school, which Nimbārka is unaware of. As pointed out by B.N.K. **Sharma**¹⁰⁹ Madhva is aware of the *Mahāvāma*, *Madhyavāma* and *Āṇuvāma* shades of the *Śākta* school. These schools are also known as the *Śākta*, *Śāmbhava* and *Āṇava* schools¹¹⁰. Among these, the *Mahāvāmas* consider *Śakti* to be all in all, needing no partnership with anybody for the creation. The other two schools advocate an alliance of *Śakti* with *Śiva* to tide over the objections raised by the earlier critics of the school¹¹¹. They, therefore, accept to a greater extent the partnership of *Śiva* in the creative act¹¹². Madhva refutes the *Mahāvāma* school under BS 2.2.42¹¹³, the *Madhyavāma* under BS 2.2.43¹¹⁴ and the *Āṇuvāma* under BS 2.2.44¹¹⁵. Finally he also points out the *Śākta* doctrines are in conflict with the teachings of the *śruti* and the *smṛti*¹¹⁶.

Nimbārka's commentary on the above *sūtras*, as we have seen above, are only a paraphrasing of the *sūtras*. He does not seem to be aware of any greater development of the *Śāktavāda* than that of the *Sūtrakāra* himself, had he been intending the *Śāktavāda* here under the *sūtras* 2.2.42-45. Perhaps, the doctrines of the *Śāmbhava* and the *Āṇava Śāktas*, advocating an alliance of *Śakti* and *Śiva* for the creative

process might be a response to the criticism of Nimbārka in Saurabha 2.2.42. "Since the origin of the world from Śakti without the *Puruṣa* is impossible, the doctrine too, which maintains it as the cause is not valid" and in Saurabha 2.2.43 "If it be said there is connection (between Śakti and the *Puruṣa*) – (we reply) No "sense organ" (*karaṇa*) is possible on the part of *Puruṣa* at that time". These arguments and objections raised by Nimbārka against the Śāktavāda resemble his arguments against the *acetanapradhāna* of the Sāṃkhya elsewhere¹¹⁷. These arguments also seem to be against an earlier form of the Śāktavāda, because these lack sophistication.

7. Madhva is aware of the later historical developments of Śāktism

The *bhāṣya* of Madhva, on the contrary, seems to be aware of the later historical developments and ramifications of the doctrine of creation in the Śāktā schools. A comparative study of the *bhāṣya* of Madhva with the *vṛtti* of Nimbārka on the above *sūtras* will make it clear that the similarities in their arguments are due to the attempt made by Madhva to make explicit what Nimbārka says under BS 2.2.42 namely "*puruṣamantareṇa śakteḥ sakāśaj jagad utpattya sambhavān na tat kārāṇavādo'pi sādhuḥ*" is made explicit with a proper reason by Madhva when he says "*na hi puruṣānanugṛhitastrībhya utpattir drśyate*". It is quite evident that Madhva is explaining the argument of Nimbārka.

Under BS 2.2.43¹¹⁸ Madhva seems to refute the views of *Madhyavāmaśāktas*, for, Jayatīrtha explains the statement of Madhva "*yadi puruṣo'ṅgīkriyate tasyāpi karaṇābhāvādanupapattiḥ*" to that effect. The *Madhyavāmaśāktas* propose *Sadāśiva* as an adjunct to Śakti in the activity of creation. Since Śiva according to them is without a body and the sense organs and is having only a subordinate role, he cannot have the necessary knowledge to help Śakti. Śakti by herself is unable to create anything, not even a body for Śiva in order that he may be able to help her. In fact, if she had the power of creating a body for Śiva, she could even carry out the entire process of creation without any help from Śiva.

Similarly, the statement of Madhva on BS 2.2.44 namely *yadi vijñānādikaraṇam tasyāṅgīkriyate tadā tata eva sr̥ṣṭyādhy upapatter īśvaravādāntarbhāvaḥ* is taken by Jayatīrtha¹¹⁹ as directed against the Aṇuvāma school of the Śāktas who hold that Śiva has a body, sense organs, and supreme knowledge and powers, so that he is in a position to help Śakti. It is pointed out by him that if Śiva has all these powers, he could be considered as the Supreme creator like the Śiva accepted by the Pāśupata school rather than as mere helpmate of Śakti. According to Jayatīrtha it would be unphilosophical to claim two ultimate Principles of equal importance, one Śakti and the other Śiva.

In Chapter Four we have seen that Nimbārka is a pre-Śaṅkara *vṛttikara*. The above comparative evaluation of the criticism of the Śākta school by Nimbārka and Madhva shows that Madhva and later on Jayatīrtha are expanding the criticism of Nimbārka against the Śāktas. Nimbārka is more archaic. Under sūtra 2.2.42 Madhva seems to make explicit what Nimbārka implicitly seems to touch¹²⁰. Therefore, it can be safely concluded that Nimbārka is the first known commentator to treat Śāktism in this *adhikaraṇa*¹²¹. The fact that Nimbārka and Madhva considered it necessary to refute the Śāktamata shows that the Śāktavāda was very influential in their respective surroundings¹²².

8. Śāktism had a pre-historical origin

It is beyond the scope of our work to undertake a detailed survey of the origin and the development of the Śāktamata. We would like to draw some conclusions on the basis of the findings of scholars who have gone into the details of the Śāktavāda¹²³. They are of the opinion that India has possessed a long tradition of the Mother worship — a forerunner of later Śāktism from the time of the Harappan civilization¹²⁴ as is evident from the cult objects excavated at Mohenjodaro and Harappa¹²⁵. According to **Bhattacharya** the widespread cult of Śākti is a natural evolution of the pre-historic mother-goddess cult¹²⁶ especially among the matriarchal¹²⁷ and the agricultural¹²⁸ races throughout the world.

Though the R̥gvedic society was “pastoral” and there was no cult of a mother goddess among them¹²⁹ there are some

female deities to whom hymns are addressed in the Rgveda¹³⁰. But in the post-Vedic times, the mother goddess worship reasserted itself¹³¹ when with the assumption of agriculture the Vedic people adopted from the local races some of the agricultural goddesses and their fertility¹³² cults and made them part of their own culture¹³³. P.K. **Sharma** points out¹³⁴ that in the post-Vedic period of later minor Upaniṣads, Epics and the *Purāṇas*, the goddesses received places of supreme worship. According to **Srivastava**¹³⁵ the Purāṇic descriptions of the goddesses are the attempts to explain and to synthesize the cults and beliefs of the common people who were absorbed into the broad frame work of Hinduism. These goddesses became objects of independent cults around the first century A.D.¹³⁶. Gradually various religious movements like Buddhism, Jainism, Vaiṣṇavism and above all Śaivism assumed these female principles (*Śakti*) into their system of thought (philosophy) and expressions (cult)¹³⁷. **Payne**¹³⁸ and P.K. **Sharma**¹³⁹ are of the opinion that an independent Śākta Sect was already well established by the 2nd and 3rd century A.D.

9. A well-developed Śākta Sect by Gupta period

The independent existence of Śāktism as a well-developed and distinct religious Sect by the Gupta period can be proved from the literary and archaeological evidences. For example Varāhamihira (Fifth Century A.D) enumerates¹⁴⁰, among the religious Sects prevalent in his time, the Śāktas, who are well versed in the Tāntric rituals of the mother goddess. In his own words:

*viṣṇor bhāgavatān magāmsca savituh śamboḥ sabhasmadvijān
mātrnām api maṇḍalakarmavido viprān vidurbrahmaṇaḥ
śākyān sarvahitasya śāntamanaso nāgnān jinānām vidu
rye yam devamupāśritāḥ svaividhinā taistasyakāryākriyā*¹⁴¹

This passage amply proves that the Śāktas acquired a recognised place as an independent religious Sect by the time of Varāhamihira. This fact is further supported by a somewhat fragmentary inscription, found at Gandhar in Malwa, which reads:

*mātrnān ca pramuditaghanātyartha nīhrādinīnām
tāntrodbhūtaprabala pavanodvartit — āmbhonidhīnām*

(broken portion) *gatam idaṁ dākinīsaṁprakīrṇaṁ veśmātyugraṁ nṛ patisacivo' kārayat puṇyahetoḥ*¹⁴².

This inscription was written in the Mālva year 480 (i.e. 423-24 A.D.). It states among the other things that one Māyūrakṣaka, a minister of Viśvavarman, the father of Kumāragupta I's feudatory Bandhuvarman caused to be built for the sake of his religious merit this very terrible abode filled full of female ghouls, of the divine mothers, who utter loud and tremendous shouts in joy (and) who stir up the (very) oceans with the mighty wind rising from the magic rites of their religion"¹⁴³

Vindhya in the central India is considered to be the perpetual abode of the Goddess¹⁴⁴. The above literacy and archaeological evidences support the existence of a developed and independent religious *Śākta* Sect in the Central India at least by the Fifth Century A.D. According to M.C.P. **Srivastava**¹⁴⁵ this *Śākta* Sect reached its final culmination and maturity by 600 A.D. as marked out by the *Devīmahātmya* section of the *Mārkaṇḍeya Pūraṇa* belonging to the Gupta period¹⁴⁶. This *Devīmahātmya* *akhaṇḍa* is the earliest available text giving some philosophical aspects of the *Śāktavāda*¹⁴⁷. According to N.N. **Bhattacharya** too the *Śākta* principles find expression in the *Devīmahātmya* section (composed between the third and fifth Centuries A.D.)¹⁴⁸. A critical and analytical study of the four *devīstutis* contained in the *Devīmahātmya* *akhaṇḍa* may throw more light on the tenets of the *Śāktavāda* in those days.

According to mythology King Suratha and his companion the merchant Samādi wanted to know the origin and the nature of the Goddess *Mahāmāyā*, pervading the whole world with her snares of illusion. They approach Ṛṣi Medhas, who explained to them the greatness of the Goddess with appropriate stories in lengthy details. The mighty deeds of the Goddess for the protection and the well-being of gods are enumerated in this account in the form of *Brahmastuti*, *Śakrādistuti*, *Viṣṇumāyāstava* and *Nārāyaṇistuti*. These *stutis* are the expressions of the faith that the power and dignity of the Goddess is much superior to all the gods including Brahmā, Indra, Viṣṇu etc. They also in a characteristic manner express the ideas about the power and energy

centering round the Devi¹⁴⁹. In this section of *Devīmahātmya*, the Goddess is invoked as the beginning and the end of everything, the incomprehensible source of everything. For example:

"Thou art the cause of all the worlds— though characterized by three qualities, even by Hari, Hara and other gods, thou art incomprehensible. Thou art the resort of all, thou art this entire world which is composed of parts. Thou verily art the sublime original nature untransformed¹⁵⁰.

J.N. **Banerjea** has pointed out that the process of emanation of everything from the great and the primary Principle is described in detail in the *prādhānikarahasya* of the *Candī* portion of the same *Purāṇa*¹⁵¹. Here the major gods like Viṣṇu, Rudra and Brahmā find a well recognised, but a subordinate place¹⁵².

Thus there is ample evidence to prove beyond any doubt the existence of a well-developed *Śāktavāda*, in which the female principle is conceived to be the source of everything at least by the end of the fifth century A.D. It is also to be noted that although the worship of a goddess originated, perhaps in pre-vedic times, *Śāktism* as a philosophical system has developed only in the early centuries of A.D., which, as **Srivastava** has pointed out, has reached its culmination at least by the sixth century A.D.

10. Nimbārka could not have lived before the early part of the sixth century AD

Nimbārka who criticises a rather developed *Śāktavāda* could not have lived prior to the end of the fifth century A.D.¹⁵³. As we have pointed out in chapter four above, the Saurabhakāra is also the *pūrvapakṣin* for Śaṅkara in a number of places in his *bhāṣya*. That would mean that Nimbārka the Saurabhakāra, lived sometime before the end of the eighth century A.D. On the other hand our study of the Sāṅkhya system as known to Nimbārka prompts us to place him prior to Īśvarakṛṣṇa, the author of the *Sāṅkhyakārikās*, who might have lived sometime in the sixth century A.D.¹⁵⁴. Therefore, it is more probable that Nimbārka lived in the first quarter of the sixth century A.D. or just before that. But the

awareness of a developed *Śāktavāda* on the part of Nimbārka compels us to place him to a period after 400 A.D.

Danielson¹⁵⁵ in his work on the *Paramārthasāra* of *Ādiśeṣa*¹⁵⁶ shows that the *bhedābheda* thought was popular in the early part of the sixth century A.D. He points out that verses 26 and 27 of the *Paramārthasāra* describe that all living entities are the modifications (*vikṛtayaḥ*) of the Supreme Self. This Supreme deity is called Viṣṇu in verses, 1, 33, 56, 74 and 86, or Vāsudeva in verses 29 and 30. Significantly in verse 29 the highest God, Vāsudeva, is identified with the self of all. Notwithstanding its theistic character *Paramārthasāra* nowhere emphasises *bhakti*, the ardent personal devotion as propounded in the *Gītā*. On the contrary *Ādiśeṣa* advocates *Jñāna* or *vidyā* as the primary means of liberation. These views of *Ādiśeṣa* are very much similar to those of Nimbārka¹⁵⁷. It only shows that the Vedānta and Vaiṣṇava trends in the early Sixth century were the same as we find in the *Saurabha*. These findings also support the view that Nimbārka lived some time in the early sixth century A.D.¹⁵⁸. Therefore the probable date of Nimbārka could be around 450-525 A.D.

Conclusion

Many modern scholars have placed Nimbārka to a post-Saṅkara period primarily on the assumption that the late works ascribed to Nimbārka by his followers and containing later philosophical trends were really the works of the *ācārya*. We have sufficiently demonstrated that these works cannot be of Nimbārka, the *Saurabhakāra*¹⁵⁹. The exclusion of these spurious works will also help us to weed out extraneous elements from the philosophical position of the *Saurabhakāra*. There had been diverse views on the date of Nimbārka precisely because we do not have any direct documentary evidence to prove his date accurately. In the above pages we have put forth a number of corroborative arguments to show that Nimbārka probably lived in the later part of the fifth century or in the first quarter of the sixth century A.D.

The traditional belief among the followers of Nimbārka that he is the first commentator (*ādyācāryaḥ*) seems to have

an element of truth in it insofar as the *Saurabha* of Nimbārka seems to be the earliest available *vr̥tti* on the *Brahmasūtras*. Naturally, there might have been other commentators and *ācāryas* of the Vedānta thought before Nimbārka. But we do not have any such *vr̥tti* on the *Brahmasūtra* as archaic in language and style as the *Saurabha*.

Since Nimbārka lived in the early part of the sixth century A.D. he cannot possibly be an immediate disciple of Nārada, the *ācārya* mentioned in the *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 7 and much less of Nārada of the mythology. It is also not possible to consider Śrīnivāsa, whom we have valid reasons to assign to a post-Śaṅkara period¹⁶⁰, to be the immediate disciple of Nimbārka. Just as we know nothing about many of the *ācāryas* in the list of the *guruparaṁparās*, it is quite possible that there might have been many other *ācāryas*, who left no traces of their existence. The question of any *ācāryapīṭha* and the legitimacy of succession seems to have propped up in the Nimbārka school only when a major split took place in the Sect after Harivyāsadeva. This question of legitimacy seems to have been the *raison d' être* of the various *guruparaṁparās*.

Similarly, it is evident that the Rādhākṛṣṇa cult, which is a special feature of the Nimbārkites today is a later appendage to the school in post-Śrīnivāsa period since the *Saurabhakāra* and even the *Kaustubhakāra* do not speak of any such *sādhana*s as *premalakṣanā bhakti* as a means for liberation. Our findings help us to have a better understanding of Nimbārka and his philosophy.

Chapter 7

A GENERAL ANALYSIS OF VEDĀNTAPĀRIJĀTA SAURABHA

Introduction : the sources of the Saurabha

In the first part of our study, we saw that Nimbārka, the author of the *VedāntapārijātaSaurabha*, must have belonged to a pre-Śaṅkara period. In this second part we shall take up a detailed study of the teachings of Nimbārka, the philosopher, contained in the *Saurabha*. A general examination of the *Saurabha* reveals that the Saurabhakāra has taken support to substantiate the *aupaniṣadic* doctrine from the following sources:

1. *Saṃhitās* (*R̥gveda*, the three collections of the black *Yajurveda*, namely *Kāthaka*, *Maitrāyaṇi*, *Taittirīya*);
2. *Brāhmaṇas* (*Śatapatha*, *Tāṇḍyamahā Brāhmaṇa*, *Taittirīya*);
3. *Āraṇyakas* (*Aitareya*, *Taittirīya*);
4. *Upaniṣads* (*Aitareya*, *Brhadāraṇyaka*, *Chāndogya*¹, *Kaṭha*, *Kauṣītaki*, *Mahānārāyaṇa*² (?), *Maitrāyaṇi*, *Muṇḍaka*, *Praśna*, *Svetāśvatara*, *Taittirīya*);
5. *Sūtra texts* (*Āpastamba srauta sūtra*, *Gautamadharmasūtra*);
6. *Epics* (*Mahābhārata* including *Bhagavadgītā*);
7. *Smṛti texts* (*Atri*, *Dakṣa*, *Manu*, *Yājñavalkya*, *Vasiṣṭha*);
8. *Purāṇas* (*Agni*, *Kūrma*, *Viṣṇu*);
9. *Philosophical texts* (*Jaiminisūtra*).

The above sources reveal that the *Saurabhakāra* has no dependence on any of the so-called sectarian literature of the later centuries as we find in the writings of the post-Śaṅkara

Brhmasūtrabhāṣyakāras like Rāmānuja and Madhva. What is more significant and striking is the absence of any quotation not only from the later Purāṇas but also from the later Upaniṣads and philosophical *sūtras* of the other *darśanas* apart from *pūrvamīmāṃsā*.

Analysis of the Vedāntapārijāta Saurabha

(the number on the right hand refers to the *sūtra* in each *pāda*)

ADHYĀYA ONE

(A) The First Pāda

1. **Brahman³ is the object of enquiry** (1-4)
 - 1.1 An investigation into Brahman Rāmākānta Puruṣottama, is always to be undertaken by a *mumukṣu* who has the proper qualifications. (1)
 - 1.2 Brahman is the Bhagavān from whom originate the *śṛṣṭi* *sthiti* *laya* of this world. (2)
 - 1.3 The *śāstra* alone can make him known. (3)
 - 1.31 The entire Veda is in *Samanvaya* (confluence) in revealing him, who is the *Viśvātma*, *Sarvabhinnābhinna* *Bhagavān*, *Vāsudeva*. (4)
2. **The acetanakāraṇa (unconscious cause) is not the kāraṇa (the cause) known in the śāstra** (5-12)
 - 2.1 The *acetanapradhāna* is not the *jagatkāraṇa* because *īkṣaṇa* (perception) which is a *cetanadharmā* is attributed to the *jagatkāraṇa*. (5)
 - 2.11 *īkṣati* is not used in a secondary sense. (6)
 - 2.2 *Pradhāna* is not the object denoted by the word *sat* and *ātman* because the *mokṣa* is the attainment of his nature. (7)
 - 2.21 On account of the absence of the statement of *heyatva* and its *prayojana*, the object denoted by words like *sat*, etc. is not the *pradhāna*. (8)
 - 2.3 The *acetanakāraṇavāda* is invalid because of the contradiction of *pratijñā*. (9)
 - 2.4 Brahman is the *jagatkāraṇa* denoted by the word *sat*. (10)
 - 2.5 In all the *Vedāntas* (i.e. *upaniṣads*) the *cetanakāraṇa* is equally known. (11)
 - 2.51 Because of the Scriptural declaration of the causality of the *sarveśvara*, the inner controller of all, *pradhāna* is not to be accepted. (12)

3. Paramātman who is different (*bhinna*) from the jīva is ānandamaya (13-22)

- 3.1 Paramātman, not jīva, is the ānandamaya (consisting of bliss). (13)
- 3.11 "Maya" means *prācurya* (abundance). (14)
- 3.2 Paramātman is ānandamaya because he is the cause of the ānanda (bliss) of the jīva. (15)
- 3.21 The text "*satyam jñānam anantam brahma*" (Tait 2.1) is praised by the word ānanda. (16)
- 3.3 The jīva is not ānandamaya. (17)
- 3.31 Because of the distinction (*bheda*) between the obtainer and the obtained. (18)
- 3.32 An individual self (*pratyagātman*) is dependent on matter, but the Ānandamaya, Puruṣottama, creates everything through mere intention, *saṁkalpa* (will). (19)
- 3.4 On obtaining him, the jīva becomes blissful. Therefore he is *anya* (different). (20)
- 3.5 The one abiding within the sun and the eye and to be meditated on by the *mumukṣu* is the *Paramātman*, who is *apahatapāpman* (free from sin), the *sarvātman* (soul of all) and not any particular jīva. (21)
- 3.51 The *Paramātman* is *anya* (other) from the group of the jīvas like the sun etc. because of the designation of difference. (22)

4. The symbolic presentation of Brahman/Paramātman/Bhagavān (23-28)

- 4.1 The "final goal" denoted by the word "*ākāśa*" (ether) is the *Paramātman* who is the creator of all things. (23)
- 4.2 The *prāṇa* (vital breath) is *Paramātman* (because it is described as the "Alpha" (*udgamana*) and the "Omega" (*samveśana*) of all beings. (24)
- 4.3 The *jyoti* (the light) is Brahman because all beings constitute a quarter (*pāda*) of him only. (25)
- 4.4 *Gāyatri* denotes Bhagavan because of the association of *Gāyatri* with qualities like *ceto'rpaṇa* (application of mind), which can belong to the Lord alone. (26)
- 4.41 *Gāyatri* is Brahman not only because of the *ceto'rpaṇa*, but also because (the four feet viz.) the *bhūta* (being), *prthivī* (earth), *śarīra* (body), *hrdaya* (heart) are appropriate (only) in Brahman the Bhagavan. (27)
- 4.5 *Dyaus* (heaven) is Brahman because there is no con-

tradition in presenting Brahman as the *adhikaraṇa* (locus) as well as the *avadhi* (limit). (28)

5. Everything is Brah̥mātmaka (Brahman as its soul) (29-32)

- 5.1 The object denoted by the term *prāṇa* is Paramātmān, because of the qualities like *hitatamatva* (highest auspiciousness) *anantatva* (endlessness) etc. (29)
- 5.11 The object denoted by *Prāṇa*, *Indra* etc. in the Scripture (*Kauṣ* 3.1.) is *Paramātmān*. (30)
- 5.111 *Indra* said "*mām eva vjānihi*" (know me alone) because of his realization of the *Brah̥mātmakatva* of everything. (31)
- 5.2 The above interpretation is correct on account of the three-foldness of *Brah̥mopāśanas* (meditation on Brahman) in accordance with the grade of the *upāśakas* (meditating devotees) viz. as the inner controller of the group of individual souls, as the inner controller of the non-sentient objects and as different from them both. (32)

(B) The Second Pāda

1. Brahman and the jīva are distinct (1-8)

- 1.1 Because the texts like "*sarvaṁ khalv idaṁ brahma*"... *Chānd* 3.14.1-2) denote the *Paramātmān* well-known in all the vedāntas, as the object of meditation. (1)
- 1.11 Because the attributes of *manomayatva*, *satyasamkalpatva*, etc. mentioned in *Chānd* 3.14.2 are appropriate on the part of Brahman alone. (2)
- 1.12 These attributes are not appropriate on the part of the *jīva*. (3)
- 1.13 The *śārīra* (embodied soul) is not the *vācya* of *manomayatva* etc because of the designation of *karma* (object) and *kartr* (agent) in *Chānd* 3.14.4 "into him I shall enter on departing hence". (4)
- 1.131 Their distinction is clear in the text "*eṣa ma ātmāntar hr̥daye*" this soul of mine within the heart (*Chānd* 3.14.3) because of the nominative and genitive case endings. (5)
- 1.132 The *Smṛti* text "*īśvaraḥ sarvabhūtānāṁ hr̥ddeṣe arjuna tiṣṭhati*" (*Gītā* 18.6) also declares their *bheda*. (6)
- 1.14 The description of Brahman (the Great) as smaller than a grain of rice, abiding within the heart (*Chānd* 3.14.3) fits in as in the case of *gavākṣavyomavat* (window and the ether). (7)

1.15 Though Brahman has *sarvahr̥daya sambandha*, He does not have *sambhogaprāpti* (experience of pleasure and pain) like the *jīva*, because of the *atyantaviśeṣa* between them as *apahatapāpmā* and *svakṛtakarmaphalabhoktr*, respectively. (8)

2. Brahman is the eater of all (9-10)

2.1 Śrī Puruṣottama is the *attā* (eater) of the entire *carācaraviśva*, (movable and immovable universe), mentioned as *Brāhmaṇa* and *Kṣatriya* in *Kaṭha* 2.25. (9)

2.2 Bhagavan Puruṣottama is the *attā* because he is the topic of discussion in the text "the great, the all-pervading" (*Kaṭha* 2.22). (10)

3. The Pramātman and the jīva indwell in the body (11-12)

3.1 The two *cetanātman*s (sentient souls) (*Kaṭha* 3.1) that have entered into the cave, are to be understood as the *jīva* and *Paramātman* because of the respective scriptural texts (*Kaṭha* 2.12) denoting them. (11)

3.2 The *jīva* and the *Para* are to be understood as having entered into the cave because of their specific mention (*Kaṭha* 1.17 and 3.2) as the *upāsya* and the *upāsaka* as well as the *vedya* (object to be known) and the *vettr* (knower). (12)

4. The Puruṣa within the eye (Chānd 4.15. 1-5) is the Paramātman (13-18)

4.1 Because the qualification as *ātman*, *abhaya* (fearlessness) (*Chānd* 4.15.1) *samyadvāmā* (*Chānd* 4.15.2) (being the uniter of all lovely things) etc. are proper to Puruṣottama alone. (13)

4.2 Because the text "*yaścakṣusitisthan*" (*Bṛh* 3.7.18) also designates the *sthāna* of the *Paramātman* as the eye. (14)

4.3 Also because the *Para* is mentioned as characterised by joy (in the earlier text) "*kām brahma* (pleasure is Brahman) *kham brahma*" (the ether is Brahman) (*Chānd* 4.10.4) (15)

4.31 What is characterized as joy is Brahman because there is a mutual specification of joy and ether in *Chānd* 4.10.5. (16)

4.4 Since the same final goal for the "*śrutopaniṣatka* (the one who has heard the upanisads) mentioned in *Prāśna* 1.10, is mentioned here also in *Chānd* 4.15.5 as

- the final goal, the *akṣyantarapuruṣa* is *Puruṣottama* alone. (17)
- 4.5 The *akṣyantara* is none other than the *Paramātman*, because none other than He abides regularly there and because of the impossibility of *amṛtatva*, etc., on the part of anybody else. (18)
- 5. The *antaryāmin* (inner controller) is the *Paramātman*** (19-21)
- 5.1 The *antaryāmin* mentioned in reference to the *adhidevas* (presiding deities) of *prthivī*, etc., in *Bṛh* 3.7.3 is *Paramātman* alone because of the designation here of *dharma*s (qualities) like *sarvaniyantr̥tva*, (controller of all), etc., to him. (19)
- 5.2 The *Pradhāna* is not the *vācya*m of *antaryāmin* because of the mention of *cetanadharmas* like *sarvaniyantr̥tva*, *sarvadṛṣṭr̥tva* (seer of all) etc. (20)
- 5.3 Nor the *jīva* is the *antaryāmin* because the *Kāṇvās* (*Bṛh* 3.7.22) and the *Mādhyaṇḍinas* (Cf, *Śat Br* 14.6.7.30) depict it as different from the *antaryāmin*. (21)
- 6. The "*adr̥śyam*" (invisible) is the *Paramātman*** (22-24)
- 6.1 The *adr̥śyatvādiguṇakam adr̥śyam* presented by the *Ātharvaṇikas* (Cf, *Muṇḍ* 1.1.6) is *Paramātman* alone because of the mention of His *dharma*s like *Sarvajñatva*, etc. (Cf, *Muṇḍ* 1.1.9). (22)
- 6.2 The *Pradhāna* and the *jīva* are not the *padavācya* of *bhūtayoni* (the source of being) and *akṣara* (imperishable) because of the designation of *viśeṣaṇa* (specific attribute) and *bheda* (difference) in the texts "*sarvagatam*" (*Muṇḍ* 1.1.6) and *aksarātparataḥ paraḥ* (*Muṇḍ* 2.1.2) respectively. (23)
- 6.3 Because of the mention of the *rūpa* (form) of *Paramātman* in the text *agnir mурddhā* (fire is his head) (*Muṇḍ* 2.1.4) etc. the *adr̥śyam* is not the other two. (24)
- 7. The *Vaiśvānara* is *Brahman*** (25-33)
- 7.1 Though *Vaiśvānara* (Cf *Chāṇḍ* 5.11.1) is a common term for *Agni* and *Brahman*, here it denotes *Brahman* alone, because of the knowledge of His *viśeṣa*: from the description of his *avayavas* (parts) such as "having heaven as the head". (25)
- 7.11 Similar description of his *rūpa* (form in the *Smṛti* also (Cf *Mbh*, 12.47.70) proves that the *Vaiśvānara* is *Brahman*. (26)

- 7.2 *Vaiśvānara* cannot be the *jātharāgni* (gastric fire) on the basis of *rūḍhi* (convention) or the mention of a triad of *Agnis* or of its being the *ādhāra* (abode) of the *āhuti* (offerings) to *prāṇa* or of its being within (*antaḥ pratiṣṭhāna*), but the *Vaiśvānara* is the *Paramātman* alone, on account of the *upadeśa* to perceive the *Parameśvara* in the *jāthara*, on account of the impossibility of having heaven as its head unless *Paramātman* is accepted, and on account of the declaration of its *puruṣatva* (personality). (27)
- 7.3 For the same reason *devatā* (deity) and the *bhūtam* (element) are not understood by the word, *Vaiśvānara*. (28)
- 7.4 On analysing the term *Vaiśvānara* Jaimini finds no contradiction in accepting *Vaiśvānara* as the *sākṣād upāsya* (directly to be meditated on) *sarvātma bhagavān* (the Lord, the soul of all). (29)
- 7.5 Āśmarathya thinks that the *Paramātman* though *ananta* (infinite) can fittingly be regarded as limited by space (*prādeśamātratvam*) since He manifests Himself (*abhivyajyate*) according to the respective capacity of his *ananya upāsakas* (exclusive devotees). (30)
- 7.6 Bādari thinks that the *kalpanā* (imagination) of a *deha* (body) from head to foot is for the sake of *anusmaraṇa* (recollection). (31)
- 7.7 Jaimini considers the *kalpanā* of their *uras* (breast), etc, as the *vedi*, (altar) is to effect the identification of the *āhuti* (offering) of the *prāṇa* which is an integral part of the *Vaiśvānaravidyā* with *agnihotra*. (32)
- 7.8 And the scriptures record this *Vaiśvānara* as a *Puruṣa* in the body of the *upāsaka*. (33)

(C) The Third Pāda

1. **Brahman is the support (*āyatanam*) of heaven and earth** (1-7)
- 1.1 Because the word *ātman* in the text (*Muṇḍ* 2.2.5) denotes Brahman. (1)
- 1.12 Because such an *āyatanam* alone is presented as the object to be approached by the *mukta* (*Muṇḍ* 3.1.13). (2)
- 1.2 No text presents the *Pradhāna* obtained through inference as that *āyatanam*. (3)
- 1.3 For the same reason the *prāṇabhṛt* (the bearer of the *prāṇa*) is not the *āyatanam*. (4)

- 1.31 Also due to the designation of *bheda* between the *jñātr* and the *jñeya*, the *prāṇabhṛt* is not the *āyatanam*. (5)
- 1.32 Jīva cannot be understood as the *āyatanam* because the Paramātmān is the topic of discussion. (6)
- 1.33 Also because in the text "*dvā suparṇā*" (two birds) (*Muṇḍ* 3.1.1), the Paramātmān is presented as the abiding *abhoktr* (non-eater) while the jīva as the eater (*adanāt*), the jīva is not the *āyatanam*. (7)
- 2. The *bhūman* (the plenitude) is the Paramātmān** (8-9)
- 2.1 The *bhūman* taught by the *Paramācārya* Śrīkumāra to our *guru* Śrīman Nārada (*Chānd* 7.23.1) is not the *prāṇa*, but *ŚrīPuruṣottama* because of the teaching of *bhūman* as above the *prāṇa*. (8)
- 2.11 Because of the appropriateness of (the attributes like) *niratiśaya sukhārūpatva*, (in the form unsurpassed pleasure) *amṛtatva* (immortality) *svamahimapraṭiṣṭhitatva* (established on one's own greatness) etc. to the *Paramātmān* alone. (9)
- 3. The *akṣara* (imperishable) is the Brahman** (10-12)
- 3.1 The *akṣara* is Brahman because of its *dhāraṇa* (support) of *ākāśa*, indicated as the support of the effects in the three-fold time (past, present and future). (10)
- 3.11 This/supporting (*dhṛti*) is by *Puruṣottama* alone because of the declaration of his *ājñāpayitṛtva* (command) (in *Bṛh* 3.8.9) (11)
- 3.2 Neither the *Pradhāna* nor the jīva, but the *Paramātmān* alone can be understood by the term *akṣara* because of the exclusion of any other *bhāva* (nature) in the *Bṛh* 3.8.11. (12)
- 4. Brahman and *Brahmā* are different** (13)
- 4.1 The object of *ikṣati* in the text "*puri śayam puruṣam ikṣate*" (*Prāśna* 5.5.) is not the *Brahmā* but the *Paramātmān* abiding in his own *asādhāraṇa* (special) and *aprākṛta* (non-material) *brahmaloka*, because of the designation of his *dharma*s (qualities) like *śāntam* (tranquil), *ajaram* (ageless), *abhaya*m (fearless), etc. (13)
- 5. The *dahara ākāśa* (small ether) is Brahman** (14-23)
- 5.1 The *dahara ākāśa* (*Chānd* 8.1.1) can only be the *Paramātmān*, because of the mention of the *asādharaṇadharmas* (unique qualities) of the

- Paramātman* like *apahatapāpman*, (sinless) *vijara*, (ageless) etc. in the later texts (*Chānd* 8.1.3) (14)
- 5.11 The *dahara* is the *Para* on account of the texts concerning the *gati* (going) of all beings to Him. (15)
- 5.12 The *vidhāra*katvam (holding apart) of the worlds (*Chānd* 8.4.1) fits in with the *Paramātmava* of the *dahara*, for such a greatness is observed in *Paramātman* alone (*Bṛh* 3.8.9). (16)
- 5.2 The *daharākāśa* is *Paramātman* alone because the word "ākāśa" is well known to be denoting *Paramātman* as the source of all beings in (*Chānd* 8.14.1, 1.9.1). (17)
- 5.3 The *dahara* (*Chānd* 8.3.4) is not *jīva*, because of the impossibility of *apahatapāpmatva* (freedom from sin) etc. on its part. (18)
- 5.31 The *dahara* is the *nityāvirbhūtasvarūpaḥ* (whose real nature is ever manifest) *Paramātman*, endowed with the stated eightfold *guṇas*, and not the *āvirbhūtasvarūpaḥ jīva*. (19)
- 5.311 The reference to the *jīva* is to show the *hetutva* (the causality) of the *Paramātman* in the *āvirbhāva* of the *jīvasvarūpa*. (20)
- 5.4 The all-pervading Brahman can be described as the small ether as shown in *Saurabha* 1.2.7 (21)
- 5.5 The *jīva*, who is an *anukartā* (imitator) (in *Kaṭha* 5.15) of the *nityāvirbhūtasvarūpa* cannot be the *nityāvirbhūtasvarūpaḥ daharaḥ*. (22)
- 5.6 Also *smṛti* (*Gītā* 14.2) declares that the *jīva* acquires these attributes. (23)
- 6. *Brahmopāsana*** (24-41)
- 6.1 Since the *angusṭhaparimāṇaka* (measured the size of a thumb) is declared as the Lord of the past and of the future (in *Kaṭha* 4-13), he is the *Puruṣottama*. (24)
- 6.11 His description as the *angusṭhamātrava* (the size of a mere thumb) with reference to the heart of the *upāsaka* (worshipper) is proper as men alone are entitled to (his *upāsana*). (This discussion is continued in *sūtra* 40 below). (25)
- 6.2 Bādarāyaṇa thinks that the *devas* (gods) are also entitled to the *Brahmopāsana*, since they are above men. (26)
- 6.21 Since one and the same deity can assume many bodies simultaneously (*yugapat*), *Brahmopāsana* is possible on their part and there is no contradiction with regard to object. (27)

- 6.3 The corporality (*vigrahatvam*) of gods does not involve the *nirarthakatva* (meaninglessness) of the vedic word both before the origin of the object and after its destruction because the objects originate (*arthasya prabhavāt*) from the word, denoting their eternal prototype (*nityākṛtīvācakāt*) serving as reminder to the thought of Prajāpati. (*Tait Br* 2.6.2.3, *Mbh* 12.232.25). (28)
- 6.31 Since the *sṛṣṭi* (creation) by Prajāpati is preceded by the (Vedic) *śabda*, the Vedas are *nitya*. (29)
- 6.32 Thus there is no contradiction even with regard to the recurrence of *sṛṣṭi* and *saṁhāra* (destruction) of the material world because the objects created in the beginning of each *kalpa* (age) have the same *nāma* and *rūpa* as those in the past *kalpas* (*ṚV* 10-190.3, *Mbh* 12.232.40). (30)
- 6.4 Jaimini thinks that *sūrya*, etc. have no right to *vidyās* like *Madhu*⁴, etc. because of the impossibility of the *upāsya* (object to be worshipped) to be *upāsaka*. (31)
- 6.41 The *pūrvapakṣin* thinks so also because of their being (*bhāvāt*) the *upāsaka* of Brahman. (32)
- 6.42 Bādarāyaṇa maintains the right of *Sūrya*, *Vasu*, etc. to *vidyās* like the *Madhu*, etc. because of the possibility of *Brahmalipsā* (a longing for Brahman) on their part, antecedent to their future *adhikāraprāpti* (attainment of offices) through the *upāsana* of Brahman their *antaryāmin*. (33)
- 6.5 Taking into consideration that the term *śūdra* is applied to a *mumukṣu* named *Jānaśruti* by his *guru*, it is not to be supposed that the *śūdra* is entitled to *Brahmavidyā*. (34)
- 6.51 That *Jānaśruti* was not a *śūdra* is known from his being mentioned with the *ksātriya* *Caitraratha* *Abhipratārin* (in *Chānd* 4.3.5). (35)
- 6.52 A *śūdra* is not entitled to *vidyā* because the *upanayana saṁskāra* (investiture rite) is referred to in the section dealing with *vidyā* (*vidyāpradeśa*). A *śūdra* is devoid of *upanayana saṁskāra*. (*GDS* 10.50, *Manusmṛti* 10.126). (36)
- 6.53 Moreover, because *Gautama* invests *Jābāla* with *upanayana* only after ascertaining the absence of his "śūdrahood". A *śūdra* is not entitled to *vidyā*. (37)
- 6.54 Since a *śūdra* is forbidden to hear the veda (*Vasiṣṭha Smṛti* 18.9) he is not entitled (to *Brahmavidyā*) (38)
- 6.55 And also because *smṛti* forbids teaching him the *dharma*s (sacred duties) (*Manusmṛti* 4.80) (39)

- 6.6 The *pramīta* (measured) is the *Parah̥puruṣa* because he is the shaker of the entire universe (*sarvajagat kampakatvāt*) and because of the (words) *mahat* etc. (used for him). (40)
- 6.61 The *Pramīta Puruṣa* is the *Para* because *jyoti* is mentioned (*darśanāt*) in the text “*tasya bhāsā*” (*Kaṭha* 5.15). (41)
- 7. The Paramātmān is different from the jīva** (42-44)
- 7.1 The *vācya* of the word *ākāśa*, presented as the producer of *nāma* and *rūpa* (*Chānd* 8.14.1) is the *Puruṣottama*, because of the designation of the producer of all objects as something different (*arthāntaratvena*) even from the *mukta jīva*. (42)
- 7.11 It is so also because of the designation of *bheda* (different) of the *sarvajña* from the non-knower (*ajña*) in deep sleep and departing. (43)
- 7.2 On account of the designation of the *Paramātmān* as different from the *jīva* in the text *sarvasyādhipati* (the Lord of all) (*Bṛh* 4.4.22) *sarvasyeśānaḥ* (the ruler of all) (*Bṛh* 4.4.22), it is established that he alone is the *ākāśa*. (44)

(D) The Fourth Pāda

- 1. The Sāṃkhya principles are not mentioned in the śāstra** (1-13)
- 1.1 The *Pradhāna* of the *Sāṃkhya* is not intended by the term *avyakta* (unmanifest) in *Kaṭha* 3.3. and 3.11 and 3.13 because the term *avyakta* there denotes *śārīra*, (body). (1)
- 1.11 The word *avyakta*, denoting something *sūkṣma* (subtle) can also denote the *śārīra*, which is a *sthūla* (grosser) state of the same *sūkṣma*. (2)
- 1.2 The *bheda* between the *aupaniṣadika pradhāna* (the *Pradhāna* mentioned in the *Upaniṣads*) and the *pradhāna* taught by others is that the former is meaningful as it depends on the *Paramakāraṇa* (supreme cause) while the latter is not. (3)
- 1.3 The word *avyakta* (in scripture) does not denote the *pradhāna* of the *Tāntrikas* also because of the absence of any statement of its *jñeyatva* (object to be known). (4)
- 1.31 The text “*anādy anantam mahataḥ param dhruvaṃ nicāyā taṃ mṛtyumukhāt pramucyate*” (*Kaṭha* 3.15) does not declare the *jñeyatva* of the *pradhāna*, but of the *Prajña*, i.e. the *Paramātmān*; He being the topic. (5)

- 1.4 Since the prior and the posterior texts of this Upaniṣad contain the statements and questions about the *upāya* (means), *upeya* (the end) and the *Upagantr*, (the realizing agent) there is no chance of any *ānumāṇikatattva* (principle derived from inference). (6)
- 1.41 Just as the word *mahat*, applied to the *sāṃkhya* principle *bhūdhi*, is found applied differently in the vedic text “*vadāham etaṃ puruṣaṃ mahantam* (*Vājasaneyi Sāṃhitā* 18.2, *Śvet* 3.8) so the world *avyakta* may refer to the *śarīra*. (7)
- 1.5 The *prakṛti* mentioned in the text “*ajāmekām*” (*Śvet* 4.5) is not the *sāṃkhyaprakṛti*, but the *Brahmātmikā* (having Brahman for its soul) *prakṛti* because of the absence of any specification in establishing the *pūrvapakṣa* as in the case of “cup with its mouth below” (*Bṛh* 2.2.3). (8)
- 1.51 The *camasa* (cup) is known as the *śira* (head) from the *vākyasēṣa* (*Bṛh* 2.2.3). So also that which is denoted by *ajā* has Brahman as its *kāraṇa* is known from the text “*tasmād etad brahma nāma rūpaṃ annaṃ ca jāyate* (*Muṇḍ* 1.1.9). (9)
- 1.52 *Brahmopādānakatva* and *ajātva* (unborn) fit in one and the same subject because of the teaching of the *viśvasrṣṭi* from Brahman, who is the *sūkṣma śaktimat jagatkāraṇam*, as in the case of *Madhu* (*vidyā*) etc. (10)
- 1.6 It cannot be said that the twenty-five principles of the *Sāṃkhya* are based on scripture (Cf, *Bṛh* 4.4.7), because the *brahmātmaka padārthas* based on the *śruti* are different from those of the *Tāntrikas*, and because of the excess of Brahman, the *adhāra*, (support) and likewise of the *ākāśa*. (11)
- 1.61 The *pañca pañcajanas* mentioned in *Bṛh* 4.4.7 are to be known as *prāṇa*, *cakṣu*, *śrotra*, *annaṃ*, and *mana* from the *vākyasēṣa* (cf. *Bṛh* 6.4.17-18). (12)
- 1.62 Since in the *vākyasēṣa* of the Kānvas ‘*annaṃ*’ is absent, the *pañcatva* is to be completed by adding *jyoti* mentioned in the beginning. (13)
- 2. Brahman is the kāraṇa of the universe** (14-15)
- 2.1 The *sarvajña*, *sarvaśakti* Brahman, described in the *lakṣaṇasūtra* (in the characterizing aphorism) alone is to be understood as the *kāraṇa* in the texts dealing with the *srṣṭi* of *ākāśa*, etc. (14)
- 2.11 Since there is no distinction of *nāma* and *rūpa* prior to creation and due to the absence of *astitva* connected

with these *nāma* and *rūpa*, the Brahman who is ever *sat* (*Tait* 2.6, *Chānd* 3.19.1) is denoted prior to creation by the term *asat* (*Tait* 2.7, *Chānd* 3.19.1) or by the term *avyakṛtam* (*Bṛh* 1.4.7) the *acetana pradhāna* cannot at all be the *antarātmabhūta prasāsītṛ* (controller) and thereby the *jagatkāraṇa*. (15)

3. The doctrine of *Sāṃkhya Puruṣa* is untenable (16-22)

3.1 The *Paramātman*, not the *Sāṃkhya puruṣa*, is to be understood (in *Kauṣ* 3.9) as the *dharmādharmakarmaphalabhoktā* because Brahman is the topic of discussion (*Kauṣ*. 4.1). Here *Karma* (meaning "something done", denotes the *jagat*, (which is a *Kārya*) and is proved by *pratyakṣa*, etc. (16)

3.2 The characteristic marks of the *jīva* (*Kauṣ*. 4.20) and of the *mukhyaprāṇa* (*Kauṣ* 3.3) are to be understood as referring to the Brahman, as explained in the section of *Pratardana* (Cf, *Saurabha* 1.1.29-31). (17)

3.21 Jaimini thinks that the question and the reply (*Kauṣ* 4.19) show that in this *prakaraṇa* (the term) *jīva* is suggestive of *Brahman*, who is other than the *jīva*. The question (*Bṛh* 2.1.16) and the reply (*Bṛh* 2.1.17) of the *Vājasaneyins* record the *Paramātman* as other than the *jīva*. (18)

3.3 *Paramātman* is the object to be seen in the text "*ātma vā are drṣṭavyaḥ*" (*Bṛh* 2.4.5, 4.5.6) because of the connection of the text with *Him* alone. (19)

3.31 Āśmarathya thinks that since there is *ananyatva* of the *jīva* from Brahman, its cause, the supreme soul could be designated by a term denoting the individual soul. (20)

3.32 Auḍulomi thinks that Brahman can be denoted by the word "*jīva*" because of the *sahabhāva* (union) of the *jīva* about to depart from the body, with Brahman. (21)

3.33 Kāśakṛtsna thinks that the *niyantr* is understood by the *niyamyā* because of the abiding of the *niyantr* (*Paramātman*) within the *niyamyā* (*jīva*). (*Tait Ar* 3.11.1.2). (22)

4. Brahman is both the *upādāna* and the *nimitta kāraṇa* of the world (23-27)

4.1 The *Paramātman* alone is both the *upādānakāraṇa* and the *nimittakāraṇa* on account of the *pratijñā* (*Chānd* 6.1.3) and of the *drṣṭānta* (*Chānd* 6.1.4). (23)

- 4.11 The *sr̥ṣṭitva* (creatorship) and the *prakṛitva* (material causality) of Brahman are established by the teaching of reflexion in the *śruti* (*Chānd* 6.2.3). (24)
- 4.12 *Śruti* (*Tait Br* 2.8.9.6.7) presents Brahman as having the two-fold forms of *nimittatva* and the *upādānatva* of the world. (25)
- 4.2 Brahman alone is the *nimitta* and the *upādāna* on account of His creating Himself (*Tait* 2.7). The *sarvajñam*, *sarvaśakti* Brahman, having transformed Himself into the form of the jagat by the *vikṣepa* of his *śakti*, becomes transformed through His own undeveloped (*avyakṛta*) yet powerful and creative nature. (26)
- 4.21 Since Brahman is declared as the *bhūtayoni* (source of beings) (*Muṇḍ* 1.1.6) and *brahmayoni* (*Muṇḍ* 3.1.3), Brahman alone is the *upādāna*. (27)
5. **All the Vedāntas refer to Brahman** (28)
- 5.1 By the totality (*samudāya*) of the *adhikaraṇas* all the vedāntas are explained as referring to Brahman. (28)

ADHYĀYA TWO

(A) The First Pāda

1. **The *smṛtis* that contradict the Vedas are to be rejected** (1-2)
- 1.1 The *Sāmkhyasmṛti* which advocates an *acetanākāraṇa* cannot be accepted because of its contradiction with other *smṛtis*, dealing with the *cetanākāraṇa* propounded in the *veda*. (1)
- 1.2 Besides, Manu and the rest do not consider the Vedas as dealing with the *pradhāna*. (2)
2. **By the rejection of the *Sāmkhyasmṛti*, the *Yogasmṛti* is also refuted** (3)
3. **Brahman is the jagatkāraṇa** (4-12)
- 3.1 *Pūrvapakṣa* I.
On the ground of *tarka* (reasoning) the *jagat* cannot have a conscious material cause because of difference (*vilakṣaṇatva*) between Brahman and the world known from the scripture (*Tait* 2.6). (4)
- 3.11 The scriptural references (to a conscious principle) (*Śat Br* 6.1.3.2, *Brh* 6.1.7, *Chānd* 6.3.2 and *Ait Up* 2.4) are the references to the presiding deities (*abhimāninīnām devatānām*). (5)
- 3.12 *Siddhānta*

- Brahman is the *prakṛīkatva* (material cause) of the *jagat* inspite of difference between them because it is seen that hair etc. originate from a person from whom they are different and dung-beetles originate from cow-dung from which it is different. (6)
- 3.13 The difference of the *upādeya* (effect) from *upādāna* (cause) prior to its origination means only a denial of similarity in every aspect between the cause and its effects. (7)
- 3.2 *Pūrvapakṣa* II
- Brahman cannot be the *jagad upādāna* because of the possibility of His acquiring the *acetanatva* of the *jagat* at the time of dissolution. (8)
- 3.21 *Siddhānta*
- There is no such possibility for just as the *prthivīvikāras* do not defile *prthivī*, when dissolved into it, so the *brahmavikāra saṁsāra* does not (defile Brahman). (9)
- 3.22 The said defect equally applies to the *Sāṁkhya* doctrine which is also opposed to the *Vedas*. (10)
- 3.3. Just as the *vedaviruddha pradhāna* is inferred to be the *jagatkāraṇa* on the basis of *tarka* (reason), there is the possibility also of rejecting it on the ground of similar *tarka*. Since there is no possibility of conclusion because of the disagreement among the *tarkikas*, what is mentioned in the *Veda* alone is to be accepted as the cause of the world. (11)
- 3.4 By the rejection of the *Sāṁkhya* view, all the other *Vedaviruddha kāraṇavādas* are also rejected. (12)
- 4. The *bhedābheda* relation between Brahman and His effects** (13-19)
- 4.1 The objection that if Brahman is the *upādānakāraṇa* of the *jagat*, He will also become the enjoying subject in the form of the *jīva* so that the Vedic distinction (*vibhāga*) between the enjoyer and the controller (*niyantr*) which will be contradicted cannot be accepted because there can still be a distinction (*vibhāga*) between them in spite of the non-distinction (*avibhāga*) as between the sea and the waves as well as between the sun and its rays. (13)
- 4.11 There is *ananyatva* (non-difference), not *atyantabhinnatva* (absolute difference) between the *kārya* (effect) and the *kāraṇa* (cause) on account of the

- scriptural texts (*Chānd* 6.1.4, *Chānd* 6.9.4, *Chānd* 3.14.1) denoting non-difference. (14)
- 4.12 There is *ananyatva* (between them) because the *kārya* can be perceived (*upalabdheḥ*) only when the *kāraṇa* is existent (*sadbhāva*). (15)
- 4.13 There is that *ananyatva* because of the existence of the *kārya*, belonging to a posterior time, (already) in the *kāraṇa* because of the designation of their *sāmānādhikaraṇya* (co-inherence) in the text: "*Brahma vā idam agra āsit*" (*Brh* 1.4.10). (16)
- 4.2 The text "*asad vā idam agra āsit*" (*Chānd* 3.19.1) means not the *asat* of the *kārya* but its *sūkṣmatva* (subtleness) prior to creation as is known from the complementary passage (*Chānd* 3.19.1), for an *asat kārya* cannot be produced at all. (17)
- 4.3 The universe is like a piece of cloth (*paṭṭa*) which is first rolled up and later spread out. (18)
- 4.31 It is like the *vāyu*, having *prāṇa*, *apāna*, etc. when controlled by *prāṇayāma* remains in its real form and when the control is removed, is known instantly in various forms. (19)
- 5. There is difference between Brahman and jīva** (20-22)
- 5.1 *Pūrvapakṣa*
If Brahman is accepted as the cause of the world (*Brahmakāraṇavāda*) the *jīva* becomes identified with Brahman (*Brh* 2.5.19) then there results the fault of not doing what is beneficial for ones own interest since the created world is an abode of all the miseries. (20)
- 5.11 *Siddhānta*
Brahman the creator of the world is superior to the embodied soul who is the enjoyer (*bhoktr*) of pleasure and pain. There is no absolute non-difference (*atyantabheda*) between them because of the designation of *bheda* (difference) in the text "*ātmānam antaro yamayati* (*Śat Br.* 14.6.7.30) . (21)
- 5.12 Just like the *vajra*, *vaidūrya*, etc, which are the modifications of the earth (*bhūvikāras*), the *kṣetrājña* though non-different (*abhinna*) from Brahman is different (*bhinna*) in its special qualities (*svarūpa*). (22)
- 6. Brahman is the creator of the world** (23-35)
- 6.1 Brahman does not require any *bāhyopakaraṇa* (ex-

- ternal implements) like a potter. But like milk, He transforms (Himself) in accordance with the form (*ākāra*) of the *kārya* (effects) on account of His special power. (23)
- 6.11 Just as the *devas* etc. create what they want through a mere wish (*saṃkalpa*), so does the Bhagavān also. (24)
- 6.2 *Pūrvapakṣa*
If the *jagatprakṛtīva* of Brahman is accepted He being *niravayavin* (without parts) there will be the consequence of His entirety (being transformed): on the other hand, His *sāvayavatva* (possessing parts) would contradict the *śāstras*. (25)
- 6.21 *Siddhānta*
There does not exist the said *doṣa* (fault) for the doctrine (of origin of the world from Brahman) is based on scripture (*Tait* 2.6, 2.7, *Chānd* 3.12.6, *Muṇḍ* 1.1.7). (26)
- 6.22 When various *vikṛtis* (modifications) are appropriate on the part of *śārīrakṣetrajñas* like the *devas* etc. how is it inappropriate on the part of the *sarvaśakti sarveśvara jagatkāraṇa*? (27)
- 6.23 The fault mentioned by you rebound to your own doctrine. (28)
- 6.24 That *devatā*, endowed with *sarvaśakti* in accordance with the scriptures (*Śvet* 6.8) is able to do everything. (29)
- 6.25 The objection that the *jagatkartṛtvam* of the *sarvaśakti* *upeta* (the one endowed with all powers) is not possible as He does not possess sense organs (*Śvet*. 6.8) is not tenable, as already been pointed out (Cf *Saurabha* 2.1.26). (30)
- 6.3 *Pūrvapakṣa*
The supreme being, who has all his desires eternally fulfilled cannot be the *kartā* since every activity has a purpose (*prayojana*). (31)
- 6.31 *Siddhānta*
This creation on the part of the Para is proper like the *krīḍā* (sports) of the kings. (32)
- 6.4 The inequality and cruelty due to unequal creation and destruction depend not on the *jagajjanmādi kartā*, but on the *karma* of the *jīva*, as in the case of rain. (*Bṛh* 3.2.13). (33)
- 6.41 The text "*sad eva saumyedam agra āsīd ekam*" (*Chānd* 6.2.1) does not go against either the *anāditva* of Karma

- of the first *jīvas* nor against the existence of the previous creations (RV 10.190-3). (34)
- 6.5 Because of the appropriateness of all the *kāraṇadharmas* (all the attributes of a cause) on *Brahman*, there is no contradiction in our view. (35)

(B) The Second Pāda

(In this Pāda rival systems of thought are refuted)

1. **The Sāṃkhya *pradhāna* cannot be the cause of the world** (1-10)
 - 1.1 The *pradhāna* is not the *jagatkāraṇam* because of its unacquaintance with the varied arrangements of the objects to be created. (1)
 - 1.2 It also lacks spontaneous activity. (2)
 - 1.21 Even if the *pradhāna* acts by itself, like milk, for the origin of the *jagat*, yet the *Para* is the inciter (*preraka*) in accordance with the text *yo'psu tiṣṭhan* (Brh 3.7.4) (3)
 - 1.22 The *pradhāna*, which is not guided (*adhishṭitam*) by the intelligent principle cannot be the *jagatkāraṇa* because the Sāṃkhya does not accept any other *sahakārin* (accessory principle) besides the *pradhāna*. (4)
 - 1.23 It cannot be said that as the grass, eaten by cows, transforms itself into milk, the *avyakta* transforms itself into *mahat* etc, on account of the non-transformation of the grass eaten by a bull. (5)
 - 1.24 The *acetanapradhāna* cannot have any *prayojana* for its activity. (6)
 - 1.25 If the *Puruṣa* is said to move the *pradhāna* as a blind man makes a lame man move or as a magnet the iron, then the assumption of the *niṣkriyatva* (non-activity) of the *Puruṣa* will be contradicted and *pradhāna*, because of its being instigated by another (*parapreryatva*), cannot be the *jagatkāraṇa*. (7)
 - 1.26. Because of the impossibility of the *Parasparāṅgāṅibhāva* (mutual subordination and preponderance) of the *guṇas* in the state of equilibrium at the time of *pralaya*, the *pradhāna* cannot be the *jagatkāraṇa*. (8)
 - 1.27 Even if *pradhāna* were in some way inferred, it cannot be the cause of *jagat* because of the absence of the *jñātrīvaśakti* (the power of being a knower). (9)
- 1.3 The doctrine of Kapila is inconsistent because of its *vedantāviruddhatva* and its inner contradictions. (10)

2. The *Paramāṇuvāda* is refuted (11-17)

- 2.1 There is inconsistency in the theory of the origin of *dvyaṇukas* (binary) and *tryaṇukas* (ternary) compounds of atoms etc. If the *paramāṇus* have parts, then there will be infinite regress and if they are without parts they cannot be the producers of other evolutes. (11)
- 2.2 The *udbhava* of *jagat* is not possible on account of the impossibility of the *ādyam karma* (first motion) in the *paramāṇus*, (ultimate atoms). It is impossible for the *adr̥ṣṭa* (the unseen principle) to inhere in the *paramāṇus* as well as be connected with the *jīva* to cause motion in the *paramāṇus*. (12)
- 2.21 The *paramāṇukāraṇapakṣa* is impossible because of the *anavasthā* (infinite regress) of the *samavāya* relations. (13)
- 2.3 If the *paramāṇus* are active by nature then there will be either *nitya sṛṣṭi* or *nityapralaya*. (14)
- 2.4 If the *paramāṇus* have colour (*rūpa*) etc. like their respective effects (*kāryas*) like pot etc. then the *paramāṇus* must be *anitya* like these *kāryas*, otherwise the *kāryas* must be devoid of colour etc. (15)
- 2.5 If the *paramāṇus* have numerous qualities⁵ (*upacita guṇāḥ*), then the elements of earth, water, fire and air will be similar and if the *paramāṇus* have only a limited quality (i.e. each be possessed of its peculiar quality) then earth etc. having only the corresponding *guṇas* of their causes must be connected with one *guṇa* only. In both ways the result is the absence of creation. (16)
- 2.6 Since the *paramāṇukāraṇavāda* is rejected by the wise (*śiṣṭa*), the *mumukṣus* must show absolute disregard for it. (17)

3. The *sugatamata* is refuted (18-32)

- 3.1 Because of the *acetanatva* of the components viz., the elements (*bhūta*), the elemental (*bhautika*), mind (*citta*) and mental (*caittika*), their aggregation (*samudāya*) is impossible in the absence of another cause for their union. (18)
- 3.11 *Saṅghāta* (aggregation) is not possible by the mutual causality (*itaretarahetutva*) of nescience (*avidyā*) past impressions (*saṁskāra*) cognition (*viññāna*) name and form (*nāmarūpa*) six supports (*ṣaḍāyatana*) etc. because even they are not the cause of the aggregation. (19)

- 3.12 Also because of the destruction of the prior moment at the production of the subsequent because both are momentary (*kṣaṇikatvena*). (20)
- 3.13 If there is the origin of the *kārya* when the cause is *asat* then the thesis of the origin of *ujñāna* from a four-fold cause consisting of *indriya* (sense organ), *āloka* (light), *manaskāra* (direction of mind), and *viṣaya* (sense objects) will be contradicted. If the cause is *sat*, then there will be *yaugapadyam* (simultaneity) since at the origin of another *kṣaṇa* (moment), the previous *kṣaṇa* is still existent. (21)
- 3.2 Because of the impossibility of an interruption of the *santāna* (series) and because of the recognition (*pratyābhijñāyamānatvāt*) of the members of the series there is no possibility of both a causal or causeless *nirodha* (destruction). (22)
- 3.21 The view that *mokṣa* is the *nirodha* of *avidyā* etc. is inconsistent because the series has no *vastutva* (existence) beyond the single momentary members. (23)
- 3.3 Their thesis of the non-existence of the ether is unreasonable because of (its) non-distinction from earth etc. (24)
- 3.31 Also because of the recognition that this is that (*idaṃ tad iti pratyābhijñāyā*) that doctrine is untrue. (25)
- 3.32 The origin of *bhāva* (entity) from *abhāva* is not observed. (26)
- 3.33 Otherwise there must be achievement of goals (*artha siddhi*) like *vidyā*, etc. for the one who has not resorted to any means. (27)
- 3.4 There is no *abhāva* of external objects as held by the *viññānamātrāstitvavādins*, (maintainers of the reality of consciousness alone) for these objects are perceived (*upalabdheḥ*). (28)
- 3.41 Even on the analogy of the dream cognitions the *arthābhāva* (objectlessness) of the waking cognitions cannot be established both on account of the *vaiṣamya* (non-parallelism) of the *dṛṣṭānta* (example) and the *dārṣṭānta* (exemplified) and on account of the fact that the *svapnājñāna* (dream consciousness) too has a base (*ālambanatva*). (29)
- 3.5 Those who deny the existence of external objects cannot defend the existence of *vāsanā* (past impressions) to explain the variety in knowledge. (30)

3.51 There is no *vāsanā* because of the *kṣaṇikatva* of the *āśraya* (substratum) according to your own doctrine. (31)

3.6 *Śūnyavāda* is also erroneous because it is inconsistent in every way and because it contradicts *pramāṇas* like *pratyakṣa*, etc. (32)

4. The Jaina views refuted (33-36)

4.1 The ascription of the dual contradictory attributes (*dharmas*) of existence, (*astitva*) non-existence (*nāstitva*), etc. to the same *vastu* (thing) by the Jainas is not reasonable, since it is impossible. (33)

4.2 In the same way, at the attainment of a larger body there will be incompleteness of the *ātman*, which is accepted to be of the size of the body. (34)

4.21 The *ātman* cannot be said to possess *avayavas* which are subject to increase and decrease because of the resulting fault of change (*vikāritva*) etc. on its part. (35)

4.22 The *dehaparimāṇavāda* is completely destroyed by accepting the constancy of the final size of the soul because in that case there must be the *nityatva* of the initial and the intervening sizes also on account of the *aviśeṣaḥ* (non-distinction) everywhere. (36)

5. The *Pāśupata* doctrine is refuted (37-41)

The *pāśupata* doctrine must be rejected, for, it contradicts the Vedic teaching about the non-distinction of the *upādāna* (material) and *nimitta* (efficient) *kāraṇas* of the world, and because it initiates an *upadharma*. (37)

5.1 *Paśupati* cannot be the cause of the world because the bodiless *Paśupati* (who is also the instigator) cannot have any relations (*sambandha*) with the *pradhāna* which is to be instigated. (38)

5.2 (And) *Paśupati* cannot have a body, either eternal—because it contradicts experience—or non-eternal—because it arises later. Therefore he is not the cause of the world. (39)

5.3 Even the supposition of the sense organs and the body (*karāṇakalevara*) like (that of) the *jīva*, (on the part of *Paśupati*) is not possible because of the *bhogaprasakti*. (40)

5.4 If he associates with the *adr̥ṣṭa* of the *jīva* consisting of its *punya*, etc., then there will be his finitude (*antavatvam*) and non-conscience (*ajñatvam*). (41)

6. **Śāktavāda is refuted** (42-45)
- 6.1 Since the origin of the *jagat* from *Śakti* without the *puruṣa* is not possible, *śaktikāraṇavāda* is invalid. (42)
- 6.1.1 There cannot be (any) *puruṣasamsarga* because the *puruṣa* has no sense organ at that time (i.e. prior to creation). (43)
- 6.2 If *śaktivāda* accepts that the *jagatkartā* has *svābhāvika vijñāna* (natural intelligence) etc. it is an acceptance of Brahman; (as a result) the *śaktivāda* is set aside by itself. (44)
- 6.3 *Śaktipakṣa* is *aprāmaṇika* (unauthoritative) as it contradicts *śruti* and *smṛti*. (45)

(C) The Third Pāda

1. **The absence of the *anyonyavirodha* (mutual contradiction) of the *śruti* is determined. All the elements in the world originate from Brahman.** (1-7)
- 1.1 *Pūrvapakṣa*
The ether (*viyat*) does not originate since it is not mentioned in the *Chāndogya* text. (1)
- 1.1.1 *Siddhānta*
The *utpatti* of *viyat* is mentioned in *Taittirīyaka* text "ātman ākāśaḥ sambhūta" (*Tait* 2.1). (2)
- 1.2 *Pūrvapakṣa*
This *Taittirīyaka śruti* is metaphorical (*gauna*) because the *ākāśa* is *niravayava*. Besides, *Brh* 2.3.3 speaks of the immortality of *vāyu* and *antarikṣa*. (3)
- 1.2.1 Also because the word *sambhūta* can be used in a metaphorical sense to the *ākāśa* and in the literal (*mukhya*) to the elements (as in *Tait*. 3.2). (4)
- 1.2.2 *Siddhānta*
Since there is *avyatireka* (non-separation) of originated objects like *ākāśa*, etc. from Brahman there is the knowledge of all through the knowledge of Brahman. But if *ākāśa* is not something originated, this thesis will be contradicted. The *Brahmāpṛthaktva* (non-separation from Brahman) of all is known from texts like "aitad ātmyam idaṁ sarvaṁ" (*Chānd* 6.8.7). (5)
- 1.3 The text like "aitad ātmyam idaṁ sarvaṁ" (*Chānd* 6.8.7) establishes the *vikāratvam* (the created nature) of *prapañca* (of the universe). *Vikāra* denotes *udbhav* (origin)⁶. The absence of any mention of *ākāśa* and the

- mention of *tejas* in *Chāndogya* (6.23) fits in as in ordinary life where reference to a group is made by mentioning some of them. (6)
- 1.4 By this principle the origin of *vāyu* (*Mātaris'van*) is also explained. (7)
- 2. Brahman has no origin** (8)
- 2.1 There is *anutpatti* (non-origin) of Brahman, the *Sat*, because of the impossibility of having *utpatti* for the *jagatkāraṇa*. (8)
- 3. Brahman creates everything and everything returns to him** (9-15)
- 3.01 *Pūrvapakṣa*
"Tejas" (fire) originates from air in accordance with the text "Fire from the air" (*Tait*, 2.1). (9)
- 3.02 *Āpas* (water) from *tejas* as declared by the text "water from fire". (*Tait* 2.1). (10)
- 3.03 *Bhū* (earth) originates from *āpa* in accordance with the text "They (viz. waters) created food" (*Chānd* 6,2.4) (11)
- 3.031 The word "food" in the above text denotes *bhū* because the subject matter is concerning creation of the *Mahābhūtas* and also because its colour is said to be as black (denoting food) in *Chānd* 6.4.1. (12)
- 3.1 *Siddhānta*
The *paramapuruṣa* is the creator of these effects, because of the texts "*bahusyām*" (may I be many) (*Chānd* 6.2.3) and "*tad ātmānaṁ svayam akuruta*" (that itself created itself) (*Tait*. 2.7) (13)
- 3.2 The order of *pralaya* is the reverse of the said order of *sṛṣṭi*. (14)
- 3.3 The text *etasmājjāyate praṇo manaḥ sarvendriyāṇi ca* (*Muṇḍ* 2.1.3) does not contradict the above mentioned order of creation, but shows that there is non-difference of the origin of knowledge, mind, the ether etc. from Brahman. In between the soul and the ether, the "categories of unmanifest, *mahat* and *ahankāra*, implied in other texts are also to be understood. (15)
- 4. The nature of the jīva** (16-52)
- 4.1 The designation of birth and death of the *jīva* is metaphorical and is dependent on the existence of the body. (16)
- 4.11 The *jīvātmā* does not originate because there is no text

- about its having an origin by nature. Besides the eternity of *jīva* is well known in Scripture. (*Kaṭha* 2.18, *Kaṭha* 5.13, *Svet* 4.5). (17)
- 4.2 The *ātman* which has become an ego (*aham artha bhūta*) is a *jñātā* (knower). (18)
- 4.3 The *jīva* is *aṇu* (atom) because of the declaration of its *utkrānti* (departure) in *Brh* 4.4.2 *gati* (going) in *Kauṣ* 1.2. and *āgati* (coming) in *Brh* 4.4.6. (19)
- 4.31 Unlike *utkrānti* which is sometimes possible on the part of one who does not move as in the case of *grama svāmyatva* (rulership of a village) *gati* and *āgati* are possible only through one's own self. (20)
- 4.32 The text "*sa vā eṣa mahān*" (*Brh* 4.4.22) refers to *Paramātman* and not to the *jīva*. (21)
- 4.33 The scripture declares the *jīva* as *aṇu* (*Muṇḍ* 3.1.9) and describes its measure as a hundredth part of the tip of a hair divided a hundred fold (*Svet* 5.9). (22)
- 4.34 The *jīva*, staying in one part of the body like a *candanabindu* (a drop of sandal paste) illumines the entire body. Hence it can experience pleasure, etc. over the entire body. (23)
- 4.341 The heart is the abode of the *jīva*. (24)
- 4.342 The illumination of the body (i.e. the experience of consciousness in the entire body) is due to the attribute (of knowledge) of the *jīva*, just like the light of a lamp in a room. (25)
- 4.343 The extending beyond of the *guṇabhūta jñāna* of which the *jīva* is the *āśraya* (substratum) (*Kauṣ* 4.20) is proper as in the case of *gandha* (odour). (26)
- 4.344 Although there is *aviśeṣa* (non-distinction) of *jīva* and its *jñāna* as far as *jñānatva* is concerned, yet because of the teaching of *prathaktva* (separation) (*Kauṣ* 3.6), their *dharmadharmaibhāva* (substratum and attribute relationship) is appropriate. (27)
- 4.4 Just as the *prājña* (intelligent one) is said to be Brahman because He possesses great attributes (i.e. Brahman is the one in whom there are great attributes) the *ātman* is said to be *nitya* (eternal) and *vibhu* (all pervading) (*Muṇḍ* 1.1.6). In the *drṣtānta* (example) the *prājña* great in Himself is great by His *guṇa*s also, while in the case of the *dārṣtānta* (exemplified) the *jīva*, though *aṇu* in size, is *vibhu* by reason of its *guṇa*. (28)
- 4.41 The designation of the *vibhutva* of the *jīva*, due to its

- attribute is reasonable because the attribute lasts as long as the *ātman* does (*Brh* 4.3.30). (29)
- 4.42 This *jñāna* is existent, even in the state of *suṣupti* (deep sleep) though it is manifested only in the *jāgrat* (waking) state, just as virility though existent in *bālīya* (childhood) is manifest in *yauvana* (youth) only. (30)
- 4.43 Since, in the *sarvagatātmavāda*, there will be the *nitya* (eternal) *prasaṅga* of perception (*upalabdhi*) or non-perception (*anupalabdhi*) or of bondage or of release, of the *ātma*, there must be a restriction with regard to one or the other (of them). (31)
- 4.5 This *ātman* is a *kartā* because of the meaningfulness of the *śāstra* informing (us) about the *upāya* (means) of *bhukti* (enjoyment) and *mukti* (salvation) (*Tait. Samhitā* 2.5.5). (32)
- 4.51 Also because of the teaching of his moving about in the body (*Brh* 2.1.18). (33)
- 4.52 And of his taking the senses (*Brh* 2.1.18). (34)
- 4.53 And of his *kartṛtva* (agentship) in the text "*vijñānam yajñam tanute*" (*Tait* 2.5). Here *vijñānam* means the *jīva*, not *buddhi*. In the latter case *karaṇavibhakti* (instrumental case) would have been used. (35)
- 4.54 There is no restriction with regard to (his) action based on the obtainment of their fruits. (Ref. 4.43 above). (36)
- 4.55 If *buddhi* had *kartṛtva* (agentship) its *karaṇa śakti* (instrumental power) would cease and would come to have *kartṛśakti*. (37)
- 4.56 If the *ātman* is not the *kartā* there will result the absence of *samādhi* due to the *kartṛtva* of a mere *acetana* principle. (38)
- 4.57 The *ātman* acts or does not act according to its own *icchā* (wish) like a carpenter (*takṣa*). In the *kartṛtva* of the *buddhi* due to the absence of *icchā*, there will be absence of any alternatives (i.e. freedom of choice). (39)
- 4.58 The *kartṛtva* of the *jīva* proceeds from the supreme cause (who has entered within the *jīva*) (*Tait. Ar* 3.11.12). (40)
- 4.581 "But there is no fault of inequality". The supreme being taking into consideration the *jīvakṛtakarmas* (works done by the soul) makes it do good deeds (*dharmādikamkarma*) in another birth too because of the "meaningfulness etc. of injunctions and prohibitions". (41)
- 4.6 The *jīva* is a part (*aṁśa*) of *Paramātman*, because of its

- designation of both *bheda* (Śvet 1.9) and of *abheda* (Chānd 6.8.6). The Ātharvānikas read the *dāsākitavāditvam* (the nature of fishermen, gamblers and the rest) of Brahman. (42)
- 4.61 Jīva is *Brahmānśa* on account of the mantra "*Pādo'sya viśvabhūtāni* (A foot of him are all beings) (RV. 10.90.3). (43)
- 4.611 *Smṛti* also supports the *Brahmānśatvam* of the jīva (Gītā 15.7). (44)
- 4.62 Though the jīva is an *aśa* of the *Paramapurūṣa*, the *aśin* does not experience *sukhaduḥkha* (pleasure and pain) just as *prakāśa* (light) etc. is devoid of the *guṇadoṣas* (virtue or vice) that come into their parts. (45)
- 4.621 The *smṛti* also supports the *nityatva* and *nirguṇatva* of *Paramātman* and the *moksabandhatva* of the *karmātman* (Mbh, 12. 339. 14-15). (46)
- 4.63 Although the jīvas are equal on account of their being the *aśa* of Brahman, yet injunction (*Tait Sam* 2.5.5.) and prohibition (*Tait Sam* 7.1.1.) are appropriate because of their connection with different bodies. (47)
- 4.64 The souls are atomic by nature, in spite of their being *aśa* of *vibhu* (all pervasive being) and their having themselves the *guṇas* of *vibhutva*. Therefore there is no *vyatikara* (exchange) of *Karmas*. (48)
- 4.65 Because of the consequence of the *vyatikara*, the *sarvagatātmavādas* of others like Kapila are fallacious indeed (*ābhāsā eva*). (49)
- 4.651 *Vyatikara* is inevitable in spite of having recourses to *adrṣṭa* (the unseen principle) in the *sarvagatātmavāda*, because of the non-restriction with regard to the *adrṣṭa*. (50)
- 4.652 There is no restriction even with regard to *saṁkalpa* (decision) etc. such as "I shall do this, not that". (51)
- 4.653 It cannot be argued that everything is consistent on account of the place of the *ātman* within its own body, because of the inclusion of the place of all the souls therein. (52)

(D) The Fourth Pāda

1. The origin of the sense organs (1-21)
- 1.1 The *indriyas* (sense organs) originate like the ether (*kha*) etc. (1)
- 1.11 Though the origin of *karaṇas* (organs) is not mentioned (in *Tait* 2.1) yet it is impossible that their origin be

- gauṇa* as the majority of *śruti* texts designate such an origin, and because of the thesis concerning the knowledge of all through the knowledge of one (*Muṇḍ* 1.3.1). (2)
- 1.12 The *śruti* about the *udbhava* of the *indriyas* is *mukhya*. (3)
- 1.2 The *prāṇas*⁸ originate like the *kha* (ether) etc. because of the mention of *vāk* (speech), *prāṇa* and *manas* as preceded by *tejas*, *āpa* and *anna* (food) (*Chānd* 6.4.4). (4)
- 1.20 *Pūrvapakṣa*
The *indriyas* are seven (*Bṛh* 4.4.2). (5)
- 1.21 *Siddhānta*
There are more than seven *indriyas* as is evident from scripture (*Bṛh* 3.2.8), and they are specified as eleven (*Bṛh* 3.9.4). (6)
- 1.3 The *prāṇas* are atomic because of the *śruti* about their going out (*Bṛh* 4.4.2). (7)
- 1.4 The *śreṣṭha*, i.e. *mukhya prāṇa* (the chief vital breath) (*Chānd* 5.1.1) originates like the *Mahābhūtas* (*Muṇḍ* 2.1.3). (8)
- 1.41 *Prāṇa* is not a mere *vāyu* or *karāṇa* or *kriyā* (function) but is the *vāyu* that has assumed a different *avasthā* (condition) (*Muṇḍ* 2.1.3). (9)
- 1.42 The *śreṣṭha* (best) *prāṇa* is a *viśeṣa upakaraṇa* (special instrument) of the *jīva* like the *cakṣu* (eye) etc. (10)
- 1.421 The *vidhāraṇam* (holding up) of the body and the *indriyas* is the *asādhāraṇakāryam* (the special function) of *Prāṇa* (*Praśna* 2.3). (11)
- 1.422 Just as the *bahuvṛtti manas* (mind having many modes), the *prāṇa* also serves the *jīva* through its *pañca vṛttis* (five modes) like *apāna* etc. (12)
- 1.43 The *prāṇa* is atomic because of the text concerning departure. (13)
- 1.5 The *karāṇas* like *vāk*, proceed to their respective functions as inspired by *devatās* like *Agni* etc. (*Āit* 1.2.4). (14)
- 1.6 There is a *sva-svāmibhāva* (master-servant) relation between the *jīva*, who is the *bhoktā* and the *indriyas* (*Chānd* 8.12.4). (15)
- 1.61 There is such an eternal relationship with the *jīva*, not with the *adhīsthātṛdevatās* (presiding deities). (16)
- 1.7 The *indriyas* are not *vṛttiviśeṣas* (special modes) of the *śreṣṭhaprāṇa*, but are different *tattvas* (entities) (Cf. *Muṇḍ* 2.1.3) (17)

- 1.71 The *bheda* of the *śreṣṭhāprāṇa* from them is declared (*Bṛh* 1.3.7) and because of the *vailakṣaṇya* (difference) of the *indriyas*, the apprehenders of the sense objects, from the *śreṣṭhāprāṇa*, the cause of the subsistence of the body, the *indriyas* are separate entities. (18)
- 1.8 The *vyākaraṇam* (evolution) of *nāma* and *rūpa* is the work of the *Paradevatā* (supreme being) (*Chānd* 6.3.2,3) who made each of the three *devatās* tripartite. (19)
- 1.81 The existence of the evolutes (*kāryaṇi*) of the *bhūtas* of *teja*, *āpa* and *annai* in the body is known from scripture. (*Chānd* 6.5.1-3). (20)
- 1.82 But they are regarded as different due to the preponderance of the parts (*bhāgabdhūyastvāt*). (21)

ADHYĀYA THREE

(A) The First Pāda

1. The ascent of the *jīva* to the orb of the moon (1-7)
- 1.1 The *jīva* possessed of the vital breath (*prāṇādīmān*) closely embraced by the *sūkṣmabhūtas*, (subtle elements), after discarding (the present) body, goes to another body as known from the text "Do you know how in the fifth oblation water comes to have the speech of man?" (*Chānd* 5.3.3). (1)
- 1.11 Though *āpa* is *tryātmaka* (due to tripartition) its mention alone is due to its preponderance. (2)
- 1.12 (The *jīva*) goes being closely embraced by the *bhūtasūkṣmas* (as known from the description) of going (*gati*) of the sense organs. (*Bṛh* 4.4.2). (3)
- 1.13 The mention of the going of *vāk* etc. of the dead man into fire etc. (*Bṛh* 3.2.13) is only metaphorical (*bhākta*) – (while the going of the *prāṇa* and *bhūtasūkṣma* is not metaphorical). (4)
- 1.14 The term *śraddhā* (reverence) (i.e. the object mentioned to be offered into the first fire in *Chānd* 5. 4.2) is to be understood as *Āpa* (water), because of the appropriateness of the introduction (*upakrama*). (5)
- 1.15 Though *jīva* is not explicitly mentioned, the text *eṣa somo rāja* (*Chānd* 5.10.4) denotes the performers of "iṣṭāpūrta" (pious works) (*Chānd* 5.10.3). (6)
- 1.16 The description of the mere performers of deeds i.e. those who are *anātmavids* as the food of gods (*Chānd* 5.10.4, *Bṛh* 1.4.10) is merely metaphorical (*bhāktam*). (7)

2. The fruits of karmas (8-21)
- 2.1 After the decay of the *karmas*, productive of fruits in the next world *jīva* descends in accordance with the *śruti* (*Chānd* 5.10.7) and *smṛti* (*GDS* 11.29) texts in order to be born in high or low status. (8)
- 2.2 Kārṣṇājini considers *caraṇa* (in the *Chāndogya* text (5.10.7) referred to above as denoting (*upalakṣaṇa*) not *ācāraḥ* (conduct) but *karma*. (9)
- 2.21 Even in that case there is no *anarthakyaṃ* (futility) of conduct because of the dependence of *karma* on conduct. (10)
- 2.22 Bādari thinks *caraṇa* means good and bad actions. (11)
- 2.30 *Pūrvapakṣa*
Even the going to the world of moon, of the *duṣṭas* (wicked) who are attached to the prohibited and averse to what is enjoined, is to be understood from the *Kauṣ* 1.2. (12)
- 2.301 There are both the ascent to and the descent from the *candramaṇḍala* (orb of the moon) for them after they have experienced suffering in the abode of Yama (*Kaṭha* 2.6, *Ṛv.* 10.14.1) (13)
- 2.302 Parāśara, and others declare (their) subjugation to Yama. (14)
- 2.303 The *smṛtis* declare that there are seven hells (*narakas*) beginning with Raurava. (15)
- 2.304 The existence of other "overlords" does not contradict their being subjugated to Yama, because in Raurava, etc, the overlords like Citragupta, etc. are under the control of Yama. (16)
- 2.31 *Siddhānta*
There is no going of the sinners (*aniṣṭādikārin*s) to the moon, for, they who do not go through the path of the gods (*Chānd* 5.10.1) i.e. the path of *vidyā* and through the path of the Fathers (*Chānd* 5.10.3) i.e. the path of Karma, but go to a third place, thereby this world is not filled up. (*Chānd* 5.10.8). (17)
- 2.32 In this third place there is no need for the *pañcam āhuti* (fifth oblation) for the origination of the body of those who do not perform sacrifices. (*Chānd* 5.10.8). (18)
- 2.33 *Smṛti* declares the origination of bodies without the *pañcam āhuti* for even those who performed sacrifices, etc. as in the case of *Dhṛṣṭadyumna*. (19)

- 2.34 Since the *utpatti* (origin) of *svedaja* (moisture born) and *udbhija* (plant born) among the four categories of beings, without even the union of male and female is seen, there is no need of the *pañcam āhuti*. (20)
- 2.341 The term "*udbhija*" in *Chānd* 6.3.1. includes the *svedaja* also, so that there is no setting aside (*hāni*) the four categorization of beings. (21)
- 3. The process of descent** (22-27)
- 3.1 The *jīva*, on its way of return, does not actually become *ākāśa*, etc. (*Chānd* 5.10.5-6), but only becomes similar (*sādrśyam*) to them, because that is reasonable. (22)
- 3.11 The association of the *jīva* with various entities beginning with *ākāśa* and ending with rain is only for a short time, while the association with rice is more difficult to escape (*Chānd* 5.10.6). (23)
- 3.12 The statement of their being born as rice, etc. already being occupied by other *kṣetrajña* (soul) (*Chānd* 5.10.6) is to be understood as a mere association (*saṁsarga*) with them as with the *ākāśa*, etc. (24)
- 3.2 The *karma* like the *Jyotiṣṭoma*, etc. though associated with *himsā* (killing of animals) (leading to immobile births like that of the rice etc.) is not *aśuddha*) (impure) because of the scriptural injunctions. (25)
- 3.3 The (*jīva*'s) becoming rice is just as its becoming one who performs the act of generation mentioned in the scripture (*Chānd* 5.10.6). (26)
- 3.4 Having depended on the *yonī* it becomes *śarīrin* (embodied). (27)

(B) The Second Pāda

- 1. Various states like dream etc. experienced by the *jīva*** (1-10)
- 1.0 *Pūrvapakṣa*
In the sphere of dream the creation of objects like *ratha* (Chariot) etc. (*Brh* 4.3.10) is made by the *jīva* (*Brh* 4.3.9). (1)
- 1.01 Some speak of the *jīva* in the dream state to be the *kartā* of desires in the form of sons etc. (*Kaṭha* 5.8). (2)
- 1.1 *Siddhānta*
The *Satyasaṁkalpa*, (true resolve) *Sarvajña* (omniscient) *Parameśvara* is the creator of the wonderful objects like *ratha* etc. but not *jīva*, whose

- satyasamkalpatva*, etc. is not fully manifested in the *baddhāvasthā* (state of bondage). (3)
- 1.12 Since dreams are indicative of future good or evil (*Chānd* 5.2.9), *Ait. Ar.* 3.24), the *Paramātman* alone is the maker of the dream chariots etc. (4)
- 1.13 The (attributes of) *satyasamkalpatva*, etc. of the *jīva* remain hidden in the *baddhāvasthā* (state of bondage) in accordance with the *karma* of the *jīva* through the wish of the *Parameśvara* (*Svet* 6.16). (5)
- 1.131 This obscuration (*tirobhāva*) takes place due to the association with *avidyā*. (6)
- 1.2 The *suṣupti* (deep sleep) also takes place in the *Paramātman* alone. In this state the *jīva* after entering into the vein and the pericardium of the heart rests in the Highest Self. (*Chānd* 8.6.3, 2.1.19, 2.1.17). (7)
- 1.21 Therefore the declaration of the rising from *Parameśvara* in the text "*Sata āgamyā*" (*Chānd* 6.10.2) is reasonable. (8)
- 1.22 The same *jīva*, who was asleep arises so that remembering the work half done on the previous day, it does the (other) half on the following day in accordance with the scriptural declaration (*Chānd* 6.9.2) and injunctions (*Maitri* 6.3.6, *Bṛh* 1.4.7). (9)
- 1.3 *Mūrccā*, (swoon) which is different (*atirikta*) from the state of *suṣupti*, etc. is the half attainment of death (*marañārdhasaṃpatti*). (10)
- 2. Brahman is Ubhayalingam (possessed of double characteristics)** (11-22)
- 2.1 As already proved (*Saurabha* 1.2.8) the respective *doṣas* of the *jīva* do not pertain to the *sarvāntarvartī* (abiding within all) *Paramātman*, even due to the place (*sthānato'pi*) as he is not subject to *karma*, because everywhere Brahman is stated to be endowed with both *nir-doṣatva* (free from all defect) and *svābhāvikaḡuṇātmakatva* (endowed with all auspicious qualities). (11)
- 2.11 Unlike in the case of the *jīva*, to whom, though really *apahatapāpman*, the *doṣas* due to the connection with the body pertain, there is no text designating *doṣas* to the *antaryāmin*, (on the contrary) there is (the designation of his) immortality (*Bṛh* 3.7.3). (12)
- 2.12 Moreover, followers of "some" branches (of Vedic tradition) teach that one of these two eats the sweet berry,

and the other, without eating, looks on, (*Muṇḍ* 3.1.1, *Śvet* 4.6, *RV* 1.164.20). (13)

2.13 Since Brahman, who is the *pradhānahetu* (the principle agent) of the *nāma* and *rūpa* (*Chānd* 6.3.2) is not even touched by the odour of *doṣa* as he is not the *bhoktr* of the *svotpādya* (to be created by himself) *nāmarūpās* he is "without form" (*arūpavat*). (14)

2.2 Brahman is *ubhayalingam*⁹ (i.e. possessed of two-fold characteristics) – untouched by darkness and possessed of light, on account of the *avaiyarthya* (not devoid of meaning) of the text "*ādityavarṇam tamasaḥ parastāt* (of the colour of the sun, beyond darkness) (*Gītā* 8.9) (*Śvet* 3.8, *Vājasaneyā Saṁhitā* 31.18, *Tait. Ar.* 3.131). (15)

2.21 Whenever a text states that much as its real meaning only, then indeed it is to be known as *avaiyarthya*¹⁰ (non-meaningless). (16)

2.22 Some of the *upaniṣadic* texts (*Chānd* 8.7.1, 8.7.3, *Śvet* 16.19, *Chānd* 8.1.5) and *Smṛti* (Cf *Gītā* 15.18, 10.18, 10.42) prove that Brahman is *Ubhayalingam*. (17)

2.3 Brahman, though *sarvagatam*, is *nir-doṣa* on account of His *ubhayalingatva*, as expressed through the *upamā* of the *sūrya* within the water receptacles. (18)

2.40 *Pūrvapakṣa*

The *dr̥ṣṭānta* (example of the *sūrya*) is not the point because unlike the water which is apprehended to be remote from the sun, there is no such apprehension of the *sthāna* (place) (i.e. *jīva*) from the *aṁśin* (whole) (i.e. *Paramātmān*). (19)

2.41 *Siddhānta*

The intended portion (*vivakṣitāṁśa*) of the *dr̥ṣṭānta* denies the participation (*bhāktvam*) in the increase and the decrease of the *sthānas* (the places i.e. souls and the world) by the *sthānin* (the Lord of the places) on account of His *antarbhāva* (inner existence). (20)

2.42 And because (expressions like) "a lion like boy" is seen in ordinary life. (21)

2.43 The text *neti neti* (*Brh* 2.3.6) denies, not the *mūrttāmūrttarūpam* (the corporeal and the incorporeal forms) of Brahman but His *etāvattya* (so muchness) (*Brh* 2.3.6)¹¹. (22)

3. Brahman is revealed in perfect meditation (23-26)

3.1 The *śāstra* speaks of Brahman as *avyakta* in the text "*na cakṣusā gr̥hyate nāpi vācā*" (*Muṇḍ* 3.1.8). (23)

3.2 But he is revealed (*vyajyate*) in *Bhaktiyoga* i.e. *ananyābhakti* i.e. *dhyāna*, in accordance with *Śruti* (*Muṇḍ* 3.1.8) and *Smṛti* (*Gītā* 11.54). (24)

3.21 The *darśana* of Brahman results from the repetition of the *upāya* consisting (*lakṣaṇa*) of *saṁrādhana* (perfect meditation), just as the *sūrya*, *agni*, etc. are manifested through the repetition of the *sādhana* by those who long for them. (25)

3.22 When (the *jīva*) has the *sakṣātkāra* (direct intuition) of Brahman, it attains (*iyāti*) *sāmyam* (similarity) with Him, as made known in the scripture (*Muṇḍ* 3.1.3). (26)

4. The *bhedābheda* relation between Brahman and the created world (27-30)

4.1 The universe, consisting of the corporeal and the incorporeal, abides in its own cause, viz. Brahman, in a relation of difference and non-difference, on account of the designation of both difference and non-difference like the case of the serpent (*aḥi*) and the coil (*kuṇḍala*). (27)

4.2 Such a (*bhedābheda*) relation between *jīva* and *Puruṣottama* is to be known as in the case of *prabhā* (light) and *tadvat* (i.e. its substratum). It is not to be supposed on the basis of "ato'nantena" (*Saurabha* 3.2.26) that there is a *kevala bheda* (absolute difference) (between Brahman and the *jīva*). (28)

4.3 As explained earlier (*Saurabha* 2.1.25) the absence of *doṣas* like *kṛtsna prasakti* (consequence of entire transformation) is to be understood. (29)

4.31 There is no connection of any *doṣa* with Brahman in accordance with the text "na līpyate lokaduḥkhena (He is not smeared with the misery of the world.) (*Kaṭha* 5.11). (30)

5. There is no reality higher than Brahman (31-41)

5.0 *Pūrvapakṣa*

There is some *tattvam* (reality) higher than Brahman because in the scripture there are the designations of bridge (*Chānd* 8.4.1), of measure (*Chānd* 3.18.2), of connection (*Praśna* 6.1) and of difference (*Śvet* 3.9-10)¹². (31)

5.1 *Siddhānta*

There is nothing whatsoever higher than *Parameśvara*, the *jagatkāraṇa*; (His) designation as the *setu* (bridge) is due to the fact that He keeps the world apart. (32)

- 5.11 The designation of *unmāna* (measure) is for the sake of *upāsana*. It is for this reason that Brahman is designated as having feet (*Chānd* 3.18.1,2). (33)
- 5.12 The thinking of the *aparimita* (unlimited) as the *parimita* (limited) is reasonable due to the *sthānaviśeṣa* (speciality of place) as in the case of *prakāśa* (light) etc. (34)
- 5.13 There is no other *tattva* (besides Brahman) in spite of the designation of a relation because He Himself leads (the *upāsakas*) to His own attainment. (35)
- 5.14 On account of the designation of difference (*bheda*) in the text "*tato yad uttarataram*" (that which is beyond that) (*Śvet* 3.10), it cannot be said that there is another *tattvam* besides Brahman because of the negation in the text "*yasmātparam nāparam asti kiñcit*" (*Śvet* 3.9). (36)
- 5.2 The *sarvagatatvam* (all-pervasiveness) of Brahman is confirmed by the texts like "*tenedam pūrṇam puruṣeṇa sarvam*" (*Śvet* 3.9) "*Brahmaivdam sarvam*" etc. (37)
- 5.3 Therefore Brahman alone is the giver of the respective fruits accruing to the individuals in accordance with their particular duties. (38)
- 5.31 *Śruti* speaks of Him as the (giver of wealth) (*Brh* 4.4.24) and as the cause of bliss (*Tait* 2.7). (39)
- 5.32 *Pūrvapakṣa*
Jaimini thinks that because of the texts like *yajeta svargakāmaḥ* (one desirous of heaven should perform sacrifices) (*Tait Saṁ* 2.5.5.) it is reasonable that *dharma* (religious merit) is the cause of *phala* (fruits) as in the case of *kṛṣi* (tilling) etc. (40)
- 5.321 *Siddhānta*
But the *Vedācārya* on the basis of scripture (*Praśna* 3.7, *Kaṭha* 2.23, *Muṇḍ* 3.2.3) considers that *Paramātman* alone is the giver of fruits. (41)

(C) The Third Pāda

1. The identity of *vidyās* (1-5)
- 1.1 The *upāsana* (meditation) though mentioned in many places, is one only because of the *aviśeṣa* (non-difference) of the injunction, etc. (1)
- 1.11 The repetition (*punarukti*) of some of the *vidyās* in different scriptures is not because of the difference of *vidyās* but because of the difference of readers (*pratipattirbheda*) and for the sake of making the topic clearer. (2)

1.12 The mention of *śirovratam* (head-rite) in the text of *Atharvaṇa* (*Munḍ* 3.2.10) as a pre-requisite for *Brahmavidyā* does not show the *bheda* of the *vidyā* but that this rite is a subsidiary part of the study of the Veda, which restricts the *adhikārins* of Vedic study (*Munḍ* 3.2.11). (3)

1.13 The text "*sarve vedā yat padam āmananti* (*Kathā* 2.15) proves that the *vidyās* are identical. (4)

1.14 Since there is identity (*aikya*) of *vidyās* their special features are to be combined because of the *abheda* (non-difference) of their *prayojana* (purpose). (5)

2. The Udgītha vidyās are different (6-9)

2.0 *Pūrvapakṣa*

Though the Udgītha (i.e. *prāṇa*) is said to be a *kartā* in the *Vājasaneyaka* text (*Brh* 1.3.7) and an object (*karma*) in the *Chāndogya* text (1.2.7) they are the same on account of the *aviśeṣa* of the introduction (*upakrama*) (*Brh* 1.3.1, *Chand* 1.2.1). (6)

2.1 *Siddhānta*

There is a *bheda* of *vidyās* because of the *bheda* of the *prakaraṇa* (introduction), for, in *Chāndogya* (1.1.1, 1.2.1) the *Praṇava*, which is an *avayava* of the Udgītha is enjoined to be viewed as the *prāṇa* while in *Vājasaneyaka* (*Brh* 1.3.1) the entire Udgītha is enjoined. (Similarly) the injunction that the Udgītha is to be viewed as the golden person (*Chānd* 1.6.9) is different from the injunction that it is to be viewed as qualified by the attributes of being higher than the high and so on (*Chānd* 1.9.2). (7)

2.12 There cannot be identity of *vidyās* just because they have the same name, for, there may be an identity of name (*sañjñāikatvam*) but a difference in the subject matter as in the case of the term "*Agnihotra*" (8)

2.2 Since the *Praṇava* is mentioned in the beginning of *Chāndogya* to be the *upāsya* (object to be meditated) in all the Udgītha *vidyās* it is consistent that the Udgītha mentioned in the middle of the text (*Chānd* 1.2.1) also really imply the *Praṇava*. (9)

3. The essential attributes of the vidyās are to be combined everywhere (10-25)

3.1 In the *Chāndogya* (5.1.13) and in *Vājasaneyaka* (*Brh* 6.1.7) under the dialogue of the sense organs *Prāṇa*,

- possessed of the attributes of the oldest (*jyaiṣṭhya*) and the best (*śraiṣṭhya*) is described as the *upāśya* to which *vāk*, etc. designated as the richest (*vasiṣṭhatva*) etc. is ascribed. But in *Kauṣītakī* (2.14) these attributes of *vāk* etc. are mentioned but not attributed to *Prāṇa*, yet they are to be taken in relation to *Prāṇa* because they are identical everywhere and *vāk*, etc. are under the control of *Prāṇa*, the cause of their seniority and excellence. (10)
- 3.2 Because of the *abheda* of the *guṇin* (substratum) everywhere the *guṇas* (attributes) like *ānanda* (bliss) etc are to be inserted in all the *paravidyās* (i.e. meditations on the Highest). (11)
- 3.21 But the attributes like *priyaśirastva* (having joy for the head) etc. do not constitute the *svarūpaguṇa* (essential attribute) of the Highest because if there be difference of the limbs in Brahman there will result increase and decrease on the part of Brahman. (12)
- 3.22 But the *guṇas* like *ānanda*, etc. are to be combined because of the *aikya* (identity) of the *guṇin* everywhere. (13)
- 3.23 The designation like "*tasya priyam eva śiraḥ*" (*Tait*, 2.5) is for the sake of meditation (*anucintana*) since there is no other purpose (*prayojana*) for it. (14)
- 3.231 The designation of *śira* (head) and *pakṣa* (wings), etc. is for the sake of meditation (*anudhyāna*) since they cannot belong to the internal self (*Tait* 2.5). (15)
- 3.232 By the term *anyo'ntara ātma* (another internal self) (*Tait* 2.5) the *Paramātmān* alone is to be understood as in the text *ātma vā idam eka evāgra āsit* (*Ait Ar.* 2.43) because of the *anandamayaviṣaya* in the subsequent text (*Tait* 2.6). (16)
- 3.24 The *ātman* in *ātmā'nandamaya*, does not refer to the *prāṇa*, but to the *Paramātmān*, though in some previous cases the term *ātman* may refer to the *prāṇa* etc. because there the *prāṇa* etc. are viewed as the *Paramātmān*. (17)
- 3.3. The meditation on water as the dress of *prāṇa* (*Śat. Br* 14.9, 215) is only a re-mention of the rinsing of the mouth with water, which is duly established by *Smṛtis* and *ācāra* (custom)¹³. (18)
- 3.4 Since the *Sāṅḍilyavidyā* (though) taught (in two places) in the branch of *Vājasaneyins* (i.e.) in the *Agnirahasya* (*Śat Br* 10.6.3.2) and in *Brhadāraṇyaka* (5.6.1) is identical, just like the *vidyās*, though mentioned in

different branches, are identical because of the identity of *vedya* (objects meditated on). The *vidyās* being the same, their special features are to be combined together. (19)

3.5 *Pūrvapakṣa*

(In that case) the two names in the text "His secret name is Day (*tasyopanīṣad ahara Brh* 5.5.3) in reference to the presiding deities and "His secret name is I' (*tasyopanīṣad aham Brh* 5.5.4) in reference to the *ātman* are to be combined because of the connection with the same *vidyā* through the introductory passage, (*upakrama*) i.e. "*satyaṁ Brahma (Brh* 5.5.1). (20)

3.51 *Siddhānta*

Because of the difference of place such combination is not appropriate. (21)

3.52 There is absence of combination of the *guṇas* of the *akṣistha* (the one situated in the eye) and of the *ādityastha* (the one situated in the sun) in the text. "The form of this one is the very same as the form of that one" (*Chānd* 1.7.5). (22)

3.53 Due to the *sthānabheda* there is no combination, in the other *vidyās*, of the attributes like holding together, pervading the heaven, mentioned in *Tait. Br* 2.4.7.10. (23)

3.54 Even in the *Puruṣavidyā* recorded in *Chāndogya* (3.16.1) and in *Taittirīyaka* (*Tait Ar* 10.64) there is a *bheda* of the *vidyās* since the details mentioned in one place (*Chānd* 3.16.1) are not recorded in the other. (24)

3.55 There is no combination of *mantras* like "Pierce all, pierce the heart" etc. and of the sacrificial acts like *Pravargya*¹⁴ etc. (*Śat, Br.* 14.1.1.1) with *vidyā* because of the *bhinnatva* of the *vidyā* from the objects of "piercing" etc. (25)

4. **Abandoning the merits and demerits at departure** (26-32)

4.1 The taking up (*upāyana*), consisting of receiving the merits (*puṇya*) and the demerits (*pāpa*) (*Kauṣ* 1.4) (of the dead) is included in their abandonment (*hāni*) consisting in the getting rid of them by the *vidvān* (*Muṇḍ* 3.13), because *upāyana* is supplementary to *hāni*, (26)

4.2 At the time of the departure from the body (the *jīva*) completely abandons *pāpa* and *puṇya* because there is no more experience (*bhoga*) to be crossed after the separation from the body (*Chānd* 8.12.1, 8.3.4, 8.12.3).

The decay of the *karma*, which has actually taken place at the time of the *dehaviyoga* is recorded to take place after crossing the river Virajā (*Kauṣ* 1.4). (27)

4.3 The friend (*suhṛt*) and the enemy (*durhṛt*) get respectively the *punya* and the *pāpa* of the *vidvān*. (28)

4.31 The parting of the good and bad deeds is meaningful because if the good deeds follow (the *vidvān*) then there will be rebirth (*āvṛtti*) after the enjoyment of their fruits. (29)

4.4 Though there is decay of all the *karmas* and of the *sthūlaśārīra* of the *Brahmopāsaka* at the time of *śārīraviyoga*, an implicit relation to the body is found in the scripture (*Chānd* 8.3.4, 8.12.3) which shows that he continues to retain the *sūkṣma śārīra* in order to go to the *viśiṣṭasthāna* (where) the *vidvān* attains *Brahmabhāva*. (30)

4.5 Since the going (*gati*) mentioned in the *Upakośala*¹⁵ *vidyā* and the *Pañcāgnividyā*¹⁶, etc. belong to all the *Brahmopāśinas*, there is no contradiction of the *śruti* (*Chānd* 5.10.1) and *smṛti* (*Gītā* 8.24) texts. (31)

4.6 But there is stay for *Vasistha* etc. so long as their office (*adhikāram*) lasts, owing to the influence of the *karmas*, the fruit of which is their office. (32)

5. Meditation on Brahman (33-39)

5.1 Because of the sameness of the chief imperishable *Brahman* everywhere, there must be the inclusion of the concepts like *asthūlatva* (non-grossness) etc. connected with the *akṣara* (imperishable) *Brahman* (*Bṛh* 3.8.8.) in all *Brahma vidyās* because they form an integral part of an investigation into Brahman. (33)

5.11 Since the *sarvotkrṣṭa* (best of all) *Brahman*, as possessed of *ānanda* (bliss) etc. characterized by *asthūlatva* is meditated on the features of *ānanda*, etc. are to be included everywhere, while *sarvakarmatva* etc. is to be comprised only where mentioned. (34)

5.2 The phrase "so te *ātma sarvāntara*" in the answer to the question of *Uṣasta* (*Bṛh* 3.4.1) is not (a reference to) the *pratyagātman* but is the *mukhya sarvāntaryāmin* as in the case of the answer to *Kahola*, for, a repetition of question and answer just as in *sadvidyā* (*Chānd* 6.1.7, 6.8.7) is reasonable in order to demonstrate that the object to be known passes beyond hunger, etc. (*Bṛh* 3.5.1). (35)

5.21 *Kahola* has to make, like *Uṣasta*, an investigation into

the *Para*, as distinguished (*vyāvṛtta*) from the *jīva*, as the *hetu* of *prāṇana* (breathing) of all *prāṇis*, just as Uṣasta has to make like Kahola an investigation into Brahman as beyond hunger, etc, so that Brahman becomes *vyāvṛttam* (distinguished) from the *jīva*, for, the same *sarvātman* is the *upāsya* (object to be worshipped) in both the cases, just as in *sadvidyā* all the answers specify one and the same *sadbrahman*. (36)

- 5.3 (In the *sadvidyā*) He alone, who is previously denoted by the term *satya* (true) (*Chānd* 6.3.2, 6.8.6) is repeated in *Chānd* 6.9.1. The attributes like *satyam* (true) etc. mentioned in the first version thus "*aitadātmīyam idam sarvaṁ tat satyam*" (Everything has that for itself, that is true) (*Chānd* 6.8.7) is to be inserted in all the versions. (37)

- 5.4 The *Paramātman* is presented as the *upāsya*, possessing the attributes of *Satyakāmatva* (having true desires) etc. in *Chāndogya* (8.1.1-5) and *Vasītva* (controller) etc. in the *Vājasaneyaka* (*Bṛh* 4.4.22). Those attributes are to be mutually included (in the meditation) because of the sameness of the *vidyās* and of the *āyatana* (abode) in both the cases. (38)

- 5.5 The negation "*neha nānā*" (there is no plurality here) (*Bṛh* 4.4.19, *Kaṭha* 4.11) refers only to the *abrahmātmaka padārthas* (things not having Brahman for their essence) and does not deny the attributes like *satyakāmatva* etc. (39)

6. Through *Brahmopāsana* one attains his own perfection (40)

When one attains Brahman and is complete in his own form (*Chānd* 8.3.4) having the stated marks, by means of *Brahmopāsana* he becomes a self ruler (*Chānd* 7.2.2.) and has the freedom of movement in all the worlds (*Chānd* 7.25.2). (40)

7. *Upāsanas* based on the subsidiary part of *karmas* (41-50)

- 7.1 There is *anīyama* (non-restriction) of the inclusion of the *upāsanas* based on the subsidiary parts of sacrificial actions (*karmāṅgāśraya*) such as *Udgūthopāsana* (*Chānd* 1.1.1.) in those *karmas* because an *anupāsaka* (non-worshipper) is also a *kartā* of the *karma* (i.e. sacrificer) etc. by means of *Praṇava* a subsidiary part of the sacrificial works (*karmāṅgabhūta*) (*Chānd* 1.1.10. The *upāsana* on the *karmāṅgas* need not be inserted

- in those *karmas* regularly because the fruit of *upāsana* is both different from that of the *karmas* (*Chānd* 1.1.10) and is superior to it. (41)
- 7.2 During the meditations on the *guṇas* (attributes), the meditations on the *dahara* (the small)¹⁷, the *guṇin* (the sub-stratum) (Cf. *Daharavidyā in Chānd* 8.1.1, 8.6.2, 8.6.5) are to be repeated on account of their being qualified by those *guṇas* as in the case of the offering of *Puroḍāśa* (sacrificial cake on eleven potsherds) to Indra (*Tait Sam* 2.3.6). (42)
- 7.3 (Just as the *karmāṅgāśrayopāsanas* are not be taken as *karmāṅgas*, the fires also are not be taken as *karmāṅgas*).
- The fires piled by the *mana*, *vāk*, *prāṇa*, *cakṣu*, *śrotra* (ear) *karma*, *agni* etc. (*Śat Br* 10. 5.31) are simply the *aṅgabhūta* of sacrifice consisting of meditation on account of the abundance of indicatory mark (*līṅga*) (*Śat Br* 10.5.3.3, 10.5.3.12 etc) which is stronger than the *prakaraṇa* (context) (*Jaimini sūtra* 3.3.14). (43)
- 7.30 *Pūrvapakṣa*
- (The fires piled up by *mana*) may be a *vikalpa* (alternative) of the same preceding *kriyāmaya* (consisting in action) fire (*Śat. Br* 10.5.3.1) i.e. they are *kriyārūpa* (of the form of action) as in the case of the mental vessel (*Ap. SS* . 21.10.2) on account of the *prakaraṇa*, (context) which is stronger than the *līṅga* (indicatory mark) in the *arthavāda* (descriptive) portion. (44)
- 7.301 Also because the *vīryam* (power) of the former fire is transferred to them (*Śat. Br* 10. 3.3.11), they are *kriyārūpa* (the form action). (45)
- 7.31 *Siddhānta*
- They are of the nature of meditation (*vidyātma*) alone, because of the specification that they are piled up by *vidyā* alone (*Śat Br* 10.5.3.12) and their being the *aṅga* of *Vidyāmayakratu* (sacrifice consisting of meditation) is clear from *Śat Br* 10.5.3.3. (46)
- 7.311 There is no *bādha* of their being the *aṅga* of the *vidyāmayakratu* because of the greater force of *śruti*, (direct scriptural statement) (*Śat Br* 10.5.3.12) *līṅga*, (indicatory mark) (*Śat Br* 10.5.3.12) and *vākya* (synthetical connection) (*Śat Br* 10.5.3.12) over the *prakaraṇa* (context) (*Jaimini sūtra* 3.3.14). (47)
- 7.32 The *vidyamayakratu* is different (*prṛthak*) like any other *vidyās* like the *Sāṅḍilyavidyā*, on account of the in-

separable adjuncts (*anubandhas*) like hymns (*stotra*) recitations (*śāstra*)¹⁸ (*Śat Br.* 10.5.3.3) direct scriptural statements (*śruti*) etc. (48)

7.33 In spite of the similarity of the *vidyāmayakratu* to the "mental vessel" they are not the *aṅga* of the *kriyāmayakratu* because of their *vidyārūpatva* (form of meditation) just like the difference between the *agni* (fire), the *ādityapuruṣa* (person in the sun) and *mṛtyu* (death) (in *Śat Br.* 10.5.2.3, *Brh* 3.2.10) remains in spite of their resemblance (*Chānd* 5.4.1). (49)

7.34 Also on account of the immediately following text (*Śat Br.* 10. 5.4.1) and the numerosity of the details the fires piled up by mind are the *aṅga* of the *vidyāmayakratu*. (50)

8. The soul is to be meditated on as in its freed state (51-52)

8.10 *Pūrvapakṣa*

At the time of *upāsana*, the *pratyagātman* is to be meditated on as in its state of bondage (*baddhāvasthā*) because of the existence of such an *ātman* in the body at that time. (51)

8.11 *Siddhānta*

At the time of the *sāadhanā* (meditation) the *pratyagātman* is to be meditated on in its freed state (*muktākāra*) because in *mukti*, (the *upāsaka*) is to become of such a form (*rūpa*), just as one attains *Paramātman* in accordance with the *dhyāna* (meditation). (52)

9. *Upāsana* mentioned in one branch can be applied to another (53-54)

9.1 The *upāsana* connected with the subsidiary parts of *Udgītha* (*Chānd* 1.1.1) is not restricted to their own branches, but connected to all the branches of each Veda, on account of the non-specification of the *śruti* about the *Udgītha* etc. (53)

9.2 There is no contradiction in applying *upāsana* mentioned in one place to another. (54)

10. *Samagropāsana* is more effective (55)

In the *Vaiśvānaravidyā* the *samagropāsana* (meditation on the aggregate) is glorified (*Chānd* 5.12.2) as in the case of a single performance of *Paurṇamāsa* sacrifice together with the subsidiary parts. (55)

11. Diversity of *vidyās* (56-58)

- 11.1 There is diversity of *Śāṇḍilyavidyās* etc. on account of the difference of *śabda* etc. regarding them. (56)
- 11.2 There is *anuṣṭhanavikalpa* (option of performance) (with regard to the various *Brahmavidyās*) on account of their *aviśiṣṭaphalatva* (non-distinctions of result). (57)
- 11.3 There is no restriction with regard to *anuṣṭhāna* (of meditation) having a different *phala* than *Brahmaprāpti* (i.e. the other *anuṣṭhānas* are performed according to each one's need because each one of these *anuṣṭhānas* has its own respective *phala*). (58)
- 12. Vidyās based on karmāṅgas need not always be included in those karmas (see Saurabha 3.3.41) (59-64)**
- 12.0 *Pūrvapakṣa*
Vidyās like *Udgīthavidyā* which are based on *karmāṅgas* have a subordinate nature (*aṅgabhāva*) to *karma*, on account of numerous indicatory marks. (59)
- 12.01 And because of the teaching of their regular inclusion (in the *karmas*) in the texts like "*Udgītham upāsīta*" (let one meditate on the *Udgītha*). (*Chānd* 1.1.1). (60)
- 12.02 And on account of the joint performance (*saṃpādanam*) of the *praṇava* and the *Udgītha* (*Chānd* 1.5.5). (61)
- 12.03 And on account of the *śruti* concerning the commonness of their attributes (*guṇasādhāraṇya*) (*Chānd* 1.1.9). (62)
- 12.1 *Siddhānta*
 There is no *niyama* (fixed rule) that the *vidyās* based on *aṅgas* (of *kratu*) are to be included in the *kratus*, just as the *aṅgas* themselves because (scripture) does not declare them (i.e. the *Vidyās* to be the *aṅgas* of *kratus*). (63)
- 12.2 And the text "Verily, the *Brāhmaṇa* priest who knows (i.e. meditates) thus protects the sacrifices, the sacrificer and all officiating priests" (*Chānd* 4.7.10) shows that there is no *niyama* that (these *vidyās*) are to be regularly included (in the *kratus*). (64)

(D) The Fourth Pāda

- 1. Vidyā is independent of karma (1-17)**
- 1.1 *Bādarāyaṇa* thinks that *Brahman* is obtained through *vidyā* (meditation) (*Tait* 2.1). (1)
- 1.10 *Pūrvapakṣa*
Jaimini considers *vidyā* as a *karmāṅga* because it purifies the *kartā*, who is subsidiary part of *karma*.

- Therefore the *phalaśruti* (scriptural statement about fruits) is a mere *arthavāda* (glorification). (2)
- 1.101 Also because of the conduct of Janaka, etc. as declared in the *śruti* (*Brh* 3.1.1). (3)
- 1.102 And because of the *śruti* about the subserviency (*upayogitva*) of *vidyā* to *karma* (*Chānd* 1.1.10). (4)
- 1.103 Also because the togetherness (*sāhitya*) of *vidyā* and *karma* is seen (*Brh* 4.4.2) (5)
- 1.104 Also on account of the enjoinder (*vidhāna*) of *karma* for the one possessed of *vidyā*¹⁹ (*Chānd* 8.15.1). (6)
- 1.1041 And on account of the *niyama* (restriction) in the text only doing work here, let one desire to live a hundred years (*Īśā* 2). (7)
- 1.11 *Siddhānta*
- The view of Bhagavan Bādarāyaṇa is that *puruṣārtha* (final goal of men) arises from *vidyā* (*BS* 3.4.1) because of the teaching (*upadeśa*) that the *sarveśvara*, *sarvaniyantā*, who is superior (*adhika*) to the *jīva*, the *kartā*, is the object to be known in the scripture (*Brh* 4.4.22, 3.9.26, *Tait Ar* 3.11.1.2, *Kaṭha* 2.15 etc). (8)
- 1.111 There is also equal support for the *akarmāṅgatva* of *vidyā* in the text "For what purpose shall we study, for what purpose shall we perform sacrifices". (9)
- 1.12 The text "*yad eva vidyayā karoti...* (*Chānd* 1.1.10) (See *Saurabha* 3.4.4) is not applicable to all the *vidyās*. (But refers only to the *Udgīthavidyā*). (10)
- 1.13 In the text "*vidyā* and *karma* lay hold of him (*Brh* 4.4.4 *vide Saurabha* 3.4.5) a division (*vibhāga*) is to be known like the division of a hundred (coins) for the sake of a two fold *phala* (i.e. *vidyā* and *karma* lay hold of him for bringing about their own respective *phalas*). (11)
- 1.14 The enjoining of *karma* (*Chānd* 8.15.1, *vide Saurabha* 3-46) is for the one who has read the Veda (*adhyayana mātravān*). (12)
- 1.15 Also the restriction (to *karma*) (*Saurabha* 3.4.7) does not necessarily refer to the *Vidvān*. (13)
- 1.151 The allowing of *karma* to the *Vidvān* in the text "only doing work here" (*Īśā* 2) is for the sake of eulogizing *vidyā*. (14)
- 1.16 Therefore some designate the voluntary giving up of the life of a house-holder (*gārhaṣṭhya*) by the knower. (*Brh* 4.4.22). (15)

- 1.17 Therefore they declare the destruction (*upamardam*) of *karma* by *vidyā* (*Muṇḍ* 2.2.8). (16)
- 1.18 The independence of *vidyā* is ascertained from the fact that *vidyā* arise, in the *āśramas* of "chastity" (*ūrdhvaretaḥ*) which are known from the texts like "there are three branches of religious duty" (*Chānd* 2.23.1). (17)
2. **Life of chastity is enjoined by the scripture** (18-20)
- 2.0 *Pūrvapakṣa*
Jaimini considers that the text "*trayodharmaskandhāḥ*" (there are three branches of religious duty) (*Chānd* 2.13.1) is only a re-mention (*anuvāda*) of those stages (known in the *smṛti*) because of the absence of any injunctive word there. Also there are texts condemning the other stages (*Tait. Sam* 1.5.2). (18)
- 2.1 *Siddhānta*
Bādarāyaṇa considers that the state of chastity is to be followed because the equality of chastity with the *gārhaṣṭhya* is seen in the *anuvākya*. (19)
- 2.2 There is indeed a *vidhi* (concerning chastity) just as the *vidhi* about the holding above of the sacrificial faggot (*samidham*) (*Ap. SS* 9.11.8-9). (20)
3. **Udgītha is to be viewed as the *rasatama* (best essence)** (21-22)
- 3.1 The text "*sa eṣa rasānām rasatama*" (*Chānd* 1.1.3) is not a mere *stuti* (eulogy) of the *Udgītha* etc. which are the *aṅgas* of *karma*, but is an injunction (*vidhāna*) to view the *Udgītha* etc. as the *rasatma* which was not established earlier. (21)
- 3.11 Also because of the *vidhi* "*Udgītham upāsīta*" (*Chānd* 1.1.1) (22)
4. **Scriptural stories.** (23-24)
- 4.1 The scriptural stories (*ākhyāna*) in the *Vedāntas* are not mere *pāriplavas* (i.e. legends meant to be recited at the *Aśvamedha* sacrifice) since only a few are specified to be so (*Śat Br* 13.4.3.3). (23)
- 4.2 They are for the sake of *vidyā* because of the connection of other stories (*ākhyāna śrutis*) as forming *ekavākyatā* with the *vidhi* as in the text "*draṣṭavyaḥ*" (*Brh* 2.4.5, 4.5.6) etc. (24)

- 5. The subsidiaries of vidyā** (25-39)
- 5.1 For those who are bound by chastity, *vidyā* is independent of kindling of fire (i.e. *yajña*) etc. in accordance with the text *brahmaṇiṣṭho'mṛtatvam eti* (Chānd 2.23.1). (25)
- 5.2 *Vidyā*, for its origination, depends on all *karmas* (Brh 4.4.2), which have become the means (*sādhana*) as one depends on a horse for going. (26)
- 5.3 Though it is possible that *vidyā* originates through the *svāśramakarmas*, yet a *Brahmajijñāsu* must be endowed with *śama* (calmness) *dama* (self control) etc. on account of the *vidhi* to practise them (Brh 4.4.23). (27)
- 5.4 The permission for all food (Chānd 5.2.1) is valid only in danger to life as seen in the *śruti* (Chānd 1.10.1-5). (28)
- 5.41 Also because of the non-contradiction of the text "*āhāra śuddhau sattvaśuddhiḥ*" (If there be purity of food, there is purity of life). (Chānd 7.26.2). (29)
- 5.42 *Smṛti* supports such a view (*Manu Smṛti* 10.104, *Gītā* 5.10). (30)
- 5.43 Therefore the text "*tasmād brāhmaṇaḥ surām na pibet*" (Hence let not a Brahman drink wine) (*Kaṭha Sam* 12.12) is to prevent wanton acting (*vyatheṣṭācāra*). (31)
- 5.5 *Yajña*, etc. which are *aṅgas* of *vidyā* are to be performed by an *amumuksu* (one who does not desire for salvation) as an *āśramakarma*, because it is enjoined on him. (32)
- 5.51 They are also to be performed by a *mumuksu* because they are enjoined as *sahakāri* (auxiliary) of *vidyā* (Brh 4.4.22), for they can have a double purpose (Jaimini 4.3.5). (33)
- 5.511 The same *yajña* etc. have a double purpose. (34)
- 5.52 By the removal of sin, which is the cause of the overpowering of *vidyā*, through *yajña* etc. in accordance with the text "*dharmaṇa pāpam apānudati*" (By *dharma* one removes one's sins). (*Mahānār* 22.1) there is no overpowering of *vidyā*. (35)
- 5.6 Those who stand between the *āśramas* are also entitled to *vidyā* as in the case of *Raikva* etc. (Chānd 4.1.3). (36)
- 5.61 The *Smṛti* speaks of the attainment of *vidyā* by them (*vidyānugraha*) by means of *japa* etc (*Manu Smṛti* 2.87). (37)
- 5.62 Also through the performance of the *sādhana* *viśeṣa* in the previous birth too (*Gītā* 6.45). (38)

- 5.63 Being within an *āśrama* is better than standing mid-way (*Dakṣa Smṛti* 1.10). (39)
- 6. The *Naisthikabrahmacārin*** (40-43)
- 6.1 The giving up of the state of chastity (*ūrdhvaretobhāva*) is not allowed. This is also the view of Jaimini. (40)
- 6.2 There is no possibility of a *prāyaścitta* (*Jaimini* 6.8.22) for a fallen *Naisthika* (Religious student of perpetual chastity) on account of its ineffectiveness in his case (*Agni Purāṇa* 165.23a-24b). (41)
- 6.3 *Pūrvapakṣa*
Some consider the deviation from the *brahmācarya* by the *Naisthika* is a minor sin because of the non-specification of his chastity from that of a *upakurvāṇa* (a temporary religious student) as in the case of taking liquor. (42)
- 6.31 *Siddhānta*
The (fallen) *Naisthika* etc, irrespective of their fall from their stage of life being mortal or venial are outside the right to *Brahmavidyā* on account of the *Smṛti* (*Agni Purāṇa* 165-24b) and on account of *śiṣṭācāra* (the conduct of the good). (43)
- 7. The fruits of the *karmāṅgāśrita upāsana* belong to the *yajamāna*** (44-45)
- 7.0 *Pūrvapakṣa*
Atreya thinks that the *upāsana* based on the *karmāṅgas* is performed by the *yajamāna* (sacrificer) on account of the *phalaśruti* (scriptural text) concerning the result attained (*Chānd* 1.1.10). (44)
- 7.1 *Siddhānta*
The *phala* (result) of the *karmāṅgāśrita upāsana* performed by the *Ṛtvik* (officiating priest) (for he is bought for that) pertains to the *yajamāna*. (45)
- 8. *Maunam* is the third auxiliary of *vidyā*** (46-49)
- 8.1 A third *sahakāryakam*, (auxiliary) distinguished from *pāṇḍitva* (learning) and *bālyā* (child-like state) namely *maunam* (silence, asceticism) is enjoined (*Bṛh* 3.5.1) like *yajña*, *śama* etc. (46)
- 8.2 On account of the equality (*sadbhāva*) of the *dharma*s of all the *āśramas*, the concluding text about the householder (*Chānd* 8.15.1) shows (the obligatory nature of) all the *dharma*s. (47)

- 8.3 Similarly the *upadeśa* (teaching) about *maunam* (asceticism) is to show (the obligatory nature of all the *dharmas*. (Chānd 2.23.1). (48)
- 8.4 Without manifesting one's *mahātmya* etc. due to *Pāṇḍitya* let one remain in the *bālyā* (child state) i.e. without any *ahaṁkārabhāva*. (49)
- 9. The rise of *vidyā*** (50-51)
- 9.1 If there is no *pratibandha* (obstruction) there is the rise (*janma*) of *vidyā* in this world (*aiḥikam*) and if there is (any *pratibandha*), in the next world (*āmuṣmīkam*) (Kathā 6.18). (50)
- 9.2 Thus there is non-restriction (*anīyama*) with regard to the *phala* i.e. *mukti* (Chānd 6.14.2). (51)

ADHYĀYA FOUR

(A) The First Pāda

- 1. The practice of meditation** (1-12)
- 1.1 The *sādhana*s (spiritual exercise) must be repeated more than once for the *Brahmadarśana* (direct vision of Brahman) (Brh 2.4.5, 4.5.6). (1)
- 1.11 The *Smṛti* too supports such a view (Gītā 12.9). (2)
- 1.2 The *Paramapuruṣa* is to be meditated on as one's own self (*svasyātmavēna*) as experienced and taught by the previous teachers (Chānd 3.14.3, Brh 3.4.1). (3)
- 1.21 The *ātman* is not to be searched in a symbol (*pratīka*) because that is not the *ātman* of the *upāsitr* (meditating devotee). (4)
- 1.211 The viewing of the mind etc. as Brahman is proper but not the other way, because of the superiority of Brahman. (5)
- 1.212 In the *upāsana* of *Udgītha* etc. the concepts (*matayaḥ*) of the sun (*āditya*) etc. are to be "super imposed" (*kartavyaḥ*) (Chānd 1.3.1), because of the superiority of the *āditya* etc. (6)
- 1.3 One must practise *upāsana* sitting only because meditation is possible only for him. (7)
- 1.31 Because of the *dhyānarūpatva* (contemplative nature) of *upāsana*. (8)
- 1.32 Also because the verb "*dhyāyati*" (contemplates) in the text "*dhyāyatīva pṛthivī*" (the earth contemplates, as it

- were) (*Chānd* 7.6.1) is used with reference to its immobility (*acalatvam*). (9)
- 1.33 The *Smṛti* also supports this view (*Gītā* 6.11). (10)
- 1.4 One must meditate (*upāsita*) wherever the *ekāgryam* (concentration) of *citta* is possible. (11)
- 1.5 *Upāsana* is to be carried on until death (*Chānd* 8.15.1). (12)
- 2. The effects of meditation** (13-15)
- 2.1 The *vināśa* (destruction) of the prior sins and the *aśleṣa* (non-clinging) of the subsequent sins take place for a *vidvān* (*Chānd* 4.13.3, 5.24.3). (13)
- 2.2 There is the *vināśa* of the prior and the *aśleṣa* of the subsequent because even the good deeds done with desire are incompatible with *mukti*, which arises immediately on the fall of the body after the *vināśa* and *aśleṣa* of the deeds (see also *Saurabha* 4.2.7). (14)
- 2.3 At the *vidyāprāpti* only those deeds whose effects have not yet started bearing fruit (*apavr̥tta phala eva*) alone perish (*Chānd* 6.14.2). (15)
- 3. Even a knower has to fulfil his āśrama duties** (16-18)
- 3.1 There is no cessation (*nivṛtti*) of one's *āśrama karmas* such as *Agniḥotra*, *dāna*, etc. since they foster *vidyā* as seen in the *Śruti* (*Bṛh* 4.4.22). (16)
- 3.2 Those works, whose effects are not yet produced in the form of *vidyā*, etc., are divided among friends and enemies as in the text of some "The friends, the good deeds, the enemies, the bad deeds" (See also *Saurabha* 3.3.26-32). (17)
- 3.3 The text "*yad eva vidyayā... (karoti)*" (*Chānd* 1.1.10) indicates the *prabalatva* (strength of *vidyā*) and *durbalatva* (weakness) of *karma*. (18)
- 4. The Vidvān attains Brahman** (19)
- 4.1 Having destroyed through experience one's *ārabdhakārya*, (deeds, the effects of which have already begun) the knower attains Brahman. (19)

(B) The Second Pāda

- 1. The merging of the senses in fire** (1-6)
- 1.1 The text "*vañmanasi sampadyate*" (speech merges into the mind) (*Chānd* 6.8.6) denotes the merging in the form of a connection of the *vāg indriya* (organ of speech)

- in the mind, because the function of the mind is seen even after the cessation (*uparata*) of the *vāg indriya*. Also on account of the text (*śabdāt*) (*Chānd* 6.8.6). (1)
- 1.2 After the *vāk* (speech), all the *indriyas* merge in the mind (*Praśna*, 3.9). (2)
- 1.3 That (i.e. mind) is united with the *prāṇa* (vital breath) (*Chānd* 6.8.6). (3)
- 1.4 The *prāṇa*, united with the *jīva*, (*Brh* 4.3.38, 4.4.2; *Praśna* 6.3) is (finally) merged in the fire. (4)
- 1.5 This merging takes place in the elements (*bhūtas*) including the fire, because of the declaration of the *sarvabhūta mayatva* (nature consisting of all the elements) of the transmigratory soul (*saṅcaratojīvasya*) (*Brh* 4.4.5). (5)
- 1.51 But such a merging is not possible with a single (*eka*) element alone, because both the *Śruti* and *Smṛti* show that a single element (without aggregation) is unable to produce the effects (*Chānd* 6.1.3, *Viṣṇu* 1.2.48). (6)
- 2. The departure of the knower** (7-17)
- 2.1 The *Vidvān* departs through a special vein at the crown of the head (*Chānd* 8.6.6), but the declaration of his obtaining *amṛtatva* (immortality) here and now (*Brh* 4.4.7) means that without destroying (*adagdhvaiva*) the relation with the *indriyas*, his prior sins are destroyed and the subsequent ones do not cling to him. (See *Saurabha* 4.1.13-15). (7)
- 2.11 That the *amṛtatva* is without destroying the connection with the body is known from the designation of *saṁsāra* until *mukti* (release) in the text (*Chānd* 6.14.2). (8)
- 2.2 The *sūkṣma śārīra* follows the *Vidvān* (*Kauṣ* 1.5.1.6). (9)
- 2.3 Therefore the text "*atha martyo'mṛto bhavati*" (Then a mortal becomes immortal) (*Brh* 4.4.7) does not speak of the *amṛtatvam* through the destruction of the relation with the body. (10)
- 2.4 Since heat (*uṣma*) is a *dharma* of the *sūkṣmadeha*, when the latter is absent, the former too is not perceived. (11)
- 2.5 *Brh*. 4.4.6 denies not the departure of the *Vidvān* (from the body) but that of the *prāṇas* from the embodied soul (*prakṛtāt śārīrāt*) only as is made clear in the reading of some (other branch) (*Śat Br.* 14.7.2.8). (12)
- 2.6 The *Smṛti* declares the departure of the *Vidvān* through the crown of the head (*Mbh* 13.154.5). (13)

- 2.7 The *bhūtasūkṣma* (the subtle elements) like fire, etc. merge in the highest as declared by the *Śruti* (*Chānd* 6.8.6). (14)
- 2.71 Those *bhūtasūkṣma* like *vāk* etc. attain *avibhāga* (non-division) i.e. *tādātmya* (essential identity) with the Highest in accordance with the *Śruti* (*Praśna* 6.5). (15)
- 2.8 When the *Vidvān* is blessed by (Brahman) the object to be known, (*prasannena vedyena*) who is pleased by his *vidyāsāmarthya* (might of knowledge) and by the application of *anusmṛti*, (remembrance) of the path, which is a supplementary part of *vidyā*, the forepart of his heart becomes lighted by *Parameśvara*, and he departs through the door (i.e. the vein that passes out of the crown of the head) revealed by the Lord (*Chānd* 8.6.5). (16)
- 2.9 He, having followed the rays of the sun, goes up (*Chānd* 8.6.5). (17)
- 3. All the *Vidvāns* attain Brahman irrespective of the time of departure** (18-20)
- 3.1 The *Vidvān* who dies even at night attains the Highest because of the cessation of his connection with the *karmas* lasting as long as the body lasts. (18)
- 3.2 So also there is *Brahmaprāpti* for the *Vidvān*, who dies even during the *dakṣiṇāyana*. (19)
- 3.3 Since the *smṛti* declares two paths (*Śruti dvayam*) for the *yogins* (*Gītā* 8.23) there is no restriction with regard to a particular time (for departure). (20)

(C) The Third Pāda

- 1. The path to the Parabrahman** (1-5)
- 1.1 There is only one *mārga* (path) beginning with light (*arcirādi*), as known from *Chāndogya* 5.10.1-2, 4.15.5) and *Brhadāraṇyaka* (*Brh* 6.2.15) which (*mārga*) consists of light, day, the waxing fortnight, six months, the year, the sun, the moon, lightning and the *Puruṣo'mānava*. (1)
- 1.11 After the *year* and before the *sun*, the *Vidvān* reaches the *agniloka* and *vāyuloka* (*Kauṣ* 1.3), *Brh* 5.10.1). (2)
- 1.12 The *vāruṇaloka* (*Kauṣ* 1.3) is to be placed above lighting, and *Indra* as well as *Prajāpati* are to be placed above the *varuṇaloka*. (3)
- 1.2 The light etc. are leaders (*gamayitāraḥ*) of the departing (souls) (*Chānd* 5.10.2). (4)

- 1.21 Above lightning the *amānava* (non-human person) alone leads the *Vidvān*, while *Varuṇa* etc. are helpers conjointly. (5)
- 2. Man attains his destiny according to his meditation** (6-15)
- 2.0 *Pūrvapakṣa* I (*Bādari*)
Badari thinks that the group of light etc. leads the *upāsakas* of *Kāryabrahman* to him, because that alone is reasonable. (6)
- 2.01 On account of the specification of the world by its plural in the text "In those worlds of Brahman dwell the highest possessed of the highest (*Bṛh* 6.2.15). (7)
- 2.02 The designation "he leads to Brahman" (*Chānd* 4.15.5) is appropriate because of his *sāmīpya* (proximity) to Brahman on account of his being the first born (i.e. *Hiraṇyagarbha*). (8)
- 2.03 At the destruction of the world of the *Kārya brahman* (the effected Brahman) the *upāsaka* together with the *Kāryabrahman* obtains (what) is Higher than the *Kāryabrahman* (*Muṇḍ* 3.2.6). (9)
- 2.04 The *Smṛti* also supports this view (*Kūrmapurāṇa* (12.269). (10)
- 2.00 *Pūrvapakṣa* II (*Jaimini*)
 He leads to the *Parabrahman* because *Brahman* (in *Chānd* 4.15.5) primarily means the *Parabrahman*. (11)
- 2.001 The text "*param̐ jyotir upasāṃpadya svena rūpeṇābhiniṣpadyate* (having attained the form of highest light, he is completed in his own form) (*Chānd* 8.2.23) shows that the *Parabrahman* is the object to be obtained. (12)
- 2.002 The intention of reaching the court of *Prajāpati* (*Chānd* 8.14.1) refers not the *Kāryabrahman*, but to the *Paramatman*, who alone is the topic of discussion. (13)
- 2.1 *Siddhānta* (*Bādarāyana*)
 The group of light etc. leads the *upāsakas*, who do not depend on any symbols i.e. those who meditate on the *Parabrahman* (the Highest Brahman) as well as those, who mediate on their own imperishable nature, having Brahman for its essence to the *Parabrahman*. If one were to accept that they lead either the *Kāryabrahmopāsakas* or only the *Parabrahmopāsakas* there will be the contradiction of the *śruti*—*Chānd*

- 8.12.3 and *Chānd* 5.10.1. Bhagavān Bādarāyaṇa thinks that a man in fact becomes in accordance with his intention (*Chānd* 3.14.1). (14)
- 2.11 The *pratīkopāsaka* has a different *phala* independent of going through the path of gods (*Chānd* 7.1.5). (15)

(D) The Fourth Pāda

1. **The liberated soul becomes completed in its own form** (1-3)
 - 1.1 The *jīva*, having attained the *Para* (Brahman), becomes manifest (*āvirbhavati*) in its own form (*svābhāvikeṇa rūpeṇa*) as declared by *Chānd* 8.12.3. (1)
 - 1.2 Only the *vimukta* (liberated) from bondage is said to be completed in his own form. (*Chānd* 8.7.1). (2)
 - 1.3 The *ātman* alone will have its real nature manifest on account of the context. (3)
2. **The *bhedābheda* experience in liberation** (4-21)
 - 2.1 The *mukta* experiences himself as non-divided from the Highest, with a non-division which is not in contradiction with a division (between the two) (*muktaḥ parasmād ātmānaṁ bhāgavirodhinā vibhāgenānubhavati*) because of the direct realization of the *tattva* (reality), and because the Scripture too reveals this. (4)
 - 2.01 *Pūrvapakṣa* I (Jaimini)

On the basis of *daharavākya* (*Chānd* 8.1.5, 8.7.1-3) Jaimini thinks that the *pratyagātman* becomes manifest as endowed with the *guṇas* belonging to Brahman such as *apahatapāpmatva* etc. (5)
 - 2.001 *Pūrvapakṣa* II (Audulomi)

Audulomi thinks that the *pratyagātman* having approached the *cidrūpa* Brahman becomes manifest in *cintmātrarūpa* (in the form of intelligence alone) (*Bṛh* 4.5.13). (6)
 - 2.2 *Siddhānta* (Bādarāyaṇa)

Bhagavān Bādarāyaṇa thinks that the *mukta jīva* becomes manifest in its own *vijñāna svarūpa* as possessed of *apahatapāpmatva* (freedom from sin) etc. so that there is no contradiction even if the real nature of the soul is established to be intelligence only. (7)
 - 2.3 The *mukta* attains the Fathers through a mere *saṁkalpa* (desire) *Chānd* 8.2.1. (8)

- 2.31 The *mukta* who has the *Parabrahman* as his *ātman* (*Parabrahmātma*) becomes *ananyādhipatī* (without another ruler) (*Chānd* 7.25.2) only because of the manifestation of (his) attributes of *satyasamkalpatva* (true desires) etc. (9)
- 2.4 Bādari thinks that there is no body for the *mukta* (*Chānd* 8.12.1). (10)
- 2.41 Jaimini thinks that the *mukta* has a body (*Chānd* 7.26.2). (11)
- 2.42 Bhagavān Bādarāyaṇa thinks that the *muktas* do or do not have a body according to their *samkalpa*. (12)
- 2.43 There is no fixed rule about the creation of the body by the *mukta* (himself) because of the possibility of *bhoga* by means of a body etc. created by the Bhagavān as in the dream state (See *Saurabha* 3.2.1-4). (13)
- 2.44 Since the *mukta* can enjoy the *līlārasa* of Bhagavān even in the presence of self-made body, he (i.e. *mukta*) creates through his own wish, corresponding to the *līlā* of the *Bhagavān*. (14)
- 2.45 The *jīva* can enter into many bodies through the attributes of *jñāna* (*Śvet* 5.9) as a lamp (*dīpa*) through its *prabhā*. (15)
- 2.5 The text "Embraced by the intelligent self, he does not know anything that is outside, nor anything inside" (*Chānd* 4.3.21) does not refer to the *mukta* (*jīva*), but either to deep sleep (*Chānd* 8.11.1) or to the departure (i.e. death) (*Brh* 4.5.13), for, in the *muktāvasthā* the *jīva* is *sarvajña* (omniscient) (*Chānd* 8.12.5). (16)
- 2.6 The *aiśvarya* (lordship) of the *mukta* has no part in the activities of creation etc of the world, which are exclusive to the *Parabrahman* (*Tait* 3.1). (17)
- 2.61 The *mukta* becoming self ruler, having freedom of movement in all the *lokas* (*Chānd* 7.25.2) means only that the objects of enjoyment (*bhogas*) in the world of *Hiraṇyagarbha*, etc. are the objects of the enjoyment for the freed soul (*muktānubhava viśayata*). (18)
- 2.62 The *mukta* experiences Brahman alone (*Tait* 2.7) who is *janmādivikāra śūnyam* (free from the changes of birth etc.) *svābhāvīkācintyānanta guṇa sāgaram* (an ocean of natural, inconceivable and infinite attributes) and *savibhūtikam* (possessed of super human power). (19)
- 2.63 The *Śruti* (*Śvet* 6.9, *Brh* 4.4.22) and *Smṛti* (*Gītā* 9.10) show that *Brahman* alone is capable of the activities of the creation etc of the entire world. (20)

2.64 Also because of the indicatory marks of equality only with regard to the enjoyment (*Tait* 2.1) the *aiśvarya* of the *mukta* is devoid of the activities (connected) with the world. (21)

3. **No rebirth for a liberated soul** (22)

The liberated *pratyagātman* who has attained the form of the highest light and has become free from the transmigratory existence does not return to the world. (22)
(*Chānd* 4.15.6, *Gītā* 8.16).

Chapter 8

BRAHMAN

Introduction

In our analysis of the *Vedāntapārijāta Saurabha*, we have already noticed that Nimbārka was a defender of the *bhedābheda* doctrine. **Ghate**¹ after his erudite study of the various commentaries on the *Brahmasūtras* comes to the conclusion that the *bhedābheda* doctrine defended by Nimbārka seems to be the doctrine that the Brahmasūtrakāra himself wanted to teach. This doctrine of *bhedābheda* seems to be even older than the Brahmasūtrakāra himself, since he refers to similar views held by earlier thinkers like Āśmarathya², Auḍulomi³ and Kāśakṛtsna⁴. But we have no details about their doctrines. The *Vedāntapārijāta Saurabha* of Nimbārka seems to be the earliest available *vr̥tti* on the *Brahmasūtras* offering us the details of the *bhedābheda* in pre-Śaṅkara days. Therefore an attempt is made in the following chapters to understand the philosophy of the *bhedābheda* as taught by Nimbārka.

In the present chapter, we discuss the concept of Brahman that Nimbārka held. Brahman has been the theme of the Upaniṣads and the *Brahmasūtras*. The discovery of Brahman as the ultimate conscious principle⁵ and the ground of all beings⁶ is the greatest contribution of the Upaniṣadic sages to Indian Philosophy. This Brahman is also known as the Ātman (the self) or the Puruṣa (the person)⁷. This

Brahman is the all important reality discussed in the *Brahmasūtras* as well as the *Vedāntapārijāta Saurabha*.

1. How do we know Brahman?

How do we know Brahman, the greatest Reality? According to the Saurabhakāra Brahman is not an object of sense perception etc⁸. According to him Brahman is made known by *Śāstra* alone. He does not discuss whether the other means of knowledge such as inference (*anumāna*) etc. accepted by the Schools like Nyāya are helpful in the acquisition of the knowledge of Brahman⁹. Yet should we not say that the Saurabhakāra admits at least incipiently the possibility of knowing Brahman from the world, because he defines Brahman as the creator etc. of this manifold universe¹⁰. As a *bhedābheda* *vādin* he also seems to admit the possibility of knowing the *Kāraṇa* (cause) from the *kārya* (effect), because the latter is not absolutely different from the former¹¹. As we will see later, the Saurabhakāra accepts Brahman as both the material supportive cause (*upādāna*) and the efficient (*nimitta*) cause of the world, which is merely an effect of Brahman. Nimbārka does not discuss such possibilities of knowing Brahman. Perhaps such means of knowledge cannot give absolute certainty. Therefore he positively asserts that *Śāstra* alone is the valid means of knowing Brahman¹².

2. What is śāstra?

The Saurabhakāra does not specify what exactly he means by *śāstra*. He not only distinguishes between the *śruti* and *smṛti* literature in the commonly accepted sense of the terms¹³ but also considers the *śruti* literature as *pratyakṣa* (perception) and the *smṛti* as *anumāna* (inference)¹⁴. Thus, the distinction between *śruti* and *smṛti* is very much substantial. He also does not identify *śāstra* with the *śruti* alone, since he quotes copiously from the *smṛti* literature also to prove his points. Among the *smṛti* literature he relies on are the *Bhagavadgītā*, the earlier *Purāṇas* and the writings of the earlier law givers. It is very significant that he does not quote from the later *Vaiṣṇava Purāṇa* like the *Bhāgavatam* or from any sectarian *āgamas*¹⁵.

He accepts the eternity of the Vedas¹⁶, but he does not

make any defence of the *apauruṣeyatva* of the Vedic literature. Therefore he also does not feel the need of showing how the unrelated or the *apauruṣeya śruti* reveals the reality of Brahman. In fact, according to the Saurabhakāra the *śruti* is not unrelated, for, he considers Brahman as the soul of the *śruti*¹⁷. Under BS 1.1.4 the Saurabhakāra encounters his first opponent, the Mīmāṃsaka, who claims that the entire Veda is *krīyāpara* (concerned with Vedic ritualism) and therefore the *Vedāntavākya*s, although dealing with different topics, are solely concerned with *vidhi* (injunctions) by way of establishing the excellence of the agent, just as the *arthavādavākya*s (descriptive portions) do. As a result, the Mīmāṃsaka denies the knowability of Brahman from the Vedas.

3. Brahman gives unity to the śruti

The Saurabhakāra rejects the commonly held Mīmāṃsa distinction of *Karmakāṇḍa* and the *Jñānakāṇḍa*. He accepts a unified view of the *śruti*. The unity of the *śruti* comes from its purport, namely, Brahman. The *vidhivākya*s (the injunctive statements of the scripture) and the entire *Karmakāṇḍa* form just an *aṅga* (part) of *Brahmajijñāsā*, in so far as they assist indirectly in the rise of *vidyā* (knowledge) by producing the desire for *vidyā*¹⁸, which is the only means of attaining Brahman¹⁹. The Saurabhakāra asserts that the primary concern of the Veda is Brahman and not *karma*, because there is confluence in Brahman of all the Vedic texts in their primary import by revealing Brahman. Brahman can never be a *kratvaṅga* (part of the sacrificial rite) because Brahman is independent of *karmas*, being the inner controller of all *karmas*, their agents and instruments. Brahman is also the giver of their fruits. Therefore the *karmas* are meaningful only in so far as they produce a desire for the knowledge of Brahman.

The Mīmāṃsaka opponent goes a step further and denies the knowability of Brahman because the scripture declares that Brahman is not the object of *pramāṇas* like *pratyakṣa* (perception), etc. Therefore he concludes that Brahman cannot be the object of any *pramāṇas* including the *śabdapramāṇa*. The Saurabhakāra does not accept such an

argument. He asserts that there is either a direct *samanvaya* (confluence) of all the texts dealing with the *lakṣaṇa* (definition) and *pramāṇa* (means of knowledge) of Brahman or an indirect *samanvaya* of all the texts dealing with the *vidyās* like *Śāṇḍilya*, etc. and types of symbols (*pratīkas*), etc. with Brahman. As a *bhedābhedavādin* he goes a step further and claims that there is in fact a direct *samanvaya* in Brahman of all the sentences, even though leading to different activities and have their own topics. All the Vedic sentences have Brahman as their primary subject matter, since they all, without exception deal with Brahman. Even the negative sentences refer to Brahman as far as they are only denying any kind of limit to the nature and attributes of Brahman²⁰.

He inflicts a further blow on the opponent by asking him whether "Brahman is or is not intended to be the purport of the statement": "Brahman is not a subject matter of human language". If the first alternative is accepted then Brahman can be spoken of and there is the refutation of the position that Brahman cannot be spoken of. In the second alternative there is all the more easily the *vācya* (being the object of language) of Brahman. Thus, by proving that Brahman can be an object of human language he proves that a meaningful discussion on Brahman is possible. Thus against the Mīmāṃsaka he upholds that Brahman is the primary concern of the entire *śāstra*. Even the *ākhyānas* (scriptural stories) in the Upaniṣads are meant to inculcate the knowledge of Brahman²¹.

4. Who is eligible to study the Veda?

The knowledge of Brahman comes through the study of the *śāstra*. Are all eligible to study the Vedas? The earlier law givers such as Vasiṣṭha²², Manu²³ and Gautama²⁴ debarred the Śūdras from even hearing the Vedas. The Saurabhakāra also does not consider everybody to be eligible to study the Vedas. He is in agreement with the earlier law givers and denies the Śūdra any right to learn the Vedas²⁵. Only those who are initiated to the purificatory rites of *upanayana* (the sacred thread) are eligible to learn the Vedas. The Saurabhakāra does not give any concession to the Śūdras. He is not prepared to say that the Śūdra can attain the

knowledge of Brahman through the study of Purāṇas and the other *smṛti* literature²⁶. Therefore it seems that the Saurabhakāra excludes the Śūdras not only from the study of the Vedas but also from the resulting salvific knowledge which is a pre-requisite for liberation. The study of the Veda is one of the pre-requisites for the acquisition of the liberative knowledge. The Saurabhakāra seems to exclude the Śūdras also from the good deeds in so far as he subscribes to the debarring of the Śūdras from being initiated to a sacrifice²⁷.

5. The study of the Veda

The Saurabhakāra concurs with the traditional method of studying the Vedas. The scripture declares that the true knowledge can be imparted by a competent *guru* who is learned in scripture and established in Brahman. (*gururṁ śrotriyaṁ brahmaṇiṣṭam* (*Munḍ* 1.2.12). The religious student goes to the house of such a *guru*. (*ācāryavān puruṣaveda. Chānd* 6.14.2). He studies the Veda in accordance with the rules in the leisure time left over from doing the work for the teacher²⁸. The mere reading of the Veda does not bring in the liberating knowledge. The study of the Veda only helps one to perform his duties as a householder²⁹.

Anyone who has studied the Vedas with its six ancillary disciplines (*ṣaḍaṅgaveda*) can undertake the long process of acquiring *Brahmavidyā*. A study of the *ṣaḍaṅgaveda* will generate a certain doubt and uncertainty regarding the exact nature of the action (*karmas*) and their results (*phalas*). This prompts one to make a thorough study of the *dharmamīmāṃsā*. Such a study also makes one convinced of the finitude of the fruits of the ritualistic action (*karmaphala*). This realization has a two-fold effect. On the one hand the seeker becomes dissatisfied with the worldly objects and on the other hand, he becomes convinced of the superiority of *Brahmajñāna*. A *brahmajijñāsu* (a seeker after Brahman) develops an aversion for the transitory fruits of *karmas*. It makes him desirous of the vision (*darsana*) of Brahman. It also generates a longing in him to obtain grace (*praśada*) of Brahman³⁰.

According to the Upaniṣadic tradition, the *mumukṣu* (one desiring liberation) longing for the vision of the Lord must

approach a preceptor. For, without such an instructor there is no reaching the final goal (*ananya prokte gatiṁ atra nāsti. Katha* 1.2.8). The *Saurabhakāra* does not describe the qualities of a competent *guru*. For the *mumukṣu* his spiritual preceptor (*ācārya*) is the only *deva* (master)³¹. The *Saurabhakāra* also demands a wholehearted devotion for the holy *guru* on the part of the *mumukṣu*³². It is not clear whether the *Saurabhakāra* makes any distinction between the *ācārya* who is the *eka deva* for the *mumukṣu* and the *śrīguru* to whom the *mumukṣu* is expected to have *eka hārda bhakti* (wholehearted devotion). In *Saurabha* 1.3.8 he considers *Śrīkumāra* as his *paramācārya* (the highest teacher) and *Nārada* as his *guru*³³. Are we allowed to make a distinction between *ācārya* and *guru* on the one hand and *guru* and *śrīguru* on the other³⁴?

There are certain moral and psychological qualities demanded of a *brahmajijñāsu*. First of all, he must possess the qualities of calmness and self-control. He must be indifferent to the worldly objects, forbearing and recollected in accordance with the *śruti* “*tasmād evaṁ vicchānto dānta uparatastitikṣuḥ samāhito bhūtvā'tmany evātmānam paśyēt* (*Brh* 4.4.23)³⁵.

He must also have deep learning, child-like simplicity, unostentatiousness and profound reflection³⁶. He must be a man of asceticism, seeking the *ātman* by austerity, chastity, faith and knowledge³⁷.

Even the gods need to seek enlightenment from a *guru*. *Indra* becomes a disciple of *Prajāpati* and lives with him for one hundred and one years to be instructed on the real self³⁸. With the help of the *guru* the *mumukṣu* follows the injunctions of *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana* – hearing the scripture, reasoning over it and realizing its truth, as declared by the *śruti* “*ātmā vā are draṣṭavyaḥ śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyaḥ*” (*Brh* 2.4.5)³⁹. The *guru*, who has realized “This is my own self” (*Chānd* 3.14.3-1) instructs his disciple “This is your own self” (*Brh* 3.4.1 etc.) and helps him to meditate on the Highest Person and to realize his own real self⁴⁰.

6. The Brahman made known by the *śruti* is *Puruṣottama*

The Saurabhakāra has inherited not only the Upaniṣadic tradition but also the Bhāgavata tradition. In conformity with the Upaniṣadic tradition he considers Brahman as the Highest Reality⁴¹. He is *brhattama* (the greatest)⁴². There exists nothing besides Him⁴³ or higher than Him⁴⁴. He is beyond the limitations of space and time⁴⁵. In fact the entire created objective world is just one foot of Brahman. He is beyond them all and is superior to them all⁴⁶. He is the Paramātman⁴⁷. As a Bhāgavata devotee the Saurabhakāra identifies the Absolute Paramātman with Bhagavān Vāsudeva⁴⁸ Ramākānta Puruṣottama⁴⁹. He is the lord and controller over Brahman, Īśa and Kāla⁵⁰. Due significance is to be given to the fact that the entire *Saurabha* Brahman or Puruṣottama is presented as adorned with *cakra*, *śaṁgha* etc⁵² or as residing in the *Vaikuṇṭha* or *Goloka*. Except for the fact that the Saurabhakāra identifies Brahman with Vāsudeva Ramākānta Puruṣottama, the *Saurabha* is free from Sectarian theology. The description of Brahman or Śrī Puruṣottama is more in the Upaniṣadic line with Upaniṣadic terminologies rather than in the Vaiṣṇavite Sectarian terms⁵³.

7. Brahman in Himself

Brahman can be considered either as *nirguṇa*⁵⁴ (attributeless) or *saguṇa*⁵⁵ (with attributes) or both⁵⁶. According to the Saurabhakāra the *nirguṇatva* of Brahman would mean that Brahman is both beyond all the *guṇas* and that he is devoid of all defects and negative qualities. Brahman is free from all limitations such as sin, parts, action, perishability etc⁵⁷. Brahman has no sense organ⁵⁸, nor does He depend on any external instruments⁵⁹. Therefore, Brahman's being *nirguṇa* (beyond all the *guṇas*) would mean that He is not limited by any *guṇas*. The *nirguṇatva* in this context has a positive content. As pointed out above the Saurabhakāra holds that even the scriptural texts denying Brahman has a positive content in so far as they deny only any kind of limitations with regard to the nature, attributes,

etc. of Brahman⁶⁰. Brahman is in fact the abode of all positive and auspicious attributes⁶¹ in their fullness.

The Saurabhakāra points out that for the sake of meditation Brahman has been described in the scriptures through various symbols and metaphors, such as *ānandamaya* (full of bliss)⁶², *manomaya*⁶³ (consisting of mind), or as mere pleasure (*kañ*)⁶⁴. Some *śruti* texts enjoin to worship Brahman as the person within the eye or as abiding within the sun⁶⁵. Brahman is also occasionally presented in the scripture as the *ākāśa* (ether)⁶⁶ or *prāṇa* (vital breath) or as *jyoti* (light) or the metre *gāyatrī*⁶⁷. In the teachings and the discourses of the Upaniṣads Brahman is often taught as the *bhūman* (plenitude)⁶⁸ or as the *vaiśvānara* (all destructive fire)⁶⁹, or the *daharākāśa*⁷⁰ (the small ether within the heart) or as the *adrśya* (the unperceptible)⁷¹ and the *akṣaya* (imperishable)⁷². He is even described as a measured being, measured to the size of a thumb⁷³. Through various symbolic expressions like these, the Vedic seers attempted to explain to us their realization of the great mystery of Brahman, who is beyond everything yet indwelling in all. The symbolic presentations of Brahman are the feeble attempts of man to understand and to realize the mystery of Brahman. Each of them points to Brahman, trying to bring out one or other aspect of the *mysterium tremendum* of Brahman.

8. Qualities of Brahman in Himself

The absolute and incomprehensible nature of Brahman can only be expressed through paradoxes. As a matter of fact his qualities (attributes) already share in the mysterious, incomprehensible and paradoxical nature of Brahman. Therefore the Saurabhakāra describes Brahman as the greatest (*brhattama*), on account of His infinite, inconceivable and innate nature (*svābhāvika svarūpa*), qualities and powers⁷⁴. His description of Brahman as *apahatapāpman*⁷⁵ etc. seems to be a reference to *Chāndogya*⁷⁶, according to which Brahman has the following eight-fold qualities. (1) *apahatapāpma* (freedom from sin), (2) *vijara* (ageless), (3) *vimṛtyu* (deathless), (4) *viśoka* (griefless), (5) *vijighatsa* (without hunger), (6) *apipāsa* (without thirst), (7) *satyakāma* (possessed of true desires) and (8) *satyasaṅkalpa* (having true resolve).

They form the evermanifest *svabhāva* (nature) of Brahman⁷⁷. Brahman is essentially bliss; others become blissful (*ānandi*) by obtaining Him⁷⁸. His bliss is unlimited, unlike the human bliss⁷⁹ of which He Himself is the cause⁸⁰. Brahman is the beginningless⁸¹ and the endless⁸².

9. Functional qualities of Brahman

Brahman, who has no origin, is the source of everything⁸³. He is the support of all the created objects, of heaven and of earth⁸⁴. He is the creator of *ākāśa* (ether)⁸⁵ etc., nay He is the sole cause of the *sṛṣṭi* (creation), *sthiti* (sustenance) and *laya* (dissolution) of this inconceivable and complex universe⁸⁶. In fact all the attributes of causality are appropriate on the part of Brahman alone⁸⁷. He is not only the manifestor of *nāma* (name) and *rūpa* (form)⁸⁸ but also the final goal of everything⁸⁹. All things are created by Him and all things return to Him. As the *alpha* and *omega* points of the entire created reality, Brahman is often presented as *ākāśa* (meaning the origin) and *prāṇa* (meaning the end)⁹⁰. All things owe their being and existence to Him. They will find their final goal and fulfilment in Him at their liberation.

Other positive qualities of Brahman consist in His being *nityāvāpta samastakāma* (whose desires are eternally fulfilled)⁹¹, *sarvajña* (omniscient)⁹², *sarveśvara* (Lord of all)⁹³, *sarvaśaktimān* (omnipotent)⁹⁴ and *sarvasamārtha*⁹⁵ (capable of doing everything). The qualities like *hitatamatva* (highest auspiciousness)⁹⁶, *abhaya* (fearlessness)⁹⁷, *samyadvāvatva* (uniter of lovely thing)⁹⁸ and *amṛtatva* (immortality)⁹⁹ are intelligible only when referred to Brahman. He is great and all-pervasive¹⁰⁰, yet at the same time, He abides within all¹⁰¹. He indwells in the heart of all the *jīvas*¹⁰². He is the inner controller of all the *karmas* and their agents as well as their implements¹⁰³ nay, of everything¹⁰⁴. Although He is the *antaryāmin* of everything¹⁰⁵, He is not contaminated by the faults (*doṣas*) of the *jīvas*¹⁰⁶, nor is He sullied by the defects, miseries, pains and pleasures of the created world.

Thus, Nimbārka seems to say that the Brahman is, both immanent and transcendent. He indwells in everything, yet remains incomprehensible and beyond all things. The more

He reveals Himself the more His nature remains paradoxical. We shall discuss these points in detail in chapter eleven.

As pointed out earlier, in the *Saurabha*, there is no mention of the tender qualities of Brahman like His loveliness, tenderness, etc¹⁰⁷. Nor is there any mention of the *premaviśeṣalakṣaṇā bhakti*, based on such tender qualities of Brahman¹⁰⁸. The *vedānta ratna mañjūṣā*¹⁰⁹, a later work of the Nimbārka school, has a detailed description and discussion of such qualities of Brahman¹¹⁰.

10. Brahman is the cause of the world

The Upaniṣads declare that the origin of this universe is from Brahman¹¹¹. The causality of Brahman is something unique. He is both the *nimittakāraṇa* (efficient cause) as well as the *upādānakāraṇa* (the material supportive cause) of everything¹¹² since there exists nothing besides Him. In ordinary life there is a clear-cut distinction and difference between the *nimittakāraṇa* and the *upādānakāraṇa* as in the case of the potter and the clay with which he makes a pot. If Brahman were only a *nimittakāraṇa*, He would be a "potter" god and would be like any *pratyagātman* (individual soul), depending upon an *upādānakāraṇa* extrinsic to Him, in the form of *pradhāna* (primordial matter), just as a potter depends on clay for the production of a pot. Let us listen to the Saurabhakāra himself:

Saurabha 1.4.23. "*prakṛtiśca pratijñādṛṣṭāntānuparodhāt*"

"The material cause as well as the efficient cause — indicated by the particle "ca" (and) (in the *sūtra*) — is none but the Supreme Soul, because then alone the initial proposition "Did you ask for that instruction whereby the unheard becomes heard, the unthought becomes thought, the unknown becomes known? (*Chānd* 6.1.3), as well as the illustration just as, my dear, through a lump of clay, all objects made of clay may be known" (*Chānd* 6.1.4) are explicable".

Saurabha 1.4.24. "*abhidyopadeśācca*"

"On account of the teaching of reflection" in the text "He perceived (i.e. thought) may I be many" (*Chānd* 6.2.3), "the fact that Brahman is the creator (i.e. the efficient cause) and the material cause is established".

Saurabha 1.4.25. "*sākṣāccobhayāmnānāt*"

"On account of the direct mention of Brahman as the efficient and material cause in the sacred text: "Brahman was the wood Brahman the tree from which they carved out the heaven and the earth. O wise men,

ask through the mind whereon it stood supporting the worlds" (*Tait Br.* 2.8.9.6-7). Brahman alone is of the two-fold forms".

Saurabha 1.4.26. *ātmakṛteḥ parīṇāmāt*

"Brahman alone is the efficient and the material cause of the world. Why? "On account of creating Himself" as known from the passage: "That itself created itself" (*Tait.* 2.7)..If it be objected: how can the creator be Himself the object of creation? (we reply); "On account of transformation". The omniscient and omnipotent Brahman, having transformed Himself into the form of the world by the projection of His power, becomes transformed, indeed, through His own nature, undeveloped, and possessing powers like creatorship, etc."

In his interpretation of the above four *sūtras*, the *Saurabhakāra* stresses that Brahman is both the *nimittakāraṇa* and the *upādānakāraṇa* of the universe. To substantiate his point he quotes *Chāndogya* 6.1.3, 6.1.4, 6.2.3. *Tait. Br.* 28.9.6-7 and *Tait, Upaniṣad* 2.7. The *nimittakāraṇatva* of Brahman consists in his willing. "He perceived may I be many" (*Chānd* 6.2.3) and as a result He projects (*vikṣepa*) His creative power. Brahman is the *nimittakāraṇa* in so far as He evolves name and form in accordance with the text "*nāmarūpe vyākaraṇāni*" (*Chānd* 6.3.2)¹¹³.

But the *Tait. Brahmana* text "Brahman was the wood Brahman the tree from which they carried out the heaven and earth. O wise men, ask through the mind whereon it stood supporting the world" (*Tait. Br.* 2.8.9.6-7) quoted above does not explain how Brahman is both the *nimitta* and *upādānakāraṇa*. Yet the *Saurabhakāra* interprets it as referring to Brahman as both the efficient and material supportive cause of the world. He also interprets "*tad ātmānaṁ svayam akurata*" (*Tait* 2.7) as referring to both the *nimittakāraṇatva* and *upādānakāraṇatva* of Brahman. Thus the *Saurabhakāra* seems to take "the decision of Brahman" as His *nimittakāraṇatva* and the aspect of His transforming Himself into the forms of created objects as His *upādānakāraṇatva*, because the *Saurabhakāra* is well aware that besides the omnipotent *Puruṣottama* there exists nothing else¹¹⁴. Therefore He alone could be both the *nimitta* and the *upādāna* of everything .

In the above passages as well as elsewhere in the *Saurabha* *Nimbārka* seems to accept a difference between Brahman

who is presented as the *nimittakāraṇa* as well as the *upādānakāraṇa* of everything and the ordinary *nimittakāraṇas* and *upādānakāraṇas* of everyday experience. The ordinary *nimittakāraṇa*, like the potter, has to depend on a given external material cause to make a pot. He brings about the effect through hard work. Brahman, on the contrary, creates everything through a mere wish. There is no question of any industry or effort on the part of Brahman. Secondly, the *upādānakāraṇa* in ordinary experience is the unconscious matter, which is shaped by an external agent. Brahman, on the contrary, is a conscious *upādānakāraṇa*. While the ordinary *upādānakāraṇas* undergo substantial change under the transforming action of the *nimittakāraṇas*, there is no transformation within the nature of Brahman. Brahman creates through a mere wish. Through His will, the finite world of *jīvas* and *jagat* are produced from Him. They owe their existence to Him. By presenting Brahman as both the *nimittakāraṇa* and the *upādānakāraṇa* of everything, Nimbārka also seems to accept not only the ontological dependence of the created world on Brahman but also their co-substantiality with Brahman¹¹⁵.

Sometimes the scriptures describe the *upādānakāraṇa* of the universe as existent (*sat*)¹¹⁶ or as non-existent (*asat*)¹¹⁷ and sometimes as *avyakta* (unmanifest) or as *vyakta* (manifest)¹¹⁸. The Saurabhakāra holds that all these texts refer to Brahman and not to the *pradhāna* of the Sāṃkhya¹¹⁹. According to our author the terms *asat*, *avyakta*, etc. refer to the subtleness of the created universe prior to creation, which exists in Brahman in an unmanifest form as his *śakti* (power). The *upādāna* of the universe is the *avyakṛta svarūpa* (undeveloped nature) of Brahman, which is both powerful and creative¹²⁰. Brahman endowed with the subtle powers is declared to be the *upādānatva* of the universe¹²¹.

This two-fold causality of Brahman makes the initial proposition "Did you ask for that instruction whereby the unheard becomes heard, the unthought becomes thought, the unknown becomes known?" and the illustration "Just as my dear, through a lump of clay (*mṛtṭpīṇḍa*), all the objects made of clay may be known"¹²² become meaningful¹²³. Though the *mṛtṭpīṇḍa* is not the *nimittakāraṇa*, yet if we know

fully the *mṛtpiṇḍa* we can know all the products made of it. A fortiori if we know Brahman, the one, who is the *nimitta* and the *upādānakāraṇa* of all the effects then we will know all the created objects. If we know Him the One then we know the many. Brahman is not a producer of the world, say like a carpenter, but He pulsates within the entire created universe. Everything created is a participation in His being.

11. Brahman needs no instruments

The Saurabhakāra now proceeds to answer some doubts and objections. He faces the objection that Brahman who is without any external implements cannot be the cause of the universe because producers like the potter, etc. use many implements. The reply of the Saurabhakāra is that Brahman needs no implements. "He transforms Himself "like milk" possessing, as He does, powers peculiar to Him alone". If the gods can create what they want, how much more Brahman, the omnipotent, can do through a mere wish¹²⁴. In accordance with the text "Supreme is His power declared to be manifold, natural is the operation of His knowledge and power" (*Śvet.* 6.8), Brahman is endowed with all the powers and therefore He is able to do everything¹²⁵.

Thus, by proceeding from a grosser type of transformation viz. the transformation of milk into curd, Nimbārka takes us to a higher form of production of effects when he speaks of the gods (super human entities) who can, through a mere wish, produce what they want. According to Nimbārka, the creative activity of Brahman transcends even the superhuman realm of the gods. By transcending the "gross" and by going to more and more "subtle" creative principle, Nimbārka seems to "spiritualize" the creative and transforming power of Brahman. Therefore, when Nimbārka says that Brahman transforms Himself into the forms of the created finite world we have to understand it in the most "spiritual" or rather metaphysical sense of the transforming creative activity.

12. Karma is responsible for unequal creation

Inequality and cruelty, due to unequal creation, destruction and the rest, depend on the *karma* of the *jīvas* them-

selves. They do not pertain to the creator of the universe, as in the case of the rain, which gives rise to manifold varieties of vegetation¹²⁶. Brahman is like an impartial and just judge who gives everyone his due. The variety in creation is due to the past *karmas* of the *jīvas*. These *karmas* are eternal in the sense that they have no beginning (*anādi*) but they can be brought to an end through *vidyā*.

13. No mutation in Brahman

Brahman, through a mere wish, transforms Himself through a process of *pariṇāma* (evolution) into the *ākāra* (form) of the universe by the projection of His power through His own powerful and creative nature¹²⁷. Prior to creation the world inheres in Brahman as His power. Creation is the manifestation of this power¹²⁸. The Saurabhakāra, on the one hand, defends the *upādānakāraṇatva* of Brahman, yet, on the other hand, asserts that there is neither a total nor even a partial transformation of Brahman because of His particular qualities¹²⁹. In fact the *pariṇāma* of Brahman is merely a *vikṣepa* of His *śakti*. Brahman does not cease to be Brahman. Brahman is indeed partless and all pervasive¹³⁰. Therefore He cannot be transformed either entirely or in parts¹³¹. Nimbārka does not accept that creation brings any change or transformation in Brahman.

The Saurabhakāra uses the term *pariṇāma* to explain this process of creation, but he does not explain the term itself. Here we are forced to interpret his mind in order to avoid glaring contradictions. *Pariṇāma* involves evolution and change. The Saurabhakāra denies any change on the part of Brahman. Brahman remains transcendent. Our author, following the scriptures, believes that the world came from Brahman, without in any way minimizing Brahman's uniqueness and transcendence. Here he touches the mystery of the origination or the procession of "the many" from "the One". Making use of the Upaniṣadic examples he tries to explain this mystery. He brings in the instance of the spider creating the web¹³² or the procession of the lustre from the sun¹³³. Ultimately creation is due to the will of Brahman as declared by the *Chānd* 6.2.3 "He perceived may I be many".

Here also Nimbārka seems to make certain distinctions

between the process of transformation on different levels. On the level of the most gross form of material transformation, for example, that of the clay into a pot or of milk into curd there is almost complete mutation of the cause into the effect. The example of the spider and the web refines the sense of mutation in so far as the web in no way causes any changes in the spider's nature and substance. At the same time the web is a participation in the essence of the spider. A more subtle example for the absence of any physical mutation is given through the example of the sun and its effect, the lustre. Nimbārka naturally expects us to transcend whatever material limitations these examples have, when he says that Brahman created the world through a mere perception, which brings no physical mutation or transformation in Him. "He perceived may I be many" (*Chānd* 6.2.3).

14. The opponents of the *Brahmakāraṇavāda*

a) Nimbārka's criticism of the creation theories of the other schools of thought will make his doctrine on the origin of the world more clear. According to the Saurabhakāra the main opponent of the *Brahmakāraṇavāda* is the Sāṃkhya. As we have noticed in chapter six above, the Saurabhakāra rejects the Sāṃkhya doctrine primarily on the ground that it contradicts the *śruti*¹³⁴. He further points out that even on logical ground the Sāṃkhya doctrine of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa* as the ultimate Principles of creation is unacceptable. First of all, an *acetana* (unconscious) principle devoid of reflexion¹³⁵ and power of knowing¹³⁶ and thus unacquainted with the varied arrangements of the objects to be created¹³⁷ cannot be the cause of the world¹³⁸. Only a conscious Principle can be the creator of the world¹³⁹. The *pradhāna* advocated by the Sāṃkhya is incapable of any spontaneous activity¹⁴⁰. It cannot be subject to the influence of an intelligent Principle¹⁴¹. Therefore a blind *acetana* cause cannot have any purpose nor direction of creation¹⁴². It cannot be the ultimate goal of all beings¹⁴³.

Similarly the *Puruṣa* advocated by the Sāṃkhya, cannot be the enjoyer of *dharmādharma karmaphala*¹⁴⁴. On the basis of *Kauṣ* 3.9 & *Kauṣ* 4.1 he also rejects the *Sāṃkhyapuruṣa*,

for that matter any other *jīva*, as the creator of the universe. Only the omnipotent and omniscient *Puruṣottama* can be the creator of the universe. The individual *jīvas* or the *puruṣas* are not omnipotent and omniscient. That seems to be the reason why the *Saurabhakāra* rejects the creatorship of the *jīvas*. In *Saurabha* 4.4.17 he points out that even the *mukta jīva* does not share in Brahman's activity of the creation of the universe. He makes it clear in *Saurabha* 2.1.22 that although the *jīvas* are non-different from Brahman, their *upādānakāraṇa*, they are also different from Him, possessing, as they do, some individual qualities of their own.

According to the *Saurabhakāra*, the material cause, denoted by the term *upādānakāraṇa*, *prakṛti*,¹⁴⁵ *avyakta*¹⁴⁶ etc. is in fact Brahman alone and not what the *Sāṅkhyas* understand by such terms. The *sāṅkhyapradhāna*, presented as the ultimate principle is meaningless¹⁴⁷ because of the *brahmātmakatva* of everything¹⁴⁸. The doctrine that Brahman is the *prakṛti* (material cause) of the world is based on both the *śruti* and *smṛti* and is free from all defects¹⁴⁹. Brahman is not only the *prakṛtatva* of everything, He is also the *preraka* (the mover) of everything¹⁵⁰. The primary cause of the universe must not only be the *upādānakāraṇa* of the world, but also the prime mover of every activity. The *sāṅkhya pradhāna* can never be such a prime mover¹⁵¹.

b) The *Saurabhakāra* also considers the *Vaiśeṣikas*, the *Sūgatas*, the *Pāśupatas* and the *Śāktas* as the opponents of the *Brahmakāraṇavāda*. He rejects the *Vaiśeṣika* position that the world is a combination of the *Paramāṇus* (ultimate atoms)¹⁵², for, such a theory is illogical and inconsistent since there cannot be any extended combination at all from the partless *Paramāṇus*¹⁵³. Further, there cannot be any first motion on the part of these *Paramāṇus*. Even the *adr̥ṣṭa* (the unseen power) cannot be considered to cause the first motion in the *Paramāṇus* because it cannot in any way be connected to a partless *Paramāṇu*¹⁵⁴. Besides, if the activity of the *Paramāṇus* is natural, there will be only eternal creation. In the absence of it there will be eternal dissolution¹⁵⁵. The combination of the *Paramāṇus* is impossible also because of the defect in the doctrine of *samavāya* (inherence)

itself. According to the Vaiśeṣikas the combination of two or more *Paramāṇus* are due to the *samavāya* which, on its part, is distinct from the *Paramāṇus* themselves. Nimbārka points out that such a doctrine would require an infinite regress of *samavāyas* to connect the proceeding *samavāyas* which are considered to be distinct entities in themselves¹⁵⁶. He also denies the doctrine of the eternity of the *Paramāṇus* since the objects made of these *Paramāṇus* can be destroyed¹⁵⁷. There cannot also be any qualitative difference among the objects made out of these *Paramāṇus*¹⁵⁸. Therefore, since reasonable people are unable to accept the *Paramāṇukāraṇavāda* it should be rejected by the *mumukṣu*¹⁵⁹.

c) The main ground on which Nimbārka attacks the Sugatas is their acceptance of *Kṣaṇikavāda* (momentariness). He points out that no *samudāya* (aggregation) of the non-sentient components like *bhūta* (element), *bhautika* (elemental), *citta* (mind) and *caitta* (mental) is possible in the absence of a proper cause for their union¹⁶⁰. Nor could the *Saṅghāta* (aggregation) be the result of the mutual causality of the momentary *avidyā*, *saṃskāra*, *vijñāna*, *nāmarūpa*, *ṣaḍāyatana*¹⁶¹, etc. because momentary as it is, the prior entity is destroyed before the production of the subsequent¹⁶². If, on the contrary, the origin of the effect is admitted even when the cause is non-existent, then the doctrine of the *kṣaṇikavāda* in that *vijñāna* (consciousness) arises from the causality of *indriya* (sense organ), *āloka* (light), *manaskāra* (mental mode), and *viśaya* (object) will be contradicted. If the effect, on the other hand, originates from an existent cause, then there will be simultaneity (*yaugapadyam*) of effect with the cause, which also contradicts the *kṣaṇikavāda*¹⁶³. Similarly he also points out the impossibility of the interruption (*viccheda*) of the continuous series (*santāna*)¹⁶⁴ as well as the inconsistency of the view that *mokṣa* is the *nirodha* of *avidyā*, because the series has in fact no reality beyond the single momentary member of the series¹⁶⁵.

d) Nimbārka considers the Pāśupata sect as an *upadharma* (sub-sect) which contradicts the Vedas in so far as it contradicts the Vedic doctrine of the non-difference of the *nimittakāraṇa* and *upādānakāraṇa* of the world¹⁶⁶. He

rejects the Pāśupata doctrine because it makes a distinction between the *upādānakāraṇa* (or *pradhāna*) and the *nimittakāraṇa* (i.e. the *preraka* or *Paśupati*)¹⁶⁷. Nimbārka points out that on the one hand, there cannot be any relation between a bodiless *Paśupati* and the *Pradhāna*¹⁶⁸, and on the other hand, *Paśupati* cannot have a body which is either eternal or non-eternal, because the former possibility contradicts experience and the latter (i.e. non-eternal body) arises only when creation sets in¹⁶⁹. Besides *Paśupati* cannot have a body and sense organs like the *jīva* because that would mean *bhoga* (experience of *karma*) on his part¹⁷⁰. How can *Paśupati* have any connection with the *adr̥ṣṭa*, consisting of the *puṇya* etc. because that will imply finitude (*antavatvam*) and ignorance (*ajñatvam*)¹⁷¹ in him.

e) Following the same kind of arguments as we have seen, in chapter six, he rejects the *Śāktamata* advocating a female principle as the ultimate source of everything under BS 2.2.42-45 where Sāṃkara and Rāmānuja discuss the pros and cons of the Pañcarātra doctrine of *vyūhavāda*. Nimbārka points out that according to the Śāktas themselves the origin of the world from *Śakti* is not possible without the *Puruṣa*. Since there is no sense organ prior to creation, no connection between *Śakti* and *Puruṣa* is possible prior to creation¹⁷². Therefore *Śakti* cannot be considered as the cause of the world¹⁷³. On the other hand, if the Śāktas consider that the *Śakti* possesses natural intelligence etc. so that she needs no external help for the creation of the world, it is an acceptance of the *Brahmakāraṇavāda*¹⁷⁴, because according to the *Brahmakāraṇavāda* the ultimate Cause is an intelligent Principle who is both the *nimittakāraṇa* as well as the *upādānakāraṇa* of everything. Finally, Nimbārka reminds the Śākta that the *śāktavāda* is opposed to both the *śruti* and the *smṛti*¹⁷⁵. Therefore it cannot be accepted at all. Thus Nimbārka establishes that *Brāhmakāraṇavāda* alone stands to reason and is based on *śruti* and *smṛti*.

15. Brahman and the universe are correlatives

Since the universe is nothing but the *śakti vikṣepa* of Brahman, there is *ananyatvam* (non-difference) between Brahman, the *kāraṇa* and the universe, the *kārya*. Though

the *kārya* is posterior (logically) than the *kāraṇa*, still since the reality of *kārya* exists in the *kāraṇa*, there is non-difference between the two. The universe (*kārya*) can never be thought of without Brahman the (*kāraṇa*) being first thought of. In the realm of existence Brahman is the ultimate Principle as the Saurabhakāra states "because the effect is perceived only when the cause is existent"¹⁷⁶ and "on account of the existence of the effect belonging to a posterior time — in the cause"¹⁷⁷. The very existence of the universe calls for its creator, who is non-different from it¹⁷⁸. It means that Brahman and the universe are correlative, one always implies the other. As a *bhedābheda*vādin, the Saurabhakāra accepts that the *jīvas* and the *jagat*, which are effects of Brahman, are real. The effect is co-relative with the cause. The effect cannot be understood without the cause or vice versa. From this we know that the *satkāryavāda* (pre-existence of the effect in the cause) is the theory that is propounded in the *Saurabha*.

16. Cause-effect have a *bhedābheda* relation

The Saurabhakāra attempts also to clear off a general misunderstanding based on the concept of *satkāryavāda*¹⁷⁹ (the doctrine of the pre-existence of the effect in the cause) that the *kārya* must be of the same nature as that of the *kāraṇa*, (that is to say, from a lump of clay we can get only a clay pot and not a gold one), otherwise the *kārya* would be *asat* prior to its origination¹⁸⁰. As a *bhedābheda*vādin he denies both an absolute identity (*atyantābheda*) between the *kārya* and the *kāraṇa* and also an absolute difference (*atyanta binnatvam*)¹⁸¹ between them. He accepts that from a conscious Brahman a non-conscious material world can originate, since it is not necessary that there must be absolute similarity between the material cause and the effects. In his defence he advances the famous Vedāntic examples of the origin of hair which is different from the person and of the dung beetles which are different from cowdung¹⁸².

17. The *aupaniṣadikapradhāna*

Our *ācārya* seems to accept a type of primordial matter (*prakṛti*) which he calls the *aupaniṣadika-pradhāna*. It de-

pend on the *Paramākarāṇa* (the Supreme Cause)¹⁸³. Brahman is its source and its controller. Therefore he calls it *brahmātmikā* (i.e. the *pradhāna* that has Brahman as its soul). The scripture refers to it as *ajā* (the unborn)¹⁸⁴. He does not consider it a contradiction to accept an unborn primordial matter (*ajāprakṛti*) which has in its turn Brahman as its *upādānakāraṇa* because ultimately Brahman is the *upādānakāraṇa* of the entire universe, even including the *ajāprakṛti*¹⁸⁵. He points out, as we have seen above, that the *acetanapradhāna* cannot be the cause of the world because of its unacquaintance with the conscious, variegated and orderly production of things in the world. Only the Omnipotent and Omniscient *Puruṣottama* can be the creator of the universe.

18. The purpose of creation

Since Brahman is the one whose desires are eternally fulfilled (*nityāvāpta samastakāma*)¹⁸⁶ He possibly cannot have any unfulfilled desires and unsatisfied needs or unachieved goals. He is the most perfect being. Therefore there cannot be any insufficiency or any wants in Him. If Brahman is *nityāvāpta samastakāma*, the question why should Brahman create this world is a legitimate one. In agreement with the Vedāntic tradition, the Saurabhakāra considers that the purpose of creation is a mere sport (*krīḍā mātram*) on the part of Brahman¹⁸⁷.

In ordinary life we see kings etc. engaging themselves in mere sports. In the days of the kings, they were considered to be *nityāvāptakāma*. The inner joy of the king finds expression in the sports he plays. It appears that inner joy of Brahman is manifested in his sport of creation. Nimbārka does not say that the cause of the creation of the world is the inner joy of Brahman. Brahman, the supreme monarch of the universe, indulges in pastimes out of His free will. In accepting the theory of sport (*krīḍāvāda*) the Saurabhakāra has not gone beyond the traditional belief that Brahman creates the world just for a sport.

Although creation is a sport on the part of Brahman it is not entirely motiveless. It serves the demand of the moral law whereby each one is given his just dues in accordance with

his *karma*. Although creation is a free act on the part of Brahman, it is a logical necessity as far as the *jīvas* are concerned. It is an outcome of the beginningless *karma* in accordance with the text "the creator fashioned the sun and the moon as he did before" (*RV* 10.190.3)¹⁸⁸. It shows that *karma* done by the *jīvas* in previous births exist prior to each subsequent creation.

The Saurabhakāra has not ventured to reconcile the sovereignty and freedom on the part of Brahman with the logical necessity of creation arising out of the *karmas* of the *jīvas*. Is the creative sport of Brahman really free or is it conditioned and necessitated by the *karmas* of the *jīva*? Nimbārka seems to accept both: He does not speak at all about the forgiving grace or soteriological action on the part of Brahman towards the *jīva*. All that the Saurabhakāra says is that Brahman creates the world out of His free will and at the same time, Brahman is not responsible for the misery and inequality in the created world. The individual souls are responsible for their lot in accordance with the *śruti* text "one becomes good by good action, bad by bad action"¹⁸⁹.

19. The process of evolution

At the end of the *Pralaya* (dissolution) of the previous age and in the beginning of a new creation, Brahman by a mere wish evolves various names and forms through a process of tripartition¹⁹⁰. The Saurabhakāra does not explain the precise role of the *adr̥ṣṭa* of the *jīvas* in this process of tripartition. The basic elements according to the Saurabhakāra are fire, water and food (earth). Everything material is the result of a combination of these elements. He explains:

"That in the body there are the evolutes of fire, water and food, made tripartite, may be ascertained from the scriptural text itself viz. "From earth the excreta, flesh and the mind, from water urine, blood and the vital-breath, from fire the bones, marrow and speech"¹⁹¹.

Brahman the supreme being renders everything including the deities tripartite¹⁹² in accordance with the text "That divinity thought" come, let me, having entered into these three deities, with this living soul, evolve name and forms" (*Chānd* 6.3.2).

The process of evolution seems to be from the most subtle to the grosser forms¹⁹³, while that of the dissolution is the reverse¹⁹⁴. We have seen that the Saurabhakāra accepts a type of primordial matter which he calls the *aupaniṣadika pradhāna*. He fails to explain not only its nature and its composition but also how the process of evolution commences from this *aupaniṣadika* primordial matter¹⁹⁵.

The Saurabhakāra insists that everything including ether originates from Brahman. According to him:

"On account of the non-separation of the mass of objects, beginning with the ether, from Brahman, there is no contradiction of the initial proposition that there is the knowledge of all through the knowledge of one". But if the ether be something non-originated then it must be outside the sphere of knowable objects and thereby the initial proposition will be set aside. The non-separation of everything from Brahman is known "from the scriptural text" viz. "Everything has that for its soul" (*Chānd* 6.8.3) etc¹⁹⁶.

He points out that the texts like "All this has that for its soul" (*Chānd* 6.8.7 etc.) proves that the entire expanse of the universe, beginning with ether, has Brahman for its soul and is an effect of Brahman¹⁹⁷. Nimbārka considers that the created things are effects and as effects they have an origin. *Tathā cayāvad vikāram udbhava eva gamyate* (as far as there is effect, there is origin indeed). Thus, for him the argument would be:

Whatever is an effect has origin

The ether is an effect

Therefore the ether has an origin¹⁹⁸.

Having proved that all created things including ether etc. have an origin, the Saurabhakāra considers the view that from *ākāśa* (ether) originates the *vāyu* (air), from *vāyu* originates *tejas* (fire), from *tejas* originates *āpa* (water) and from *āpa* originates *bhū* (earth) as a *pūrvapakṣa* doctrine¹⁹⁹. According to him the correct doctrine is that all things originate from Brahman their inner soul in accordance with the text "May I be many" (*Chānd* 6.2.3) "He himself created Himself" (*Tait* 2.7)²⁰⁰.

20. The order of evolution

On the one hand the Saurabhakāra seems to deny any specific order of creation. He considers that the text "from him arise the vital breath, the mind and all the sense organs" (*Mund* 2.1.3) is not concerned with any specific order of creation²⁰¹. On the other hand, he accepts that the order of dissolution is the reverse to the order of creation. He also acknowledges that the categories of the unmanifest, *mahat*, *ahankāra*, etc., well-known from texts concerned with the order of creation and dissolution are to be understood as intermediaries between the soul and the ether as implied in the *śruti* text "From this soul, verily, the ether originated" (*Tait* 2.1)²⁰². Such a position on the part of the *ācārya* prompts us to consider that he is not averse to the popularly known order of creation and dissolution of the evolutes of the elements, the sense organs etc. from the (*aupaniṣadika*) *pradhāna*. What he wants to assert appears to be the doctrine that all things have their origin from Brahman, their inner soul, and on whom they depend for their existence and activities. In this process of creation the cause (*kārya sraṣṭā*) is the Paramapuruṣa, who is the inner controller of all these elements²⁰³.

21. Dissolution

The great *pralaya* (dissolution of the world) is a counter part of creation²⁰⁴ which would mean that it is the withdrawal of the creative power. Therefore when the universe returns to Brahman it must inhere in Him as His power rather than as a defilement. Just as the evolutes of *Pr̥thivī* (earth) do not defile it on their dissolution into their material cause (*pr̥thivī*) at any time, so also the *acetana* universe or the *jīvas* do not defile Brahman when they are dissolved into Him or return to Him respectively at the great *pralaya*²⁰⁵. As a power inhering in a substratum there must be a distinction between Brahman and the universe which is returned to Him. As we will see later, Nimbārka accepts a distinction in the case of the *muktajīva* and Brahman, although he is not very clear about the distinction of the material world, which is merged into Brahman.

22. Brahman is beyond karma

Although Brahman indwells in the created universe of both matter and spirit, He does not undergo the experience of pleasure and pain that the created world undergoes. The *jīvas* undergo the experience of pleasure and pain on account of their *karmas*. These experiences do not affect Brahman because there is no *karma* in him. He is beyond the power of *karma*²⁰⁶. He is ever free from sins²⁰⁷. The activity of Brahman is not productive of *karma*. *Karma* affects the subtle body (*śarīra*), which accompanies the soul until it attains Brahman. Brahman has no such material body in Him²⁰⁸. He is free from all the properties of matter, including *karma*. Although Brahman indwells in all created objects, He transcends them all. Therefore nothing can tarnish His pristine purity²⁰⁹. There is no imperfection in Brahman who is the abode of all the auspicious qualities. Brahman who is the *amśin* does not experience the pleasure and pains of the *jīvas* who are His *amśas*²¹⁰ because Brahman is *nitya* and *nirguṇa*. Just as the brightness of the light is not dependent on anything else, so also Brahman's purity is not dependent on another. Light is not affected by dirt. Because it is effulgent, light's brightness cannot be blackened by another.

This doctrine touches the very core of the *bhedābheda* philosophy, according to which there is both a *bheda* (difference) and an *abheda* (non-difference) relation between Brahman and the *jīvas* as well as between Brahman and the *jagat*²¹¹.

23. Brahman is the final goal

Brahman is not only the creator of the world, but also its final destiny. He is the origin and goal of all creation. He is the source of everything²¹² and everything returns to Him²¹³. He is also the giver of salvation. He imparts to each one the just rewards for his deeds²¹⁴. From Him alone arise both the bondage and the release of the *jīva*²¹⁵. He grants a direct vision of Himself to His *upāsakas* (worshippers)²¹⁶, who have been meditating on Him in accordance with the text "*ātmā vā are dr̥ṣṭavyah*" (*Bṛh* 4.5.6)²¹⁷.

Conclusion

We may conclude that Nimbārka identifies Brahman with Ramākānta Vāsudeva Puruṣottama, who is, on the one hand, a mine of innumerable auspicious qualities and, on the other hand, devoid of all defects. He is eternal, immutable and partless and yet is the material cause of the world. The world is a projection of His power, which can be considered as the subtle, unmanifest *aupaniṣadika prakṛti*. Since the world is an effect of Brahman it is real. The world depends on Brahman not only for its existence but also for its activities, for, it subsists in Him. Brahman not only indwells and rules the world, but also pervades and transcends it. The entire world is just a foot of Him, the world cannot contain Him. Yet He exists in every bit of this world. The world subsists in Him and cannot exist apart from Him. While Brahman is independent of the world for His existence and activities, the world is dependent on Him even for its existence. Brahman is the source and the final goal of the entire created universe.

Chapter 9

THE JĪVA AND THE JAGAT

Introduction

In the last chapter we have been considering Brahman the cause of both the jīva and the jagat. Now, in this chapter we are going to consider the jīva and the jagat and their respective nature as effects of Brahman. As we have seen above, creation or the production of the world is a mere *vikṣepa* of the *śakti* of Brahman. Prior to creation, therefore, the jīva as well as the jagat inhere in Brahman as His *śakti*. In the *kāraṇāvasthā* (the causal state of Brahman) the jīva and jagat are nothing but the *śakti* of Brahman. In the *kāryāvasthā* (as effects) they are “the evolutes” of Brahman and become manifest. Once created they are realities in their own right and are independent of each other, though dependent on Brahman.

1. What is jīva?

Of these two realities, the conscious reality is the jīva. It is an eternal reality. It has neither beginning nor end¹. As a *śakti* of Brahman, it is co-eternal with Him. It does not mean that the jīva is equal to or a rival of Brahman. It is only an *aṁśa* (part) of Him². The Saurabhakāra does not explain what he really means by an *aṁśa* of Brahman. That by *aṁśa* he does not mean a physical part can be inferred from the fact that he considers the jīva and the jagat in their *kāraṇāvasthā* as the *śaktis* of Brahman.

He bases his position on *śruti* and *smṛti*. He explains:

"On account of the wording of the sacred text" viz, 'A foot of him are all beings' (*ṚV* 10.90.3, *Chānd* 3.12.6), "the individual soul is a part of Brahman³. It is declared by *smṛti* also that the individual soul is a part of Brahman. Thus "A part of my own self, in the world of men, has become the individual soul, the eternal" (*Gītā* 15.7)⁴.

Here it is evident that the Saurabhakāra is following the Bhāgavata tradition, which considers the *jīva* as an *aṁśa* of the Supreme Being⁵. The Kaustubhakāra makes it clear that by *aṁśa*, the Saurabhakāra means only potency and not a physical part⁶. It is also proved by the above scriptural texts quoted by the Saurabhakāra.

As pointed out by the Saurabhakāra himself the *aṁśāṁśī* (part and whole) relationship shows both the oneness (*abheda*) as well as the difference (*bheda*) between the *jīvas* and Brahman⁷. The *bhedābheda* is the basic significance of this *aṁśāṁśī* relationship between Brahman and the *jīva*. It is the reason why the Saurabhakāra insists that the *aṁśin* (the whole i.e. the Brahman) is in no way contaminated by the experiences of pleasure, pain etc. of the *aṁśas* (the parts i.e. the *jīvas*) just as light is devoid of the contaminations or qualifications that come to its parts⁸. The *jīva* experiences pleasure, pain, etc. under the influence of its own past deeds (*karmas*). As pointed out earlier, Brahman is free from the influence of *karma*. As *aṁśa* of Brahman, the *jīva* also possesses the *guṇas* like *apahatapāpmatva*⁹ which are the qualities of Brahman. But, in the state of bondage, these qualities are veiled and remain unmanifest because of the influence of its *karmas* as decreed by the Lord¹⁰.

In this connection it should be noted that according to Nimbārka and his school it is the influence of the *karma* that deludes the *jīva* and makes it experience pleasure and pain¹¹. The Saurabhakāra does not speak of any type of false knowledge (*avidyā*) or illusory appearance (*māyā*) as propounded by the Advaitins. Therefore *avidyā* in the *Saurabha* seems to mean the influence of the *karmas* on the *jīva*, as declared by the *śruti*, "It eats the fruit which is sweet"¹². It is under the influence of its own *karma* that the *jīva* assumes a new body in the subsequent births.

2. The jīvas are equal

As *aṁśas* of Brahman, all the jīvas are equal. They are all equally pure and conscious. There is no difference in their nature. Yet there are distinctions among them as *Brāhmaṇa* and *Sūdra* etc¹³. These distinctions are secondary, depending on their association with the body. The jīvas can be considered as pure or impure, *Brāhmaṇa* or *Sūdra* etc. on account of their connection with distinct bodies. The Saurabhakāra seems to accept that caste does not affect the nature of the jīva. Caste does not spring from the nature of the jīva, but from the type of the body which each jīva receives in accordance with the past *karma*. Nimbārka points out that we make a distinction between the fire that is brought from the house of a *Śrotrīya* (one who maintains the sacred fire) and the fire brought from a crematorium, although the nature of the fire is essentially the same¹⁴. Just as the fire having the same nature can be considered as pure because of its association with a *Śrotrīya* and as impure because of its association with a crematorium, so also the jīvas can be considered as pure and impure depending on its association with the body. But from the point of view of their nature not only is there no essential difference between the jīvas among themselves, but also they share in the ontological essence of Brahman.

3. The jīva is a knower

The jīva is a self-conscious being. The Saurabhakāra seems to define the jīva when he states in *Saurabha* 2.3.18 "*aham arthabhūta ātmā jñātā bhavati*" (the ātmā which has the "I" as the content of its consciousness is a knower)¹⁵. The *sūtra* reads "*jñā'ta eva*". Nimbārka takes *jñāḥi* to mean *jñātā* (knower)¹⁶. The jīva is an intelligent substance having *jñānā* (knowledge) as one of its essential attributes¹⁷. This attribute of knowledge persists in all the states of consciousness including even the state of deep sleep¹⁸. There is no contradiction in accepting that the jīva is a *jñātā* and at the same time it has *jñānā* as its quality. As far as the knowledge (*jñānatva*) is concerned there is a likeness (*aviśeṣa*) between them. There is also a distinction between them as between a substance and its attribute (*dharma-dharmīsambandha*) as

declared by the *śruti* "*prajñayā śarīram āruhya*" (*Kauṣ 3.6*) (having mounted the body by means of intelligence)¹⁹. Knowledge is a special quality present in the *jīva*, and it extends beyond, just as odour pervades its surroundings. Thus Nimbārka does not consider *jñāna* as constituting the essence of the *jīva*. *Jñāna* is only one of the essential attributes of the *jīva*.

4. The *jīva* is an agent

The *jīva* is an active agent²⁰. The scriptural injunctions like "Desirous of *svarga*, one should perform the sacrifice"²¹, desirous of salvation one should contemplate upon Brahman²², "understanding performs a sacrifice"²³ etc. require a conscious entity as the doer of actions. This conscious agent is the *jīva*²⁴. Otherwise all the above scriptural injunctions will be futile. They presuppose activity on the part of the *jīva*. Supposing that the *jīva* were not an agent what would be the consequences? The Saurabhakāra points out that in that case the *samādhi* (the state of deep contemplation) enjoined by the scripture would be the outcome of a non-sentient agent (*acetana mātrāvyatirikta kartṛka*) which is impossible²⁵. The sense is that *samādhi* is obtained by a conscious agent after a long process of *Brahmopāśana*. *Buddhi* etc. cannot be such an agent, because *buddhi* is an unconscious principle according to the Sāṃkhya theory²⁶. Further in the scriptural injunction "understanding (*viññānam*) performs (*tanute*) sacrifice (*yajñam*)", the term *viññānam* is used in the sense of the one having *viññānam* that is to say the *jīva* and not in the sense of intellect, for, if it were so, then the term *viññanam* should not have been used in the nominative case but in the instrumental case (*viññānena*)²⁷. Therefore the *jīva*, which alone is a conscious principle, can be the agent of the scriptural injunctions regarding *bhakti* (devotion), *mukti* (liberation) and *karma* (Vedic action).

The *jīva* is the controller of the entire body and all its various functions²⁸ even in the state of deep sleep etc²⁹. The *jīva* as declared by the *śruti*, moves about within its own body during the dream state. It takes away the cognitive powers of the sense organs and the vital airs (*prāṇa*) with the help of *buddhi* and retires to sleep³⁰. In deep sleep the *jīva* moves

about within its own body. The soul is an agent even in *mukti*. The scripture supports such a view when it says "He becomes a self ruler. He comes to have freedom of movement in all the worlds" (*Chānd* 7.25.2)³¹. Yet the soul is never (either in *mukti* or in *saṁsāra*) an independent supreme agent. In fact the agentship of the *jīva* proceeds from Brahman, the Supreme Cause, who indwells within the *jīva* as the inner controller³². It means that the *jīva* is not an independent or sovereign master as Brahman. It is Brahman who makes the *jīva* to act in conformity with its own *karma*³³. Even in the state of *mokṣa*, where the *jīva* attains similarity (*paramaiṁ sāmīyam*) with Brahman, the *jīva* does not become a sovereign principle³⁴. Such an absolute independence is an attribute of Brahman alone.

According to the Saurabhakāra the *jīva* is only an *anukartā*³⁵. He rightly chooses the word *anukartā* in order to show the dependence of the *jīva* on Brahman for all its actions. As pointed out earlier the term *anukartā* here seems to mean "the one who follows after" rather than "the one who imitates". The activities of the *jīva* depends on Brahman as the brightness of the moon on the sun as declared by the *śruti* '*tam eva bhāntam anubhāti sarvam*'³⁶. Here the Saurabhakāra seems to say that we are just instruments in Brahman's hand rather than that we act like Brahman in a smaller way.

When the Saurabhakāra speaks of the agentship of the *jīva*, he seems to accept a certain freedom of choice on the part of the *jīva*. Says the *ācārya*: "The soul acts or does not act according to its own wish, like a carpenter" and such a situation is possible "in both ways..."³⁷. But Nimbārka does not spell out what this freedom really means and how it is exercised. The Saurabhakāra accepts a certain amount of freedom of choice, yet he concedes that through some unseen force sometimes one is led to perform good deeds and sometimes bad deeds also³⁸. He does not discuss the actual influence of *karma* on the *jīva* in its freedom of choice. He does not say whether the *karma* of the *jīva* really affects the *jīva* or only the body which the *jīva* receives in accordance with its past *karma*. He does not explain how far the soul has freedom of action when the law of *karma* rules it³⁹.

5. The jīva is an enjoyer (bhoktā)

The fact that the jīva is a *kartā* demands that he must also be the *bhoktā* of all the good and the evil deeds he does⁴⁰. Since the jīva is both the *kartā* and the *bhoktā* both bondage and liberation can be attributed to jīva. For the jīva reaps the fruits of all its actions⁴¹. The soul also enjoys the dream objects, created by Brahman for it, in accordance with its *karmas*⁴². That the jīva is an enjoyer both during the conscious state of waking and dreaming is a matter of ordinary experience. Although the jīva is freed from all *karmas*, it is an enjoyer even in the state of *mokṣa*. This enjoyment in *mokṣa* is not a mundane one and therefore does not lead to further rebirths⁴³. The greatest of all the enjoyments for a jīva is the experience of Brahman in the state of liberation. We shall discuss the state of liberation in the next chapter.

6. The jīva is atomic

The individual self which is an *aṁśa* of Brahman is of atomic dimension (*aṇutva*)⁴⁴. The *aṇutva* of the jīva is declared by the *śruti* in such texts like "By that light this soul departs through the eye or through the head or through other parts of the body"⁴⁵ in which the jīva is said to pass in and out of the body through such small opening like the eye etc⁴⁶. Only an atomic entity can pass through such a passage. The Saurabhakāra also points out⁴⁷ that there are direct declarations of the *aṇutva* of the jīva in the texts like "This atomic soul" (*Muṇḍa* 3.1.9) and "An individual soul is a part of the hundredth part of the tip of a hair, divided a hundredfold" (*Śvet* 5.9).

Although this atomic jīva occupies only a small point in the body⁴⁸ yet like a drop of sandal wood paste, which can refresh the entire body, the jīva can enlighten the whole body⁴⁹. It can experience the various sensations of pleasure and pain of the entire body through its all-pervasive attribute of knowledge⁵⁰. The illumination of the body through the attribute of knowledge takes place as the illumination of a room by the light of a lamp. The atomic jīva, indwelling within the heart exercises complete authority over the entire body in conformity with the *śruti* text "He has entered up to the

body hairs and finger nails (*Kauṣ* 4.20)⁵¹. The *jīva* is the substratum that has this attribute of knowledge which has the power of extending beyond as in the case of fragrance.

7. The all-pervading attribute of the *jīva*

On the authority of the *śruti* the Saurabhakāra has accepted that the *jīva* is atomic in size. But there are also *śruti* texts which declare the *jīva* to be eternal and all-pervading. For example, *Muṇḍa* 1.1.6 declares the soul as eternal and all-pervading. Now the problem is how to understand this *śruti* text. How could an atomic *jīva* be all-pervading like Brahman? Brahman, as we have seen above, is great and all-pervasive by nature and He has equally great and all-pervasive attributes as well⁵². According to the Saurabhakāra the *vibhūtvā* (all-pervasiveness) of the *jīva* is to be understood from the angle of its knowledge, which is one of its essential attributes. As we have seen above, the attribute of knowledge has the power of extending beyond as in the case of fragrance. The *jīva*, which has this attribute of knowledge can rightly be called all-pervasive. This attribute of knowledge lasts as long as the *jīva* itself lasts⁵³.

The Saurabhakāra is not prepared to accept *vibhūtvā* (all-pervasiveness) as the essential nature of the *jīva* because the *jīva* cannot be all-pervasive on account of its being *aṇu* by nature⁵⁴. On the same ground he also rejects the all-pervasiveness of the soul in spite of the fact that the individual souls are parts of the all-pervasive Brahman⁵⁵. He points out that the acceptance of *sarvagatātmavāda* (all-pervasiveness) is open to many serious difficulties. If the *jīva* is all-pervasive by nature, there must be the consequence of either universal perception or universal non-perception on the part of the *jīva*. If the *jīva* is all-pervasive, then there will be either eternal contact with all the objects or there will be eternal non-contact with all the objects. In the former case, there will be eternal perception of all the objects and in the latter case there will be eternal non-perception of all things, since there is no other third principle outside the all-pervasive *jīva* to bring about a contact. As a result, there will be the consequences of either eternal release (*mokṣa*) or eternal bondage (*bandha*) for the *jīva*⁵⁶.

The Saurabhakāra also points out that if the *jīvas* are all-pervasive, they will be in contact with all the *karmas* with the result that there will be confusion of *karmas*. In order to avoid such fusion, one cannot take recourse to the doctrine of *adr̥ṣṭa* (unseen principle) because there is nothing else to assign a particular *adr̥ṣṭa* to a particular *jīva*⁵⁷. If the all-pervasiveness of the soul is accepted there cannot be even the restriction with regard to the resolve "I shall do this, not that" to a particular *jīva*⁵⁸, because all the all-pervasive *jīvas* shall be included as indwelling in all the bodies⁵⁹. The reason is that if the *jīva* is all-pervasive, a particular *jīva* cannot be said to be joined to a particular body because no such restriction is possible for a universal *jīva*. Therefore the doctrine of the all-pervasiveness of the soul advocated by Kapila and others is defective⁶⁰.

The Saurabhakāra points out that it is due to the *aṇutva* of the *jīva* that there is no confusion of *karmas* and no universal perception or universal non-perception or an eternal release or eternal bondage. Since the *jīva* is of atomic nature all these are possible in spite of the *jīvas* being an *aṁśa* of the all-pervasive Brahman and in spite of its possessing the all-pervasive attribute of knowledge.

Under BS 2.2.34-36 the Saurabhakāra rejects the Jaina doctrine of the *dehaparimāṇa* (i.e. the doctrine which considers that the size of the soul changes according to the size of body) as it involves either incompleteness on the part of the *jīva* or its *vikāra* (change). He points out that if the constancy of the final size of the soul is accepted it would also mean that the initial and the intervening sizes of the soul are equally eternal. Thus the Saurabhakāra rejects the Kapila doctrine of the all-pervading soul as well as the Jaina doctrine of the *dehaparimāṇatva* of the soul.

8. The five states of the *jīva*

The *jīva* may experience the following five states during its earthly sojourn: waking (*jāgrat*), dreaming (*svapṇa*) deep sleep (*suṣupti*), swoon (*murchā*) and death (*maraṇa*). In the *jāgrat* state the *jīva* is a self-conscious ego, a knowing subject, an active agent and an enjoyer of its own *karmas*. In the *svapnavasthā* also the *jīva* is a conscious subject enjoying

the various and wonderful dream objects created by the Parameśvara. The Omnipotent and Omniscient Parameśvara, whose resolves are true (*satya saṅkalpa*), is capable of producing the wonderful dream objects according to the demands of the *karmas* of each *jīva*⁶¹. In some cases the dreams are indicative of future events⁶².

In the dreamless sleep (*suṣupti*) the *jīva* in some way enters into the Paramātmān. In this state, the *jīva* after entering the vein and the pericardium, finally rests in the Paramātmān in accordance with the *śruti*. "Then he comes to fall asleep in those veins" (*Chānd* 8.6.3): "Having crept out through them, he lies in the pericardium" (*Bṛh* 2.1.19). "That which is the ether within the heart, in that he lies" (*Bṛh* 4.4.22)⁶³ In the *suṣupti*, though the *jīva* is a conscious subject, its attributes of knowledge etc. remain unmanifest unlike in the *jāgrat* state⁶⁴. The coming back into the *jāgrat* state from *suṣupti* is a returning from the Parameśvara⁶⁵. The very same *jīva* that went to sleep, and not a different one, arises again from sleep. The identity of the *jīva* in all these stages is proved from the fact that on rising from sleep, the *jīva* is able to recollect the work that it has done in the previous day and is able to complete it subsequently⁶⁶. Thus, there is identity of the person in these various states of consciousness. The *śruti* also supports this view, when it declares "Whatever they are in this world, whether tiger, or lion, or wolf or boar...or gnat or mosquito, that they become" (*Chānd* 6.9.2). Above all, the injunction on sacrifice like "let one perform Agnihotra" (*Maitri* 6.32) and on *upāsana* like "let one meditate on the soul" (*Bṛh* 1.4.7) are meaningful only if there is the identity of the *jīva* throughout its various states⁶⁷.

Swoon (*mūrcchā*) is half death. In this state the *jīva* reaches half way to the state of death. The state of swoon cannot be included under *suṣupti* (deep sleep) or the state of death (*marāṇa*). Therefore *mūrcchā* is a distinct state. It is an unconscious state⁶⁸.

Finally, the state of death is experienced when the soul departs from the body. The Saurabhakāra explains three types of departure for the *jīvas*⁶⁹.

9. The kinds of jīva

The Saurabhakāra does not treat the types or categories of the jīvas as a special topic anywhere in the *Saurabha*. However, basing ourselves on his conceptions on jīva, we can validly infer that he considered that there are various types of jīvas.

- (a) The Saurabhakāra seems to consider the gods etc. as a special category of jīvas. They are above men⁷⁰. These deities can assume various bodies simultaneously⁷¹. These gods are also creatures. Prajāpati fashioned them in accordance with the Vedas⁷². These gods like Indra, Sun, Vasu, etc. have to meditate on Brahman, their inner controller⁷³, because of the possibility of a longing for Brahman on their part antecedent to their attainment of the respective offices in the future *kalpa* also through the *upāsana* of Brahman their *antaryāmin*⁷⁴.
- (b) There are again, certain special persons like Vasiṣṭha etc, who owing to certain past *karmas*, have been entrusted with a particular office like composing the Vedas etc⁷⁵. They remain as long as their office lasts. They can be considered as a special group of jīvas. Because of their special office they seem to be born again even after obtaining knowledge.
- (c) The jīva assumes a human body in its *saṁsārika* existence since no jīva can live as a pure spirit in the state of *saṁsāra*. As we pointed out earlier the jīva assumes the body in accordance with its past *karmas*. The Saurabhakāra considers the caste distinctions as a result of the body that the jīva assumes in accordance with its past *karma*⁷⁶. Therefore this type of jīvas can be classified into four groups in accordance with the traditional four castes. Of these four castes, the Śūdra is not entitled even to hear the Vedas⁷⁷.
- (d) On the basis of the teachings of the *Saurabha*, the jīvas can be again classified as (1) the *vidvān* (knowers); (2) the doers of pious deeds and (3) the evil doers (*aniṣṭādikārins*). Different destinies await each of these types of jīvas⁷⁸. The knowers attain liberation after passing through the path of the gods, while the workers

of pious deeds are born again in this world in accordance with their past deeds, after enjoying the fruits of their meritorious deeds in the world of the moon, which they reach after travelling through the path of the Fathers. The evil doers seem to be eternally condemned⁷⁹. They are not worthy of going through the path of the gods (the way marked out for the *vidvān*) and the path of the Fathers (the way marked out for the doers of pious deeds). They seem to be born here as birds, insects and creepers without going to the other world.

10. The bondage of the *jīva*

The *jīva* does not exist in a purely spiritual or free state in this world. As long as the *jīva* lives in this world it is in bondage. The Saurabhakāra considers Brahman as the cause of bondage and liberation in accordance with the *śruti* text "The cause of transmigration, bondage, subsistence, salvation" (*Śvet* 6.16)⁸⁰. The real nature of the *jīva* is concealed by the will of Brahman in accordance with the merits and demerits of the *jīva*⁸¹. When these merits and demerits are destroyed the real nature of the *jīva* will be manifested⁸². Nimbārka does not attempt to explain or to reconcile how on one hand, Brahman is the cause of the bondage and liberation of the *jīva* and, on the other hand, how the present state of bondage is solely due to the past *karmas* of the *jīvas*.

The good deeds and the bad deeds of the *jīva* produce their *karma*, which get attached to the *sūkṣma śarīra* (the subtle body) of the *jīva*. At the rise of knowledge (*jñāna*) the *karma* that has not started producing its effects are destroyed and at the expiry of the effects of the *prārabdha karmas* the *jīva* is liberated. The *sūkṣma śarīra* follows the *jīva* in its travel through the path of the gods⁸³. The sense is that in spite of the decay of all the works and of the gross body the knower continues to retain the subtle body by the power of *vidyā* in order to go to the *viśiṣṭhasthāna*⁸⁴. The *jīva* on its departure from the gross earthly body takes with it the subtle body also⁸⁵. The subtle body finally merges in the Highest⁸⁶. It is amply clear that the *sūkṣma śarīra* leaves the *jīva* only when the *jīva* attains Brahman. Otherwise, the *sūkṣma śarīra* follows the *jīva* always. The *sūkṣma śarīra* is retained by the *jīva* until the *jīva* attains liberation⁸⁷.

Nimbārka says: "At the time of the soul's departure from the body, it completely abandons its merits and demerits. Why? Because after (its) separation from the body, there is no more experience "to be crossed" (i.e. to be undergone) through these two. This very thing others declare thus "Verily, when one is bodiless, pleasure and pain do not touch him" (*Chānd* 8.12.1). "This serene being, having arisen from this body, having attained the form of highest light, is completed in its own form" (*Chānd* 8.2.4, 8.12.3) and so on. This being so, the decay of works has actually taken place at the time of the soul's separation from the body. But according to *śruti* it is said to take place after the soul crosses the river Virajā as in the text "He crosses the river Virajā. Then he discards both the good and the evil deeds"⁸⁸.

Here Nimbārka considers that *bhogābhāva* (absence of any enjoyment of pleasure and pain) is due to *śarīrābhāva* (absence of a body). Absence of a body is due to the absence of merits and demerits. Therefore bondage is the connection of the soul with a body as a result of the past *karma*. The *karma* is beginningless, that is to say, every subsequent rebirth is an outcome of the *karmas* of the previous births. The *karmas* of the previous births get attached to the soul through the *sūkṣmaśarīra*. But through the power of *vidyā*, as we shall see in chapter ten below, the past *karmas* that have not yet started yielding the effects are destroyed. The *prārabdhakarmas* are exhausted through experience in the present body, and no more new *karmas* get attached to the *jīva*. The *jīva* leaves the body with the *sūkṣmaśarīra*. This *sūkṣmaśarīra* having the property of heat, (*Saurabha* 4.2.11) leaves behind the physical body cold. This *sūkṣmaśarīra* accompanies the soul on its journey through the path of the gods or of the Fathers. At liberation the *sūkṣmaśarīra* is dissolved and merged into Brahman and obtains *tadātmya* with Brahman. On the one hand, without the *sūkṣmaśarīra* no *karmas* can get attached to the soul and on the other hand, the mere presence of the *sūkṣmaśarīra* does not demand the presence of *karmas*. On the contrary the presence of *karmas* demands the existence of the *sūkṣmaśarīra*. Also the absence of the *sūkṣmaśarīra* shows the absence of *karmas*. Thus the liberated souls are completely free from *karmas*.

The birth of a person is the assumption of a physical gross body by the *jīva*. The origin or the end of the *jīva* in expressions like "one is born" or "one is dead" is predicated of the birth or death of the gross body. Therefore the *jīva* is said to be born or dead only in a secondary sense⁸⁹. What, in fact, is born or is dead is the gross body (*sthūlaśarīra*). The birth or the death of the body is metaphorically attributed to the *jīva*, which indwells in the heart⁹⁰. The *jīvas* being the *aśās* of the eternal Brahman are also eternal. They cannot be subject to birth and death. They are immortal.

The *jīva* is different and distinct from the body with its eleven sense organs, the vital breaths (*prāṇa*)⁹¹ etc. These sense organs have a material origin⁹² while the *jīva* is an immaterial and a conscious knower. These sense organs and the *prāṇas* are mere instruments of the *jīva*⁹³. Although the sense organs are initiated into their actions by the presiding deities, they are mere instruments under the complete control of the *jīva*⁹⁴. There is an eternal relation of the master and the servant between the *jīva* and the sense organs. The soul is the enjoyer of the function of the sense organs in accordance with the *śruti* "Now when the eye has entered into the ether, that is the seeing person: the eye is for seeing" (*Chānd* 8.12.4)⁹⁵. According to Nimbārka the senses are also of atomic dimension. They are different from the *jīva* who possesses them and they are also different from the *prāṇa* which also serves the purpose of *jīva*.

11. The cause of bondage

As we have seen above, the cause of bondage is *karma*. In the *Saurabha*, *avidyā* also means the influence of one's *karma* on the *jīva*. Unlike in the Advaita, *avidyā* or *māyā* does not have the meaning of false or illusory appearance in the Nimbārka school. The *jīva* experiences pleasures and pain due to the influence of its past *karmas*, in accordance with the *śruti* "It eats the fruit which is sweet". (*Muṇḍaka* 3.1.1, *Śvet* 4.6)⁹⁶.

The Saurabhakāra considers the earthly existence as the result of one's past *karmas*. The earthly life is full of suffering. Even the pleasures that man enjoys not only on earth, but also in the world of the moon are ephemeral and transitory.

Man seems to be condemned to the apparently beginningless cycle of births and deaths, one birth giving rise to the next. This world is an ocean of suffering. Man's getting entangled in the web of worldly existence is the effect of *avidyā* and *karma* which is of his own making.

According to Nimbārka the condition of man is not that hopeless. From this worldly existence there is a way to liberation, a path to freedom. We will discuss it in the next chapter. Here we proceed to discuss what is the nature of the world in which man finds himself.

12. The world

Man exists in a material world which is created for the sake of the experience of the *jīva*. The Saurabhakāra accepts the reality of the world. According to him the universe is of inconceivable form. It has also manifold and wonderful combinations of objects. This universe is the abode of innumerable specialities of names and forms⁹⁷.

This wonderful universe is an evolution of Brahman. As we have seen above, the Saurabhakāra accepts an *aupaniṣadikapradhāna* from which this material world has originated⁹⁸. This *aupaniṣadikapradhāna* is not an independent principle, but is under the control of Brahman. It is *brahmātmaka*, that is to say, it vibrates with Brahman, who is its *ātmā*⁹⁹, its essence.

The *Daśaśloki*¹⁰⁰, attributed to Nimbārka, speaks of three types of material categories. DS verse 3 explains:

aprākṛtam prākṛtarūpakam ca kālasvarūpam tad acetanam matam māyāpradhānādi pada pravācyaṁ śuklādibhedaśca samepi tatra.

Thus the DS speaks of three types of material categories namely (1) *aprākṛta* (not derived from *prakṛti*); (2) *prākṛta* (derived from *prakṛti*) and (3) *kāla* (time). The *Saurabha* contains no such classifications. The *Saurabha* also does not describe *māyā* as the *aupaniṣadika pradhāna*. As pointed out earlier, Nimbārka accepts the *aupaniṣadika pradhāna* as the material supportive cause, which depends on Brahman for its existence.

13. The world is real

The Saurabhakāra asserts the reality of the world against

the Buddhist *Vijñānavādins* (the maintainers of the reality of consciousness) and the *Śūnyavādins* (Nihilists). Bādarāyaṇa himself has refuted their views¹⁰¹. The Saurabhakāra agrees with the *Sūtrakāra* in his refutation of the *Vijñānavādins* and the *Śūnyavādins*. The *Vijñānavādins* deny the reality of the external objects distinct from their cognitions. Nimbārka points out that the position of the *Vijñānavādins* viz. there is no external objects, goes against our daily experience. We perceive external objects¹⁰². The baselessness of the cognitions of the waking state cannot be established on the analogy of the dream-cognitions, because there is no parallelism between them. Besides, the dream consciousness has also a basis¹⁰³. Moreover, the doctrinal position of the *Vijñānavādins* that the variety in knowledge is due to the past impressions (*vāsanās*) is not tenable, for according to their view external objects are perceived¹⁰⁴ due to their impressions (*vāsanā*) on *vijñāna*. How could non-existent objects create impressions on consciousness? External objects are necessary to produce *vāsanās*. Nimbārka also points out that no past impressions could exist now, in order to impart their *vāsanās* on the *vijñāna*, because the *vijñānavādins* themselves subscribe to the doctrine of *Kṣaṇikavāda* (doctrine of momentariness)¹⁰⁵.

Nimbārka refutes¹⁰⁶ the *Mādhyamika Śūnyavāda* on the ground that it is totally unreasonable since it is contradicted by perception, inference etc.¹⁰⁷.

Nimbārka is unaware of the Advaitic theory of the illusory appearance of the created world. Therefore there is no refutation of the Advaitic theory of *māyā* and of the illusory nature of the world in the *Saurabha*¹⁰⁸. As we have pointed out in chapter four above, Nimbārka, the Saurabhakāra is unaware of Śaṅkara and his philosophy.

As we have noted earlier the Saurabhakāra considers the world as an evolution from Brahman. He seems to accept that this evolution takes place from the subtle elements to the grosser ones. The material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) of the entire universe, which certain *śruti* texts call the *ajāprakṛti* and which the Saurabhakāra prefers to call the *aupaniṣadikapradhāna* is nothing but Brahman, for, Brahman is the Inner Self of this *prakṛti*. The unconscious *prakṛti*

cannot be the controller of the created objects by entering into them.

Just as Brahman is the inner controller or soul of the *ajāprakṛti* and of every created object, there are certain subordinate presiding deities over subtle elements and their production. The *jagat* (world) is supported by Brahman and is finally dissolved into Him.

Conclusion

Nimbārka accepts the metaphysical reality of the individual souls and of the material world. They owe their origin, existence and activities to Brahman who abides in them as their inner controller. They are *brahmātmakas*. Yet Brahman is not contaminated by their defects and limitations. He transcends them all. The *jīva* has, in its own finite way, its independence of activity and freedom of choice. Bondage is due to the influence of its past *karmas*. From a metaphysical point of view the *jīva* is an *aṁśa* of Brahman, yet it is of atomic size. All the perfections of the *jīva* are veiled by the effects of its past deeds in the form of *avidyā*, which is also the cause of its earthly sojourn. In the final analysis the caste distinctions and social status are all due to *karmas* and they do not effect the essential nature of the *jīvas*. All the *jīvas* are essentially of the same nature, but each *jīva* is ultimately responsible for its life on earth and for its final destiny.

Chapter 10

THE FINAL DESTINY OF THE CREATED BEINGS

Introduction

We have seen that Nimbārka accepts the reality of the created beings. He is also convinced that there is a final destiny for the entire creation both conscious and unconscious. The destiny of the material world seems to be limited to the great *pralaya*, in which the entire material creation returns to Brahman¹ and remains in Him as His *śakti*.

When the *sūkṣma śarīra* of the liberated person merges in Brahman² the subtle elements (*sūkṣma bhūta*) get absorbed in Brahman. For, once liberated, the *jīva* does not return any more to this world. Thus, Nimbārka seems to say that the material elements can find their lasting repose in Brahman in and through man. These subtle elements attain *tadātmyam*³ with Brahman. *Tadātmyam* does not mean complete identity. Here it means that when matter is dissolved into Brahman at the great *pralaya*, matter remains in Brahman and has Brahman as its soul. Thus the *bhedābheda* relation between the material creation and Brahman is preserved even in the state of *pralaya*.

The *jīvas*, who are not evil-doers, can definitely be liberated. This liberation (*mukti*) is the final goal of the life of the *jīvas* on earth. The misery of embodied life can be removed by the destruction of *karma*. This final goal of the

jīva calls for the employment of proper means to attain it. What are these means?

A. Means to liberation

1. The Karma (works)

In the *Saurabha*, *karma* (works) means the *Varṇāśrama dharma*. It consists in doing one's duties as demanded by one's caste and stage of life. Traditionally works are considered to be three kinds: daily obligatory duties, prudential duties and occasional duties. Of these the obligatory duties consisting of restraint of the senses, eating prescribed food, study of Veda etc. are common to all. The prudential duties are those prescriptions of the Veda, the performance of which leads one to this worldly as well as heavenly prosperities and happiness. Some of these duties are prohibitory in nature such as not killing a Brāhmaṇa, not committing adultery etc. The occasional duties are those rites to be performed on special occasions such as *śrāddha* (funeral rites) etc. Nimbārka does not speak anything systematically on these various types of duties and *karmas*⁴. But we can put together the scattered ideas he offers on *karmas* in various sections of his *Saurabha*.

a. Obligatory Duties

The *Saurabhakāra* demands faithful observance of all the obligatory duties in accordance with one's caste and stage of life⁵. The proper performance of the duties incumbent on one's stage of life are necessarily to be practised, for example, the *āśrama dharma* in accordance with the text "Hence, he who knows thus, having become calm, self-restrained, indifferent, patient and recollected, should see the self in the self alone" (*Bṛh* 4.4.23)⁶. Scripture also declares that one must restrain oneself in one's food habits when it says "If there be purity of food, there is purity of life" (*Chānd* 7.26.2)⁷. The obligatory duties like offering sacrifices etc. are to be performed by every one, even by the one who does not desire salvation as the duties incumbent on his stage of life, since these sacrifices etc. are enjoined in the passage "He performs the Agnihotra sacrifice as long as he lives"⁸. Much more, they are to be performed by one who

desires salvation⁹ in accordance with the *śruti* "The Brāhmaṇas desire to know the nature of Brahman by performing sacrifices, charity and austerities" (*Brh* 4.4.22). In the same way the muttering of prayers in accordance with the *smṛti* (Cf. *Manu* 2.87) is also to be performed by a Brāhmaṇa as a daily obligatory duty¹⁰. Nimbārka points out that just as in the case of the householder in the passage "For having stayed thus as long as he lives, he reaches the world of Brahman and does not return any more" (*Chānd* 8.15.1) all religious duties, incumbent on all the stages of life, are obligatory¹¹.

Thus, Nimbārka prescribes that each one must fulfil his duties demanded by his stage and state of life, whether one is a householder or a recluse in accordance with the *śruti*. "There are three branches of religious duty. Sacrifice, study and charity are the first, austerity alone is the second, a student of sacred knowledge living in the house of a preceptor and exhausting himself completely in the house of a teacher is the third. All these become possessors of the meritorious world"¹². According to Nimbārka there are three branches of religious duties (*dharmaskandha*) which are made explicit in *Chānd* 2.23.1 quoted above. They are the duties incumbent on the states of learning, of householder and of asceticism. Nimbārka prescribes all these duties as obligatory.

The Saurabhakāra does not consider that there is any impurity or sin in the killing of animals involved in the sacrificial *karmas* like *jyotiṣṭoma* etc. sanctioned by the sacred texts¹³. These Vedic sacrifices are to be performed by a *mumukṣu* as a duty incumbent on his stage of life as demanded by the *śruti* "*yāvaj jīvam agnihotraṁ juhoti*".¹⁴

b. Occasional duties

The non-performance of the incumbent duties is a sin of omission. Since the performance of occasional duties like *śrāddha* is incumbent on one's stage of life, they are recommended by the Saurabhakāra.

c. Prudential duties

Nimbārka does not favour the performance of the prudential duties by the one who is desirous of salvation. According to him these good deeds, aiming at selfish ends are

incompatible with salvation, just as sins are¹⁵. These deeds generate *karma* which cling to the soul, demanding future births either to enjoy or to atone for them. The net result of these prudential duties is the acquisition of merit on account of which one will get this worldly as well as the other worldly happiness for which one will have to be born again.

The commission of actions prohibited by the Vedas and the non-performance of rites prescribed by them are sins. They too generate demerits, which is the cause for further painful existence. This is the case of the evil doers. Therefore a *mumukṣu* should refrain not only from performing prohibited actions but also from every thing that will generate *karma*. The omission of the prescribed duties and performance of prudential duties come under this category. Therefore they are to be avoided totally. But if they are performed by a *Vidvān* (knower), the *karmas* generated by these performances do not cling to him¹⁶.

According to the Saurabhakāra these good deeds, by themselves, are unable to lead anyone to liberation. They fulfil their purpose by just generating a desire for knowledge, for, *karma* (ritualistic action) is just a part of *Brahma jijñāsā*. By producing a desire for knowledge (*vidyā*), the *karmas* indirectly assist in the rise of *vidyā*, which is the only means for attaining Brahman¹⁷. The conscientious performance of the duties of one's state and stage of life will give rise to *vidyā* by purifying the mind. The Vedic sacrifices like *agnihotra* can be considered as auxiliaries to *vidyā*¹⁸. These sacrifices and other good works can be considered to serve a double purpose¹⁹. These good deeds are useful in removing sins. By removing sins they also protect *vidyā* from being overpowered by sin²⁰. But by themselves these *karmas* are unable to liberate the soul from bondage or the cycle of birth and death.

We may conclude that Nimbārka does not consider *karma* as a real means for salvation. *Karma* is only an accessory or a helpful way. The purpose of the *karma* is not *mokṣa* (liberation), but the purification of the mind. Therefore all have to perform the *karmas* in accordance with the demands of his stage and state of life. Even a *Vidvān* (knower) has to perform them. Though *karma* is so essential, it is not the real means of salvation. It is only a help.

2. Jñāna

a. *Vidyā is not a Karmāṅga*

The Saurabhakāra considers *jñāna* as the proper means of salvation. According to Nimbārka, salvation which consists of attaining Brahman is an outcome of *vidyā*²¹. This salvific *vidyā* is the result of a life-long process of meditation. It is not a product of *karma* but independent of *karma*²². *Karma* is always subservient to *vidyā*²³, so much so a *Vidvān* is encouraged to give up voluntarily the life of a householder²⁴. The fruits of the *karma* is quite different from the fruits of *vidyā*²⁵.

Jaimini considers *vidyā* to be a part (*aṅga*) of *karma* because there is a question of the purification of the agent, who is a subsidiary part of the rituals²⁶. Such a position is defended by him on the basis of the *śruti*²⁷ and the conduct (*ācāra*) of Janaka²⁸ who is said to have performed a sacrifice in which many presents were given out. There are some texts which seem to subordinate *vidyā* to *karma*²⁹, such as "knowledge and work lay hold of him" (*Brh* 4.4.2) and "Only doing work here, let one desire to live a hundred years" (*Īśā* 2). Nimbārka is not prepared to make any concession to the doctrine of Jaimini. He holds that the *summum bonum* of man arises in knowing Brahman, who is the *sarveśvara* and the *sarvaniyantā* as declared by the scriptures³⁰.

The *Vidvān* has no use of the sacrificial rites³¹. Even some aspects of the sacrificial rites like the fire piled by the mind etc. are of the nature of *vidyā* and not of *karma*³². In fact *vidyā* destroys *karma* (the effects of past deeds)³³. The mere fact that *vidyā* is seen in the life of the celibates (*ūrddva retaḥsu āśrameṣu*) shows that the *vidyā* is in no way dependent on the performance of the rituals³⁴. In any case as we have seen there is equality of all the stages of life³⁵, through the muttering of *japa* etc³⁶. The *naiṣṭhika brahmachārins* (religious students of perpetual chastity) are not required to perform any sacrificial rites³⁷. They attain *Brahmavidyā* without any ritualistic performances. Therefore the scriptures teach the voluntary giving up of the *gārhasthyam* (life of a householder) by a knower. Once knowledge is generated, the *karma* (the effects of past deeds) is destroyed by the knowl-

edge. This knowledge alone brings liberation.³⁸ In the blazing fire of *vidyā* the accumulated (*sañcita*) *karmas* are burnt away. The *Vidvān* does not acquire any more *karmas* (*āgāmya*). But the *karmas* that have already begun to operate (the *prārabdhakarma*) resulting in the present body will continue to run its full course just as the wheel of the potter continues revolving for some time even after he stops turning the wheel.

Therefore, the only direct means to liberation is *vidyā*. For, *vidyā* alone can destroy the already accumulated *karmas* and prevent all further accumulations as well. Without the destruction of *karma* (the merit and demerit of past actions leading to further births) release (*mokṣa*) is not possible.

b. The source of *vidyā*

The *śāstra*, which is the source of *Brahmajñāna* is also the source of salvific *vidyā*. Hearing (*śravaṇa*), reflection (*manana*) and meditation (*nididhyāsana*) are to be constantly employed for the rise of *vidyā*. Of these, hearing consists in listening to the scriptural instructions about Brahman from one's own teacher. Reflection on what is heard namely, the scriptural instructions, is the next step. Constant meditation on Brahman, is the final step in the acquisition of *vidyā*.

c. Who are qualified for *Brahmavidyā*

As we have seen above, every one except the *Śūdra* is entitled to study the scriptures³⁹. It is the firm stand of Nimbārka that the *Śūdra* has no right for *Brahmopāśana* or *Brahmavidyā*. He is denied the right to study the *Śāstra*⁴⁰.

There is another group of people who are denied every right to *Brahmavidyā* by Nimbārka. They are those religious students, bound to perpetual chastity (*naiṣṭhika brahmacārins*) but have lapsed or given up their commitment to perpetual chastity. They are already condemned⁴¹. No penance can atone for their misconduct⁴². They are considered to be slayers of themselves and are automatically excluded from the knowledge of Brahman.

The Saurabhakāra prescribes strict regulations on purity of food for all those who seek Brahman, because the purity of life is dependent, to a great extent, on the purity of

food⁴³. A seeker of *Brahmavidyā* cannot lead a wanton life. He must not drink wine at all⁴⁴. Nimbārka is prepared to make a concession in the extreme case, namely, the danger to life. In such an extreme case of life and death, one is permitted to eat even the *ucchiṣṭa* (food left over by others). Nimbārka contents that such an attitude towards food is based on both the *śruti* and the *smṛti*⁴⁵.

d. Need of Guru for the study of the scripture

For a proper study of the scriptures, the help of a spiritual preceptor is needed. One studies the Veda in the house of a *guru*. Nimbārka demands whole-hearted devotion to the *śrīguru*⁴⁶. His statement that the spiritual preceptor is the only god (*ācāryaika deva*) seems to mean that one must not have two masters. Perhaps according to Nimbārka one should not go from one teacher to another in one's enthusiasm for *Brahmavidyā*. Nimbārka does not elaborate the attitude one should have towards one's *guru*. Nor does he describe the qualities and aptitudes of a good *guru* who will lead the disciple on the path of *Brahmavidyā*.

Since the path of knowledge is like the sharpened edge of a razor, hard to traverse⁴⁷, there is all the more need of a competent *guru* who will lead the disciple on the right path. With the help of the *guru*, the seeker of *Brahmavidyā* is able to follow the upaniṣadic method of *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*⁴⁸, which will lead him to the realization of the ultimate truth. The Upaniṣadic tradition also shows that only under the guidance of a competent *guru*, one can attain final liberation when it says *ācāryavān puruṣo veda tasya tāvad eva ciraṁ yāvan na vimokṣye atha saṁpatsye*⁴⁹.

e. What is vidyā

Under the guidance of a competent *guru* one continues with the process of *nididhyāsana*. In this meditation the *mumukṣu* considers the *Paramātmān* as one's own self (*svasyātmātvenā*)⁵⁰. The *guru* instructs him in accordance with the teaching of the earlier *gurus* recorded in the scriptures namely "This is my *ātman*"⁵¹ (*eṣa me ātmā*) and "This is your *ātman*"⁵². This process of meditation does not bring about a mere metaphysical or scientific knowledge, but an experience and awareness of one's own *bhedābheda* relation

with Brahman. Therefore, one should meditate on one's own real self as it is in the freed state (*muktāvasthā*), freed from all bondage of sins and imperfections, for the *jīva* becomes that very form which it has been meditating on⁵³. The *jīva* is to be meditated on as in the state of freedom, for in liberation the *jīva* is to attain such a state.⁵⁴ This meditation on the self should in no circumstance be on the self as in the state of bondage⁵⁵ or on any symbol⁵⁶. The meditation on the symbol does not lead the *mumukṣu* to the realization of his *bhedābheda* relation with Brahman nor to the attainment of Brahman, because such symbols are not the *ātman* of the *upāsaka*⁵⁷. The symbolic meditation has only a limited result⁵⁸.

The meditation on Brahman must be on the real nature of Brahman. Brahman is to be meditated on as distinguished from the *jīva*, because Brahman passes beyond all the limitations of the *jīva*⁵⁹. The highest *vidyā* is the realization of the *bhedābheda* relation between the self and Brahman, the Highest reality.

As we have pointed out in chapters one and two, the Saurabhakāra does not advocate, as a means of liberation, any meditation on, much less any exclusive worship of, Kṛṣṇa or Rādhā as proposed in *DS* 6, *SNKS* 1, 3, 5, 7, 16, 18 and 25. Were he a Rādhākṛṣṇa worshipper he ought to have propagated some form of Rādhākṛṣṇa cult as a means of liberation for the *jijñāsu*.

f. *Upāsana* (meditation)⁶⁰

The salvific *vidyā* is not something intellectual. It is something deep and experiential, entering into the very reality of the *jīva*. This experience, as we have seen above, is achieved through *upāsana* or *dhyāna* (meditation). Therefore meditation contributes the lion's share in the rise of *vidyā*, although ultimately the final goal of man (*Puruṣārtha*) arises from the *Sarveśvara*⁶¹ (Lord of all).

This *upāsana* or *dhyāna* is the continuous and uninterrupted thought on the *ātman* and the Brahman without being distracted by any other thoughts. This meditation consists in the concentration of the mind on Brahman as one's own Supreme Self or the Inner Controller⁶². It directly generates

on the *upāsaka* the awareness of his own *bhedābheda* relation with Brahman.

This process of meditation has two sides. We may say that there are meditations of which the *jīva* is the *viṣaya* (object) and meditations that have Brahman as the *viṣaya*. When the *jīva* is the *viṣaya* of meditation, it must be meditated on as in the state of liberation⁶³. The self is not to be searched in symbols (*pratīkas*) because they are not the real *ātman* of the *upāsitr* (the seeker)⁶⁴.

Similarly Brahman should not be sought for in a symbol. Brahman, who is all-pervasive can be viewed in all things, even in a minute thing as the mind (*manas*). A minute thing like the mind can be viewed as Brahman, but Brahman who is all-pervasive cannot be viewed as the mind, because Brahman transcends them all⁶⁵. This meditation of which Brahman is the object can be of various types in accordance with the qualifications of the *upāsaka*.

g. The types of Brahmopāśanas

There are various branches of Upaniṣadic tradition. These traditions describe distinct types of *Brahmopāśanas* meant for their own respective followers. These *upāśanas*, belonging to different branches of *śruti* have their own special features. The Śaurabhakāra asserts that these various *upāśanas* such as *Śāṇḍilya*⁶⁶, *Prāṇa*⁶⁷, *Udgītha*,⁶⁸ *Dahara*⁶⁹, *Vaisvānara vidyā*⁷⁰ etc⁷¹ are different procedures in themselves and therefore are different in themselves meant for different *adhikārins*. They are prescribed in view of the differences among the *upāsakas*.

Although these various procedures of *upāśana* are different among themselves they have the same object for meditation, namely Brahman⁷². These various types of *Brahmopāśanas* are identical in so far as their object is concerned. They all lead to the same result, namely the attainment of Brahman. Since their results are the same, there is option of performance (*anusthāna vikalpa*). Any of them will lead the *upāsaka* to Brahman⁷³.

Nimbārka seems to accept a *bhedābheda* relation between these various types of *Brahmopāśanas*⁷⁴ prescribed for different *adhikārins* in accordance with their *śruti* tradition.

On the one hand he asserts the distinctions and differences between the various types of *Brahmopāsanās* as described for distinct *adhikārins*. On the other hand, he also upholds their sameness on account of the sameness of their object and the sameness of their result.

h. *Samagropāśana*

Since the various *Brahmopāsanās* described in various branches of Upaniṣadic tradition are one and the same from the point of view of the sameness of the object of meditation as well as of the result, namely, Brahman, the special features of one *upāśana* can be extended to the others. Therefore in every meditation on Brahman all the essential qualities and attributes of Brahman are to be included⁷⁵. Such qualities are bliss (*ānandatva*)⁷⁶, non-grossness (*asthūlatva*)⁷⁷, imperishability⁷⁸, freedom from sin⁷⁹, having true desire⁸⁰, consisting of knowledge⁸¹, controller of all⁸², lord of all⁸³, etc. Such essential qualities of Brahman are to be included in all the meditations on Brahman, irrespective of their being specially mentioned in a particular type of *upāśana*, set forth in a particular branch of the Upaniṣadic tradition. The *vidyās* being the same, all these special features are to be combined together as in the case of what is complementary to the injunction with regard to the *Agnihotra* etc⁸⁴. This type of meditation is called *samagropāśana*. It is praised as the most effective and excellent type of meditation⁸⁵.

But there are many accidental or non-essential qualities of Brahman described in some types of *Brahmopāsanās*. These non-essential qualities like "having joy for His head" etc. need not be included in all the meditations on Brahman⁸⁶.

i. *The posture and place of upāśana*

The *upāśana* is carried out in a sitting posture. Such a posture is favourable for meditation. The *upāśaka* can remain in this posture without any distractions and movements. Concentration of the mind is easily possible in a sitting posture⁸⁷. There is no special restriction as to the place of meditation. Meditation is easily practised in a solitary place where there is no possibility of distractions. One is free to choose a suitable place for *dhyāna*⁸⁸. One must

continuously practice meditation, until death as declared by *śruti* "Verily, having stayed thus as long as he lives" (*Chānd* 8.15.1).⁸⁹

j. *The rise of vidyā*

As a result of prolonged meditation on the self and the Brahman, the salvific knowledge (*vidyā*) will rise in this life if there are no obstacles present⁹⁰. What are these obstacles? The Saurabhakāra does not elaborate them. He mentions pride as an obstacle to the rise of *vidyā*⁹¹. The more one advances in his spiritual realization the humbler he becomes. A truly great ascetic always remains as simple as a child. The greater his learning the less he speaks in accordance with the *śruti* "Hence let a Brāhmaṇa, being disgusted with the states of childhood and learning, become a *muni*" (*Bṛh* 3.5.1)⁹². The more he advances in the process of Brahman realization, the calmer he becomes. A *muni* is the one who has advanced both in his learning as well as in profound meditation⁹³.

The commentator Śrīnivāsa explains the meaning of reaching a *child like state*. According to him, it means that as one advances in one's quest for self realization, one becomes free from arrogance (*dambha*), pride, (*darpa*), self consciousness (*abhimāna*)⁹⁴ in accordance with the *śruti* "Not one who has not refrained from bad conduct, not one who is not tranquil, not one who is not composed, not one who is not of peaceful mind, can obtain Him even through intelligence" (*Kaṭha* 2.24).

Śrīnivāsa also considers that the obstruction to the rise of *vidyā* includes works which are dependent on particular place and time and are about to produce results other than knowledge⁹⁵. Since Nimbārka does not explicitly state what are these obstructions to the rise of knowledge, we may presume on the basis of the doctrinal position of Śrīnivāsa that certain types of *karmas* were considered obstacles for the rise of salvific *vidyā* in the early Nimbārka tradition.

We may also add that those qualities and attitudes that are unbecoming of a *mumukṣu* are also real obstacles to the rise of *vidyā*. The Saurabhakāra in *Saurabha* 1.1.1 has given a detailed list of those who are really qualified for

Brahmajijñāsā. Therefore, all the contrary qualities may be counted as real obstacles to the rise of *vidyā*.

According to the Saurabhakāra if the obstacles to the rise of *vidyā* are present in the life of an *upāsaka*, then *vidyā* arises only at the destruction of these obstacles in the next life⁹⁶. He brings in the example of Nāciketas, who obtains the salvific knowledge from Yama in the next world⁹⁷.

At the rise of *vidyā*, as a result of constant *dhyāna*, all the *karmas* are destroyed⁹⁸, that is to say, all the previous good and bad deeds which have not yet taken effects are destroyed instantly⁹⁹. But those deeds whose effects have already begun their fruition are to be borne by the *Vidvān* through experience¹⁰⁰. At the destruction of the fruits of the *karma*, he attains Brahman. The result of *vidyā*, namely, *mukti*, may originate immediately after the fall of the present body but there is no restriction with regard to the fruit of *vidyā*.¹⁰¹ If the work which have begun to bear fruits be absent then the fruit of knowledge i.e. *mukti*, belonging to the knower, arises after he is freed from the present body—but if they are present, then after he is freed from still another body. It may demand many more births to exhaust the *prārabdha karmas* through experience. That seems to be the reason why Nimbārka says that there is no fixed rule as to the rise of salvation.

k. *Upāsana and bhakti*

The Saurabhakāra identifies *dhyāna* with *bhakti* when he says that Brahman is revealed in meditational (*dhyāna*) devotion (*bhaktiyoga*)¹⁰². Since the Saurabhakāra was a Vaiṣṇava belonging to the tradition of the *Bhagavadgītā*, he seems to say that the *dhyānā* (meditation) one undertakes in order to acquire the salvific knowledge must be accompanied by *bhakti*. There is always an element of devotion and surrender in the *Gītā*.¹⁰³ Therefore the statement of Nimbārka “*bhaktiyoge dhyāne tu vyajyate brahma* (But Brahman is revealed in devotional meditation) would mean that the entire process of meditation is carried out with devotion and commitment. As a result Brahman reveals himself to the *upāsaka*. The sense is that the direct vision of Brahman

results from the incessant repetition of the means consisting in perfect meditation"¹⁰⁴.

It is to be noted that the *Saurabha* does not speak of *bhakti* as an independent means of liberation. Today the Nimbārka Sect is a *bhakti* dominated religious group. The *Daśaśloki* verse 9 speaks of *premaviśeṣalakṣaṇā bhakti*. Such a doctrine is totally alien to the Saurabhakāra. As pointed out earlier, Nimbārka does not speak of the loving tender aspect of Brahman. So also the *premaviśeṣalakṣaṇā bhakti* is not found in the *Saurabha*. But later Nimbārkites have developed a full-fledged doctrine of *Bhaktimārga*. Puruṣottama in his *Vedāntaratnamañjūṣā*¹⁰⁵, Puruṣottama Prasāda Vaiṣṇava in his *Śrutyantakalpavallī*¹⁰⁶ and Giridhara Prapanna in his *laghumañjūṣā*¹⁰⁷ have developed the various forms and types of *Bhakti*. Prominent among them are *parābhakti*, *aparābhakti* and *sādhana rūpikā bhakti*.

Similarly, as we have discussed in chapter two, there is no mention of *prapatti* (complete self-surrender of the devotee to the Lord) or *gūrūpasatti* (self-surrender of the disciple to his preceptor) in the *Saurabha*. *Prapatti* and *gūrūpasatti* are the natural but gradual developments in the *bhaktimārga*. The mere fact that the Saurabhakāra does not speak of them nor considers *bhakti* as an independent means for liberation of the *jīva* may point to the antiquity of the *Saurabha*. The doctrine of *prapatti* is contained in *Daśaśloki* verse 8. Its developed form is found in *PK* verses 4,5-15, 19, 22, 24 and 25. In the same way the doctrine of *gūrūpasatti* as a powerful means for salvation is well developed in *MRS*.

It seems that doctrines of *premaviśeṣalakṣaṇābhakti*, *prapatti* and *gūrūpasatti* came to the Nimbārka sect at a later period. Since the *Saurabhakāra* does not consider them as *sādhana*s (means) for the liberation of the *jīva*, he seems to be unaware of them, or even if he was aware of them, he did not mention them in the *Saurabha*. It is more logical to hold that he did not consider them as of any help in the realization of the final goal of man. It may also be pointed out that the Saurabhakāra who insists on *vidyā* as the only means to *mokṣa* and considers *karma* (i.e. ritualism of the Vedic tradition) as useful only in so far as it will produce a desire for *vidyā* through purification of imperfections, would also

speak of the relative importance or role of *prapatti* and *gurupasatti* had he been aware of them.

3. Prasāda (grace)

As we have noted above Nimbārka considers Brahman to be the cause of both bondage and liberation of the soul. (*Saurabha* 3.2.5). One of the basic qualifications in order to undertake the arduous task of *Brahmajijñāsā* is an intense desire for the *prasāda* (grace) of Bhagavān¹⁰⁸. The *prasāda* of Bhagavān seems to be the ultimate cause of the liberation of the soul. For, the final enlightenment is a gratuitous gift from the Lord. According to Nimbārka "when the knower comes to be 'favoured' by the object to be known (viz. the Lord) who has become pleased through the might of (his) knowledge and through the application of the remembrance of the path which is a supplementary part of that (viz. knowledge) — then there results "a lighting up of the forepart of his abode" viz. the heart. Then, with the door revealed by the Highest Lord, he, knowing that vein, departs through it"¹⁰⁹.

From the above statement of the Saurabhakāra it can be inferred that as a true Bhāgavata Vaiṣṇava, belonging to the tradition of the *Bhāgavadgītā*, he accepted the importance and role of God's grace in the whole process of liberation¹¹⁰. Brahman is the source and the end of the work of liberation. Perhaps He Himself puts the *icchā* (desire) for His grace in the heart of His devotees. That would be the meaning of the phrase when the knower comes to be favoured by the *vedya* (the object to be known). It is under the protecting guidance and providence of the Lord that the devotee proceeds in the path of knowledge through constant remembrance of the Lord. Seeing the earnestness and commitment of the *upāsaka* the Lord finally enlightens him and reveals the door of salvation to him. Departing through it the *upāsaka* attains Brahman Himself. Thus the Lord becomes the source and the goal of the process of liberation.

B. The life of a Vīdvān

Even after the rise of *vidyā* the *Vīdvān* continues to live until the *prārabdhakarman* is destroyed through experi-

ence. In the blazing fire of *vidyā* the accumulated (*sañcita*) *karman* is burnt away. And after the rise of *vidyā* there is no more acquisition of further *karmas*. But the *karmas* which have already begun to operate (*prārabdha*) giving existence to the present body will continue. Therefore the *Vidvān* must continue to perform his own *āśrama karmas* such as *agnihotra*, *dāna*, *tapa* etc. because, as we have seen, they foster *vidyā*¹¹. But there is no more any clinging of the subsequent *karma* to the *Vidvān*. He is above good and evil. As water does not cling to lotus leaf, so evil deeds do not cling to the one who knows reality¹². The effects of his *punya* and *pāpa* whose fruits are not yet produced, are divided among his friends and enemies respectively at his departure from this world¹³.

C. Salvation after the *prārabdhakarmans* exhausted

From a metaphysical point of view, Nimbārka cannot accept a state of liberation, simultaneous with the rising of *vidyā* which is technically called the "*jīvan mukti*", because *mukti* for him is the union of the soul with God after death¹⁴. His understanding of *mukti* is based on the cosmic theme of the *Upaniṣads* where both the world and the *jīvas* are real and are distinct from Brahman, who is a personal God. The experience of enlightenment or the state of *vidyā* cannot be considered as *mukti* in its strict sense. There cannot be any complete freedom in the bodily existence. Even after the acquisition of the state of *vidyā*, the *prārabdhakarman* continues its course of action and brings to completion the retributive experience¹⁵. Although *vidyā* may rise during the embodied state of the *jīva*, the real fruit of *vidyā*, namely, salvation, is possible only when the *prārabdhakārman* is destroyed and the *jīva* is liberated from the body. The *Vidvān* can really experience *brahmasākṣātkāra* in the *videha* (bodyless) state¹⁶. The scriptural declaration of "the immortality" of the knower here and now in the text "when all those desires which abide in the heart are loosened, then a mortal becomes immortal" (*Brh* 4.4.7) really means that a knower's prior sins are destroyed and subsequent sins do not attach to him any more, and not that his connection with

the sense organs and the like is destroyed all at once¹¹⁷. Therefore, Nimbārka does not accept the possibility of liberation in the embodied state.

D. Death

When all the *prārabdhakarmans* are exhausted through experience, death occurs. After death, the knowers follow the path of the gods¹¹⁸, which leads them finally to Brahman. The pious workers, who follow the path of the Fathers¹¹⁹, will be born again in accordance with their *karma*, after a period of sojourn in the world of the moon where they enjoy the fruits of their deeds. The third type of the *jīvas*, namely, the evil-doers (*aniṣṭādikārin*)¹²⁰ do not follow either the path of the gods or the path of the Fathers. They go to a third place. The Saurabhakāra seems to deny their rebirth as human beings, when he quotes the text "now through neither of these two paths, these small manytimes-returning creatures are born. "Be born and die". This is third place. Thereby this world is not filled up". (*Chānd* 5.10.8)¹²¹. The Saurabhakāra does not explain what is the nature of this third place waiting for the evil-doers. He is also equally silent on the path that leads the *jīvas* to this place. Nor does he describe how the souls return from such a place. Although he does not describe the categories and forms of life into which these sinners are reborn, he seems to accept that they are born as worms, gnats etc. in accordance with *Chānd* 6.9.2¹²².

The process of death begins with the merging of the sense of speech with the mind¹²³. Then one after another all the senses are merged with the mind¹²⁴. Once the senses are connected with the mind the mind in turn gets connected with the vital breath, and the vital breath with the *jīva*¹²⁵, then the *jīva* with all the subtle elements¹²⁶. Up to this stage there is similarity between the departure of the pious worker and a *Brahmopāsaka*¹²⁷ in accordance with the *śruti* "There are a hundred and one veins of the heart, of these, one goes out through the crown of the head. Going up through it, one goes to immortality. The others are for departing in other direction" (*Chānd*, 8.6.6).

1. The departure of the pious worker: the path of the Fathers (Pitṛ yāna)

At death the soul of the pious worker, accompanied by the sense organs and surrounded by the five *sūkṣmabhūtas* (subtle elements) such as water, which constitute the potentials for the new body to be assumed in the next birth, leaves the present body in order to enjoy the fruits of its *karma* in the world of the moon¹²⁸. The *jīva* leaves the body through the eye or any other external opening. Once out of the body, the soul follows the path of the Fathers, which begins with the smoke.

On the way of the Fathers, after the smoke comes the night. Then follow the dark half of the moon, the six months of the sun's southern progress, the world of the Fathers and finally the moon, successively¹²⁹. In the world of the moon, the *jīva* enjoys the fruits of its *karmas* meant for the other worldly enjoyments. After the decay of these *karmas*, which produce their fruits in the moon, the *jīva* returns to the earth with the remainder of its *karmas* still clinging to it and which are to bear their fruits in this world¹³⁰.

On its return journey to the world, the *jīva* becomes associated with or similar¹³¹ to *ākāśa* (ether), then *vāyu* (air), *dhūma* (smoke), *abhram* (mist) and *megha* (cloud) successively. The cloud pours the *jīvas* down to the earth together with the rain. Thereafter the *jīvas* get associated with the food producing vegetables like rice, barley, sesamum etc. for a longer period than with the previous substances like *ākāśa* etc. These food substances in their turn, are eaten by men and animals. As a result the *jīvas* become associated with the would be male genitor. In his explanation of how the *jīva* becomes reborn on earth in accordance with its past *karma* the Saurabhakāra follows the imagination of the Upaniṣadic sages.

2. The departure of the Vidvān (the path of the gods)

Unlike the *jīva* of the pious worker which leaves the body through the eye or any other external openings, the *jīva* of a knower leaves the body through the vein which passes out of the crown of the head. The Lord Himself, pleased with the knower, lights up the tip of this vein, and as a result, the

knower can easily recognize it¹³². The soul passes out through this vein, which is directly connected with the rays of the sun. The soul ascends up through the rays of the sun¹³³ which is the first stage on the path of the gods (*deva yāna*).

The knower discards his merits and demerits¹³⁴ completely at the time of his death¹³⁵. The Saurabhakāra accepts that this decaying of the *karmas* actually take place at the very moment of the departure of the soul, because there is no more experience to be crossed, although the scripture speaks of such a decaying only at the crossing of the river Virajā.¹³⁶ The description of the decay of *karmas* means that the knower's prior sins are completely destroyed and subsequent actions do not produce any more *karmas*¹³⁷.

In spite of the decay of the *karmas* at the moment of the departure of the *Brahmopāsaka*, the description of the path is appropriate¹³⁸ because he retains the *sūkṣma śarīra* (subtle body) a fact clearly implied in the description of the *jīva*'s relation to a body in the texts like "Having attained the form of supreme light, he is completed in his own form" (*Chānd* 8.3.4). "He roams about there, laughing, playing and enjoying" (*Chānd* 8.12.3). The *jīva* is able to retain its relation to the *sūkṣma śarīra* by the power of *vidyā* in order to go to the *viśiṣṭa sthāna* (special place) meant for him, when he attains *brahmabhāva*¹³⁹.

The journey through the path of the gods to the world of Brahman is common to all the *Brahmopāsakas*¹⁴⁰. The successive stages, after ascending the rays of the sun on the path of the gods are the light, the day, the bright fortnight, the six months of the northern progress of the sun, the year, the air — otherwise called the world of gods, the moon, the lighting, the world of Varuṇa, the world of Indra and the world of Prajāpati¹⁴¹. The attaining the rays of the sun, which is the initial step on the path of the gods is not impossible even if one were to die at night or during the sun's southern progress owing to the cessation of one's connection with *karman*¹⁴². The real obstacle to attain the path of gods is not darkness, but the existence of *karman*. When *karman* is removed the soul can easily attain the path of the gods. Therefore there is no restriction with regard to the proper time for death.

The presiding deity of each particular stage leads the soul to the next stage. When the *jīva* reaches lightning, the presiding deity of lightning, an immortal person, leads the soul to the world of Varuṇa. This immortal person continues to lead the soul in later stages to the world of Indra, Prajāpati and finally to the world of Brahman¹⁴³.

E. The final goal

The *Sūtrakāra* answers¹⁴⁴ the interesting eschatological question whether the *devayāna* involving progress and attainment applies to the realization of the *parabrahman* (supreme Brahman) or the *Kāryabrahman* (the effected Brahman), (who is the Hiranyagarbha). Bādari takes the object of the *Vidvān*'s going as the effected Brahman alone because going to the effected Brahman alone is reasonable (BS 4.3.6-10). Movement to the effected Brahman who is said to be occupying a particular place as expressed in the text "In those worlds of Brahman dwell the highest, possessed of the highest" (*Bṛh* 6.2.15) is more reasonable. Bādari also points out that Hiranyagarbha is very near to the Supreme Brahman. Owing to the proximity, the first born of the absolute is referred to as the absolute. Both the *śruti*¹⁴⁵ and *smṛti*¹⁴⁶ declare the eventual liberation of the worshippers of *kāryabrahman* who have attained him, when the world of *kāryabrahman* is dissolved at the great dissolution.

Jaimini, on the other hand, considers that the *Vidvān* goes to the *Parabrahman* (the highest Brahman) since the Brahman in the text "Leads them to Brahman" (*Chānd* 4.15.5) primarily refers to the *Parabrahman* (BS 4.3.11-13). Besides the texts like "having attained the form of highest light, he is completed in his own form" (*Chānd* 3.2.23) show that the object to be attained is the *Parabrahman*. Moreover the topic of discussion in the text "I reach the court of Prajāpati, the Chamber" (*Chānd* 8.14.1) is not the effected Brahman, but the highest Brahman.

Bādarāyaṇa follows a *via media* in this dispute (BS 4.3.14-15). Nimbārka considers the view of Bādarāyaṇa as stating the *siddhānta* view and the opinion of both Bādari and Jaimini as the *pūrvapakṣa*. He relies on the *Chānd*, 3.14.1 which says "Just as the intention a man has in this world, so

alone does he become after departing. "This text shows that there is a close relation between the nature of desire and its realization. An *upāsaka* may meditate on the Highest Brahman as well as on their own imperishable nature as having Brahman for its essence. Such an *upāsaka* attains the highest Brahman. On the other hand those who meditate on *Kāryabrahman* may accordingly be led to the *Kāryabrahman*. According to Nimbārka the view that it leads only those who meditate on the *Kāryabrahman* contradicts the scriptural text "Having risen from the body, having attained the form of highest light" (*Chānd* 8.12.3), while the view that it leads only those who meditate on the *Parabrahman* goes against another text "Those who know thus and those who meditate on faith and penance in the forest reach light". Therefore, Nimbārka considers all those who are not dependent on symbols are led to Brahman in accordance with their intention. Those who rely on symbolic meditation have a different result, independent of going through the path of light etc. in accordance with the text "As far as name goes, so far he comes to have freedom of movement" (*Chānd* 7.1.5).

F. The state of *mokṣa*

In Indian tradition there are different conceptions of the final liberation (*mokṣa*) of the *jīva*. Different systems and even each school within the systems have their own different understanding of the state of *mokṣa*¹⁴⁷. Three of these traditions find their expression in the *Brahmasūtras*. They are:

1. The tradition of the theistic Vaiṣṇava (and Śaiva) religions which identify the Supreme Being with Viṣṇu (or Śiva). *Mokṣa* is considered to be the attainment of the absolute, Supreme Being. In this tradition the Supreme Being is a Personal God. He is, on the one hand, full of supernatural qualities, and on the other hand, devoid of all defects. *Mokṣa* is considered to be the attainment of this loving Personal God by the devotee. There is no merging of the individual in the Absolute. The devotee keeps his individuality and identity. The idea of *mokṣa* that the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* and the *Bhagavadgītā* contain belongs to this theistic tradition. As this theistic tradition is found in the Upaniṣads, this could be considered as one of the Upaniṣadic traditions.

2. There was another Upaniṣadic tradition, which was more monistic. In this tradition, the final liberation was thought of as the recovery by the soul of its own real self which was veiled during the time of *Samsāra*. This tradition has also entered into the Indian theism. According to this tradition the beginningless *jīvas*, with their perfections, are really not contaminated by the bondage of *karman* or *avidyā*. Bondage only veils their perfection. Therefore liberation becomes in reality only an unveiling, a recovery, a re-discovery, or a self-realization. The Advaita of Śaṅkara is a full flowering of this Upaniṣadic tradition.

3. There is yet another Upaniṣadic tradition, which thought of *mokṣa* as a type of material enjoyment. Liberation becomes a prolongation of the enjoyment of the worldly pleasures without any trace of pain. *Kauṣītaki* 1.3.7 describes the *Brahmaloka* as having rivers, trees, lakes, mountains and nymphs with fruits and garlands in their hands. According to *Chānd* 7.1.14-25 the released obtain whatever they desire. They are able to meet the departed loved ones¹⁴⁸. The state of *mokṣa* is conceived of as a type of earthly paradise. This view is as old as the R̥gvedic hymns¹⁴⁹. For the R̥gvedic sage immortality was a prolongation of the joys and pleasures of this world in a different yet analogous form, free from all disadvantages of human imperfection.¹⁵⁰ The conception of liberation as a state of enjoyment and happiness seems to be an outcome of man's realization of the transitory nature of earthly joys and pleasures.

The above three views of liberation are also seen in the *Saurabha*. Nimbārka insists more on the first (i.e. attainment of the *Brahmabhāva*), which is the unifying factor, in which the other two views are merged. It is in attaining Brahman, the *Summum Bonum* of the *jīva*, that the *jīva* realizes its own real self and enjoys all the happiness beyond measure.

The ultimate goal of the *jīva* is the attainment of Brahman. On attaining Him, the *sūkṣma śarīra* of the *jīva* composed of the *sūkṣmabhūtas* like *teja*, etc. merge in Brahman¹⁵¹ and becomes one (*avibhāga*) with Him in the sense of attaining *tadātmya* with him¹⁵². The *jīva* has been retaining this subtle body through the power of *vidyā* in order to facilitate his journey to the *Brahmaloka*. Immediately after

his separation from the subtle body, the knower attains the nature of Brahman (*Brahmabhāva*)¹⁵³.

The attaining of Brahman has a three-fold dimension. First of all, the liberated soul, when it has the immediate vision of Brahman (*Brahma sākṣātkāra*), attains similarity (*sāmya*) with Brahman¹⁵⁴. He experiences Brahman, who is both devoid of all changes and negative qualities, on the one hand and is an ocean of all auspicious and supernatural qualities and powers, on the other. Brahman, as we have noted early, is free from the changes of birth etc. and is an ocean of natural, inconceivable and infinite attributes, and possessed of superhuman powers. On attaining Brahman, the *mukta jīva* also shares in these perfections, as declared by the *śruti* "For when verily, he finds fearlessness as a foundation in that which is invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported, then he has gone to fearlessness" (*Tait* 2.7)¹⁵⁵. "Verily, he is the essence, for, on attaining this essence one becomes blissful" (*Tait* 2.7)¹⁵⁶.

Secondly, by obtaining Brahman, the *jīva* also attains a full development of its own individuality. *Mokṣa* is not only *brahmabhāvāpannatva* (obtaining the nature of Brahman) but also equally an *ātmasvarūpalābha* (gaining of its own real self)¹⁵⁷. The *jīva* becomes manifest in its own true form, in a most perfect manner. It means the full manifestation of the real nature of the *jīva* as pure consciousness and the acquisition of freedom from all shackles like ignorance, hunger, thirst, sin, death and decay¹⁵⁸. As we have seen earlier, the real nature of the *jīva* with its true perfection remains hidden during its earthly life of bondage under the influence of *avidyā*. But in *mokṣa*, when the shackles of *avidyā* are shattered the *jīva* becomes perfect in its own form in accordance with the *śruti* "Having attained the form of highest light (*param jyotir upasampadya*), he is completed in his own form" (*Chānd* 8.12.3). Thus, in liberation the *jīva* re-discovers its pristine perfection and glory. The *jīva* realizes itself in a *bhedābheda* relation with Brahman¹⁵⁹. It is an experience in which the *jīva* realizes that it is both one with, and at the same time, different from Brahman. In spite of its attaining all the positive perfections of knowledge, freedom from sin etc., in full measure, the *jīva* remains atomic in size

even in the state of *mokṣa*¹⁶⁰. Atomicity remains one of the very essential characteristics of the *jīva* and makes it always distinct from Brahman. This individuality of the *jīva* is not lost at all in the state of *mokṣa*¹⁶¹. The fact that the *jīva* attains *brahmabhāva* and becomes a self-ruler¹⁶² possessing supreme majesty, does not make it a sovereign as Brahman. The *aiśvarya* of the *mukta* is devoid of the activities of creation of the world etc. for, creation, maintenance and destruction of the world are the activity of Parabrahman alone¹⁶³. The *jīva* is always under the control of the Lord¹⁶⁴.

Liberation is the attaining of similarity of nature with Brahman, who is the mine of all perfections. The *jīva* too attains all the perfections in full measure in accordance with its capacity. Although the *jīva* attains similarity (*sāmyam*) with Brahman, it never becomes equal to Brahman. It always remains distinct from Brahman. In liberation the *jīva* keeps its personality and distinction not only from the other *jīvas* but also from Brahman. In *mokṣa*, although the subtle elements of the *jīva* merge in Brahman, the *jīva* does not merge in Brahman. *Mokṣa* is not the destruction of the individuality of the *jīva*, but its full development and perfection. The personality and individuality of the *jīva* is not only preserved and kept intact, but also developed and enriched in liberation. On obtaining Brahman the *jīva* does not obtain identity with Him, but only similarity with Him in so far as bliss and joy of liberation are concerned. There is no complete identity of essence (*svatūpa*) between Brahman and the *jīva*. Nor does liberation make a *jīva* sovereign in all aspects. The *jīva* always remains dependent on Brahman. In liberation the *jīva* continues to be sustained and controlled by Brahman, its inner controller. The *jīva* finds its freedom in Brahman's will. *Mukti* guarantees the security of this absolute dependence on the absolute will of Brahman and not the losing of one's own self in the Absolute. Even in *Mukti* external and eternal relation of dependence on Brahman is not lost nor does the *mukta* acquire the absolute freedom of self-dependence in opposition to Brahman.

Thirdly, by attaining Brahman, the *jīva* attains Supreme joy and bliss beyond measure¹⁶⁵. Brahman's enjoyment becomes the enjoyment of the *jīva* too. It is through Brahman

that the *jīva* enjoys, for, the source of all joys and pleasures for the *mukta* is Brahman. On attaining Brahman, the *jīva* also attains the power of realizing all its wishes at once. It is capable of meeting its forefathers through a mere wish¹⁶⁶. It attains the power of moving about everywhere at will in accordance with the *śruti* "He comes to have freedom of movement in all the worlds" (*Chānd* 7.25.2)¹⁶⁷. It becomes capable of fulfilling all its desires because its attributes of *satyasaṁkalpatva* (he whose desires are true) etc. become manifest in liberation¹⁶⁸. It may possess a body of its own liking, through a mere wish¹⁶⁹. Even in the absence of a body created by itself it can enjoy supreme happiness through a body created by the Lord as in the dream state¹⁷⁰. The *mukta jīva* shares in all the sportive pleasures of Brahman with the exclusion of those connected with creation etc. of the universe¹⁷¹. In spite of its being atomic in nature, even in the state of *mokṣa*, the *jīva* is capable of entering into many bodies through its attribute of knowledge and is able to enjoy pleasures and happiness of various bodies simultaneously¹⁷². By experiencing the blessedness of Brahman as well as His perfections the *mukta jīva* acquires them. Yet the distinction of the *jīva* from Brahman is all the more experienced in so far as the rulership and creation of the universe belong exclusively to Brahman.

Thus according to Nimbārka liberation is not the abolition of consciousness, nor is it the dissolution of one's personality in the Supreme Consciousness. Neither does salvation mean the aloneness (*kaivalyam*) of the *jīva* just as it does not mean its absolute identity (*advaita siddhi*) with Brahman. *Mukti* is the infinitizing of the finite in which the finite remains without the limitations of the finitude. The *jīva* experiences Brahman, as Nimbārka says, in the *vibhāgāvirodhinā'vibhāga* experience¹⁷³. Here the *avibhāga* is neither absorption (*laya*) of the *jīva* nor conjunction (*samyoga*) but is the realization of Brahman by the *jīva* as the absolute and to which *jīva* itself is the relative. In this state the finite transcends its own finitude.

The liberated *jīva* transcends birth and death. There is no return to the *samsāra*. The liberated soul, in accordance with the texts "Those who proceed by this do not return to this human whirlpool, return not" (*Chānd* 4.15.6) and "But

on attaining me, O son of Kuntī, there is no rebirth" (*Gītā* 8.16), has broken the shackles of *samsāra* for ever¹⁷⁴.

Conclusion

According to Nimbārka the entire process of creation and liberation is a movement from Brahman unto Brahman Himself. Both the *jīva* and the *jagat* have a distinct destiny in Brahman. When the material creation gets merged into Brahman, its *upādānakāraṇa*, it cannot be said that it loses its individuality and identity in so far as its relation with Brahman is said to be one of *tadātmya* with Brahman. It means that the material creation has become one with Brahman in so far as it has Brahman as its *ātman*. The *jīva* retains its individuality and distinction, which is perfected on attaining Brahman. The unique means for the acquisition of liberation is *upāsana* or *dhyāna*. Good deeds and the Vedic sacrifices are helpful in so far as they purify the mind of the *jīvāṇsu* and generates a longing for *Brahmajñāna*. The salvific *jñāna*, due to which the *jīva* realizes its *bhedābheda* relation with Brahman, is ultimately a gift (*prāsada*) of Brahman. The *jīva* merits this *prasada* through its constant meditation on Brahman. The *guru* plays an important role in teaching the *upāsaka* the way of meditation.

Chapter 11

THE BHEDĀBHEDA PHILOSOPHY OF NIMBĀRKA

Introduction

Nimbārka accepts the realities of Brahman whom he calls *Puruṣottama* (the Highest Person) or *Paramātman* (the Supreme Spirit), of the *jīva* (the intelligent individual soul *pratyag ātman*), and of the *jagat* (the non-intelligent material world). These realities are also known as *nīyantr* (inner controller), *bhoktr* (the enjoyer) and the *bhogya* (the objects of experience or enjoyment) respectively. In this chapter we try to understand the mutual relationship between the One Supreme and the Absolute Brahman and the relative *jīva* and *jagat* as propounded by the Saurabhakāra. According to him the mutual relationship between Brahman the creator (the source of all beings) and the *jīva* and the *jagat* (the creatures) is one of *bhedābheda* (difference and non-difference) in so far as they are both distinct from the Supreme and yet non-different from Him. Nimbārka denies both an *atyanta bhinnatva* (absolute difference)¹ and an *atyantābhedatva* (absolute identity)² between Brahman and the *jīva-jagat*. According to him there is only a *bhinnābhinna* (difference non-difference) relation between them³.

1. The scripture and the Brahmasūtras teach the bhedābheda doctrine

Nimbārka as we have seen earlier agrees with the

Sūtrakāra that our knowledge of the metaphysical realities is derived from *Śāstra* alone⁴. Nimbārka feels that there cannot be either an absolute identity or an absolute difference between Brahman and the *jīva-jagat* because such doctrines are opposed to the Upaniṣads which teach both an identity as well as a difference between Brahman and the *jīva-jagat*. The relation between the Absolute (the One) and the relative (the many) cannot be either of absolute identity or of absolute difference. Firstly, the doctrine of absolute identity will go against numerous Upaniṣadic passages describing a mutual distinction and difference among them⁵. The *jīva* and *jagat* are different from Brahman in as much as Brahman is described by *śruti* as possessing attributes and capacities distinct from them⁶. There are a large number of the *Brahmasūtras* which clearly affirm a clear difference between Brahman and the *jīva*⁷. Perhaps Nimbārka might have realised that on the basis of the *śruti* texts he has to maintain a clear metaphysical distinction between Brahman and the *jīva-jagat*, otherwise there will result confusion of their nature and their attributes⁸. Therefore the Saurabhakāra accepts that there is an obvious difference in the concepts of the nature of Brahman, *jīva* and *jagat*. He considers Brahman as the cause and the *jīva* and the *jagat* as the effects of Brahman. The relation between them is described through the analogy of the ocean and the waves, sun and its lustre⁹ etc. He considers the *jīva* as a part and Brahman as the whole¹⁰. Brahman is the object to be obtained and the *jīva* is the obtainer¹¹. Brahman is to be known and worshipped while the *jīva* is the knower as well as the worshipper¹². Brahman is the inner controller within the *jīva*¹³, yet He is ever free from all sins and defects of the *jīva*, who is the enjoyer of the fruits of its own deeds¹⁴. Similarly when Brahman is the omniscient and the transcendent, who cannot be limited by time, space and place, the *jagat* is inanimate, gross and limitable. As we have noted earlier, Nimbārka considers that the difference and the distinction between Brahman and the *jīva* continues to exist even in the state of liberation. The *mukta-jīva*, according to him, is different from Brahman on two counts. First of all, the *mukta-jīva* is of atomic size even though it is able to assume several bodies simultaneously through its attribute of knowledge¹⁵. Secondly

Brahman alone is the creator and the Sovereign ruler of the Universe. Even the liberated soul does not acquire the perfection of Brahman. Thus, Nimbārka seems to point out that the difference and the distinction between Brahman and the jīva is essential, natural and eternal.

Although there is thus a distinction between the creator and the created, Nimbārka does not accept an absolute difference between them. He points out that the jīva and the jagat are non-different from Brahman. Jīva and jagat are the effects (*kārya*) of Brahman. There cannot be an absolute difference between the cause (*kāraṇa*) and the effects (*kārya*). The jīva and jagat derive their existence, nature and attributes from Brahman, besides whom there exists nothing prior to creation. They share in the "esse" of Brahman and are absolutely dependent on Him as His effects for their existence and activities just as the dependence of the pot on the clay, its supportive material cause, for its continued existence. An absolute difference between Brahman (the cause) and jīva-jagat (the effects) will go against many of the *śruti* texts teaching their non-difference¹⁶.

Since both the scripture and the *Brahmasūtras* present a relation of both difference as well as non-difference between the Absolute Brahman and the relative jīva-jagat, all those commentators, who stress either identity or difference have to do violence to the *sūtras* and have to explain away those *śruti* texts supporting a view contrary to their own¹⁷. After making a critical evaluation of the interpretations of the *Brahmasūtras* as well as the scriptural texts by Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Madhva, Vallabha and Nimbārka, V.S. **Ghate** came to the conclusion that Nimbārka is most faithful both to the *Brahmasūtras* as well as the *śruti* texts. He says:

"If at all we insist on seeing in the *sūtras* one of the five systems under discussion, it can be at the most the *bhedābheda* system of Nimbārka, according to which both *bheda* and *abheda* are equally real, without the idea of any subordination of one to the other. (See in this connection specially *sūtras* 3.2.27-29, which fit in with the doctrine of Nimbārka better than with any other; also *sūtras* 4.4.7 and 12, which represent a clumsy combination of both the views contained in the immediately preceding *sūtras*). For, if we

classify the five schools in question from the point of view of the formation of a system based on the reconciliation of the passages teaching difference and non-difference, or plurality and unity, the school of Nimbārka (leaving out of consideration the later theological and Sectarian encumbrances) represents the first and in a sense, elementary and rather clumsy stage and the very title *bhedābheda* bears testimony to this fact¹⁸.

2. The *bhedābheda*vāda is founded on *satkāryavāda*

Now, the *bhedābheda* relationship as expounded in the *Saurabha* is rooted both in the *satkāryavāda* and in the doctrine that Brahman is at once the efficient (*nimitta*) and material supportive (*upādāna*) cause of the universe. According to the doctrine of the *satkāryavāda* originally based on the Upaniṣads and propounded by the Sāṃkhya, there is non-difference between the material cause and its effect. The effect pre-exists in its material cause and is of the nature of its cause. The effect is not something non-existent in the cause as the *Nyāya Vaiśeṣikas* would have us to accept. The effect (*kārya*) in fact pre-exists in the cause in a subtle form. It becomes manifest when the *nimittakāraṇa* (efficient cause) brings it out. The potter, for example, transforms the clay into a pot. Thus the activity of the agent also has a positive role in making the effect known. Through the activity of the potter, for example, the pot which was unmanifest in clay, is made manifest. But, if the effect were non-existent in its material cause, for example the pot in the clay, then it would not be produced at all by any *nimittakāraṇa*. The potter is able to produce a pot or a brick from clay because the pot or brick is pre-existent in a subtle form in the clay. In support of the *satkāryavāda* Nimbārka points out that if a previously non-existent effect does indeed arise, why is that there is no origin of a barley sprout from fire¹⁹. According to Nimbārka the manifestation of the pre-existent effect at creation is like the spreading out of an already rolled up piece of cloth²⁰ or it is like the breath, having the *prāṇa*, *apāna* etc. controlled by breathing exercises, remains in its real form, and when the control removed, is instantly known in those respective forms²¹. It means that the production of an effect is a

manifestation of the effect from a cause in which it pre-existed in an unmanifest state.

The effect is dependent on its *upādānakāraṇa* (supportive material cause) for its continued existence and activities. For example, the pot depends on the clay for its continued existence and activities as a pot. The clay is called the supportive material cause (*upādānakāraṇa*) of a pot because the clay goes on supporting the pot to continue to exist as a pot. If the clay disappears, the pot cannot exist anymore. But the dependence of the effect or the product on the *nimittakāraṇa* (efficient cause) seems to end from the moment the effect is produced. For example, once the pot is produced, it does not depend on the potter for its continued existence. Even if the potter goes away or is dead, the pot can exist independently of the potter. Therefore according to the *satkāryavāda* the dependence of the effect on its *upādānakāraṇa* continues to exist as long as the effect exists. In other words the doctrine of *satkāryavāda* insists on the immanence, the organic unity and the continuity of the *upādānakāraṇa*. The *upādāna* contains the effect (*kārya*) potentially and the effect is this potency actualized.

In the Vedānta system, the *satkāryavāda* is very much connected with the doctrine of the *upādānakāraṇatva* of Brahman. The world which is an effect pre-existed in a subtle causal state in Brahman. Prior to creation the only reality was Brahman. He is the self-existent independent reality. There existed nothing besides Him. In Him pre-existed this vast and multifarious universe in a subtle causal state prior to its particularization into concrete physical things. It is due to the subtleness of the universe prior to creation that the *śruti* occasionally describes it as non-existent (*Chāṇḍ* 3.19.1). But the pre-existence of the world in Brahman is evident from the complementary passage "That was existent" (*Chāṇḍ* 3.19.1). In that state, one could say that the world is one with Brahman. There is non-difference of the effect from the cause. But when these effects are manifested, in their effect state, they have their own distinctions among themselves as well as their distinction from Brahman. Yet, the universe and all the *jīvas* continue to depend on Brahman their supportive cause for their continued existence and activities just as any other effects on their respective *upādānakāraṇa* as pointed out early.

3. The Saurabha teaches Brahmapariṇāmavāda

Brahman is not only the *upādānakāraṇa* of the *jīva* and the jagat. He is also their *nimittakāraṇa*, because there exists nothing besides Brahman. As we have seen above, Nimbārka considers Brahman as both the *nimitta* as well as the *upādānakāraṇa* of the entire created universe²². According to him, this universe is a transformation (*pariṇāma*) of the all-pervading, partless Brahman. Here Nimbārka seems to follow the lead given by the *Brahmasūtrakāra*. Ghate points out that we have sufficient reason to believe that the *Sūtrakāra* held the doctrine of *pariṇāma* as opposed to *vivarta*. Firstly, the *Sūtrakāra* expressly uses the word *pariṇāma* in *sūtra* 1.4.26. Secondly, in answer to the objection that is raised against the intelligent Brahman being the cause of the non-intelligent universe, an objection based on the dissimilarity between cause and effect (BS 2.1.4. ff) the *Sūtrakāra* never says nor even suggests that this is possible owing to the superimposition of the effects upon the cause, as for instance, that of silver on the mother-of-pearl. On the other hand, he refuses to admit that the effect is non-existent in the cause, before its production (2.1.7) which would be the case if the *vivarta* view be accepted²³.

Brahman, being both the *upādānakāraṇa* and the *nimittakāraṇa* of everything, has the power of transforming Himself into the forms of various entities without undergoing any change in His nature. By this *śakti* (power) Brahman manifests the forms of creation — *jīvas* and jagat. There seems to be a creative urge or *śakti* in Brahman which is potential in *pralaya* and evolves into the whole cosmic process or *śaktivikṣepa* as Nimbārka calls it²⁴. According to Nimbārka the indivisible *niravayava* (partless) Brahman evolves into the world of forms and names through His own power in the same manner as milk changes into curd without any external influence²⁵. It is clear that *sāvayavatva* (having parts) is not the cause of the transformation of milk to curd. If it were so, water, being *sāvayava* (with parts) should also be changed into curd. It is also evident that the potency of milk to be changed into curd is a special property of milk independent of its being *sāvayava* or *niravayava*. Similarly, it is due to the *asādhāraṇa* power of Brahman that He is able

to create or rather to transform Himself into the forms of the created world, without causing any mutations or reductions to His nature. The creative process does not affect Brahman in any way. This is the doctrine that Nimbārka seems to hold when he says that "just as the spider weaves its own web Brahman by His *śaktivikṣepa* differentiates Himself into the manifold created beings without being affected thereby²⁶. The chief point in the theory of *Brahmapariṇāma* is its insistence on the principle of self-differentiation as opposed to external origination.

4. The causality of Brahman is unique

The causality of Brahman is a unique one, without any parallel instance. It cannot be compared to the causes we see in our everyday experience. Brahman is both the *nimitta* and *upādānakāraṇas* of everything that exists, because there is no other entity besides Brahman prior to creation. Therefore when the Upaniṣadic sages, or for that matter, the commentators like Nimbārka, use *drṣṭāntas* to drive certain points home or to explain certain metaphysical realities through physical examples, it is very much important to see what is the point of comparison that they want to stress. In every metaphysical or analogical expression there is an important point which is meant to be conveyed. As **Fawcett** points out that if we are told that the brain is like a "telephone exchange", it is clear that the analogy would break down at many points. The similes are helpful in that they convey something of the nature of the reality to us by striking a comparison, yet the difference between the one and the other in each case is clear²⁷.

Though the example of the potter, the clay and the pot is an apt analogy to explain the pre-existence of the effect in the cause (*satkāryavāda*), yet it is too gross an example to be applied to Brahman (the cause) and to the pre-existence of the *jīva-jagat* (the effects) in Him. We cannot apply *satkāryavāda* used in a gross, material sense, to Him, without transcending sufficiently its material paradigm (clay-pot). The Upaniṣadic sages and Nimbārka too, seem to understand the point, although they do not explicitly explain it. That they understand that the gross material *satkāryavāda* cannot be applied to Brahman is clear from the fact that they

use many other analogies and symbolic expressions to explain the creation of the world. The examples of the procession of the lustre from the sun or the production of the web from the spider go a long way to transcend much the "gross sense" of the *satkāryavāda*. As pointed out earlier, the expression "*so'kāmayata bahusyām*" (Tait 2.6) seems to be an attempt to "de-materialize" the *satkāryavāda*. It is very evident that we cannot apply the gross examples of the transformation of the clay or milk to the Absolute, transcendental Brahman. Therefore the Upanisadic sage says: "*so'kāmayata bahusyām*" (Tait 2.6) "*svayam ātmānam akuruta*" (Tait 2.7). Brahman creates the world through a mere decision. Creation is a process through which Brahman, the Absolute manifests Himself in the finite forms. Texts like *so'kāmayata* (Tait 2.6) which Nimbārka also quotes in a number of places in the *Saurabha*, seem to point out that creation is due to a decision of will on the part of Brahman. The divine *pariṇāma* belongs to the realm of the transcendence and it leaves the Absolute cause (Brahman) unmutated and unchanged. But Nimbārka has not "exploited" properly the *śruti* texts describing the creation of the world due to the will of Brahman. Such a refinement is necessary in order to make the *satkāryavāda* applicable to Brahman who transcends the realm of matter. Such a refinement also enables us to understand better the "paradoxical" assertion of Nimbārka that the world is a *pariṇāma* of Brahman and yet Brahman remains ever unchanged. The paradox is only an apparent one.

The *satkāryavāda* also makes the *bhedābheda* between the cause and effect more clear. That there is a *bhedābheda* relation between the pot and the clay (*upādānakāraṇa*) is very evident. (But there is no such relation between the pot and the potter—*nimittakāraṇa*). Similarly, the co-substantiality of the cause and the effect is shown through the analogy of the sun and its lustre or the spider and the web. When such an analogy is applied to the ontological relation between Brahman who is the conscious *upādānakāraṇa* as well as the *nimittakāraṇa* of the entire creation and the created world we have also to transcend the crude material understanding of the *bhedābheda* relationship. Brahman the transcendental *upādāna* and *nimittakāraṇa* of the world is

both non-different (*abheda*) and different (*bheda*) from the created world. The world is non-different from Brahman. The created world has its existence and essence from Brahman. And the world is different (*bheda*) from Brahman in so far as He transcends it. In so far as the *jīva* and *jagat* derive their existence and essence from Brahman, they can be said to have in a finite way, co-essentiality with Brahman. But they are in no way identical with Brahman. Their *being* and *essence* are given to them. Therefore they are dependent beings. They are finite beings while Brahman is the only Absolute transcendental Reality.

5. The *bhedābheda* relation

Nimbārka denies that there is either an *atyanta bhīnnatva*²⁸ (absolute difference) or an *atyanta abhedatva* (absolute non-difference) between Brahman and *jīva-jagat*. According to him there can be only a *bhīnnābhīnna* or *bhedābheda* relation between them²⁹. He has also pointed out, as we have noted earlier, that an absolute identity as well as absolute difference between Brahman and *jīva-jagat* are opposed to the Upaniṣads which predicate the equal reality of difference and non-difference. Nimbārka seems to hold that since both the terms of that relation i.e. both Brahman and the world are real and objective, the relation between them is also real. Unlike Nimbārka, Śaṅkara does not consider the relations as real. According to him all the relations are purely conceptual and superimposed, because according to him there is only one reality (*pāramārthika sattā*). Therefore, from a transcendental point of view, all the relations in the *Advaitavāda*, including the relation between the cause and the effect are illusory. They are mere superimpositions. But, as we have seen above, Nimbārka considers that the *bhedābheda* relation between Brahman and the *jīva-jagat* is a real one.

Brahman is not out of all relationships. He is the ground of all relationships, for He sustains all things. It is He who gives meaning to the finite. In the realm of *being* we have the One, the Infinite, the Absolute Brahman, while in the world of *becoming* we have the many, the finite, the relative, the

jīva-jagat . *Becoming* is as real as the *Being*. The one Being becomes the many. The One, the Absolute remains unchanged while the "many", the relative, change and pass away. Brahman in His transcendence is beyond all categories of limitations, of time and space. He is the fullness of Being, Bliss, Power and Perfection³⁰. Brahman, the Infinite, who "limits Himself" into the name and form of the world, cannot be limited or exhausted by the world. Similarly Brahman, who transforms Himself into the world of the jīvas and the material objects transcends all of them. Changes and defects in them cannot in any way affect Him³¹ .

Nimbārka explains the relation between Brahman and jīva-jagat not only in terms of the cause and its effects³² but also through other analogies and similes such as the ocean and its waves³³, the sun and its lustre³⁴, a substratum of Power, and its power³⁵, the whole and its parts³⁶, the snake and its coil³⁷ etc. These analogies and symbolic expressions point out, according to Nimbārka, both the difference and the non-difference between Brahman and the jīva-jagat. We may also presume that as the effects of Brahman, both the jiva and the jagat also have *bhedābheda* among themselves just as the pot and the plate, which are the effects of clay, have among themselves.

Here Nimbārka is trying to communicate the metaphysical *bhedābheda* experience through physical categories and metaphorical and symbolic expressions. But what is the meaningfulness i.e. the ultimate significance of these symbolic expressions? As pointed out earlier the cause-effect relationship based on both the *satkāryavāda* as well as the *upādāna* and *nimittakāranatva* of Brahman as propounded by Nimbārka explains not only how there can be a relation of *bheda* and *abheda* between Brahman and the jīva-jagat, but also demonstrates, on one hand, the immanence as well as the transcendence of Brahman and, on the other hand, the relative nature and the total dependence of the jīva-jagat on Brahman, their cause. The *abheda* here means not an absolute identity between Brahman and the jīva-jagat but their essential dependence on and their ontological participation in the nature of Brahman, their cause.

6. The bhedābheda relation is explained through metaphors

a) The total dependence of the created reality on Brahman, expressed through the metaphor of the ocean and the waves, denotes the *mysterium tremendum* of Brahman. Brahman is beyond human comprehension. The description of Brahman in terms of the vast ocean also indicates the eternal and the causal nature of Brahman. The description of the jīva and the jagat as the waves in the ocean indicates their temporary and relative existence. It also shows that Brahman is the underlying principle beneath all changes and transformations. Brahman the all-embracing and the all-pervading reality is the support of all beings just as the ocean is the support of the waves. Under the rising and vanishing waves remains the tranquil, the limitless and vast ocean which is the source of these waves. Just as no wave can exist apart from the ocean, no jīva or jagat can exist apart from Brahman. If the ocean ceases to exist the waves are also destroyed. The wave is formed from the ocean. It is dissolved into the ocean. The waves have no existence apart from the ocean. Similarly Brahman is the beginning and the end of the jīva-jagat. The wave is only a modification of the ocean. It is not the totality of the ocean. The wave is only an *arṇśa* (part) of the ocean. It is totally dependent on the ocean for its origin, subsistence and finally it is dissolved into ocean. The ocean is the primordial ground of the waves. The metaphor of the ocean and the waves also demonstrate to some extent the mystery of the One and the many. There is a multiplicity of the waves, but there is the oneness of the ocean. Although the wave is not the whole ocean, yet it has got a certain amount of independence. It can be considered as different from the ocean. The destruction of one or all of the waves does not warrant the destruction of the ocean.

b) Similarly, the ultimate significance of the *dr̥ṣṭānta* of the snake (*aḥi*) and the coil (*kunḍala*) is again the total dependence of the created world on Brahman the creator. The coil is a particular mode of the existence of the snake. Similarly the jīva is one of the particular ways Brahman manifests Himself. He manifests Himself in many other ways. The snake need not exist in the coil form. The coil form

is not a necessity for the snake nor does it form the essential nature of the snake. Similarly the *jīva* or the *jagat* are not necessary beings. They are relative and they depend on Brahman's free will for their existence and essence.

c) In the same way, the description of the relation of Brahman and *jīva-jagat* as the relation between the sun and its lustre or between the substratum of power and its attribute of power again demonstrate the total dependence of the finite and relative world on Brahman, who is the source of all existence. There is co-essentiality between the lustre and the sun, yet there is difference and distinction between them. In both the cases the *dharma* and the *dharmin* are identical and yet different.

d) Again the presentation of the relation between Brahman and *jīva-jagat* as the one between the whole and its parts demonstrates the total dependence of the parts (*jīva-jagat*) on the whole (Brahman) as well as their co-essentiality. Nimbārka does not explain the simile. But it is clear that he is not speaking in terms of physical parts from the fact that he denies any parts (*avayavatva*) to Brahman. Brahman is not a physical reality, but the metaphysical and transcendental entity, the source and the goal of everything. The whole is not composed of the parts but constitutes them and is not discrete but organic. The part has meaning only in the context of the whole. There is a dependent co-substantiality of the parts on the whole. The part depends entirely for its existence and activity on the whole. In the realm of being and existence the transcendence and the independence of Brahman as well as the dependence and relateness of *jīva-jagat* and their *bhedābheda* relation with Brahman as well as among themselves are well expressed through the symbolism of *aśīśa* (parts) and *aśīśin* (whole). The *jīva* and *jagat*, as parts of Brahman, are essentially one with Brahman and yet they have their own distinct nature from Him as well as being distinct among themselves.

e) Through the above similes, metaphors, allegories and symbols Nimbārka has been driving home the following facts. First of all, there is the absolute independence and transcendence of Brahman. Brahman is a personal God. His personality is the Supreme. He is *Puruṣottama*. He is the

absolute *per se*, the self complete and the self-determined. In this respect there is difference (*bheda*) between Brahman and the jīva-jagat. Secondly, there is the total dependence of the created world of jīva-jagat on Brahman for their existence and activity. Brahman is the logical primus of the relative existence. The Absolute constitutes the relative. Yet the relation between "the One" and "the many" is one of co-existence and not of contradiction. "The many" participate in the *esse* (existence) of the One. In this sense there is a relation of non-difference between Brahman and the jīva-jagat³⁸. The Absolute is immanent in the relative yet remains beyond them, without losing its Absoluteness. Like the spider weaving its own web, Brahman emanates into the forms of the entire created world and yet exceeds their totality. The entire cosmos is the self-actualization of the creative power of Brahman. Brahman's causality implies both His transcendence and immanence. Neither of them is more or less. Neither of them dominates over or destroys the other³⁹.

7. The meaningfulness of the *bhedābheda* relation

a) According to M.M.Agrawal⁴⁰, in the philosophy of Nimbarka, the relation always presupposes difference and non-difference (*bhedābheda*). Relation presupposes a meeting point. Both absolute identity and absolute difference do not have such a meeting point for any relation. That is why Śaṅkara, who accepts the doctrine of absolute identity, has to explain all the relations as superimposition and merely phenomenal. Nor can there be any relation between two things that are contradictory or rather completely *bhirna*. Therefore there must be some form of *bhedābheda* relation between the *anuyogin* (the related) and the *pratīyogin* (the relative). There is such a *bhedābheda* relation between the cause and effect, and the whole and its parts. How could difference and non-difference co-exist in the same entity? Is it not a contradiction as the Naiyāyikas allege, or rather, one cancelling the other⁴¹. True, there could be such a contradiction and negation of each other, if the *bhedābheda* relation is understood as the attribution of contradictory predicates (for example of potness and non-potness) to one and the same subject at the same time and the same way.

But in the *bhedābheda* doctrine as expounded in the Nimbārka philosophy both the difference and the identity are to be understood from different angles. There cannot be a total difference between Brahman and the created world because of the *Brahmātmakatva* of everything⁴². Brahman permeates everything created because Brahman is the supportive material cause of everything. Yet there is a real difference between Brahman the cause and the world of *jīva-jagat* which are the effects. Both difference and non-difference are real, but are not to be viewed from the same angle. Here *abheda* (non-difference) does not mean absolute identity (e.g. the clay and the pot are not absolutely identical. If they are identical one could serve the purpose of the other). Their *abhedatva* presupposes and includes their difference. Thus, the root of the *bhedābheda* relation is the *Brahmaparināma-vāda*. Prior to creation, *jīva* and *jagat* inhere in Brahman, their cause, as His powers. Even in that state there is a distinction between Brahman who possesses the power and the *jīva* and the *jagat* which inhere in Him as His powers. This distinction and difference are made manifest at creation (i.e. at the origin of the *jīva* and the *jagat*). This difference continues even in the state of *Mukti* as we have seen earlier. In liberation the *jīva* retains its distinction, individuality and difference from Brahman while the material creation returns to Brahman and inheres in Him as His power to be made manifest at the new creation.

b) We have to “dematerialize” even the concept of relations when applied to Brahman. But Nimbārka has not done it. Perhaps he might be aware of such a need when he transcends from the *nimittakāraṇatva* of the potter to Brahman through the example of gods who create things through a mere wish⁴³. But he has not explicitated it. The relation between Brahman and the world is not mutual in all aspects. Our experience of relation is mostly gross and material, between the clay and the pot or between a father and his son, etc. We also have ideas of logical relation such as between the genus and the species etc. It is amply clear that when we speak of the ontological or transcendental relation between the Absolute Brahman and the created relative world we must not understand their relation in a physical sense as between a material cause and its effect. We

have to dematerialize our understanding of the metaphysical realities. The *Brahmaparināmvāda* of Nimbārka has to be understood in the light of the totality of his *bhedābhedavāda*. Since Nimbārka stresses the *bheda* aspect of the relation between Brahman and jīva-jagat as real as the *abheda* aspect⁴⁴, he cannot be accused of being a pantheist.

c) What is the purpose of the *bhedābhedavāda*? It is to show a certain oneness between the cause and the effect. This oneness is seen in similarity. We know from our ordinary experience that there is a similarity between the cause and the effect, for example, between the gold and its products like bracelet or earring. At the same time the cause and the effect cannot be totally identical. If so, one could be the same as the other. This experience cannot be adequately expressed and explained by one or the other of the two extremes of *bheda* and *abheda*. As we have seen earlier there are traits of both *bheda* and *abheda* doctrines in the Upaniṣads. For example texts like “*vācāraṁbhaṇaṁ vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttiketyeva satyam*” (Chānd 6.1.4) “*aitadātmyam idaṁ sarvaṁ tat satyam tat tvam asi*” (Chānd 6.9.4) and “*sarvaṁ khalvidaṁ brahma*” (Chānd 3.14.1) denote their *abhedatvam*, while texts like “*ātmānam antaro yamayati*” (Bṛh 3.7.22), “*rasaṁ hyevāyam labdhvā nandībhavati*” (Tait. 2.7) “*eṣa ma ātmā ntarhṛdaye*” (Chānd 3.14.3) support their *bhedatvam*. A process of harmonization was inevitable. The acceptance of a third view, comprising both *bheda* and *abheda* seems to have taken place prior to the days of Bādārayana. Bādārayana himself, attempted at harmonization of *bheda* and *abheda* in his *Brahmasūtras*, which is really a condensation of the Upaniṣadic teachings. Scholars are of the opinion that Bādārayana himself was an adherent of the *via media* of the *bhedābhedavāda* because all the examples given in the *Brahmasūtras* to explain the relationship between Brahman and jīva-jagat point to the *bhedābhedavāda*. Nimbārka follows this path⁴⁵.

d) Another point which is not explicitly discussed by Nimbārka, but is still worth considering is this, viz., the Absolute Being, namely, the One from whom everything comes and the One whom everything depends upon for its existence and to Whom everything finally returns is a mystery – an incomprehensible Reality⁴⁶, as the Upaniṣads

say “*yato vāco nivartante*” (Tait 2.9) “How” the many spring from the Absolute Being and the relationship that exists between the “One” and “the many” are also equally incomprehensible mysteries. The Absolute is not an object of our daily sense experience. We can try to understand Him through similes and analogies as the Upaniṣadic sages taught us. Therefore we can form only an analogical understanding of Him. The similes and allegories we have examined form part of this attempt to understand Brahman and His relation to the created world. The experience of the mysterious relationship between the Absolute and the relative finds expression in this paradox which we call the *bhedābheda*vāda. It may appear at first sight that there is a contradiction in the doctrine of *bhedābheda*. How can there be a *bheda* and *abheda* relationship at the same time? As explained above the *bheda* and the *abheda* are seen from different angles. Thus, a real contradiction is avoided. Still what the *sūtrakāra* himself and the commentator Nimbārka as well as the other *bhedābheda*vādins apparently want to bring out is the mystery of self-communication of Brahman, the Infinite to the creatures, the finite. Through this creative self-communication the finite receive their very existence. In spite of Brahman being totally the Other, the Transcendent and the Infinite, He has designed to share His Being with others. This is the mystery of creation. Brahman is the *Alpha* and the *Omega* of creation. The relation that exists between Brahman and the creatures is one of *bhedābheda* because the created world shares in the being and the existence of Brahman. But the created world does not exhaust Brahman. He always remains totally the Other.

The Upaniṣadic sage well expressed this mystery when he exclaimed.

*pūrṇam adaḥ pūrṇam idaṁ
pūrṇāt pūrṇam udacyate
pūrṇasya pūrṇam ādāya
pūrṇam evāvaśiṣyate.* (Brh 5.1.1)

CONCLUSION

The present study, based primarily on the *Vedāntapārjīāta Saurabha*, will go a long way in removing many misconceptions about Nimbārka and his philosophy. In chapter one it is pointed out that Nimbārka, the author of the *Saurabha* was not a worshipper of Rādhākṛṣṇa, but was a Bhāgavata Vāsudeva Vaiṣṇava. It is also shown in chapter one that Rādhā became an object of worship only in the tenth century A.D, if not later. This point is also substantiated by the findings in chapter five where it is demonstrated that Rādhā entered the Nimbārka school only after Śrīnivāsa, the Kaustubhakāra. The *Vedāntapārjīāta Saurabha* fully supports the fact that Nimbārka was not a *Pañcarātra* Nārāyaṇa Vaiṣṇava. Firstly, there is no mention of Nārāyaṇa in the *Saurabha*. Reference to Nārāyaṇa is omitted in the *Mbh* text (12.339.14-15) which he quotes in *Saurabha* 2.3.42. Secondly, there is no trace of any *Pañcarātra* element, including the *vyūhavāda*, in the entire *Saurabha*. Nimbārka was a *Bhāgavata* Vaiṣṇava Vedāntin.

The examination of the traditional accounts of Nimbārka has shown that these traditions are coloured by theological considerations and mythological beliefs. We have also pointed out that the traditional belief that Nimbārka lived in the 15th year of *Kaliyuga* is untenable. After all, Nimbārka is a commentator of the *Brahmasūtras* and as such he cannot be assigned to a period prior to the composition of the *Brahmasūtras*. It is also pointed out that the date of Nimbārka cannot be determined by assigning "an average life span" to the *ācāryas* found mentioned in the *guruparaṁparās* made in order to claim legitimacy and authority after major splits took place in the Sect. The list of the *guruparaṁparās* made as late as the 15th or the 16th century A.D. is unable to provide any historical or chronological data concerning the *ācāryas* some of whom have themselves not left any evidence of their existence, nor have found any mention in the writings of their immediate followers.

A tendency is also noticed in the Nimbārka school to interpolate later ideas into the writings of the earlier *ācāryas*. There have been cases where spurious and later works were attributed even to Nimbārka himself. Therefore all the works generally attributed to Nimbārka in the Sect today have been examined. On the basis of this study, it is pointed out in chapter two that the works like *Daśaślokī*, *Mantrarahasyaśoḍaśī*, *Prapannakalpavallī* etc. belong to a later stage in the development of the *Vaiṣṇava bhakti* movement. It was mainly on the basis of such late works attributed to Nimbārka by his followers that modern scholars were forced to assign Nimbārka to a post-Rāmānuja and even a post-Madhva period. But a detailed study of the *Saurabha* prompts one to place the author of the *Saurabha* in a pre-Śaṅkara period. In chapter four a number of instances has been discussed where one naturally expects a post-Śaṅkara commentator to be aware of Śaṅkara, but the *Saurabhakāra* is completely unaware of Śaṅkara. Many instances have been illustrated where Śaṅkara considers some doctrines which are identical to the ones upheld by Nimbārka to be the *pūrvapakṣa*. In such instances Nimbārka could not possibly be summarizing Śaṅkara because no post-Śaṅkara commentator could defend his theory by a mere clumsy summary of what Śaṅkara presents as the *pūrvapakṣa*. No post-Śaṅkara commentator could also afford to leave aside the refinements and insights brought by Śaṅkara. A comparative study of the commentaries of Nimbārka, Śaṅkara, Śrīnivāsa and Rāmānuja compels one to conclude that Nimbārka appears to be the earliest and the most primitive among them all.

It has also been shown that Nimbārka is not acquainted with the *Kārikās* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. There is nothing in the *Saurabha* to warrant any extra knowledge of the Sāṅkhya on his part than that of the Sūtrakāra himself. Besides, Nimbārka's preference to the term *Tāntrikas* for the Sāṅkhyas indicates that he identifies the Sāṅkhya system with the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*, a later systematization of which is the *Kārikās* of Īśvarakṛṣṇa. It is also noticed that Nimbārka refutes the *Śāktamata* under BS 2.2.42-45. It shows that Nimbārka is aware of a rather developed philosophical school of the Śāktas. Therefore, even if Nimbārka were a pre-Īśvarakṛṣṇa

Vedāntin he cannot be placed before the fifth century A.D., for it is found that the development of the Śākta school, as warranted by the *Saurabha* 2.2.42-45, took place only by the fifth century A.D. (late Gupta period). It prompts one to place Nimbārka between the later half of the fifth century A.D. and the first half of the sixth century A.D.

But the study of the *Kaustubha* in chapter five compels us to place Śrīnivāsa, the alleged disciple of Nimbārka according to the *guruparaṁparās*, in the post-Śaṅkara period. It only supports the findings in chapter two that the list of the *guruparaṁparās* cannot be relied upon to determine the actual succession in the Nimbārka Sect. The gap between Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa is of a few centuries. It also explains why there is conflicting traditional accounts even concerning the real name of Nimbārka, his parents, his place of birth, etc. as pointed out in chapter two. Therefore, Śrīnivāsa's claim of being a disciple of Nimbārka demands only that he belongs to the tradition of Nimbārka just as the claim that Nimbārka himself makes of his being a disciple of Nārada can mean only that he belongs to that tradition of Vaiṣṇavism.

The claim that Nimbārka is one of the earliest *vṛttikāras* on the *Brahmasūtras* is supported by the Vedānta Vaiṣṇava philosophy as expounded in the *Saurabha*. In the present work a detailed study has been made of the doctrines of the Saurabhakāra concerning Brahman, the jīva, the jagat, the bondage, the cause of this bondage, the means of liberation, the state of liberation, the *bhedābheda* relation between Brahman, the Ultimate cause and the jīva-jagat, the effects, etc. As a Vaiṣṇava philosopher Nimbārka identifies the Absolute Brahman with Vāsudeva Ramākānta Puruṣottama. But, as we have noticed, there is no "sectarianism" in the entire *Saurabha*. The *Saurabha* also lacks any understanding of the popular *bhaktimārga* as a means for liberation. His understanding of *bhakti* is that of meditation (*dhyāna*). He has also no idea of a *Vaikuṇṭha* or *Goloka*. All these point to one fact that the *Saurabha* of Nimbārka belonged to a time prior to the development of the popular *bhakti* movements.

Studies so far made on the philosophy of Nimbārka failed to make a distinction between the primitive and archaic thoughts of the Saurabhakāra and the later development of

the Vaiṣṇava thought as found in the writings of the later followers of the Nimbārka as well as the later spurious works attributed to the founder *ācārya*.

According to Nimbārka, Brahman is the only entity (*sat*) and we all share in His ontological existence. Nimbārka explains this fact through various philosophical concepts like the *nimittakāraṇa* and the *upādānakāraṇa*, *satkārya*, *brahmapariṇāma*, *aśśāśśībhāva*, etc. We have also demonstrated that Nimbārka seems to perceive a difference between the application of the terms like *nimittatva*, *upādānatva*, *pariṇāmatva*, *aśśīn* etc. when applied to Brahman and when used in our ordinary language. Hence these terms are to be understood in a "non-material" or ontological sense. Being the *upādānakāraṇa* of the created reality Brahman not only pulsates within the entire creation in so far as the created world is co-substantial with Him, but also transcends them all and ever remains as the Other, the Ultimate, the One, the Infinite, the Absolute and the Beyond.

Nimbārka defends the individuality and the personal perfection of the *jīva* in the state of liberation. The state of bondage only veils these perfections of the *jīva*, which it shares in its ontological participation with Brahman. In liberation these perfections become manifest. The *jīva* retains its distinction even in the state of liberation. Nimbārka also accepts the reality of the material creation. According to him even the material world will find its lasting destiny in Brahman in and through man. The material elements will attain *tadātmya* with Brahman.

Nimbārka is an exponent of the *bhedābheda* relation between Brahman and *jīva-jagat*, which as **Ghate** points out seems to be a more archaic philosophical expression. The *bhedābheda* as propounded by Nimbārka keeps clear of the Scylla-charybdis syndrome of the absolute identity and absolute difference between Brahman and the created world. All the monistic theories attempt to explain the experiences of oneness to the neglect of difference. The creationism, and the *dvaitavāda* neglect the experience of unity and oneness. The *bhedābheda* takes into account the totality of human experience. But the real problem with the *bhedābheda* of the *Saurabha* is that it lacks details.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

Chapter 1

1. The Saurabhakāra does indeed criticise and refute the doctrines of the non-vedic schools like Sāṃkhya, Śākta, etc. *Vide infra* p. 149 ff.
2. From the epithet given to Nimbārka in the colophon as *Śrīmad bhagavan* it appears that the colophon is added to the *Saurabha* at a later stage, when Nimbārka has already been recognized as an authority on religious matters.
3. Later it will be shown that the *Saurabhakāra* cannot be the author of some other works attributed to Nimbārka. *Vide infra* p. 45 f.
4. *Saurabha* 1.1.1. *anantācintya-svabhāvika svarūpaguṇaśaktiādibhir brhattamo yo ramākāntaḥ puruṣottamo brahma śabdābhidheyaḥ*.
5. For example, *Vide Saurabha* 1.1.2. 1.4.14, 1.4.17,
6. For example, *Vide Saurabha* 1.2.9-10; 13, 17; 1.3.8; 12, 24, 40, 42 etc.
7. *Ibid*, 1.1.4, *tasmāt sarvajñaḥ sarvācintya śakti viśvajanmādi hetur vedaikapramāṇagamyāḥ sarvabhinnā bhinnobhagavān vasūdevo viśvātmaiva jñānāsāviṣayaḥ*.
8. *Ibid*, 1.2.19; 27; 1.3.9; 12, 13, 14, 16, 42, 44; 1.4.23 etc.,
9. *Ibid*, 1.2.19; 2.3.13 etc.
10. R.N. **Dandekar**, (1) 1979, p. 213.
11. Pāṇini IV, 3.98 Cf also **Dandekar**, 1974 pp. 205-210.
12. D.C. **Sircar**, 1942, pp. 90-91.
According to **Sircar**, the Besanagar inscription reads:
Devadevasya Vā (sude) vasa guruḍadhvaḥ ayam kārīte i(a) Heliodorena bhāgavatena diyasaputrena takhasilākena yonadūtena āgatena mahārājasa Antalikenasa upā(m)tā sakāsam rājñokaliputasa Bhāgabhadrasa trātārasa vasena (catu) dasamnarājena Vadhamānasa....
13. Cf. Pāṇini IV 3. 98, **Dandekar**, 1979, pp. 213-215

14. Cf. Kautilya's *Artha Śāstra* XIII, 3, 67.
Cf. also Ghosundi stone inscription of Sarvatāta and Nanaghat cave inscription of the Sātavāhana Queen Nāyanikā.
Vide S. Jaiswal, 1967, pp. 51-60.
Cf. *Kāśikā* on Pāṇini VIII, 1.15.
Cf. also Dandekar, 1979, pp. 238-240.
15. Cf. Dandekar, 1979, pp. 216-218 and pp. 241-245. He opines that the Yādava hero Kṛṣṇa might have been the same as Devakiputra Kṛṣṇa, mentioned in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad* III, 17.1 as the pupil of Ghora Āngirasa.
16. R.N. Dandekar, 1979, pp. 223, 245-248
R.G. Bhandarkar, 1913, p. 37
Debala Mitra, "The Abhiras and their contribution to the Indian Culture", PIHC, Jaipur, 1951, pp. 91-100.
17. R.N. Dandekar, 1979, pp. 248-250.
18. H.C. Ray Chaudhuri, 1936, pp. 109-110
19. S. Jaiswal, 1967, p. 71.
20. *Ibid*, p. 74.
21. J.F. Fleet (Ed.) "Inscription of the Early Gupta Kings" (CII : III), London, 1888, pp. 270-271.
22. *Vāyupurāṇa*, 2.35. 1- 2.
23. S. Jaiswal, 1967, pp. 41-44.
24. (a) Mrinal Dasgupta, "Early Viṣṇuism and Nārāyaṇīya Worship" in *IHQ*, Vol. VIII, 1931, pp. 108-109, 346 ff.
(b) R.C. Hazra, 1958, pp. 14 and 216.
(c) R.N. Dandekar, 1979, p. 261.
(d) S.K. De "Sects and Sectarian Worship in the Mahābhārata, Our Heritage (Bulletin of the Department of Post Graduate Training and Research, Sanskrit College, Calcutta, Vol. I, 1953, P.20 f.
25. S. Jaiswal, 1967, pp. 75-76.
According to her The *Tait. Ār.* 10.1.6.1 invocation *Nārāyaṇāya vidmahe vāsudevāya dhīmahi tanno viṣṇuḥ procodayāt* is a later interpolation even as late as the Gupta period.
26. F.O. Schrader, 1916, Adyar Library, Madras.
27. The absence of the *Vyūhavāda* in the *Bhagavadgītā* is very significant.
28. J.N. Banerjea, 1966, Calcutta, p. 45; 1974, Delhi, p. 93.
29. R.G. Bhandarkar, 1913, p. 49.

30. R.N. Dandekar, 1979, p. 256.
31. R.P. Chanda, 1916, p. 100.
Munsiram Sharma, 1958, p. 235.
He opines that the *Parāśara Purāṇa*, *Vasiṣṭha-Saṁhitā*, *Śuka-Saṁhitā*, *Āsvalayana-Smṛti* etc. condemn the *Pañcarātras*. In contrast to this tendency of the *dharma-sāstras*, we have *Yāmūnācārya* in the 11th century making all out effort in his *Āgamaprāmāṇya* to defend the vedic nature of the *Pañcarātras*.
32. (a) *Manu Smṛti*, 5-180.
(b) *Parama Saṁhitā*, 3-47 (Ed. and Tr. G.S.K. Aiyangar, GOS LXXXVI Baroda, 1940.)
33. S. Jaiswal, 1967
34. D.C. Sircar, 1942, p. 159 ff.
35. J.N. Banerjea, 1966, p. 52.
36. D.D. Kosambi, 1951, p. 3.
37. Cf. (1) *Epigraphia Indica*. Vol. III, Calcutta, pp. 305-6.
(2) S. Jaiswal, 1967, pp. 36, 47, 48.
38. Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, *Tantravārtikam* 1.3.3.3. and 4.
39. Bāṇabhaṭṭa, *Harṣacaritam*, 8.5. (Ed. P.V. Kane, Bombay, 1917).
40. *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* on BS 2.2.42.
Yady apyevam jātīyako'mśaḥ samānatvān na viśaṁvādagocarō bhavati api tu aṁśāntaram viśaṁvādashānam ity atas tat pratyākhyānāyārambhaḥ.
41. *Ibid.*
42. It is to be noted that in his *bhāṣya* on the *Bhagavadgītā* he considers the *Bhāgavatamatam* as *aupanīṣadam matam* (13.31). His reverence for *Sāligrāma* and *Viṣṇupratimā* is seen in various commentaries, e.g., *Gītā* 4.24 BS 1.3.14, 1.2.14, 1.2.7, 3.3.9, 4.1.3, 4.1.5, *Chānd* 8.1.1., 6.16.3.
43. *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* on BS 2.2.42-45.
44. For example while quoting *Mbh* . 12. 339. 14-15 in the *Saurabha* 2.3.46 Nimbārka avoids a line which contains the name of Nārāyaṇa, namely: "Sa hi nārāyaṇo jñeyaḥ sarvātmā puruṣo hi saḥ" and quotes the preceding and subsequent lines only:
*Tatra yaḥ paramātmā' sau sa nityanirguṇaḥ, smṛtaḥ...
na lipyate phalaiścāpi padmapatram ivāmbhaśā
karmātmā tv aparo yo' sau mokṣabandhaḥ sa yujyate.*

The implications of the above text are that either Nimbārka avoids the mention of *Nārāyaṇa* or that this portion of the text has a post-Nimbārka origin, which may mean that "Nārāyanization" of Mahābhārata took place in post-Nimbārka days.

45. The *Pañcarātra* theory of creation seems to be influenced by the *Śākta tāntric* understanding of creation. Cf. *Ahīrbudhnya-Saṁhitā* 3.28-30.
46. Rāmānuja defends the *Pañcarātra* doctrine of *Vyūhavāda* in BS 2.2.42-45. Madhava defends the *Pañcarātra Āgamas* in BS 1.1.3.
47. In a number of places the Saurabhakāra calls the ultimate reality as Bhagavān. For him Brahman is *Puruṣottama-Ramākānta-Bhagavān Vāsudeva*.

e.g. 1. *Saurabha* 1.1.4 The object of enquiry is Lord Vāsudeva alone, omniscient, possessed of all inconceivable powers, the cause of the origin and the rest of the universe, known through the evidence of the Veda alone, different and non-different from all and the Soul of all. All scriptures are in concordance with regard to Him alone – this is the settled conclusion of the followers of the Upaniṣads (Viz. the Vedāntins)

2. *Saurabha* 1.1.1

An enquiry is to be instituted, at all times, into the Highest Person – Ramā's Husband (*Ramākāntaḥ Puruṣottamaḥ*), denoted by the term 'Brahman' the greatest of all because of His Infinite, inconceivable and innate nature, qualities, powers and so on... (Translation by Roma Bose. The translation of the *Saurabha* texts is taken from VPSK, Vol I and II)

48. J.N. Banerjea, 1966, p. 40.
49. In chapter four below we will show that the *Saurabhakāra* is the *pūrvapakṣin* of Śaṁkara in a number of places. Therefore the question of defending the Bhāgavata religion against any attacks of Śaṁkara does not arise at all.
50. Madhva too rejects Śāktavāda under these very *sūtras* and is here silent about the *Vyūhavāda*. But it must be pointed out that Madhava is familiar with a developed form of Śāktism than Nimbārka (Cf. *Vide infra*. chapter six) and very intelligently he defends the *Pañcarātra* system by elevating its scripture to an equal status with the Veda (Cf. *Madvabhāṣya* on 1.1.3 and 1.1.15).
51. *Vide infra*. chapter three.
52. *Vide infra*. chapter four.

53. Cf. *Saurabha* 3.3.30, 3.3.40-41. Nimbārka never mentions *Vaikuṇṭha* or *Goloka* the favourite term used by the later Vaiṣṇavas to denote heaven. According to him the Jīva attains the world of Brahman through *Brahmopāsana* (*Saurabha* 3.3.40). In fact very little of Sectarianism can be found in the *Saurabha*. The idea of the *Saurabhakāra* on *bhakti*, *karma* and *jñāna* as means to liberation are far less developed than those in Rāmānuja. *Vide infra* chapters VIII to X.
54. Roma **Bose**, 1943, . 8-12.
We will examine the traditional claim that Nimbārka is the author of works like *Rādhāṣṭakam*, *Kṛṣṇāṣṭakam*, *Prātaḥsmaraṇa stotram* etc. *Vide infra* chapter two.
55. *Saurabha* 1.1.1.
56. *Amarakosa* 1.1.27: *Lakṣmī padamālayā padmā kamalā śrīrharipriyā indirā lokamātā mā kṣīrodatanayā ramā, bhārgavī lokajanani kṣīrasāgarakanyakā*.
57. U.N. **Dhall**, 1978, p107.
A.B. **Keith**, 1928, p. 413.
58. There is no trait even of any influence of the Rādhākṛṣṇa cult and philosophy on the Saurabhākara in his understanding of Brahman, world, the means to attain Mokṣa, and the state of Mokṣa itself.
59. *Ācāryacaritam*, pp. 34-35, 42-48. See chapter two for a detailed discussion on the historical validity of *Ācāryacaritam*.
60. The traditional Nimbārka school accepts that Nimbārka is the author of *Daśa Ślokī* in which Rādhākṛṣṇa cult is advocated as the primary means to liberation. *Vide infra* chapter two.
61. J.N. **Banerjea** (1974, p. 422) points out that in archaeological investigations only reliefs belonging to late medieval and modern periods illustrate the cowherd (*Gopāla*) Kṛṣṇa's dalliance with the cowherdesses (*Gopis*), the chief among whom was Rādhā.
62. *Viṣṇu-Purāṇa* 1.6, *Mbh.* 1.16. 90-95, *Harivaṃśa* 2.51.31.
63. S.C. **Mukherji**, 1966, p. 183.
64. S.B. **Dasgupta**, 1958, p. 101.
65. R.G. **Bhandarkar**, 1913, p.37.
Debala Mitra, *The Ābhira and their contribution to the Indian culture*. PIHC, Jaipur, 1951, p. 91.
66. For a comparative account of the *Rāsakṛīḍā* given in the

various *Purāṇas*. vide S.N **Tadpatrikar**, "The Kṛṣṇa Problem, ABORI, X, 1930, p. 269 ff.

The attempt to see references to Rādhā Kṛṣṇa-dalliance in the *Kuravai* dance of Māyāvan and Nappinnai (Pinnai) mentioned in *Silappadikāram* of the Tamil classical literature is without any significant success because the hero and the heroine in the *Kuravai* dance are Māyāvan and Nappinnai and not Kṛṣṇa and Rādhā.

67. *Gāthāsaptasāti*, 1.29 II.12, 14, V.42
68. *Gāthāsaptasāti* 1.29; could be translated as "Oh Kṛṣṇa by removing the dust (*raised by the cows*) from the face of Rādhikā with the breath of your mouth, you are stealing away the pride of these Bālavis and all other women".
69. A.B. **Keith**, 1928, Oxford, p. 224.
70. S.C. **Mukherji**, 1966, p. 186.
71. (a) Prabhosa (near Allahabad) inscription, (dating, perhaps to seventh century A.D.) according to Bühler (see E.I. II 482) reads: *śrīkṛṣṇagopīrūpakarttā...*
 (b) Mahavallipuram sculptures dating seventh century A.D. show Kṛṣṇa surrounded by the *Gopas* and *Gopis*.
 (c) Belāva inscription (E.I. Vol. 12, pp. 37-38) dating 8th century A.D. contains an inscription of king *Vanamāladeva* of Assam stating "*gopījanānandita mānasasya...*" Vide also S.C. **Mukherji**, 1966, p. 189.
 (d) Mandor (Mandavipura the ancient capital of Marwar) pillar reliefs depict only the various phases of Kṛṣṇa's early life centred around stories found in the *Harivaṁśa* and the *Bhāgavata* (Vide J.N. **Banerjea**, 1974, pp. 421-22.

In none of these archaeological depictions, any importance is given to Rādhā. We have already noted that in the early *Purāṇas* including the *Bhāgavata* there is no mention of Rādhā (Cf. f.n. 66 *supra*).

Some of the Gauḍīya Vaiṣṇava Goṣyāmins such as Sanātana Gosvāmin and Jīva Gosvāmin in their commentaries on the *Bhāgavata* took great pains to find Rādhā in the following stanza of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* which reads:

"Anayārādhito nūnam bhagavān harir īśvaraḥ
 Yan no vihāya govindaḥ prīto yām anayadrah"

(Bhāg p . 10-30.24)

It is very important to note that Śrīdhara Svāmin has not said anything about Rādhā in this stanza in his commentary on the *Bhāgavata*. It needs a lot of imagination to find Rādhā in "ārādhitaḥ"

72. (a) Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa in the Nāndi of *Veṇisaṃhāra* prays:
*Kālindīyāḥ pulineṣu kelikupitām utsrjya rāse rasam
 gacchantīm anugacchato' śrūkaluṣām kaṃsadvīṣo rādhikām
 tat pāda pratimāniveśita padasyodbhūtaromodgater
 akṣuṇṇo nunayaḥ prasannadayitādrṣṭasya puṣṇātu vah*
 (b) Vākpati (in the *Gaudavaḥo* 1.22) describes the marks of
 nails and bangles of Rādhā on the chest of Kṛṣṇa.
 (c) Ānandavardhana (in the *Dhvanyāloka* II.9) refers to Rādhā
 and creeper grove near Kālindī.
 (d) *Saduktikarṇāmṛta* (attributed to *Abhinanda*) 54.2 refers
 to the Rādhākṛṣṇa dalliances in the creepers grove on the
 banks of Kālindī.
73. *Rādhāmādhavayorjayantiyamunākule rahaḥ kelayāḥ. Vide
 Jayadeva's "Gītagovindam"*
74. A.K. Majumdar, "A note on the development of the Rādhā
 cult" *ABORI*, Vol. 36, 1955, p. 238.
75. *Ibid*, p. 239.
- These inscriptions contain the same benedictory verse in
 praise of Viṣṇu, which reads: may the active body of the
 enemy of Māra (i.e. Kṛṣṇa) which the face of Lakṣmī could not
 please, which the waters of the ocean could not cool, which
 the lotus of the lake of his own navel was powerless to pacify
 and which could not be soothed by the fragrant breath
 issuing from Rādhā's separation protect you.
76. S.B. Dasgupta, 1958, p. 100.
77. Perhaps due to the *Pañcarātra* and *Tāntric* influence on
 Vaiṣṇavism.
78. A.K. Majumdar, The Anavada inscriptions are the earliest
 available document for the existence of Rādhā cult., *ABORI*,
 Vol. 36, 1955, pp. 231-257.
79. S.B. Dasgupta, 1958, p. 130.
80. Only the late Purāṇas like *Padma*, *Mahābhāgavata*,
Brahmavaivarta mention Rādhā.
81. S.B. Dasgupta, 1958, p.130
82. It is a significant element for the identification of Rādhā with
 Lakṣmī, for the early Purāṇas present Lakṣmī as born of
 Padmā and even the Sāgara.
83. S.B. Dasgupta, 1958, p. 130.
84. A.K. Majumdar, 1955, p. 248.
85. H.H. Wilson, (Vol. III, 1864, p. 120) considers that the
 present form of the *Brahmavaivarta purāṇa* has originated

about four centuries ago with the Vallabhācārya and the Gosvāmins of Gokula.

R.C. **Hazra**, (1940, pp. 166-167) feels that the *Brahmavaivarta* was most probably composed in the eighth century A.D., with various revisions and additions down to the sixteenth century A.D. C.M. **Brown**, (1974, p. 21 and 37) establishes that the earlier form of the *Brahmavaivarta* was "Brahmaite" in nature. In the course of subsequent versions and editions it was slowly transformed into a *Vaiṣṇavite* text. *Vide infra* chapter five for some more details on the *Brahmavaivarta purāṇa*.

86. *Brahmavaivarta Purāṇa*, Śrīkr̥ṣṇa Janmakhaṇḍa, chapter 15.
87. S.B. **Dasgupta**, 1958, p. 106.
88. S.B. **Dasgupta**, (1958, p. 139) points out that there is a favourite Bengali saying: "Kānūchāḍa gītā nāi" (without Kṛṣṇa no lyric).
89. *Ibid*, p. 276.
90. See our assessment of this traditional belief in the next chapter.
91. See *Vedānta Kaustubha* 1.1.1.
92. *Vide infra*. chapter five on Śrīnīvāsa.
93. *Vide infra*. p. 53.
94. *Saurabha* 1.3.8. The plenty, taught by the highest teacher, the venerable Sanatkumāra, to our preceptor, the reverend Nārada, in the passage "But the plenty alone should be enquired after" (*Chānd* 7.22.1) is not the vital-breath, but the Highest Person. Why? "Because of the teaching" of the Plenty as "above" the vital-breath.
95. R.G. **Bhandarkar**, 1913, p. 41 (Here I have no intention to investigate the actual authorship of the *Nārada pañcarātra*).
96. D.D. **Kavisvara**, 1965, p. 39.
97. AC p. 56, p. 57, SN p. 4. SNM pp. 7-8.
98. *Nārada Bhakti Sūtra* 83
"ityevaṃ vadanti janajalpa nirbhayā ekamatāḥ kumāravyāsa śuka sāmṇīlya-garga-viṣṇu kauṇḍinya śeṣoddhavarūṇi balihanumad vibhīṣaṇādayo bhaktyācāryā.
99. We consider Nimbārka is the *pūrvapakṣin* of Śaṅkara in some parts of the *Śaṅkarabhāṣya*. *Vide infra* chapter four.
100. BS 3.3.32 *Yāvad adhikāram avasthītīr ādhikārikāṇām*.
101. *Saurabha* 3.3.32 of Vasiṣṭha and the rest, on the other hand, "there is abiding so long as the office lasts", owing to the influence of the works of which their office is the result.

102. Śāṅkarabhāṣya 3.3.32 "Sanatkumāro'pi brahmaṇa eva mānasah putrah svayaṁ rudrāya varapradānāt-skandatvena prādurbabhūva. Evamevadaḥśanāradaprabhṛtīnām bhūyaś dehāntarotpattiḥ kathyate tena tena nimittena smṛtau.
103. Saurabha 1.1.1. "...bhagavatprasadeṣuṇā tad darśaneccāhampateṇācāryaikadevena śrīguru bhaktyekahārdena mumukṣuṇā..."
104. L.K. Goswami, 1972, p.53.
105. Gopal Misra **Kaviratna**, "Damoda devaghosa ratna", Gauhati, 1976, Introduction, p. VII
106. *Ibid*, p. VIII, Cf. Bhāgavata Purāṇa, 1.4.30, 1.5.2.
107. N.D. Sharma, 1978, Mathura, p.5
108. A.P. Bhattacharya, 1966, pp. 29-30.
109. The Bhedābheda doctrine of Nimbārka also contains two opposite principles of *bheda* and *abheda*.
110. Śāṅkarabhāṣya on BS 3.3.32.
111. The Saurabha, 3.3.32.
112. This original personality of the sage is seen in the Chāndogyaopaniṣad, 7.22.
113. Roma Bose, 1943, p.6.
114. *Ibid*. (Italics mine).
115. Cf. Saurabha 1.3.8.

Chapter 2

1. **Vrajavallabha**, 1974, p. 66. See also f.n. 153 below.
2. *Ibid*., p. 68.
3. AC, pp. 35 and 42-48.
Vrajavallabha, (1974 pp. 10-13) quotes from the following Purāṇas wherein Nimbārka is mentioned as the *avatāra* of Sudarśanacakra.
 (a) Bhaviṣyottarapurāṇa: Bhagavan nimbārka brahmāṇḍa svāmi prādurbbhāva khaṇḍa.
 (b) Vāmanapurāṇa: Valivāmanasamvāde śrīṇiyamānandotpattir dvātriṁśat tamo' dhyāya.
 (c) Bhaviṣyapurāṇa: Pratisarga parvaṇi catūryuga khaṇḍa paraparyyāye kaliyugiyeti hāsasamuccaye rāmānanda nimbārka samudpattivārṇanāṁ nāma saptamo' dhyāyaḥ.
4. Bhāgavata Purāṇa 1.3.6, Kārtike śuklapakṣe vainavamyaṁ.
5. Bhāgavata Purāṇa 1.4.17.

6. The nucleus of this mythology seems to be the incident in *Chāndogyopaniṣad* 7. It seems to be probable that in the succeeding ages the *Purāṇakāras* developed beautiful legends with vivid details around this *Chāndogyān* tradition.
7. The basis of such a belief seems to be the reference that Nimbārka makes to Nārada as his *guru* is *Saurabha* 1.3.8. For the mythological details see AC pp. 7-21, 57-64, also **Kathiyababa** 1972, pp. 23-26.
8. *Vide supra* chapter one for our discussion on Nārada as the *guru* of Nimbārka.
9. AC, p. 48.
10. *Stotraratnāvalī*, Mathura (ed.) 1925, pp. 124-25.
11. Cf. Also the preface of the *Śrutyantakalpavalī* of Puruṣottama **prasāda vaiṣṇava**, Benares (ed.) 1927, p. 4.
Vide also the preface of the *Saurabha*, CSS (ed.) p.3.
12. AC, p. 35.
13. Harivyāsadeva, *Siddhānta Kusumāñjali*, Bombay (ed.), 1925, p.3.
14. *Mañjūṣā*, Benares (ed.), 1907, p. 1
15. The *guruparamparā* given in *Stotraratnāvalī* (pp. 127-136) contains the names of the *ācāryas* of the school including the mythological Haṁsa, the four Kumāras and Nārada. The others are Nimbārka, Śrīnivāsācārya, Viśvācārya, Puruṣottamācārya, Vilāsācārya, Svarūpācārya, Mādhavācārya, Balabhadraācārya, Padmācārya, Śyāmācārya, Gopālācārya, Kṛpācārya, Sundarabhaṭṭa, Padmanābhabhaṭṭa, Upendrabhaṭṭa, Rāmacandrabhaṭṭa, Vāmanabhaṭṭa, Kṛṣṇabhaṭṭa, Padmākarabhaṭṭa, Śravaṇeśabhaṭṭa, Bhūribhaṭṭa, Mādhavabhaṭṭa, Gopālabhaṭṭa, Gopīnāthabhaṭṭa, Keśavabhaṭṭa, Keśavakāśmīribhaṭṭa, Śrībhaṭṭa, and Harivyāsadeva. Since various lists of the *guruparamparā* contains these 35 common names and indicate a split in the Sect after the 31st successor of Nimbārka, called Śrī Harivyāsadeva, it seems certain that the earliest list was made only after the split with the intention of claiming authority and succession. Therefore the question whether such a list, made at a later stage, guarantees an unbroken succession is open.
16. The *Mañjūṣākāra* criticizes the *Pratibimbavāda* (Cf, *Mañjūṣā*, pp. 5-6); *Avacchedavāda* and *Upādhivāda* (pp. 6-7); *Nirguṇavāda* (pp. 60-63) and *Vivartavāda* (pp. 63-69).
Besides it must also be pointed out that since the *Mañjūṣā*

is a commentary on *Daśaślokī* in which *Rādhā* is presented as the divine consort of Hari, it could be composed only after *Rādhā* has acquired "divine status" which according to scholars is after the tenth century A.D. (*Vide supra* p 31).

17. **Kisoridasa**, 1922, p. 2.
18. R.G. **Bhandarkar**, 1913, p. 64.
Jadunath **Sinha**, 1973, p. 1.
19. L.K. **Goswami**, 1972 p.53.
20. AC, p. 48.
21. AC p. 35.
22. *Vide infra* chapter six p 163.
23. "*Siddhāntakusumāñjali*" (Ed. by Vāsudeva Śarman), 1925, p.3.
24. AC, p. 35.
25. AC, p. 48 Cf. also the Preface to *Saurabha*, (CSS ed.) p. 2,
26. *Harivaṃśa* 1.50.23.
Viṣṇudharmottara P. 1.269, 2. 153-64
Bṛhat Saṃhitā, 43, 1-2.
Meghadūta, 2.53.
Mudrārākṣasa, 3.21.
27. *Fleet* (CII 3.19) gives an account of an inscription dating to 424 A.D., stating such a conception. Perhaps the importance of the *Kārtikapūrṇimā* might have prompted the followers of Nimbārka to consider it as his birthday, since he is believed to be an *avatāra* of the *Sudarśanacakra* in order to revive and to propagate the *Bhāgavatadharma*, which was declining due to the stiff competition from the Buddhists and the Jains (Cf. also AC, pp. 42-48, 34-35).
28. Perhaps the belief that he was born on *Kārtikapūrṇimā* might have originated after the *Rādhākṛṣṇa* cult was absorbed into the Nimbārka Sect. According to the *jyotiṣa* books one who is born on *Kārtikapūrṇimā* is born in the very *vaṃśa* of Hari.
29. AC, p. 56.
30. AC, pp. 35, 37, 39.
31. *Ibid*, p. 61.
32. *Ibid*, pp. 34, 37.
33. *Kaustubha*, 1.1.1. SAKV p. 3. T.P. p. 1.
34. SK, p. 3.
35. *Kaustubha*, Manglapāṭha (Vrindāvana edition) 1932, p. 1.
36. *Mañjūṣā*, p. 1.

SJ, pp. 2,6

SS, pp.1.

SAKV, pp.1, 148

VM, p.1

37. AC, pp. 52-56.

38. **Bhaviṣya P.** (Bombay Ed.) *Prati sarga parva*, 4th Khaṇḍa 7. 80-85.

39. *Ibid*, Cf, AC, pp. 52-56.

40. Cf. "*Śrīnimbārka vīkrānti*" attributed to Audumbara muni, stanza 59-62 & 134-137; edited and commented by **Vraja Vallabha Sarana**, Vrindavana, 1941.

41. Roma **Bose**, 1943, p. 4.

42. *Ibid*,

43. AC, p. 96 ff.

44. AC, p. 72: Keśavakāśmirin in the *manglapāṭha* of his *TP* gives another etymological explanation of the name Nimbārka namely that he was like a medicinal fruit (*nimba*) in curing people from the worldly disease and that he was like the sun (*arka*) in removing the darkness of the heart.

Vrajavallabha Sarana (1974, p.68) quotes another etymological explanation from the Samohanatantra in the following stanza:

"*Havirdhānābhīdhās tu cakram āśīnmahāmuniḥ
so'tapyatatapas tīvram nimbakvārthaikabhojanaḥ*"

45. *Vide supra*, fn. 36.

46. LS, p. 1.

47. GM, p. 2.

48. AC, p. 56.

49. It seems that the belief that he was the *avatāra* of Sudarśana was already popular by the time of the *Mañjūśākāra* (i.e. Puruṣottama), who assigns his birth to the Sudarśanāśrama. (Cf. *Mañjūśā*, p.1 Benaras Ed.), 1907).

50. Baldeva **Upadhyaya** considers Nimbārka as the first *Bhāgavatācārya* (*Vide*, *Bhāgavata Sampradāya*; Varanasi, pp. 315-317).

51. It is less probable that the *arka* element came to his name from the belief that he is the *avatāra* of the *Sudarśanacakra* because in that case one has yet to explain how the belief of his being an *avatāra* of the *Sudarśanacakra* originated, since such a belief could naturally originate only after his death. Therefore it seems to be more reasonable to hold that the *arka* element originally belonged to his name and that the

arka element in his name gave rise to the belief that he is the *avatāra* of the *Sudarsanacakra*.

52. It is less reasonable to consider that the *nimba* element came to his name from the legends connected with the *nimba* tree, because such legends lose their *raison d'être* without the former. Besides, as we have seen above, if the Telinga tradition is more probable, the assignment of his birth to Nimbagrāma or Nimbapura is less historical and more etymological.
53. *Kaustubha*, 1.1.1.
54. *Manglapāṭha* of the *Kaustubha*.
55. *Mañjūṣā*, p.1.
56. *Vide f. ns.* 51 and 52 above.
57. During a conversation with me on 12-10-1981 at Śrīji temple at Vrindāvana, **Vrajavallabha Sarana** told me that he had a very hard time in preventing Pd. **Amolakarama Sastri** from completing the incomplete work of Devācārya called *Siddhāntajāhnavī* which is a *bhāṣya* on the *Brahmasūtras*. Only the first *pāda* of the first *adhyāya* of the original work is available. Pd. **Amolakarama** wanted to complete the work. **Vrajavallabha Sarana** had to point out to him that such a method of scholarship would add a lot of historical problems for the schools. Had **Vrajavallabha Sarana** failed in his persuasion, we would have been provided with a *manuscript* of the remaining portion of the *Siddhāntajāhnavī*, naturally attributed to Devācārya, allegedly the twelfth successor to Nimbārka
58. (a) *Śrūtisiddhānta mañjarī* by Vrajesāprasāda, ed. by Ratna Gopala **Bhaṭṭa**, CSS No. 41, Benaras, 1908.
 (b) *Śrutyanta Kalpavallī* by Puruṣottamaprasāda Vaiṣṇava I ed. Gopala Sastri **Nene** CSS No. 356, 357, Benaras, 1927.
 (c) *Śrutyanta Sura drumā* by Puruṣottamaprāsada Vaisnava II ed. Ratna Gopala **Bhaṭṭa**, CSS No, 135, Benaras, 1907.
59. Cf. The first edition of SNKS by **Kisoridasa**, 1922, Etawah.
60. Roma **Bose**, 1943, pp. 10-11.
61. A.P. **Bhattacharya**, 1966, p. 52 ff.
Vrajavallabha, 1974, p. 75.
Kathiyababa, 1972, pp. 87, 112.
62. The entire *Saurabha* is free from any polemic against the advaita theories of Śaṅkara. It is just and proper for a *bhāṣyakāra* to deal with the philosophical problems and to throw out the doctrines of the opponent in the course of the

- bhāṣya* itself rather than complaining against the views of the opponent to the *iṣṭadeva* as done in the SNKS.
63. **Kathiyababa**, 1972, pp. 107-114.
 64. Roma **Bose**, 1943, p. 16.
Vide also **Aufrecht Theodore**, *The Catalogus catalogorum*, p. 428.
 65. S.N. **Dasgupta**, 1952, p. 400, too had a similar fate. In spite of his being unable to verify the said manuscript he jumps to the conclusion that Nimbārka is a post-Madhava *bhāṣyakāra* on the presumption that Nimbārka has really written a work called the *Madhvamukhamardana*.
 66. **Erich Frauwallner** (1973, pp. 320-21) speaks of an *ācārya* called Madhva, belonging to the Sāṅkhya School.
 67. Ānandāśrama Series 113, published with *Tippaṇi* and *Vyākhyā* by **Palghat Narayana Sastri**, Pune 1940. This edition is prepared by K Ramacandra Sastri **Suri** from a rare copy of the *Madhvatatantramukhamardana*, printed in the *grantha* scripts in the Cola country (*Grantha lipyā coḷadeśe mudritam atiprācinam...*) which was in the possession of P.R. Siva Subrahmanya **Sastri**, Head of the *Dharma Śāstra* Department in the Mysore *Pāṭhaśālā* (Vide Introduction to the Ānandāśrama edition p. 9) Dixit himself is said to be the author of the *vyākhyāna* of these stanzas known as *madhavamatavidhvamsa* or *Madhvatatantramukhamardana vyākhyāna*.
 68. R.L. **Mitra**, *Notices of Sanskrit Manuscripts* No. 2826 as pointed by Roma **Bose**, 1943, p. 13.
 69. N.D. **Sharma**, 1978, p. 13.
 70. *The Catalogus Catalogorum* by Theodore **Aufrecht**, Part 2, pp. 14, 64. **Bhandarkar**, 1894, *Report on the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts* p. 56.
 71. *Catalogus Catalogorum*, 1896, Part 2, p. 63.
A.V. Kathavate. *Report on the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts*, Bombay, 1901, p. 29.
 72. *Catalogus Catalogorum*, Part 1, 1891, p. 297.
 73. Roma **Bose**, 1943, p. 178.
 74. *Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Library of the India Office* by Ernest **Windsich** and Julius **Eggeling**. Part IV, London 1894, MS No. 2486.
 75. A manuscript written in 1825 (*Vikrama* year) by Rādhāramanadāsa is with **Vrajavallabha** at Vrindāvana. It also contains the *Śrīnimbārkavikrānti* attributed to

Audumbaramuni. It may be noted that **Vṛajavallabha** has also a manuscript of the work *Stavasmaranīya* written down by a certain *Rādhikādāsa*. Although the name of the scribes of *Svadharmādhva bodha* and *Stavasmaranīya* are different, namely *Rādhāramaṇadāsa* and *Rādhikādāsa*, the hand-writing of the manuscripts is identical.

76. N.D. **Sharma**, 1978, p. 22.
77. **Kathiyababa**, 1972, p. 44.
78. The *Rādhāṣṭakam* is mentioned in AC, pp. 122-125 and the *Kṛṣṇaṣṭakam* is mentioned in AC, pp. 130-133. As we have pointed out earlier the AC is a much later work.
79. In this context it may be pointed out that there was a time when the authorship of even the *guruparaṁparā* was attributed to Nimbārka himself. Vide *Harigurustavamālā* noted in **Bhandarkar's** 'Report of the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts,' Bombay, 1882-1883.
80. Cf. *Prapannasuratarumañjari*, published by **Kisoradasa**, p. 1. It is a commentary on the *Prapannakalpavālī* and is attributed to Sundarabhaṭṭa (Cf. N.D. **Sharma**, 1978, p. 23). **Kisoradasa** has also published a commentary on *Mantrarahasyaṣoḍaśī*, also alleged to be written by Sundarabhaṭṭa named *Śrīmantrārtha rahasya ṣoḍaśī* (Vrindāvana, 1937).
81. PK (Sloka) 4.
82. PK, 19.
83. PK, 24.
84. PK, 4-5.
85. PK, 24.
86. PK, 19.
87. PK, 6-8.
88. PK, 9.
89. PK, 10-11.
90. PK, 12-14.
91. PK, 14.
92. PK, 15.
93. PK, 22-23.
94. PK, 18-21 exhort the devotee to give up all sense of egoity and feel completely merged in his *guru*.
95. The *Mantrarahasyaṣoḍaśī* is a very good instrument in the hands of the *guru* even to demand a type of "complete slavery" from his disciple who aspires for liberation.

96. MRS, 1-2.
97. *Klīm Kṛṣṇāya govindāya gopījanavallabhāya svāhā*. According to MRS, the *mantra* "Om" and the *bījamantra* of the Sect "*klīm*" denote the same reality or have the same meaning. Just as the syllables "a" "u" and "m" contained in "Om" denote *Hari*, *guru* and *jīva* respectively, the syllables "k" "i" and "m" contained in "*Klīm*" denote *Kṛṣṇa*, *guru* and the *kṣetrajña* (Vide MRS 3-5).
98. See the Introduction by Pt. **Ramacandradasa Vaisnava** to the MRS edited by **Kisoridasa**, 1937, pp. 1-4.
99. MRS, 17.
100. MRS, 8.
101. MRS, 9, NB. The idea of Mokṣa in the *Saurabha* is "*brahma sākṣātkārādheto tena saha sāmyam yāti...param sāmyam upaiti* (Cf, *Saurabha* 3.2.26).
For the *Saurabhakāra* mokṣa is not only *Brahmasvarūpalābha* but also *ātmasvarūpalābha*. (*Saurabha*, 4.4.1-2). Thus there is a difference in their understanding of *mokṣa* by the author of *Saurabha* and the author of MRS.
102. MRS, 15.
103. MRS, 13,15.
104. MRS, 13.
105. MRS, 15-16.
106. MRS, 17.
107. MRS, 18.
108. *Saurabha* 1.1.1: *bhagavat prasādepusnā tad darśaneccchālampateṇa. śrīgurubhakttyeka harddena. Saurabha* 4.2.16: *Prasannena vedyenānugṛhito*.
109. *Saurabha* 1.1.1.: *ācāryaikadevena śrīgurubhakttyeka harddena mumukṣuṇā...*
Saurabha 1.3.8: *Paramācāryaih śrīkumārair asmad gurave śrīmannārādāyopadiṣṭo..."*
110. *Saurabha* 3.4.1.
111. *Ibid*, 3.2.24-25.
112. *Ibid*, 1.1.1.; 3.2.24.
113. *Saurabha*, 3.2.24: *bhaktiyoge dhyāne tu vyajyate brahma...sūryāgnyādīnām yathā tadarthikṛtasāadhanābhyāsād āvirbhāvas tad vad brahmano' py avaiśeṣyam brahmaprakāśo bhavati, samrādhana lakṣaṇād upāyād brahmadarśanam bhavati tyarthaḥ...brahma sākṣātkārād heto tena saha sāmyam yāti..."*
114. R.G. **Bhandarkar**, 1913, pp. 65-66.

115. Perhaps on such grounds **Radhakrishnan** and **Bhandarkar** were forced to assign Nimbārka to a post-Rāmānuja period. (*Vide infra* p 67).
Suffice it to say here that such conclusions are based on the wrong premise that PK and MRS are actually the work of Nimbārka.
116. *Saurabha*, 1.3.34 ff.
117. AC, p. 120: Harivyāsadeva, *Siddhānta Kusumāñjali*, p. 3, Bombay edition, 1925.
118. *Vedāntaratnamañjūṣā* of Puruṣottama, ed. by Ratna Gopala **Bhatta**, Benaras, 1907.
119. *Siddhāntakusumāñjali* of Harivyāsadeva edited by Vasudeva **Sarman**, Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay 1925.
120. *Laghumañjūṣā* of Giridhara Prapanna edited by Dhundiraja **Sastrin**, CSS No. 358, Benaras, 1927.
121. DS, 4: Significantly the Saurabhakāra never mentions Kṛṣṇa by name in the entire *Saurabha*.
122. DS, 5: Note also that there is no place for Rādhā in the *Saurabha*.
123. DS, 4-5.
124. DS, 8: The means for salvation according to the Saurabhakāra is *vidyā*, which is also called *Brahmopāsana* or *dhyāna* (*Vide infra* chapter ten).
125. DS, 9 *kṛpāsyā dainyādiyuji prajāyate yayā bhavet premaviśeṣalakṣaṇā*
bhaktir hy ananyādhipater mahātmanaḥ sā cōttamā sādhanarūpikā parā
126. *Ibid.*
127. *Vide supra* p. 31 f.
128. DS, 9.
129. DS, 7.
sarvaṁ hi vijñānam ato yathārthakam śrutismṛtibhyo nikhilasya vastunaḥ
brahmātmakatvāditi vedavinmataṁ trirūpatā' pi śrutisūtrasādhitā!
130. Roma **Bose**, 1943, p. 9.
131. L.K. **Goswami**, 1972, p. 51. It is my suggestion that the DS is an amalgam of various stanzas some of which come from pre-Kaustubha times, put together at a later time when Rādhā cult and *premaviśeṣalakṣaṇā bhakti* became popular among the masses.

132. Keśavakāśmīribhaṭṭa, *Tattva-Prakāśikā*, ed. Baldeo Prasada, Vrindāvana edition, 1908, p. 380.
133. Mañjūśā, 1907, p. 97. It is claimed that a few leaves of *Sadācāraprakāśa* is found in a place called Aruṇaghāta in Bengal. See SNM, p. 9.
134. Sundarabhaṭṭa, *Dvattādvaita siddhāntasetukā*, a commentary on the *Siddhānta jāhnavī* of Devācārya. p. 3. : It is to be noted that it is the same Sundarabhaṭṭa to whom the commentary on PK called *Prapannasuratarumañjarī* and another on MRS called *Śrīmantrārtharahasyaṣoḍaśī* developing the doctrines of *prapatti* and *gurūpasatti* respectively are attributed.
135. AC, p. 56.
136. AC, pp. 34-35, 42-48.
137. Vrajavallabha, 1974, pp. 9-19, 66-72.
138. Kathiyababa, 1972, pp. 123-143, Cf. also A.P. Bhattacharya, 1966, pp. 32, 35-38.
139. As quoted by Vrajavallabha, 1974, p. 12.
140. Kathiyababa, 1972, p. 143.
141. Traditional belief is that the *Kaliyuga* began with the end of the Mahābhārata war, which is believed to have taken place in 3102, B.C. *Vide infra*.
142. A.P. Bhattacharya, 1966, p. 32. points out that from time to time, on the one hand, additions were made in the *Purāṇas* and on the other hand, passages were either deleted or abridged. This fact makes it difficult to judge which verses are part of the original *Purāṇas*. Therefore he concludes that the *Paurāṇic* account of the date of Nimbārka is not above suspicion. (*Vide* also p. 91).
143. Kathiyababa, 1972, p. 93 ff,
144. S.L. Pandey, 1974, pp. 17-26, rejects the identification of the author of *Brahmasūtras* with Vedavyāsa as misleading, unfounded, historically unjustified and patently baseless.
145. Kathiyababa, 1972, p. 93.
146. Shiv Kumar, "A study of the Sāṃkhya thought as found in the Brāhmaṇical systems of Indian philosophy". A doctoral thesis submitted to the University of Poona, 1976, p. 76. Cf. also Ram Suresh Pandey, 1972, p. 78. He opines that the *Sāṃkhya Sūtras* were composed after the time of Vācaspati Miśra.
147. Frazer, Literary History of India, 1920, p. 196.
148. A.B. Keith, *Karma mīmāṃsā*, 1921, p. 5.

149. BS, 2.2.18-32.
150. S.L. Pandey, 1974, p. 27.
151. AC, p. 114.
Cf. Also **Kathiyababa**, 1972, p. 102.
152. *Vide*, chapter on Śrīnivāsa below.
153. As pointed out by Roma **Bose**, the AC begins with the following narration. "Once several highly learned men like Svabhūdeva and the like approached the great sage Harivyāsadeva in the Dhruvakṣetra in Mathura and wanted to hear the biography of Nimbārka, the founder of their Sect. Therefore Harivyāsadeva first made obeisance to his guru Śrībhakṣa and began to tell them about the life and doings of Nimbārka (*Vide* Roma **Bose**, 1943, Calcutta, p. 2).
- Vrajavallabha Sarana**, 1974, p. 75, points out that there were two or three Śrīnivāsas and three or four Puruṣottamas in the Sect.
154. A.P. **Bhattacharya**, 1966, pp. 57-68.
155. **Kathiyababa**, 1972, p. 116.
156. **Kathiyababa** also brings further evidence from the traditional belief that Keśavakāśmīri had a meeting with Śrī Gaurāṅga Mahāprabhu, who is said to be born in 1480 A.D. (i.e. 1542 Samvat). According to **Kathiyababa** perhaps the meeting might have taken place when Śrī Gaurāṅga was 25 years of age. Thus **Kathiyababa**, as a first step, concludes that Keśavakāśmīri lived at least 450 years. He gets a further help from Vimānavihāri **Manjundar** who in his *Śrīcāitanyacaritā kā upādāna* (p. 311) states that Keśavakāśmīri was alive at the time of Vallabha. Therefore the final conclusion of **Kathiyababa** is that Keśavakāśmīri might have lived for 500 years.
Vide **Kathiyababa**, 1972, pp. 121-128.
157. *Vide supra* p. 55.
158. **Kathiyababa**, 1972, p. 115.
159. **Vrajavallabha**, 1974, pp. 78-79. It is to be noted that the list of succession according to **Kathiyababa** (*Vide* **Kathiyababa**, 1972, pp. 66-69) and that of **Vrajavallabha** agree up to Harivyāsadeva (i.e. the 31st successor of Nimbārka). The differences in the list of *guruparamparā* after Harivyāsadeva shows that a major split took place after Harivyāsadeva who had twelve disciples. Perhaps the Nimbārka Sect suffered the consequences of many such earlier splits. **Kathiyababa** follows the Sect led by Svabhūdeva and **Vrajavallabha**

follows the Sect led by Paraśurāma. Both Svabhūdeva and Paraśurāma were two of the 12 disciples of Harivyāsadeva. In fact there are many sub-Sects within the Nimbārka Sect, each having its own special list of *guruparaṁparā*.

160. For example we know practically nothing about the *ācāryas* between Puruṣottama (Mañjūśākāra) and Devācārya (the 12th successor of the school.) See also f.n 90 and 92 in chapter six below.
161. R.G. **Bhandarkar**, 1913, pp. 62-63.
162. N.D. **Sharma**, 1978, pp. 8-9 and 13.
163. There might have been exceptions. It seems that some great men were not denied the right to succession because they had been married before their "initiation". An example in modern times is Śrī Santadāsa, Vide **Kathiyababa**, 1972, pp. 69, 115.
164. S.N. **Dasgupta** (1940, p. 400) is less generous in so far as he assigns only an average of ten to twelve years as the pontifical period of an *ācārya* in the Nimbārka Sect.
165. *Pratisargaparva*, 4th *Khāṇḍa*, 7th chapter, verses 77-79.
166. It has already been pointed out that there is another tradition, also contained in the AC that Nimbārka was born on *Vaiśākhatṛtīya* (Vide *Supra* p. 42).

The belief that Nimbārka was born on *Kārtikapūrṇimā* is based not only on theological reasons as pointed out earlier, but also on astrological reasons because according to some *jiyotiṣa* books like *Bhṛgusaṁhitā* (Cf. *Karmavipāka* chapter of *Bhṛgusaṁhitā*, 4th *Khāṇḍa*, verses 18 ff) declare those who are born on *Kārtikapūrṇimā* as great men. They are born in the very *Varṇsa* of Hari.

167. Vide also **Vrajavallabha**, 1974, p. 14.
168. *Ibid*.

The key to the chart is as follows: *Ca* = *Candra*; *Bu* = *Budha*; *Śa* = *Śani*; *Rā* = *Rāhu*; *Ke* = *Ketu*; *Sū* = *Sūrya*; *Ma* = *Mangala*; *Br* = *Brhaspati*; *Śu* = *Śukra*.

169. **Vrajavallabha**, (1974, p. 14,) too accepts that there is a mistake in the chart, which he attributes to the carelessness of the writer or that of the "proofreader".
170. **Kathiyababa**, 1972, p. 139. It also shows that on the basis of the purāṇic accounts one is able to make more than one horoscope. In fact, we are able to make horoscopes even of hypothetical and mythical personalities. The mere fact of the existence of a horoscope or the possibility of making a horoscope does not *ipso facto* warrant the actual existence of the person, whose horoscope it is supposed to be.

171. Alexander **Cunningham**, 1970, pp. 31-32.
172. *Śrīmad Bhāgavatam*, Ch. 1, verse 66 considers that the *Kaliyuga* began after the death of Kṛṣṇa.
*Yadā mukundo bhagavān kṣmām tyaktvā svapadaṁ gataḥ
tad dināt kalir āyātaḥ sarvāsāadhanabādhakaḥ*
This shows that there is no unanimity among the different traditions about the origin of the *Kaliyuga*.
173. C.V. **Vaidya**, *Śrīman Mahābhārataṭcen Marāṭhi Surasabhāṣāntra*, 1918, Vol. 10, pp. 116-117.
174. Though in this chart *Candra* is not specifically mentioned we can infer it being in the sign *Vṛścika* (Scorpio) in conjunction with *Sūrya*, *Budha*, *Rāhu* and *Śukra*, because on *Amāvāsya* day the *Sūrya* and the *Candra* make an angle of 0° degree.
175. Chart by M.D. **Pandit**, Poona. The plus (+) sign in the chart indicates that the probable position of the planet can be either *rāśi*.
176. *Jayantyām jayarūpiṇyām jajāna jagadīśvaraḥ
yena sarvam idam viśvam vedadharme niyojitam !!
Vide supra p 44.*
177. We have already pointed out that the tradition of placing Nimbārka's birth in the *kārtikapūrṇimā* appears to be prompted by theological reasons. In fact the older tradition seems to be the one that considers Nimbārka to be born on *Vaiśākhatṛtīyā*. If that is true, the older tradition is also against the account given by the *Bhaviṣyapurāṇa*.

Chapter 3

1. Some consider him to be a post-Madhva commentator. A few scholars like R.L. **Mitra** place him even after Vallabha. Cf. Roma **Bose** 1943, p. 17.
2. R.G. **Bhandarkar**, 1913, pp. 87-88.
3. Roma **Bose**, 1943, pp. 14-17.
4. D.D. **Kavisvara**, *Vedāntapārijāta Saurabha*, 1965, Poona, pp. 39 & 49 ff. of his introduction to the book.
Others like S. **Radhakrishnan**, Rajendranath **Ghosh**, Parasuram **Caturvedi**, Pulinavihari **Bhattacharya**, etc., also consider Nimbārka to be a post-Rāmānuja commentator.
Cf. **Kathiyababa**, 1972, pp. 47-55.

5. Manuscripts 709 of the collection of 1884-87, Vide **Bhandarkar**, 1913, p.88.
6. Vide *supra* p. N.D. **Sharma**, 1978, p.8.
B.G. **Tilak** feels that Nimbārka should have lived at least 100-200 years earlier than the date Bhandarkar has assigned him to. See B.G. **Tilak**, 1935, Poona, p. 17.
7. S.N. **Dasgupta**, 1952, Vol. III. p. 400.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Saurabha* 3.3.30.
10. *Ibid*, 4.3.1, 3.3.31.
11. For Rāmānuja the *prathamapakṣa* opponent is generally the *Brahmavādin* while the *dvitīyapakṣa* is the *aupādikabhedābheda*vāda and the *trītiya pakṣa* is the *svābhāvika bheda*bheda vāda.
12. Rāmānuja "Vedārthasaṁgraha" pp. 99-102.
See also p. 103 for further refutation of the *bheda*bheda vāda.
13. *Kaustubha* 2.1.13...*tathā brahma jīvayor api svābhāviko bheda*bheda saṁbandhaḥ..." (See also footnote 22 of chapter five.
14. *Śrībhāṣya* 1.1.1.
15. Hemādri, Caturvarga cintāmani, Vratākhaṇḍa, Chapter II, published by the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta, 1875, p. 784. This stanza is quoted by Kamalākāra Bhaṭṭa (1595 - 1644 AD) in his Nirṇayasindhu, second pariccheda, *brādrapada janmāṣṭamī prasanga*. Venkatesvara press, edition 1849, saka Year; p. 93).
16. The present edition of the *Bhaviṣya purāṇa* does not contain this stanza.
17. **Kathiyababa**, 1972, pp. 120-23.
18. It is also claimed by the scholars of the Nimbārka school that certain stone inscriptions of *Śrīnimbāditya prāsāda* belonging to the 12th century Vikram year are found at Adilabad in Andhra Pradesh (Cf. **Vrajavallabha**), 1974, p. 72.
19. Vācaspati Mīśra criticises the *bhinnābhinnavāda* in a number of places in *Bhāmati*. Cf. *Bhāmati* on *Brahmasūtras* 1.1.4; 1.2.6; 1.4.22; 2.1.12; 2.3.43-6; 3.2.27-30.
20. This is *Sūtra* 1.1.31 according to Bhāskara. He omits the portion *āśritatvād iha tadyogāt*.
21. Since Bhāskara says *anye paṭhanti*, it may mean, from a grammatical point of view that more than two commentators accept this extra *sūtra*. It can also mean that a particular

school or tradition does so. This acknowledgement of Bhāskara that *anye pathanti* an extra *sūtra* here does not necessarily mean that he is aware that Śrīnivāsa also reads this extra *sūtra* here as claimed by **Vrajavallabha** (1974, p. 78).

22. This is *sūtra* 2.3.32 in *Bhāskarabhāṣya*.
23. *Saurabha*, 2.3.31. On the doctrine of an all-pervasive soul, the perception and the non-perception, the bondage and the release of the soul must become eternal. The soul will be either eternally fettered or eternally free. Thus there must be a restriction with regard to the one or the other.
24. *Saurabha*, 2.3.32-39;49.
25. *Vide infra*. chapter four.
26. *Bhāskarabhāṣya* 2.3.29.
27. As will be pointed, Śrīnivāsa reaffirms that the *sūtra* is directed against the vedāntins who accept *cetanabhutātma vibhutvavāda*. (*Vide* chapter five below).
28. *Vide*. *Bhāskarabhāṣya* on BS 2.3.32.

Chapter 4

1. This is *sūtra* 2.3.50 according to Śaṅkara, Bhāskara, Baladeva, etc. Śaṅkara reads the *sūtra* as *ābhāsaḥ eva ca*. Rāmānuja gives two alternative readings, one like Nimbārka and the other like Śaṅkara. Bhāskara reads *vā* instead of *ca*. The general context of the *sūtra* according to the *bhāṣyakāras* is the discussion of the nature of the *jīva*.
2. *Saurabha* 2.3.49.
3. *Ibid*, 2.3.19-31.
4. *Ibid*, 2.3.42.
5. Śaṅkara is also an *ātma vibhutvavādin*. But Nimbārka does not seem to be aware of it. For Nimbārka the *ātma vibhutvavādins* are the followers of Kapila (the Sāṅkhyas).
6. The *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* on BS 2.3.50.
7. *Saurabha* 2.3.48.
8. *Ibid* 2.3.28.
9. Here he quotes *Śvet* 1.6, 1.9, and 5.6
10. For details *vide* *Śrībhāṣya* 2.3.49.
11. Śrīnivāsa includes the doctrine of *Kaṇāda* also here.
12. The fact that Śrīnivāsa does not criticise the Śāṅkarite

theory of the *pratibimbavāda* does not necessarily mean that he should also be a pre-Śaṅkara commentator, because the sole aim of the *Kaustubha* is to explain the *Saurabha*.

13. Cf. P.M. **Modi**, *A Critique of the Brahmasūtra*, Part II 1956, pp. 266-290.
14. For example the lack of unanimity among the various commentators on BS 2.2.42-45.
15. Cf. Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 1.1.4, 1.1.12-19, 1.1.23, 1.1.31, 1.2.23, 1.3.28, 1.4.3, 1.4.14, 2.1.14, 2.1.9, 3.3.33, etc.
Ītābhāṣya, 13, 13; *Chāndogyabhāṣya* 2.23.1, 3.10.10, 7.12.1;
Brhadāranyakabhāṣya, 2.1.20 etc.
16. *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, 1.3.19 *asmadīyāśca kecit....*
Brhadāranyakabhāṣya, 2.3.6 *aupaniṣadamanyā api kecit...*
Māṇḍūkya bhāṣya 3.20 *kecid upaniṣad vākhyākāro brahmavādin...*
17. Padmapāda, *Pañcapādika* published with the commentary *vivarāṇa* of Prakāśātmā, Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series, Benaras, 1891, p. 58.
18. *Ibid*, Vol, II Part I, p. 58, "ity annair api 'svavṛttau varṇitam tathā ca vṛtyantare varṇitam..."
page 64, "....tatra anyaiḥ vṛttikāraiḥ brahmaśabdasyārthāntaram āśamkhyā.....vṛtyantare tu śeṣalakṣaṇā vyākhyātā"
19. G.V. **Buddhakar**, *Is the Advaita of Śaṅkara Buddhist in Disguise*, QJMS, Vol XXIV, Bangalore 1933, Nos. 1-4. p. 260.
20. S.L. **Pandey**, *Pre-Śaṅkara Advaita Vedānta*, Allahabad, 1974, p. 88.
21. Cf. the respective positions of *Bhāmati*, *Ratnaprabhā*, *Nyāyanīmāya* and *Prakaṣārthavivarāṇa* on the references that Śaṅkara makes to other *vṛttikāras* as given in footnote 15 above.
22. G.V. **Buddhakar**, 1993, p.260.
23. M. **Hiriyanna**, "Bhartṛprapañca — An Old Vedāntin", Proceedings and Transactions of All India Oriental Conference III, Madras, 1924.
24. M.T. **Sahasrabuddhe**, "A Survey of the pre-Śaṅkara Advaita Vedānta" 1968.
25. S.L. **Pandey**, *Pre-Śaṅkara Advaita Vedānta*, 1974
26. *Ibid*, p. 150.
27. *Bhāskarabhāṣya*, p. 1, CSS ed, Benaras.

- sūtrābhiprāya saṁvṛtyā svābhiprāyaprakāśanāt
vyākhyātam yair idam śāstram vyākhyeyam tan nirvṛtaye
28. *Ibid.*, 2.2.29: ...ye tu bauddha matāvalambino māyāvādinaste'py anena nyāyena sūtrakāreṇai'va niraṣṭā veditavyāḥ..."
Ibid. 1.4.25: ...vigītam vicchinna-mūlam mahāyānika bauddhagāthitam māyāvādam vyāvṛṇyanto lokān vyāmohayanti.
29. For example, the rejection of māyāvāda by Bhāskara as pointed out in footnote 28 above.
30. Śrībhāṣya 2.3.20. If ātman is taken to be possessed of an all-pervading nature indeed, then the departure, etc. would not fit in.
31. We have pointed out that for the Saurabhakāra the vibhutavādin is Kapila. Cf. Saurabha 2.3.49.
32. Śrībhāṣya 2.3.21. The absence of the simile of grāmasvāmyanivṛtti in Śrībhāṣya may perhaps show that this simile was not very popular in the Bodhāyana tradition.
33. BS2.3.24 avasthītvaiśeṣyād iticen nābhyupagamād hr̥di hi. This sūtra both raises an objection and answers it. The objection is that the two cases of the sandal ointment and the soul are not parallel because the former has a specialized abode while the soul has no such specialization. The answer is that the scriptures declare the heart to be the abode of the soul within the body.
34. For example, the Nṛṇayasāgara edition.
35. Perhaps the scribes of the manuscript might have made a mistake because guṇād va'lokavat can equally be read as guṇādvā lokavat.
36. Śāṅkarabhāṣya 2.3.26-27. They break the sūtra as vyatireko gandhavat and tathā ca darsayati.
37. V.S. Ghate. "The Vedanta", 1926, p. 94.
38. Cf. Saurabha 2.3.28.
39. Śāṅkarabhāṣya 2.3.29: ...The soul is not of atomic size, since scripture does not declare it to have had an origin. On the contrary, as scripture speaks of the highest Brahman entering into the element and teaches that it is their self, the soul is nothing else but the highest Brahman. And if the soul is highest Brahman it must be of the same extent as Brahman. Now scripture states Brahman to be all-pervading. Therefore the soul also is all-pervading.....Nor again could the soul, if it were of atomic size, experience sensations extending over the whole body. If it be said that is possible owing to the soul's connection with the sense of touch, we

deny that assertion....Concerning the light emitted from a lamp we have already shown that it is, not a quality, but rather a different kind of substance.... (when not mentioned otherwise, the translation of the *Śāṃkarabhāṣya* on BS is taken from George **Thibaut** 1904).

40. *Ibid.*If the intelligence of the soul pervades the whole body, the soul cannot be atomic, for intelligence constitutes the soul's proper nature, just as heat and light constitute that of fire. A separation of the two as quality and that which is qualified does not exist...
41. For example, Śāṃkara does not consider *sūtra* 31 (according to his reading) of this *pāda* as stating a *siddhānta* doctrine opposed to what has been considered in the preceding *sūtras*. There are many other instances where Śāṃkara does not consider the *sūtras* containing a *tu* as a reply to a *pūrvapakṣa* view.
42. **Ghate**, 1926, p.96.
43. **G. Thibaut**, *The Vedānta sūtra*, Part I, 1904, Introduction p. LV.
44. **Ghate**, loc cit.
45. *Ibid*, p. 97.
46. *Śāṃkarabhāṣya* 2.3.29.
47. *Śrībhāṣya* 2.3.29: *viññānaguṇa sāravāt ātmano viññānam iti vyapadeśaḥ viññānam evāsyā sārabhutoguṇaḥ. yathā prājñāśyānandaḥ sārabhutoguṇa iti prājña ānandaśabdena vyapadiśyate.*
48. *Saurabha* 2.3.30: During the waking state there is "the manifestation" of "this", i.e. of knowledge, which is "existent" indeed during the states of deep sleep and so on. Hence, the attribute of knowledge does last so long as the soul itself does, just as in youth there is the manifestation of virility and so on, which are existent indeed during childhood.
49. *Śāṃkarabhāṣya* 2.3.31: As in ordinary life virile power and so on, existing potentially only in young children, and being then looked upon as non-existing, become manifest at the time of puberty – and do not originate at that time from previous non-existence, because in that case they might originate in eunuchs also – so the connection of the soul with *buddhi* exists potentially merely during deep sleep and the period of general retraction, and again becomes manifest at the time of waking and the time of creation. This explanation is appropriate, because nothing can be assumed to spring up unless from something else. Otherwise we should

have to suppose that effects spring up without causes. That the rising from deep sleep is due to the existence of potential *avidyā*, scripture also declares, "Having become merged in the true they know not that they are merged in the true. Whatever these creatures are here, whether a lion or a wolf", etc. (*Chānd* VI 9.2.3)...

50. *Brh* 2.4.12: *na pretya saṁjñāsti*
51. *Saurabha* 2.3.31: *sarvagatātmavāde ātmopalabdhyānupalabdhyor bandha mokṣayor nityam prasaṅgaḥ syānnitya baddho vā nityamukto vā'tmeti anyataraniyamo vā syāt.*
52. Śaṅkara accepts the soul not only as all-pervasive but also as having knowledge as its essential nature (Cf. *Śaṅkarabhāṣya* 2.3.18). As will be pointed out in the next chapter Śrīnivāsa attacks the *cetanabhutātmavibhutvavādin* who considers the essential nature of the all-pervading soul as *jñānamātra*.
53. We have pointed out under *sūtra* 28 above that Śaṅkara brings up the discussion on *buddhi* which is not at all demanded by the *sūtra*. Now we know that he discusses *buddhi* under the four *sūtras* in order to explain the present *sūtra*. Here he avoids the arguments against the *sarvagatātmavāda* by Nimbārka, but explains it through the theory of *pratibimbavāda* under *sūtra* *abhāsaḥ eva ca* (*BS* 3.2.50 according to Śaṅkara's reading). Even there Nimbārka is unaware of the *pratibimbavāda* of Śaṅkara.
54. *Vide* our discussion in chapter five (page 141)
55. *Vide Śrībhāṣya* 2.3.32.
56. Since it would be too voluminous to go into a detailed study of all such instances where Śaṅkara seems to be aware of the doctrinal position of the *Saurabhakāra*, we are compelled to bypass many of them, especially those instances where Śaṅkara seems to elaborate the *vṛtti* of Nimbārka on the *BS*. In a number of places Śaṅkara refines the *archaism* of the *Saurabha*, corrects his scriptural quotations by placing them at their proper places. In the following references, the numbering of the *sūtras* is as given in the *Saurabha*. We have already discussed the question of the *anutva* of the *jīva*. Another example could be their commentaries on *BS* 3.3.16 and *BS* 3.4.39. Śaṅkara brings better coherence and order by even dividing the *sūtras*, for example, *sūtra* 3.3.35. In some instances Śaṅkara refines the *sūtras* themselves (for example 3.3.37). Nimbārka seems to be unaware of these facts. There are other instances where Śaṅkara after giving his

own special interpretation of the *sūtras*, incorporates as an alternative what Nimbārka has said. For example, Śaṅkara incorporates into 2.2.40 what Nimbārka has stated in *Saurabha* 2.2.38-39. There are also instances where Śaṅkara incorporates into a previous *sūtra* what *Saurabha* says later and reserves this later *sūtra* to treat some other special scriptural texts and problems. For example in 3.3.13, Śaṅkara adds what Nimbārka has to say at 3.3.14 and reserves *sūtra* 3.3.14 to take up the *Kaṭha* passage. All these may well point out that Śaṅkara appears to reread and readjust the *Saurabha*.

Nimbārka gives due importance to *Karma* and *jñāna* for a *mumukṣu*. There are many references to *Mīmāṃsā sūtras* and examples from *Mīmāṃsā* in the *Saurabha*. That seems to be the reason why Śaṅkara makes an appeal to the *pūrvamīmāṃsā* and points out that one and the same passage cannot refer to more than one thing as understood by Nimbārka in the *Saurabha* 1.1.32.

Vide Śaṅkarabhāṣya on the above *sūtras*.

57. i.e. *sūtras* seven to sixteen according to Śaṅkara.
58. i.e. *sūtras* 4.3.7-11.
59. This division of the *sūtras* by Śaṅkara goes against the general method adopted by the *Brahmasūtrakāra*, who normally gives the view of the *pūrvapakṣin* first and then presents the doctrine of the *siddhāntin*. Interestingly, Śaṅkara is aware that he is going against the normal method. See his *bhāṣya* on BS 4.3.14.
- 60.* *Saurabha*. 3.6-10.
61. *Ibid* 4.3.11-15.
62. V.S. Ghate, 1960, p. 171.
63. Śaṅkarabhāṣya 4.3.14: "....kecit punaḥ pūrvāṇi pūrvapakṣa sūtrāṇi bhavanty-uttarāṇi siddhānta sūtrāṇi ity etām vyavasthām anurudhyamānāḥ para visayā eva gati śrutiḥ pratiṣṭhāpayanti.
64. For example BS 2.2.5-9, BS 3.2.4-6. Here the order of the *sūtras* among themselves, as given by Rāmānuja differs from the order of these *sūtras* given by other *bhāṣyakāras*.
65. This is *sūtra* 4.3.15 according to Śaṅkara. He reads the *sūtra* as *apratikālaṁbanān nayaṭīti Bādarāyaṇa ubhayathā* 'doṣāt tat kratuśca.
66. Ghate, 1960, pp. 171-173.
67. Śaṅkarabhāṣya 4.3.14: "nāhi gatam eva gamyate anyo hyanyad gacchatīti prasiddham loke....

Later on Śaṅkara points out that the going of the soul to Brahman is based on three wrong notions about the individual soul. These are: *firstly* the individual soul is a part of Brahman, *secondly*, the individual soul is an effect of Brahman and *thirdly*, the individual soul is different from Brahman. Śaṅkara rejects all these as wrong hypotheses. Since Nimbārka accepts that the jīva is a part of Brahman and is an effect of Brahman, he must reply to the objections raised by Śaṅkara if he were a post-Śaṅkara vedāntin. At any rate Nimbārka is completely unaware of the objections raised by Śaṅkara.

68. *Ibid*, "tad evam parabrahmavido gantavyādi vijñānasya bādhitatvān nā kathaṁcana gatir upapādayitum śakyā saguṇavidyāviśayā bhaviṣyanti..."

According to Śaṅkara all the scriptural texts speaking of Brahman as possessing of manifold powers and qualifications such as the originator of the universe etc, have only a secondary purport and are ultimately meant to teach the absolute oneness of Brahman. On the basis of various scriptural texts (e.g. *Chānd* 5.3.24, 4.10.5, 4.15.3, 7.1.1. 7.6.5, *Brh* 4.4.6, *Kauṣ* 1.1., *Tait* 2.1., *Praśna* 5.2 etc.) he attempts to establish the existence of a two-fold knowledge; a higher and a lower knowledge, corresponding to higher and lower Brahman. According to him the soul's going falls within the sphere of lower knowledge and applies to the lower Brahman only.

69. See Śāṅkarabhāṣya 4.3.14.
 70. Saurabha, 1.1.1.
 71. Śāṅkarabhāṣya, 1.1.1. : ...nityānitya vastuvivekaḥ ihāmutraphalabhogavirāgaḥ śamadamādi sādhanasampat, mumukṣatvam ca....
 72. Vide for details Kaustubha, 4.1.16, 3.4.32-35.
 73. Vide for details Saurabha, 4.1.15 and Kaustubha, 4.1.15.
 74. Saurabha, 4.1.19: vidvān ārabdhakārye tu sukṛtaduṣkṛte bhogena kṣapayitvā brahma sampadyate.
 75. Saurabha, 3.3.27.
 76. Surprisingly Śrīnivāsa in his Kaustubha 3.3.27 seems to be influenced by the jñāna theory of Śaṅkara. It appears that he reinterprets the doctrine of Nimbārka in the light of Śaṅkara. His using the term jñāni in the beginning of his bhāṣya on the sūtra here amply supports it. Incidentally, it may be noted that Śaṅkara uses the terms jñāni only towards the end of his bhāṣya on this sūtra. Śrīnivāsa's

comments in *Kaustubha* 4.1.19 also points to his awareness of Śaṅkara's attack on Nimbārka. Therefore he clarified the doctrine of Nimbārka better here. (*Vide Kaustubha* 4.1.19).

77. *Vide infra* p. 282.
78. *Saurabha*, 4.4.15.
79. *Saurabha*, 1.3.42, 4.4.17-21.
80. *Ibid*, 4.4.1.
81. *Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, 1.4.21, 3.4.8.
82. *Saurabha*, 4.4.1.
83. *Saurabha*, 4.4.4.
84. *BS* 3.2.27. *ubhayavyapadeśāt tv ahikuṇḍalavat.*
85. *BS* 3.2.28. *prakāśāśrayavad va tejastvāt.*
86. *Vide infra* p. 104.
87. *Saurabha*, 3.2.28.
88. *Vide infra* p. 298.
89. By *pūrvavat* Śaṅkara understands *BS* 3.2.25 while Nimbārka understands it as referring to *BS* 2.1.25 and Rāmānuja as referring to *BS* 2.3.43 and 46.
90. *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* 3.2.29.
91. *BS* 3.2.25 *prakāśādi vaccāvaisēṣyam prakāśaśca karmaṇya' bhyāsāt.*
92. According to Rāmānuja these form *BS* 3.2.26, 3.2.27 and 3.2.28 respectively instead of *BS* 3.2.27, 3.2.28 & 3.2.29 as in Nimbārka.
93. *Vide Śrībhāṣya*, 3.2.28.
94. i.e. *sūtra* 1.1.26 according to Nimbārka.
95. This is *sūtra* 2.3.40 according to Śaṅkara.
96. V.S. Ghate, 1926, p. 95.
97. *Vide* their respective commentaries on *sūtra* 3.2.11 and *Saurabha* 3.2.27-28.
98. *Bhāskarabhāṣya*, 3.2.3.
99. *Vide Śrībhāṣya*, 3.2.3.
100. *Chāṇḍ* 6.8. 6 : *asya somya puruṣasya prayato vāñmanasi sampadyate manaḥ prāṇe prāṇastejasi tejaḥ parasyāṁ devatāyām.*
101. *Vide* footnote 106 *infra*.
102. *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* 4.2.1.
....the *pūrvapakṣin* maintains that speech itself is merged in

the mind...to this we reply that only the function of speech is merged in the mind. But how can this interpretation be maintained, considering that the teacher (in the *sūtra*) expressly says 'speech in the mind'? — True, we reply, but later on he says "There is non-division, according to scriptural statement (*sūtra* 16), and we therefore conclude that what is meant in the present *sūtra* is merely cessation of the function of speech. For if the intention were the absorption of the thing (i.e. the organ of speech) itself, there would be "non-division" in all cases, and for what reason then should "non-division" be specially stated in another case (i.e. in the case of which *sūtra* 16 treats)? The meaning therefore is that the different functions are retracted and that while the function of the mind continues to go on the function of speech is retracted first....

103. *Ibid.*, "Śabdo'py asmin pakṣe'vakalpate, vṛttivṛttimator abhedopacārād ity arthaḥ.
104. *Saurabha* 4.2.1 ...vāg indriye uparate'pi manaḥ pravṛtti darśanāt...
105. Cf. *Kaustubha*, 4.2.1.
106. It seems that the adjectival phrase *saṁyogarūpa* found in *Saurabha* 4.2.1 is an interpolation, because that phrase sounds awkward when we take the entire *Saurabha* on this *pāda*. Nimbārka consistently insists on a literal interpretation of the *sūtra* in this *pāda*. Therefore the original position of Nimbārka could have been *vāgindriyasya manasi sampattir ucyate* instead of the present reading *vāgindriyasya manasi saṁyogarūpa sampattir ucyate*. Śrīnivāsa is aware of the argument of Śaṅkara that the mind is not the material cause of speech. Therefore the addition of *saṁyogarūpa* has a meaning in the *Kaustubha*. We have already pointed out that the tendency for interpolation has played havoc with the doctrine of the *pūrvācāryas* in the Nimbarka school.
107. Bhāskara, one of the *bhedābhedavādins*, as usual throws his lot with Śaṅkara throughout this *pāda*, thereby clearly showing the influence Śaṅkara has on him.
108. *Śrībhāṣya* 4.2.1. ...manaso vākprakṛti tvabhāvāt tatra vāksvarūpa saṁpatty asaṁbhavāt. vāgādivṛttinām mano'dhīnatvena vṛtti saṁpatti śrutiḥ kathamcid upapadyate iti evaṁ prāpte....
109. *Ibid.*, 4.2.1. na hi tadānīm vṛtty uparame vāgindriyam paramāṇāntareṇopalabhyate yena vṛttimātraṁ sampadyate ity ucyeta.

110. *Saurabha* 4.2.3 "tacca prāṇena samyujyate" manaḥ prāṇa (Chānd 6.8.6) ity uttara śabdāt.
111. Śāṅkarabhāṣya 4.2.3.
112. *Ibid*, tad apy āgrhūtabāhyedriya vṛttiḥ mano vṛttidvāreṇaiva prāṇe praliyate ity uttarād vākyād avagantavyam.
113. Śrībhāṣya 4.2.3.
114. *Saurabha* 4.2.4. The prāṇa is united with the jīva, why? On account of the texts indicating 'its approach' viz. 'Thus verily, do all the prāṇas approach together to the jīva at the time of death (Brh 4.3.38). He going out, the prāṇa goes out after him' (Brh 4.4.2) 'Or, who staying should I stay' (Prasna 6.3). The prāṇa, connected with the jīva is united with fire— this is the resultant meaning.
115. *asya saumya puruṣasya prayato' vān manasi saṁpadyate' manaḥ prāṇe prāṇas tejasi tejaḥ parasyām devatāyām.* (Chānd 6.8.6).
- Nimbārka treats elaborately only the merging of the prāṇa in the soul, and all of a sudden, jumps to the conclusion that the prāṇa connected with the soul, is united with fire: "this is the phalito'rthaḥ" (the resultant meaning) such a conclusion pre-supposes certain detailed discussion which is not found in the available *Saurabha*. Perhaps that is a trait of his style.
116. Nimbārka accepts the merging of the prāṇa in the jīva, as demanded by the sūtra. Śāṅkara as usual accepts the merging of the function of prāṇa in the jīva. Besides, Nimbārka seems to be unaware of the reasons advanced by Śāṅkara for the merging of the functions only.
117. Śāṅkarabhāṣya 4.2.4.
118. Rāmānuja might have derived this simile perhaps from a similar one concerning one's travelling from Srughna to Pāṭaliputra via Mathura, given by Śāṅkara in the following sūtra.
119. It is unlikely that such a mention of Mathura would be left out by a post-Śāṅkara Śrīnivāsa if the Nimbārka school of vedānta had an earlier connection with Mathura and Rādhākṛṣṇa cult.
120. *Saurabha* 4.2.12 ... There is no such contradiction, since that is a denial of the departure of the sense organs "from the embodied soul" the topic of discussion is clear from the reading "of some", viz. "from him the vital-breaths do not depart" (Śat. Br. 14.7.2,8). scripture denies their departure from that alone.

121. The *Brh* 4.4.6 reading *tasya* seem to cause misunderstanding. Therefore Nimbārka points out that *Śat. Br* 14.7.2.8 reads *tasmāt* thereby removing all ambiguity. That these variations belong to the *Kāṇva* and the *Mādhyaṇdina* recensions respectively is made clear by the *Śrībhāṣya*.
122. These are *sūtras* 12-13 according to the *Saurabha*.
123. *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* 4.2.12.
124. i.e. *sūtra* 4.2.13 according to Śāṅkara, which reads "*spaṣṭo hyekeṣām*."
125. For example *Brh* 3.2.11, 4.4.2, 4.4.6 etc.
126. *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* 4.2.13: ...*tatsāmānyāt na tasmāt prāṇā utkrāmanty atraiva samavanīyante'ity atrāpy abhedopacāreṇa dehāpādānasyaivotkramaṇasya pratiśedhah...*
127. *Ibid...* *na ca brahmavidah sarvagata brahmātmabhūtaṣya prakṣiṇakāmakarmaṇa utkrāntir gatir vā upapadyate, nimittābhāvāt. "atra brahma samaśnute" iticaivānjāti yakāḥ śrutayo gaty utkrāntyor abhāvam sūcayanti.*
128. *Kaustubha* 4.2.12. It is one of those few instances where Śrīnivāsa clearly rejects the doctrine of Śāṅkara, without naming him.
129. *Kaustubha* 4.2.13 ...By the texts: By that light, this soul goes out (*Brh* 4.4.2), "He assumes another newer and a more auspicious form" (*Brh* 4.4.4) and so on, it is suggested that during the state of transmigratory existence, the sense organs of the embodied soul depart in order that there may be the origin of a new body— and it is this that is denied here. Further, it is suggested that at the time of the knower's departure from the final body, set up so long by the work the effects of which have already begun, he is separated from the sense organs — and this too is denied. The sense is that these sense organs accompany him as he proceeds through the path of gods, and are not separated from him prior to his attaining Brahman. In the reading "of some" branches, viz. "From him the sense organs do not depart (*Śat Br* 14.7.2.8), there is an explicit denial of the departure of the sense organs from the embodied soul, mentioned as the topic of discussion thus "He who is without desire, who is free from desire, who has attained his desire" (*Śat. Br* 14.7.2.8) and indicated as an ablative by the fifth case ending. (Translation of the *Kaustubha* texts are from Roma Bose 1940 and 1941).
130. *Vide Śrībhāṣya* 4.2.12.

Chapter 5

1. Vide the various *guruparaṁparās* such as the ones given in *Strotraratanāvalī* (pp. 127-136), *Laghustavāvalī* (pp. 9-11) and *Śrīnimbārkaśa tan matañ ca* (pp. 6-7) Vide supra footnote 15, chapter two.
2. AC, p. 114.
*dharmabhṛtām varīṣṭasya yudhiṣṭarasya bhūbhṛtaḥ
rājyād uttarakālē' bhud vajranābho nṛpottamaḥ
śasāsāsau mahābhāgo mathurāmaṇḍale mahīm
tadā Śrīnivāsācārya gurūṇāñ śaraṇaṁ gataḥ!*
A.P. **Bhattacharya** (1966, p. 96) considers that Vajranābha is the founder of the kingdom of Śurasena in the sixth century BC.
3. AC p. 96 ff. It is said that when Ācāryapāda came to the hermitage of Nimbārka on a world-conquering mission, Nimbārka performed a miracle by showing the *arka* (sun) above *nimba* tree in order to enable the guest to have his meals in spite of being late at night. For, the sages are not allowed to eat anything after the sun set. (Vide a similar story in chapter two above).
4. AC, p. 143.
5. N.D. **Sharma**, 1978, pp. 25-26, Vide also NUS, p. 81.
6. A.P. **Bhattacharya**, 1966, pp. 98-100.
7. **Vrajavallabha**, 1974, p. 79.
8. *Kaustubha* 2.2.28.
9. Chawkhamba vidyābhavan ed., Varanasi, 1964, p. 67.
10. ed. Swami **Dvarikadasa Shastri**, Bauddha Bharati Series 3, Varanasi 1968, p. 205.
11. It is said that Dharmakīrti is called *Viprabhīkṣu* because originally he was a Brahman but later became a Buddhist monk. On that account he was popularly called *Viprabhīkṣu*.
12. **Kathiyababa**, (1972, pp. 109-112) defends the pre-Dharmakīrti days of Śrīnivāsa on the ground that these texts in the *Vedāntakaustubha* of Śrīnivāsa are interpolations from the *Vedāntakaustubhaprabhā* of Keśavakāśmirin. Thereby he also acknowledges that in the past, some zealous scribes in the Sect have manipulated the original writings of the *ācāryas*. Since there is a general acceptance in the school of Nimbārka that the above text is that of Śrīnivāsa, we do not go into a detailed examination of the position of **Kathiyababa**. Besides, even if the text in question is an

interpolation in the *Vēdantakaustubha*, we have ample evidence to prove the post-Śaṁkara nature of the *Vedāntakaustubha*.

13. A.P. **Bhattacharya**, 1966, pp. 78-79.
14. *Ibid*, pp. 81-82.
15. *Saurabha* 1.3.8, *Vide supra*, chapter one. A later disciple can also consider himself as led by the command of the founder *guru* to undertake any good deeds. He also does the meritorious deeds for the *prasāda* of the founder *guru*.
16. A.P. **Bhattacharya**, 1966, pp. 79-80.
17. V.S. **Ghate**, 1926, p. 79.
18. An objection is already contained in the *sūtra* itself which reads *bhoktāpatter avibhāgaś cet syāllokavat*.
19. *Kaustubha* 2.1.13. ... "Moreover, there will not be any distinction between the enjoyer and the controller, because the group of enjoyers being non-different from the controller, the enjoyer will become the controller, and the controller, the supreme soul, will become the enjoyer. In ordinary life, to begin with, the distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed is well known, thus "The individual soul is the enjoyer, the body and the rest are the objects enjoyed" and in the Veda too, thus "Eats the sweet berry" (*Muṇḍaka* 3.1.1, *Śvet* 4.6). Similarly the distinction between the enjoyer and the controller, too, is well known in ordinary life as is evident from the conduct of the good who always regard their pleasures and pains as dependent on the Lord; and in the Veda too, thus: "He alone makes one do good deeds" (*Kauṣ* 3.8). "The soul which is without the Lord is bound, because of being an enjoyer" (*Śvet* 1.8) and so on. Thus "on account of becoming an enjoyer, there is non-distinction" and hence the doctrine of the causality of Brahman cannot be accepted"....
20. *Śaṁkarabhāṣya* 2.1.13... "The distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment is well known from ordinary experience the enjoyers being intelligent, embodied souls, while sound and the like are the objects of enjoyment. Devadatta, for instance is an enjoyer, the dish (which he eats) an object of enjoyment. The distinction of the two would be reduced to non-existence if the enjoyer passed over into the object of enjoyment, and vice versa. Now this passing over of one thing into another world actually results from the doctrine of the world being non-different from Brahman. But the sublation of a well-established distinction is objectionable,

not only with regard to the present time when that distinction is observed to exist, but also with regard to the past and the future, for which it is inferred. The doctrine of Brahman's causality must therefore be abandoned, as it would lead to the sublation of the well-established distinction of enjoyers and objects of enjoyment.

21. *Kaustubha* 2.1.13 ... "The author states the correct conclusion in the words "It may be, as in ordinary life". That is, on our view, too, there may, indeed, be a distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed, as well as between the enjoyer and the controller, "as in ordinary life". In ordinary life, although pots, dishes and the rest, having the lump of clay as their material cause; bracelets, earrings and the rest, having gold as their material cause, foams, waves and the rest, having the sea as their material cause; and leaves, fruits and the rest, having the tree as their material cause; are all non-different from their respective causes, there is still a mutual distinction amongst the particular effects themselves. In exactly the same manner, there may be a mutual distinction between the enjoyer and the object enjoyed, although they are non-different from Brahman, having Brahman as their material cause. Similarly, in spite of their non-distinction there may still be a distinction between the enjoyer and the controller, just as pots, dishes and the rest, though by nature non-different from the clay, as having no existence and activity apart from the clay, are yet by nature different, too, from the clay possessing as they do their own particular attributes which the clay lacks. The same should be known to be the case with the gold and bracelets and the rest too. Likewise, there is a natural relation of difference — non-difference between Brahman and the individual soul. *There is, indeed, no inconsistency here.* Hence it is established that the doctrine of the causality of Brahman is not open to the above objections (Italics mine)."
22. Rāmānuja seems to be referring to Nimbārka when he says: *yattu parair brahmakāraṇavāde bhoktr̥bhogyavibhāgābhāvaṃ śaṅkya samudraphenatāṅgaḍṣṭāntena vibhāgapratipādanaparaṃ sūtraṃ vyākhyātaṃ tadayuktam.*

He gives the reason for rejecting such an interpretation when he states: *antarbhāvitaśaktyavidyopādhikād brahmaṇaḥ sṛṣṭim abhyupagacchatām, evam ākṣepa parihārayor asaṅgatatvāt.* Here Rāmānuja seems to reject the interpretation of the *sūtra* by Nimbārka, Śaṅkara and Bhāskara. For, Nimbārka accepts the creation of the world from

Brahman by *svāsādhāraṇasāktimattvāt* (Saurabha 2.1.23). It is well known that Śāṅkara considers the creation to be due to *avidyā* and Bhāskara as due to *upādhi*. Thus this reference of Rāmānuja points out the priority of Nimbārka over Rāmānuja.

Significant also is the fact that Rāmānuja speaks of these other philosophers after presenting the view of the author of the *Dramiḍabhāṣya*, thereby making a clear distinction between the philosophy of Dramiḍācārya and that of Nimbārka. On this count, it is not possible to accept the position of Lalita Krishna **Goswami** that Nimbārka and Dramiḍācārya are one and the same historical person. (Cf. L.K **Goswami** 1972, Allahabad, p. 60 ff.)

23. Śāṅkarabhāṣya 2.1.13 ... "To the preceding objection we reply. It may exist as in ordinary experience. Even on our philosophic view the distinction may exist, as ordinary experience furnishes us with analogous instances. We see, for instance, that waves, foam, bubbles and other modifications of the sea, although they really are not different from the sea-water, exist, sometimes in the state of mutual separation, sometimes in the state of conjunction, etc. From the fact of their being non-different from the sea-water, it does not follow that they pass over into each other, and, again, although they do not pass over into each other, still they are not different from the sea. So it is in the case under discussion also. The enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment do not pass over into each other, and yet they are not different from the highest Brahman. And although the enjoyer is not really an effect of Brahman, since the unmodified created himself, in so far as he enters into the effect, is called the enjoyer (according to the passage "Having created he entered into it" (*Tait. Up.* 2.6). Still after Brahman has entered into its effects it passes into a state of distinction, in consequence of the effect acting as a limiting adjunct just as the universal ether is divided by its contact with jars and other limiting adjuncts. The conclusion is, that the distinction of enjoyer and objects of enjoyment is possible, although both are non-different from Brahman, their highest cause, as the analogous instance of the sea and its waves demonstrates."

24. Vide Śāṅkarabhāṣya, 2.1.14.

25. BS, 2.1.14-19 according to the reading of Nimbārka. Śāṅkara divides the *sūtra* 17 into two.

26. *Kaustubha* 2.1.14 "In the first chapter, Brahman has been described many times as different from the sentient and the non-sentient, in order that there may be a proper discrimination between the peculiar natures of these three realities respectively. Here, on the other hand, the non-difference of the world, the effect, from Brahman the cause, resulting from the absence of separate existence, activity and the rest (on the part of the former) has been established under the aphorism: If it be objected that (in that case the effect must be) non-existent (we replay) no, on account of there being a negation merely" (*BS*, 2.1.7) and so on. Now, with a view to confirming the stated conclusion, the author is refuting the view of the Vaiśeṣikas who hold that the effect is non-different from the cause, but is something which originates (i.e. is an absolutely new creation).
27. *Ibid.* ... "The compound (*tad anyatvam*) is to be explained as follows. There is non-difference between the two, viz. the cause and the effect, or, there is non-difference of that, viz. the world, the effect, from Brahman, the cause, or there is non-difference of the effect from that, viz. the cause. That is the effect, which is of the form of the sentient and the non-sentient, which is limited, has many names and forms, and is dependent, is non-different from Brahman, the supreme cause, possessing the sentient and the non-sentient as his powers, unlimited, denoted by words like "one", "without a second" and so on, capable of abiding voluntarily in the causal state and in the effected states, and prior to the entire universe..."
28. *Ibid.* "Among these, the meaning of the text beginning with the world "beginning" (*ārambhaṇa*) is as follows:
The *Chāndogya*s, having made an initial statement to the effect that through the knowledge of the material cause there arises the knowledge of all the effects, in the passage: "Whereby the unheard becomes heard, the unthought thought, the unknown known" (*Chānd* 6.1.3), state a parallel instance to establish it, in the passage: "Just as, my dear, through one lump of clay, everything made of clay may be known — the effect, having its beginning in speech is a name, the reality is just the clay" (*Chānd* 6.1.4). That is, just as "through one lump of clay" being known as clay "everything made of clay" i.e. the group of the evolutes of clay, may be known, since they are all made of clay; — for such a group of evolutes 'has its beginning in speech' i.e. meaning, and "name" i.e. word. The function of speech rests on these two, viz. meaning and word, e.g. we say: Fetch water by the pot.

Hence, "the truth" is that the evolute, characterized by having a broad bottom and resembling the shape of a belly, having the name "pot", and conducive to the function of fetching water and so on, is "just clay". That is, the view that the effect is different from the cause, on account of the difference of individuality and conception, is incorrect, for it is not possible to attribute the individuality or the conception of a pot to the wind and the rest which are different from clay. If the effect is to originate from the non-existent simply, then that would lead to the origin of everything everywhere, as well as to the futility of the activity of the agent. So desist from further arguments."

29. Under *sūtra* 1.3.7. Śaṅkara says that the distinction between the individual soul and Brahman is no more real than that between the ether within a pot and the universal ether.
30. Under the same *sūtra* 2.1.13 Śaṅkara too has accepted such an interpretation from a practical point of view.
31. Cf. Roma **Bose**, 1940, p. 287.
32. Śrīnivāsa brings again the example of "the tree and leaves" under *sūtra* 2.1.22, to show that there is no absolute identity between the *jīva* (the effect) and Brahman (the cause). According to him, just as the leaf, though non-different from the tree, is yet not the tree, so is the case with the *jīva* and Brahman. Such a contention is defective because the *dṛṣṭānta* shows only a physical connection, not a metaphysical relation.
33. An alternative reading of the text is "*yadūrdhvaṃ gārgī divo yadadhastāt prthivyāḥ ye cobhe dhyāvāprthiyor yadantarakṣaṃ yad bhūtaṃ yadbhaviṣyac ca.* (Vide Vrindavana ed. of the *Kaustubha*, p. 84).
34. Bhāskara as it is well known accepts most of what Śaṅkara has expanded throughout his *bhāṣya*. Therefore, he could be called a "non-believing follower".
35. For example, the first of the two interpretations of Śrīnivāsa on *BS* 1.1.3 (*Śāstrayoniṭvāt*) agrees with the only interpretation of the *sūtra* by Nimbārka and with the second interpretation of the same *sūtra* by Śaṅkara, while Śrīnivāsa's second interpretation agrees with the first interpretation of Śaṅkara. Again, the second interpretation of *BS*, 1.4.2 *sūkṣamam tu tad ārhatvāt*, by Śrīnivāsa appears to be a summary of what Śaṅkara has given in his *bhāṣya* on the same *sūtra*. In the same way, the second interpretation of the *sūtra* 2.1.7 *asad iti cen na pratiṣedhamātratuṭvāt* seems to be influenced by Śaṅkara's interpretation of the *sūtra*.

Similarly the first interpretation given by Śrīnivāsa on BS, 2.2.4 *vyatirekānaṣasthiteśca na pekṣatvāt* is similar to the interpretation of Śaṅkara.

36. We may point out that *bhāṣya* of Śrīnivāsa on the following *sūtras*, among others, seems to be influenced by Śaṅkara.
- | | | |
|--------------|----------------------------------|-----------------|
| 1.1.19,20,26 | 2.4.16,17 | 3.4.10-12,29-31 |
| 1.2.5,22 | 3.1.1,4,5,13,20,24,25 | 4.2.1,4,12 |
| 2.1.7,13,22 | 3.2.7,10,11,18,32,37 | 4.3.3 |
| 2.2.4,21. | 3.3.1,10,21,23,26,49,51,55,58,59 | |
| 2.3.46,47 | | |
37. Saurabha, 3.2.19: *Sūryād ambu dūrasthaṁ gr̥hyate, tad vad aṁśīnaḥ sakāśāt sthānasyāgrahaṇād dṛṣṭāntavaiṣamyam iti.*
38. Cf. Śaṅkarabhāṣya, 3.2.19.
39. Saurabha, 3.2.20
40. BS, 3.4.32 : *vihitatvāc cāśramakarmāpi*
 BS, 3.4.33 : *sahakāritvena ca*
 BS, 3.4.34 : *sarvathāpi ta evobhaya līṅgāt*
 BS, 3.4.35 : *anabhibhavam ca darsayati*
41. Both may be indebted to the Śabarabhāṣya on the *pūrvamīmāṁsā sūtra* 4.3.5 for the example of *khādīra* wood.
42. Such influence of Śaṅkara on Śrīnivāsa is seen elsewhere also in his commentary. For example, in *sūtra* 1.3.2 Śrīnivāsa considers the *sūtra* as referring to *Muṇḍaka* 2.2.8 and 3.2.8 as referred to by Śaṅkara rather than *Muṇḍaka* 3.1.13 as referred to by Nimbārka. The reason perhaps may be that the scriptural texts that Śaṅkara quotes are better suited to explain the *sūtra*.
- It must also be mentioned in this context that Śrīnivāsa seems to be influenced by Śaṅkara in the interpretation of BS 3.2.9: *sa eva tu karmānusmṛtiśabda vidhibhiyaḥ*. Nimbārka interprets the compound as (i) *karmānusmṛti* (remembrance of works) (ii) *śabda* (text) and (iii) *vidhi* (injunction) while Śrīnivāsa follows the example of Śaṅkara and breaks the first compound as (i) *karma* (ii) *anusmṛti*, followed by (iii) *śabda* and (iv) *vidhi*.
43. BS 3.4.40. *tadbhūtasya tu nātad bhāvo jaiminer apinīyamāt tad rūpābhāvebhyah.*
 Śaṅkara reads the *sūtra* slightly different, viz. *niyamātad rūpābhāvebhyah.*
 BS, 3.4.41 : *na cādhikārikam apipatanānumānāt tadāyogāt.*
 BS, 3.4.43 *bahis tūbhayathā'pi smṛter ācārāc ca.* Śaṅkara takes the *sūtra* as an *adhikaraṇa* by itself.

44. *Saurabha* 1.2.11 "the two souls, entered into the cave, should be known to be two sentient beings, viz. the jīva and the Paramātmān. Why? Because that is seen; i.e. because it is found that this section designates the entering of these two alone — of the Supreme Soul in the passage (*Kaṭha* 2.12)and of the individual soul in the passage (*Kaṭha* 4.7).....
45. *Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, 1.2.11 ...*tatra saṁśayaḥ..kim iha buddhijīvau nirdiṣṭau uta jīvaparamātmānau iti*.
46. *Kaustubha*, 1.2.11 ...*tatra saṁśayaḥ kim iha buddhijīvau guhām praviṣṭav iti nirdhīṣṭam uta jīva paramātmānau iti*.
47. *Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, 1.2.11 ...*pibantau'iti ca dvivacanena dvayoḥ pānaṁ darśayati śrutiḥ ato buddhikṣetrajñapakṣastāvan na sambhavati*.
48. *Kaustubha*, 1.2.11 *guhām hṛdayalakṣaṇām praviṣṭau ātmānau hi cetanau eva*.
49. *Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, 1.2.11 *chatrino gacchantīty ekenāpi chatrinā bahūnām chatritvopacāradarśanāt. evam ekenāpi pibatā dvau pibantāv ucyete*.
50. *Ibid*, *yadvā jīvas thāvat pibati, īśvaras tu pāyayati*.
51. *Kaustubha*, 1.2.11.
52. *Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, 1.2.11.
53. *Kaustubha* 1.2.11. The statement of Śrīnivāsa "asya gordvitiyo' nveṣṭavya: ity ukte gaur evānviṣyate nāśvo na gardabha'iti mahābhāṣye sthitam" seems to be a direct reference to *Patañjali's Mahābhāṣya on Pāṇini* 1.3.19. Therefore Śrīnivāsa cannot at all be assigned to a pre-Patañjali times as claimed by the traditionalists.
54. For instance in *Kaustubha*, 2.1.22, 2.2.4 and 3.4.35.
55. For instance in *Kaustubha*, 4.2.4, 3.3.49.
56. For instance in *Kaustubha*, 3.4.43.
57. See chapter four above.
58. For example, the defence he makes for the reality of created world in *Kaustubha* 3.2.22.
59. *BS* 2.3.31. *nityopalabdhyanupalabdhiprasango'nyatara niyamo vā nyathā*.
60. See chapter six for Nimbārka's criticism of the Sāṅkhya System.
61. *Bhāskarabhāṣya*, 2.3.32.
62. *Ibid*, 2.3.29.
63. *Kaustubha* 2.3.31.

"This aphorism is meant for indicating the defects in the view of those who maintain the all-pervasiveness of the soul which is consciousness. 'Otherwise' i.e. on any view other than our view, viz. that the soul is possessed of the essential attributes of being a knower, knowledge by nature and atomic in size i.e. on the doctrine that the soul is consciousness merely and all-pervading, there must be the consequence of eternal perception and non-perception. On account of the all-pervading soul being ever unenveloped, there will be perception, on account of the existence of mundane existence, non-perception. In this way, there will result simultaneous bondage and release or restriction with regard to the one or the other"There must be eternal bondage alone on the part of the soul which is consciousness merely and immobile, or there must be salvation alone — such a restriction will result

64. A.P. **Bhattacharya**, 1966, p. 74.
65. *Saurabha*, 2.3.31, 2.3.49 f.
66. Cf. *Bhāskarabhāṣya*, 3.2.29.
67. *Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, 2.3.18.
68. *Ibid*, 2.3.29. ...*parasya ca brahmaṇo vibhutvam āmnātārṇ tasmād vibhurjīvaḥ*.
69. *Kaustubha*, 1.1.1. Today this text forms a part of the *Daśaslokī*. See chapter two for comments on *Daśaslokī*.
70. It must be pointed out, that even if the DS in the present form were available to Śrīnivāsa, he left out those verses that give any importance to Rādhā. It is also significant to note that, although Śrīnivāsa identified Brahman with Kṛṣṇa in the *Kaustubha* 1.1.1, he never makes any mention of Rādhā in the entire *Kaustubha*. Nor does he advocate Kṛṣṇa-cult as the only means for salvation as propounded in verse 8 of the DS.

Incidentally it may be pointed out that Śrīnivāsa introduces the three stanzas (i.e. stanzas 3,4 and 7 of the extant DS) with the phrase *yathāhuh*, which shows that they are not his own creation, but are borrowed. Perhaps even the author of the DS might also have borrowed these stanzas from some common sources. Anyway the omission of the stanzas connected with Rādhā worship as well as the non-mention of Rādhā in the entire *Kaustubha* in spite of the occasions to do so, shows that Rādhā might have entered the Nimbārka school only some time after Śrīnivāsa.

71. *Brahmavaiivarta Purāṇa* (Anandāśrama edition, Poona 1935)

2.26.70, *avaśyam eva bhoktavyam kṛtam karma śubhāśubham...*

72. *Kaustubha* 4.1.13. ...Now, the author shows how on the rise of knowledge all obstructions cease immediately. The text "Just as water does not cling to the lotus-leaf, so no evil deeds cling to one who knows this" (*Chānd* 4.14.3) declares that there is the non-clinging of the subsequent sins on the part of a knower.... If it be suggested: In accordance with the declaration "A work done, good or bad, must necessarily be experienced" (*BVP* 26. 70) and so on the consequences of the work done must necessarily be undergone. Hence the non-clinging and destruction of subsequent and prior sins are not justifiable, the scriptural texts of (*Chānd* 4.14.3.5; 5.24.3; *Muṇḍaka* 2.2.9) about such non-clinging and destruction simply refer to the cessation of works the consequences of which have already been undergone.
73. *Ibid*, ... "On the attainment "of knowledge", ..."the non-clinging and destructions of the subsequent and prior sins" are justifiable....This designation too cannot be taken to be referring to works the consequences of which have already been undergone since the destruction of such works holds good equally in the case of a non-knower, and since the declaration "A work which is not experienced does not decay even in hundreds of millions of ages. It must be experienced necessarily" (*BVP* 26.70) and so on, refers to the case of the non-knowers, and to works which have begun to produce consequences...."
74. H.H. **Wilson**, 1864, Vol. I, pp. 119-120.
75. F.S. **Growse**, too considers the Goswāmins as the authors of the present extant *BVP*. Cf. *Mathura* a district memoir, with numerous illustrations. (North-Western provinces and Audh Government Press 1883, p. 74).
76. R.C. **Hazra**, 1940, pp. 166-167.
77. C.M. **Brown**, 1974, pp. 23-29.
78. *Ibid*, p. 25. Cf. also Anand Swarupa **Gupta**, "The apocryphal character of the extant *Brahmavaivarta Purāṇa*", *Purāṇa*, Vol. III, 1961, Varanasi, p. 96.
79. *Ibid*, pp. 23-24, Also Edward C. **Sachau**, (Tran.) Alberuni's India, Vol. I, 1910, p. 131.
80. R.C. **Hazra**, 1940, pp. 2-4.
81. *Ibid*, p. 166.
82. C.M. **Brown**, 1974, p. 29.

83. According to **Wilson** (Cf. the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa* "A system of Hindu Mythology and Tradition, edited by Fitzedward Hall. 5 vols. (Vols VI-X of **Wilson's** work, London, (Trubner and Co.) 1864-1877, Preface, pp. LXV-LXVI) the original content of BVP might have been what *Mat P* 53.33-35 describes. It reads as follows (The *Purāṇa*) which gives an account of the *Rathantarakalpa* (as related) by *Sāvarni* to *Nārada*, joined with a glorification of *Kṛṣṇa* (*Kṛṣṇamahātmya*), (and) in which the history of *Brahmavarāha* is repeatedly told, consisting of eighteen thousand (*śloka*s) is called the *Brahmavaivarta*. Whoever makes a gift of the *Brahmavaivarta Purāṇa* in the month of *Māgha*, on an auspicious day during the full moon is honoured in *Brahmaloka*.
84. In spite of the fact that he is familiar with BVP Śrīnivāsa does not advocate any type of *Rādhā* worship in the *Kaustubha*. Perhaps the observation of A.K. **Majumdar** is correct that BVP was re-written by the Goswamins of Gokula in order to extol *Rādhā* and her worship (*Vide supra*) which has definitely taken place after the time of Śrīnivāsa.
85. BVP. 4.12.18 *Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series* (1935) p. 560, line 20.
86. BVP 4.129, 81 *Ibid*, p. 898, line 27.
87. BVP 4. 129. 74, *Ibid*, p. 899, line 2.
88. *Madhvamukunda*, "*Parapakṣagirivajra*" (Mathura ed.), 1935.
89. *Kaustubha*, 1.1.1. "atha tu tadājñayā tad uktavartamanā tad anugraha-kāmena tacchisyena mayā..."
90. We have pointed out earlier that neither the AC nor the various *guruparaṁparās* can be taken as historical or chronological records. For example, according to the AC and the various *guruparaṁparās* the immediate disciple of Śrīnivāsa is Viśvācārya (Cf. AC, p. 143). But *Puruṣottama*, the author of the *Vedāntaratna-maṇjūṣā*, who is considered to be the disciple of Viśvācārya, makes obeisance, not to Viśvācārya, but to Śrīnivāsa as is evident from the following *mangalapāṭha* of the *Maṇjūṣā*.
- yoḥ brahmeśasurarṣivanditapado vedāntavedyo haris
tam vande manasā girā ca śirasā śrīśrīnivāsam gurum.
kanthe yasc cacāsti kaustubhamanirvedānta tatvātmako
bhakteḥ śrīrṣṭdayeśaraṇyamagateḥ kārūṇyasindhū mudā.
- He also refers to Śrīnivāsa as his *guru* in the concluding verse of the same *Maṇjūṣā* (p. 148). He refers to Śrīnivāsa again and again in the *Maṇjūṣā* (for example pp. 127-134 etc.) Similarly according to the *guruparaṁparās* and AC, the *guru*

of Keśavakāsmīribhaṭṭa is Gāṅgalabhaṭṭa (Cf. also the *mangalapāṭha* of TP), but Keśavakāsmīri in his *bhāṣya* on *Brahmasūtras* called "*Vedāntakaustubhaprabhā*" makes obeisance, not to Gāṅgalabhaṭṭa, but to Mukunda, which shows that either the author of TP is a different Keśavakāsmīribhaṭṭa from the author of the *Vedāntakaustubhaprabhā*, or the author of AC and the *Guruparamparās* were not interested in historical or chronological facts.

91. Cf. *Saurabha* 1.3.8. See also the discussion on this claim of Nimbārka in chapter one.
92. It must be pointed out that *ācāryas* belonging to different traditions are also claimed by some later scholars of Nimbārka school as belonging to the Nimbārka tradition. For example the list of the *guruparamparās* given by **Kisoridasa** in his *Śrīnimbārkaśtan matañca* (1922, pp. 6-7) contains the name of *Bhāskarācārya*, the *aupādika* *bhedābhedavādin*, as the second successor of Nimbārka, after Śrīnivāsa. **Kisoridasa** has left out the name of the twenty-sixth successor called Keśavabhaṭṭa from the list so that the total number of the successors of Nimbārka before the great split after Harivyāsadeva is preserved as thirty.

Chapter 6

1. *Saurabha*, 2.2.10.
2. *Ibid*, 1.4.11.
3. *Ibid*, 1.4.1. If it be objected that in the text of the *Kaṭha*-branch viz. "Higher than the *mahat* is the *avyakta*, higher than the *avyakta* is the *Puruṣa*" (*Kaṭha* 3.11) "What is derived from inference i.e. *pradhāna* too is found mentioned. See also *Saurabha*, 1.4.5 where he says that what is higher than *mahat* is not the Sāṃkhya *pradhāna* but the intelligent Supreme Soul.
4. *Saurabha*, 1.2.23.
5. *Ibid*, 1.3.12.
6. *Ibid*, 2.3.48 f.
7. *Ibid*, 2.3.1-6.
8. *Ibid*, 2.3.7.
9. *Ibid*, 2.3.9.
10. *Ibid*, 2.3.10.
11. *Ibid*, 2.3.11.
12. *Ibid*, 3.1.11.

13. Saurabha, 2.4.8.
14. *Ibid*, 1.4.2.
15. *Ibid*, 2.4.8-13, 3.3.10; 4.2.12.
16. *Ibid*, 2.3.15.
17. *Ibid*, 2.4.6.
18. *Ibid*, 2.4.9.
19. *Ibid*, 2.4.10-12.
20. *Ibid*, 2.3.17.
21. *Ibid*, 2.3.42.
22. *Ibid*, 1.4.3.
23. *Ibid*, 1.4.11.
24. *Ibid*, 2.2.10; 1.1.5.
25. *Ibid*, 1.4.2.
26. *Ibid*, 1.4.7.
27. *Ibid*, 1.4.15; 1.4.5-6.
28. *Ibid*, 1.4.15.
29. *Ibid*, 1.1.7-8.
30. *Ibid*, 1.2.23; 1.3.12.
31. *Ibid*, 1.3.3.
32. *Ibid*, 1.1.7.
33. *Ibid*, 1.3.2.
34. See chapter ten for details of liberation.
35. Saurabha, 2.1.1-2.
36. *Ibid*, 2.2.10.
37. *Ibid*, 1.1.5.
38. *Ibid*, 1.3.3; 1.3.12; 1.2.24; 1.2.23; 1.1.7-8; 1.4.1.
39. *Ibid*, 2.2.1.
40. *Ibid*, 2.2.2.
41. *Ibid*, 2.2.3.
42. *Ibid*, 2.2.5.
43. *Ibid*, 2.2.8.
44. *Ibid*, 2.2.7.
45. *Ibid*, 2.2.6.
46. *Ibid*, 1.4.3; 1.4.8-10.
47. *Ibid*, 2.2.3.
48. *Ibid*, 2.2.4.
49. *Ibid*, 2.2.7.
50. *Ibid*, 2.2.37-41. Also see the opponents of
Brahmakāraṇavāda, in chapter eight.

51. *Ibid*, 2.3.42-45. *Vide infra* for a special discussion on the *Śāktavāda* in this chapter.
52. See chapters eight and eleven below.
53. *Saurabha*, 2.3.49.
54. *Ibid*, 2.3.50-52.
55. *Ibid*, 2.4.2. See also *Kaustubha* 2.4.7. According to **Chakravarti** (1975, p.147) Vindhyavāsin (beginning of fifth century A.D.) the great Sāṃkhya teacher held that the sense organs being directly derived from *ahaṃkāra* are naturally ubiquitous. This view of Vindhyavāsin is refuted by the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* (pp. 145/18-25). See also Pulinbihari **Chakravarti**, 1975, . 296.
56. **G.J. Larson**, 1969, p. 185.
57. Īśvarakṛṣṇa seems to have lived before the later part of the sixth century A.D. As **G.J. Larson**, points out (1969, p.4) the *Sāṃkhyakārikās* along with the commentary was translated into Chinese by Paramārtha, sometime between A.D. 557-569.
58. It is common knowledge that Śāṃkara accepts under *BS* 1.4.11 the 25 principles of the Sāṃkhya as enumerated by Īśvarakṛṣṇa in his *kārikā* 3. He also seems to be referring to Īśvarakṛṣṇa's *Kārikās* 12,13 and 15 under *sūtra* 2.2.1, when he says "We must suppose that all inward and outward (i.e.) animate and inanimate) effects which are endowed with the characteristics of pleasure, pain and dullness have for their causes pleasure, pain and dullness in general. Pleasure, pain and dullness in their generality together constitute the threefold *pradhāna*. This *pradhāna* which is non-intelligent evolves itself spontaneously into multiform modifications, in order thus to effect the purpose (i.e. enjoyment, release and so on) of the intelligent soul. The existence of the *pradhāna* is to be inferred from other circumstances, also such as the limitations of all effects and the like (**Thibaut's** translation)".
59. **N.N Bhattacharya** (1974, p.17) traces the root of the Sāṃkhya philosophy to the pre-Vedic matriarchal tradition in India.
60. **E.H. Johnston**, 1937, p.2.
61. **E.H. Johnston** 1937, pp. 81-88.
62. **Erich Frauwallner**, 1953, pp. 288-348.
63. **G.J. Larson**, 1969, pp. 77-165.
64. **G.J. Larson**, p.57.
65. *Ibid*, p. 164, **Larson** places the *Sāṃkhyapravacanasūtra* to this period.

66. Pulinbihari **Chakravarti**, 1975, p. 27; Ram Suresh **Panday**, 1972, pp. 76-78.
67. G. **Thibaut**, 1962 (ed.) Vol. 48, p. 524 where Rāmānuja uses the term *tantra* with *Pañcarātra* and calls his Vaiṣṇava school as the *Pañcarātratāntra*.
68. According to P.K. **Sharma** (1974, p.2) the term *tantra* in this sense means a system of magical and sacramental ritual, taught in the sacred Hindu texts known as *tantras*, which teach the attainment of the highest aims of religion by such methods as spells, diagrams (*yantras*), gestures (*mudras*) and other physical exercises (*yoga*).
69. Commenting on BS 1.4.4. *jñeyatvāvacanāc ca*, Nimbārka says *nāvyakta śabdāś tāntrikapradhāna vacanaḥ jñeyatvāvacanāc ca*.
70. SKI 70-73.
These *Kārikās* are not found in the text of Gauḍapāda. Therefore it is very significant to note that Gauḍapāda refers to *Ṣaṣṭitantra* in his *bhāṣya* on *Kārikā* 17. Cf. Also AB **Keith**, 1975, p. 72-73. Ram Suresh **Panday**, 1972, p.86 points out that in a number of places *Ṣaṣṭitantra* is denoted by the short form "*tantra*".
71. (a) Gangānath **Jha**, 1896, pp. 113-115.
(b) M. **Hiriyanna**, *JOR*, 1929, pp. 107-112.
(c) A.B. **Keith**, 1949, (IIInd ed) p. 72-77.
(d) F.O. **Scrader**, 1914, pp. 101-110.
72. K.B. **Ramakrishna Rao**, 1966, p. 342.
73. Pulinbihari **Chakravarti**, 1975, p. 26.
74. Ram Suresh **Panday**, 1972, pp. 76-78. **Panday** points out that a long passage said to be from the *Tantra* and whose author is said to be Devala, the ancient Sāṅkhya exponent is found quoted in the *Yājñavalkya smṛti*. **Panday** identifies this passage with one of the *sūtras* on *Tattvasamāsa*.
75. G.J. **Larson** 1969, p. 248; Cf. P. **Chakravarti**, 1975, pp. 168-170.
76. *Vide* his *Tattvavaiśāradi* on *Yogasūtra* 4.13 & *Bhāmati* on BS 2.1.3.
77. *Jayamaṅgala* on SKI 70 states "*pañcaśikheṇa muninā bahudhā kṛtāṁ tatraṁ ṣaṣṭitantrākhyāṁ ṣaṣṭikhaṇḍam kṛtāṁ iti. tatraiva hi ṣaṣṭī arthā vyākhyātāḥ*".
78. A.B. **Keith**, 1975, p. 68.
79. *Ibid*, p. 69.
80. *Ibid*, p.70.

81. Pulinbihari **Chakravarti**, 1975, p. 26.
82. Bhaṣkara in his *bhāṣya* on BS 2.11 also calls the Sāṃkhya as the *Tantra*.
83. SKI 40.
pūrvotpannam asaktaṃ niyataṃ mahadādīsūkṣma paryantam. saṃsarati nirupabhogam bhāvair adhivāsitaṃ līgam.
84. Saurabha, 1.4.1. In Saurabha 2.4.8 he speaks of the *Mahābhūta*.
85. Saurabha, 2.4.19-20, 3.1.2, 4.2.6, See also ch. eight below.
86. Ram Suresh **Panday**, 1972, p. 233.
87. Saurabha 4.2.9-10, 4.2.14-16.
88. *Ibid*, 3.1.6, 4.1.1-6.
89. SKI, 39 ff.
90. Saurabha, 2.3.49.
91. *Ibid*, 2.2.8.
92. Atheism in Indian thought can be considered in two ways. One type of atheism denies the authority of the Vedas. The second type denies the existence of God. Here by atheism we mean this second type.
93. *Ahīrbudhnyā Saṃhitā*, Ch. XII. 18-30. *vide* XII.19 which clearly states "*saṣṭibhedam smṛtam tantram sāmṃkhyam nāma mahāmune*. XII-30 accepts that there had been numerous forms of Sāṃkhya system.
94. A.B. **Keith**, 1975, p. 70.
95. Pulinbihari **Chakravarti**, 1975, p. 120.
96. It does not speak of some fundamental Sāṃkhya doctrines such as the three *guṇas* and the *satkāryavāda*. Since Aśvaghoṣa is writing a *kāvya* and not a philosophical treatise, he is not expected to incorporate all the Sāṃkhya categories into his short account of the Sāṃkhya. His Buddhist bias is evident from the fact that he found sufficient place to describe the four kinds of the Buddhist meditations in this short description of Samkhya. Cf. *Buddhacarita* XII, 49-56.
97. Like Nimbārka, Madhva also considers these *sūtras* as refuting the *Śāktamata*. As will be pointed out below, Madhva is aware of a much developed form of the *Śāktavāda*, while Nimbārka is unaware of such a later form of the *Śāktavāda*.
98. Cf. B.N.K. **Sharma**, 1974, Vol, II p. 104.
99. As pointed out in chapter one according to J.N. **Banerjea**

- (1966, p. 10) nobody before Śaṅkara considered these *sūtras* as referring in any way to the *Pañcarātra* School.
100. For example Rāmānuja on BS 2.2.42-45.
 101. According to A.P. **Bhattacharya** (1966, p. 80) the fact that Nimbārka does not attack Śaṅkara's rejection of the *vyūhavāda* is a strong argument for the pre-Śaṅkara existence of Nimbārka. Since Madhva too like Nimbārka considers these *sūtras* as the rejection of the *Śāktavāda*, the argument of **Bhattacharya** loses much of its strength. Although Madhva does not defend the *Pañcarātra* system here, he makes a defence of its scriptures under BS 1.1.3 and 3.1.15 as we have pointed out in chapter one. The fact that Nimbārka does not make use of these *sūtras* to explain or to defend the *Pañcarātra* doctrine of *vyūha* shows only that he was not a follower of the *Pañcarātra* School. The prior existence of Nimbārka to Śaṅkara, and thereby to all the commentators of the extant commentaries of BS is proved by us in chapter four on various counts.
 102. According to S. **Jaiswal**, 1967, the distinction of these two streams of *Vaiṣṇavism* could be seen even in the 6th century A.D. *Vide supra*, chapter two.
 103. Cf. *Devī Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, 1.2.19-22. (Ed. Ram Tej **Pandaya** Pandit Pustakālaya, Kashi, 1952). As pointed out by P.K. **Sharma** (1974, pp. 1-2) Śāktism is the worship of goddess while Tāntrism is a system of magical and sacramental rituals, taught in the *Tantras*. Tāntrism aims at the highest attainments of religion through such methods as spells, diagrams (*yantras*), gestures (*mudras*) and other physical exercises (*yoga*).
 104. *Saurabha*, 2.2.42, *puruṣam antarena śakteḥ sakāśājjagat ulpatty asambhavān na tatkāraṇavādo'pi sādhuḥ*.
 105. The *Pañcarātra* doctrine contained in the *Ahīrbudhnya Saṁhitā* 3.28-30 considers Lakṣmī as the *śakti* of god, through whom he creates the world. Here it is evident that the *Pañcarātra* *Vaiṣṇavism* of the pre-Śaṅkara days has accommodated the *śāktavāda* into its own system. The refutation of the *Śāktavāda* by Nimbārka strengthens the contention that Nimbārka was not a *Pañcarātrin*.
 106. *Saurabha*, 2.2.43, *puruṣa saṁsargo'stīticet, puruṣasyakaraṇam nāsti tadānim*. It is to be noted that while in the *Ahīrbudhnya saṁhitā* of the *Pañcarātras* the *Puruṣa* is the primary principle and Śakti, as the power of the *Puruṣa*, has only a subordinate place in the *Śākta* system their roles are interchanged, whereby the *Puruṣa*

has only a subordinate place. M.C.P. **Srivastava** (1974, p. 97-98) seems to hint that the philosophical foundation for the superior role of the Śakti in the creative process has already been laid by the teaching of the Sāṃkhya system, originally expounded by Kapila, in which the Puruṣa plays only a very subordinate role in the process of evolution.

107. *Saurabha*, 2.2.44, *svābhāvika vijñānādibhāve khalu jagatkartrtve kaḥ pratiśedhaḥ? svato vinaṣṭaḥ śaktivādaḥ brahmasvīkārāt*. Cf. also Nimbārka's criticism of the opponents of the *Brahmakāraṇavāda* in chapter eight below.
108. *Ibid*, 2.2.45. *Śrutismṛtivyapratīśedhācca śaktipakṣo'-prāmāṇikaḥ*.
109. B.N.K. **Sharma**, 1974, Vol. II, p. 104.
110. Jadunath **Sinha**, 1971, Vol. III, p. 93.
111. Cf. Also Nimbārka's criticism of the Pāśupata School under BS 2.2.37-41. In the Pāśupata School the Paśupati is presented as a "potter god" depending on the *upādānakāraṇa*.
Here in the *Mahāvāma* system, Śiva has only a subordinate role as has the *Puruṣa* of the Sāṃkhya.
112. B.N.K. **Sharma**, 1974, Vol. II, p. 104, while the *Mahāvāmas* give no special role to Śiva in the evolution the Sāmbhava and the Āṇava give Śiva a greater role.
113. *BS*, 2.2.42, *utpattayasambhavāt*.
114. *BS*, 2.2.43, *nacakartuḥ karaṇam*.
115. *BS*, 2.2.44, *vijñānādibhāve vātadapratīśedaḥ*.
116. *BS*, 2.2.45, *vipratīśedhācca*.
117. As pointed out by scholars the origin of the *Śāktavāda* as a philosophical school might be a development of the original Sāṃkhya philosophy (Cf. M.C.P. **Srivastava**, 1979, p. 97, S.B. **Dasgupta**, 1958, p. 100).
N.N. **Bhattacharya** (1977, pp. 267-269) is of the opinion that the origin of the anomalous position of the Puruṣa in the Sāṃkhya may presumably be traced to the anomalous position of the males in a matriarchal society.
118. Jayatīrtha's *Tattvaparakāśikā* on BS 2.2.43 *asty eva śaktyanugrāhakaḥ puruṣaḥ sadāśivo'tastasyā jagad utpattir yukteti keśāmcic – chākteyānāṃ mataṃ nirākurvat sūtram upanyasya vyācaṣṭe na ceti. yadi puruṣo'ngīkriyate śakty anugrāhakaḥ tathāpi tasyotpatty upayogijñānādi sādhanābhāvenotpatty anupapattir ev-ety-arthaḥ*.

119. Jayatīrtha on BS 2.2.44, *śakty anugrāhakasya puṁsaḥ sārva jñādisadbhāvena yuktatarā jagad utpattir iti kecit. tan mātanirāsāya sūtram paṭhīva vyācāṣṭe vijñāneti. yadi śakty anugrāhakaśyeśvarasya vijñādikaraṇam aṅgīkriyate tadā tenaiva jagad utpatti sambhavād vyartham śakter api prṛthak kartrtvāṅgīkaraṇam syāt tathā cānena śakteyamatenaprakṛtapāśūpatasyāpratīṣedhaḥ kṛtaḥ syāt anumata meva syāt tac ca nirastam iti bhāvaḥ.*
120. Cf. B.N.K. **Sharma**, 1974, p. 107.
121. Cf. Also B.N.K. **Sharma**, 1974, pp. 107-122 for an evaluation of the discussion of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja on this *adhikaraṇa*.
122. P.K. **Sharma**, (1974, p.5) perceives three distinct stages or phases in the development of Śaktism. (a) Ancient or pre-Buddhist, going back to pre-historic times (b) Ancient, Mediaeval or post-Buddhist, rather post-Christian upto 12th Century, (c) Modern, from 13th Century onwards. Nimbārka seems to belong to the second phase while Madhva seems to belong to the third phase. We have already pointed out that Nimbārka is a pre-Śaṅkara commentator. It is a matter of common knowledge that Madhva lived sometime in the 13th Century A.D.
123. For example:
J. Marshall, *Mohenjodaro and the Indus Civilization*, Vol. I
 London, 1931.
E.A. Payne, *The Śāktas*, Calcutta, 1933.
S.K. Das, *Sakti or Divine Power*, University of Calcutta,
 1934.
O.R. Ehrenfels, *Mother—right in India*, Hyderabad. 1941.
S.K. Dikṣit, *The mother Goddess*, Poona, 1943.
D.P. Chattopadhyaya, *Lokāyata*, Delhi, 1959.
E.O. James, *The Cult of the Mother-Goddess*, London, 1959.
J.N. Banerjea, *Puranic and Tantric Religion*, Calcutta, 1966.
R.N. Dandekar, "Some Aspects of the History of Hinduism",
 Poona 1967.
P.K. Sharma, *Śakti Cult in Ancient India*, Varanasi, 1974.
N.N. Bhattacharya, *History of the Śākta Religion*, Delhi, 1977
The Indian Mother Goddess, Delhi, 1977.
Lalan Prasad Singh, *Tantra: Its Mystic and Scientific Basis*,
 Delhi, 1976.

- M.C.P. **Srivastava**, *Mother Goddess in Indian Art, Archeology and Literature*, Delhi 1979.
- S.K. **Lal**, *Female divinities in Hindu Mythology and Ritual*, Poona, 1980.
124. M.C.P. **Srivastava**, 1979, p. 197.
 125. J. **Marshall**, 1931, Vol. I, p. 52 and p. 341.
 126. N.N. **Bhattacharya**, 1974, p. 2.
 127. N.N. **Bhattacharya**, 1977, p. 68.
Cf. R. **Ehrenfels**, 1941, p. 18 ff. 121-129, 204 ff.
D.P. **Chattopadhyaya**, 1959, p. 232.
 128. R. **Briffault**, 1917, p. 117.
Hogarth in *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* (ed.) **Hastings**, Vol. I, 1908, p. 142.
 129. E.O. **James**, 1959, pp. 103-113.
Cf. M.C.P. **Srivastava**, 1979, pp. 32-62 and 197.
 130. P.K. **Sharma**, 1974, pp. 9-16.
S.K. **Lal**, (1980) traces the origin and development of 18 female deities in the Vedic and post-Vedic society in his work referred to earlier.
 131. M.C.P. **Srivastava**, 1979, p. 198, Cf. Also pp. 63-89.
 132. N.N. **Bhattacharya**, 1974, pp. 32-35.
Cf. Also D.P. **Chattopadhyaya**, 1958, pp. 318-19.
Bachhofer, 1927, Reprint, 1973, pp. 14-15.
Rowland, 1953, p. 23.
 133. S.K. **Diksit**, 1942, p. 59.
 134. P.K. **Sharma**, 1974, p. 4, pp. 20-37.
 135. M.C.P. **Srivastava**, 1979, p. 132.
 136. N.N. **Bhattacharya**, 1974, pp. 44-51.
M.C.P. **Srivastava**, 1979, p. 109.
J.N. **Banerjea**, 1974, pp. 111 f. 230, 489-509, 1966, pp. 110-132.
 137. N.N. **Bhattacharya**, 1974, p. 66.
B.C. **Bhattacharya**, 1939, p. 24 f.
R.P. **Chanda**, 1916, p. 129.
J.N. **Banerjea**, 1974, pp. 89. 181-189.
 138. E.A. **Payne**, 1933, p. 39.
 139. P.K. **Sharma**, 1974, p. 32.

140. Varāhamihira in his *Br̥hat-Samhitā* (chapter 59, verse 19).
141. As quoted by J.N. **Banerjea**, 1966, p. 12, Also 1974, p. 230.
142. CII, Vol.III, p. 78 as quoted by J.N. **Banerjea**, '74, p. 194.
143. **Fleet's** translation as quoted by J.N. **Banerjea**, '74, p. 494.
144. J. **Muir**, Vol. IV, p. 369.
M.C.P. **Srivastava**, 1979, p. 109.
In ch. two, we have seen that the southern tradition places Nimbārka to the region of Tailanga. The fact that he criticises the *Śāktavāda* may reinforce the belief that he lived in the region of Tailanga, which is very close to the Vindhya the perpetual abode of the Goddess.
145. M.C.P. **Srivastava**, 1979, p. 12, p. 124.
P.K. **Sharma**, (1974, pp. 52-68) points out that greater development of the doctrinal aspect of *Śāktism* is found in the later *Purāṇas* like *Devī Bhāgavatam*
146. V.S. **Agrawal**, 1961, p. 19.
147. P.K. **Sharma**, (1974, p. 48) says that these 13 chapters of the *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*, named as *Durgāsaptasati* and *Devī Māhātmya* have the status of a scripture of the highest sanctity and efficacy. The Supreme Principle of Reality has been invoked and glorified under the name of the Devī.
148. N.N. **Bhattacharya**, 1974, p. 73.
149. J.N. **Banerjea**, 1974, p. 493.
150. *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa*, chapter 85, Pargiter's translation.
151. J.N. **Banerjea**, 1974, p. 496 ff.
152. *Ibid*, p. 497.
153. It is generally accepted that the *Brahmasūtras* were composed before the 5th century A.D. See chapter two above. It seems that we can safely assign them to the first century A.D.
154. Cf. C.J. **Larson**, 1969, p. 4.
155. Ādiśeṣa's *Paramārthasāra* (text and tr.) by Henry **Danielson** (Religious texts Translation series, Nisaba, Vol. 10, Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1980, pp. X, 87, gld. 28). The *Paramārthasāra* consists of 87 verses, the first two are in *Triṣṭubha* metre and the rest in *Āryā* metre.
156. According to **Danielson** (1980, pp. 1-2), the *Paramārthasāra*, was written sometime before 550 A.D. Vide also Victor A. **Van Bijlert**. Ādiśeṣa "Paramārthasāra" philosophy East and West. Vol. 33, No. 1, 1983, pp. 99-100, University of Hawaii.

157. *Vide infra* chapters eight, nine and ten.
158. Scholars of Nimbārka School like Nrusingh Das **Vasu**, Virajakanta **Ghosh**, A.P. **Bhattacharya**, and N.D. **Sharma** also assign Nimbārka to pre-Saṅkara period. Their conclusions vary in so far as they differ in assigning an average life span per ācārya of the Sect given in the list of Guruparaṁparās (Cf. **Kathiyababa**, 1972, pp. 55-56).
- Since these scholars, with the exception of N.D. **Sharma**, have exposed their findings in Bengali, it was not possible for me to follow their arguments. Their findings also give additional support to our conclusion, arrived at solely on the basis of the *Vedāntapārijata Saurabha*, the *opus magnum* of Nimbārka.
159. See chapter two above.
160. See chapter five above.

Chapter 7

1. The great bulk of the scriptural references in the *Saurabha* is from the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*.
2. The text "*dharmena pāpam apanudati*" in *Saurabha* 3.4.35 seems to be from the Mahānārāyaṇopaniṣad 22.1 which reads *dharmena pāpam apanudanti*. It is more probable that both Nimbārka and the author of Mahānārāyaṇa might have received the text from a common source, which cannot be traced now. It could also be a variant reading of the same Mahānārāyaṇa text. The Mahānārāyaṇopaniṣad is an appendix of the *Taittirīyaraṇyaka* dating back to the vedic times.
3. Although the term Brahman is neuter gender in Sanskrit we take it as masculine in our analysis and the philosophical discussions because Nimbārka identifies Brahman with Bhagavān Vāsudeva Ramākānta Puruṣottama.
4. *Madhvidyā* is the representation of the sun as the honey extracted from all the Vedas. Prajāpati was taught this *vidyā* first by Brahma. Prajāpati taught it to Manu, and Manu in his turn taught it to all his descendants. Finally Uddālaka Āruṇi was taught this by his father (*Vide Chānd* 3.1.3.11) According to *Brh* 2.5.6-19 the *Madhvidyā* is the doctrine of the corelativity of all things and the immanence of the ātman, taught to the two Aświnis by Dadhyañca Ātharvaṇa. The other *vidyās* mentioned in the *Saurabha* and *Kaustubha* are the *Upakośalavidyā* (knowledge obtained by Upakośala

the disciple of Satyakāma Jābāla). (*Chānd* 4.10-4.15 Cf *Kaustubha* 1.2.13); the *Pañcāgnividyā* (taught to Gautama by King Pravāhana) (*Brh* 6.2 and *Chānd* 5.4-5.10 Cf *Kaustubha* 3.1.1) the *Daharavidyā*, the doctrine that the universal soul is within the heart of man (*Chānd* 8.1-8.6, *Mahānārāyaṇopaniṣad* 10.7 Cf. *Kaustubha* 1.3.14-23, 3.3.38) the *Śaṇḍilyavidyā* (*Brh* 5.6, *Śat Br* 10.6.3, *Chānd* 3.15. Cf *Kaustubha* 3.3.19) and *Vaiśvānaravidyā* (*Chānd* 5.11-5.18 Cf *Kaustubha* 1.2.25 3.3.35).

5. In the Vaiśeṣika system it is held that every kind of atom is possessed of the five qualities of smell etc.
6. What an effect has an origin.
7. Here he does not mention in which text there is a direct mention of the origin of the sense organs. Śrīnivāsa makes it clear in *Kaustubha* that the text is *Mund* 2.1.3. "From him arise the *prāṇa*, *mana* and all the *indriyas*, the ether, the air". See also *Saurabha* 2.4.17, 2.3.15.
8. Nimbārka seeks to understand by the term *Prāṇā* (plural) the sense organs (Cf. *Saurabha* 2.4.4, 7.) By the term *prāṇa* (singular) he normally understands the chief vital breath or its five-fold forms like *apāna* etc. (*Saurabha* 2.4.8, 9, 12 etc.) Their distinction is clear in *Saurabha* 2.4.17, 18.
9. Brahman is both the source of light and at the same time untouched by the defects of the objects to be illumined.
10. A sentence can have its full significance only when it signifies all that it expresses, without leaving out anything.
11. The *neti neti* (*Brh* 2.3.6) denies only limitations of the finite on the part of Brahman. There is nothing higher than Brahman.
12. These various descriptions in the *śruti* show that there must exist some other reality besides Brahman. See the explanation given by the *Siddhāntin*.
13. The rinsing of the mouth with water before and after meals, which is enjoined by custom and *smṛti* is rementioned in *Śat. Br* 14.9.215 thereby enjoining the meditation on water as the dress of *Prāṇa*.
14. *Pravargya* is an introductory ceremony in a Soma sacrifice. Śrīnivāsa clarifies that the doubt here is whether the sacred formulas and the sacrificial acts like *Pravargya* etc. mentioned in certain *vidyās* are to be included in the meditation on Brahman as its subsidiary parts as they are being mentioned in close proximity or not.

15. *Upakośala Vidyā Vide Chānd* 410-415. The story is this "Upakośala Kāmatāyana dwelt with Satyakāma Jabāla as a student for 12 years tending the fires. But his teacher did not teach him Brahnavidyā, nor allowed him to go back home. When his teacher went off on a long journey Upakośala filled with grief, began to fast. At this the three fires, Gārhapatya, Anvāhārya and Āhavanīya took pity on him and taught him Agnividya and Ātma vidyā and told him that his teacher will instruct him more. His teacher on his return taught him thus "that person who is seen within the eye is the ātman that is the immortal, the fearless, that is Brahman. (*Chānd* 4. 15.1). Satyakāma Jabāla instructed him further on the path of God's (*Chānd* 4.15.5).
16. *Chānd* 5.3-5.10 See also fn. 4 above.
17. *Dahara Vidyā* or the doctrine of the small i.e. the doctrine that the Universal soul is within the heart of man. What is within that should be searched for that certainly is what one should desire to understand (See *Chānd* 8-6. 1-5)
18. CSS ed. omits the portion "*stotra śāstrādibhyo*" found with *Vrindāvana* edition. Perhaps this portion may be a later interpolation.
19. The *Vrindāvana* edition omits the phrase "*Vidyāvataḥ*".

Chapter 8

1. V.S Ghate, 1960, pp. 169-70.
2. BS, 1.4.20.
3. BS, 1.4.21.
4. BS, 1.4.22.
5. Brh, 3.8.8-11
6. *Chānd*, 6.1.3-4, *Tait. Br* 2.8.9.6-7, *Muṇḍ* 1.1.6.
7. *Ait. Up.* 1.1.3, 1.2.3-4, *Brh*, 2.5.1 ff.
8. Saurabha, 1.1.4 nanu pratyakṣādi
pramāṇāviśayakatvavacchabda pramāṇāviśayatvasyāpi
śruti siddhatvān na śāstraikaprameyaṁ brahm eti prāpte
brumah jijñāsyam Brahma śāstrapramāṇakam eva
nānyapramāṇakam.
9. The commentary called *Śrutyantara Suradruma* attributed to Sri Purusottama Prasāda on Verse 19 of *Saviśeṣanirviśeṣa śrīkṛṣṇastava* discusses the various types of perception and

inference. The whole process is just like that of the Nyāya School. The need of evaluating the validity of the means of knowledge arose in the context of polemics against other Schools. See *śrutyantara suradruma* (Benaras Sanskrit series. Nos. 135, 136, 141; 1907-8, pp. 183-204.)

10. *Saurabha* 1.1.2 ...That very Lord — the substratum of infinite attributes like Omniscience, etc, and the ruler of Brahmā, Śiva, Kāla (time) and the rest — from whom arise the origination, subsistence and dissolution “of this” i.e. of the universe — endowed with manifold combination, the abode of innumerable peculiarities of names and forms and the like; and the form of which is inconceivable— is Brahman, the object of the above statement...
11. *Ibid*, 2.1.15, *tad anyanyatvam kāraṇasādbhāve kāryopalabdeḥ*.
12. *Ibid*, 1.1.3, *śāstram eva yonis tajjñāptikāraṇam yasmīn tad evokta lakṣaṇalakṣitam vastu brahmaśābdābhidheyam iti*.
13. Cf. *Saurabha*, 2.1.1.f. 4.2.6.
14. *Ibid*, 1.3.28, 3.2.24, 4.3.10 etc.
15. *Vide supra*, “The source of the Saurabha in chapter seven”.
16. *Saurabha*, 1.3.25.
17. *Saurabha*, 1.1.4,...*tattad vākyaviśayānām sarveṣāṃ api brahmātmakatve’pi sāṅśād eva brahmaṇi samanvayaḥ*.
18. *Ibid*, 1.1.1, 1.1.4, 3.4.26.
19. *Ibid*, 1.1.4.
20. *Ibid*, 1.1.4
21. *Ibid*, 3.4.23-24.
22. *Vasiṣṭha Smṛti*, 18.9, *śūdra samipe nādhyetavyam*.
23. *Manu Smṛti*, 4.80, *na cāsyopadiśed dharmam na cāsyā vratam ādiśet, na śūdrāya matim dadyāt*.
10.126 *na śūdre patakaṃ kincinna ca saṃskāram arhati*.
24. GDS, 10.50, *śūdrascaturtho varṇa ekajātīḥ*.
25. *Saurabha*, 1.3.34-39.
26. It is to be noted that the *Vedāntaratna Mañjūṣā* (pp. 74 and 127) allows the Śūdras the right to meditation based on the Purāṇas. Perhaps Puruṣottama Prasāda I, the author of the said work, wanted to reform the Sect in accordance with the demands of his time.
27. *Saurabha*, 2.3.47. Here he quotes the *Tait. Sam.* 7.1.1. which forbids the initiation of a Śūdra to a sacrifice “*śūdro*

yajñenāvaklaptaḥ . He does not explain how a Sūdra can attain liberation.

28. *Saurabha*, 3.4.6.
29. *Ibid*, 3.4.12.
30. *Ibid*, 1.1.1 An enquiry is to be instituted, at all times, into *Puruṣottama*, Ramā's Husband, denoted by the term "Brahman", the greatest of all because of His infinite, inconceivable and innate nature, qualities, powers and so on — by one who has studied the Veda with its six parts; who has been assailed with doubt arising from texts which teach that the fruits of works are both transitory and eternal, who has, for that very reason, enquired into the science which is concerned with the consideration of religious duties, and has, thereby, gained the knowledge determined therein regarding works, their kinds and their fruits, in whom, as a consequence, there arisen a disregard (for worldly objects) that is the result of a discrimination between the finitude and eternity of the fruits of the knowledge of works and Brahman respectively; the former being surpassable, the latter non-surpassable who wishes for the grace of the Lord; who is covetous of having a vision of Him, to whom the spiritual preceptor is the only God; who has whole-hearted devotion for the holy spiritual teacher; and who is desirous of final release....
31. *Saurabha* 1.1.1. *ācāryaika devena...mumukṣuṇā...*
32. *Ibid*, 1.1.1. *Śrīgurubhakty ekahārdena mumukṣuṇā.*
33. *Ibid*, 1.3.8. *paramācāryaiḥ śrīkumārair asmad gurave śrīmannārādāyopadiṣṭo....*
34. Here he does not address Nārada as *Śrīguru*. Nowhere in the *Saurabha* he speaks of any whole hearted devotion to an earthly *guru*. Does *Śrīguru* in *Saurabha* 1.1.1 mean *Śrīpuruṣottama*? If so the whole hearted devotion to *Śrīguru* becomes all the more meaningful.
35. *Saurabha* 3.4.27 "Hence he who knows thus, having become calm, self restrained, indifferent, patient and collected, should see the self in the self alone" (*Bṛh* 4.4.23).
36. *Saurabha* 3.4.46.
37. *Ibid*, 1.2.17.
38. *Chānd*, 8.7.11, Cf, also *Saurabha* 1.1.29-31.
39. *Saurabha*, 1.4.19, 3.4.24.
40. *Ibid*, 4.1.3.
41. *Ibid*, 2.1.21, 4.1.5

42. *Saurabha*, 1.1.1.
43. *Ibid*, 1.4.15, 1.2.23, 3.2.36.
44. *Ibid*, 3.2.31-36.
45. *Ibid*, 1.1.25-28.
46. *Ibid*, 1.1.25-28.
47. *Ibid*, 1.1.13-15, 21-22 etc. In many passages in the *Saurabha* Brahman is described as the Paramātmān.
48. *Ibid*, 1.1.4.
49. *Ibid*, 1.1.1.
50. *Ibid*, 1.1.2 "...brahmeśakālādi niyantur bhavagato...."
51. Nowhere in the *Saurabha* the Paramātmān is identified with the name Kṛṣṇa though the name Vāsudeva is used once.
52. Cf. *Śrutyantasuradruma* (p. 103) describes Viṣvakṣeṇa, Jaya etc. as the attendants of the Supreme Lord; *Garuḍa* as His conveyance, *Śeṣa* as His couch, *Śaṅkha* etc. as His weapons and crown, *Kaustubha* etc. as His ornaments...
53. No *vyūhas* or *avatāras* are mentioned or accepted in the *Saurabha*. Unlike Rāmānuja the *Saurabhakara* does not describe Brahman as *saccidānanda svarūpa*.
54. *Saurabha*, 3.2.22-23, 2.3.46.
55. *Ibid*, 2.1.29, 2.1.35.
56. *Ibid*, 3.2.11.
57. *Ibid*, 3.2.15-21.
58. *Ibid*, 2.1.30, 2.1.35.
59. *Ibid*, 2.1.23.
60. *Ibid*, 1.1.14.
61. *Ibid*, 1.1.2.
62. *Ibid*, 1.1.13-20.
63. *Ibid*, 1.2.1-8.
64. *Ibid*, 1.2.16.
65. *Ibid*, 1.2.13-18, 1.1.21-22.
66. *Ibid*, 1.1.23, 1.3.42.
67. *Ibid*, 1.1.24-28.
68. *Ibid*, 1.3.8-9.
69. *Ibid*, 1.2.26-33.
70. *Ibid*, 1.3.14-23.
71. *Ibid*, 1.2.22-23.
72. *Ibid*, 1.3.10-12, 1.3.16, 1.3.40.
73. *Ibid*, 1.3.24-25, 1.3.40-41.

74. *Ibid*, 1.1.1., 1.1.4, 2.1.29-30, 1.3.19, 1.3.24 etc.
75. *Ibid*, 1.3.18, 1.1.21, 3.2.3, 4.4.7.
76. *Vide* .Chānd 8.1.5.
77. *Saurabha*, 1.3.18-20, 1.1.29, 1.2.2, 3.2.5— In *Saurabha* 1.3.19 Nimbārka points out that the Brahman has these eight-fold qualities ever manifest while the jīva possesses them in a veiled manner in the state of bondage. They will be made manifest in liberation.
78. *Ibid*, 1.1.13-20, 1.2.15-16, 3.2.39.
79. *Ibid*, 1.3.9.
80. *Ibid*, 1.1.15
81. *Ibid*, 3.2.14, 2.3.8.
82. *Ibid*, 1.1.29.
83. *Ibid*, 2.3.8, 1.4.27, 1.2.23, 1.2.1, 1.3.17.
84. *Ibid*, 1.3.1.
85. *Ibid*, 1.4.14.
86. *Ibid*, 1.1.2.
87. *Ibid*, 2.1.35, 1.4.14.
88. *Ibid*, 1.1.3, 1.4.14-15, 1.3.42, 1.1.19.
89. *Ibid*, 1.2.9 ff. 1.3.2-7, 1.3.15.
90. *Ibid*, 1.1.23-24, Cf. Chānd 1.9.1. *sarvāṇi ha vā tmāṇi bhūtāny ākāśād eva samutpadyante, ākāśam pratyastam yanti ākāśo hy evaibhyo jyāyān.*
91. *Ibid*, 2.1.31.
92. *Ibid*, 1.1.2, 1.1.4, 1.1.12, 1.4.14, 1.4.26 etc.
93. *Ibid*, 2.1.27.
94. *Ibid*, 1.4.14, 1.4.26, 2.1.23, 2.1.27, 2.1.29 etc.
95. *Ibid*, 2.1.29.
96. *Ibid*, 1.1.29.
97. *Ibid*, 1.2.13.
98. *Ibid*, 1.2.13.
99. *Ibid*, 3.2.12.
100. *Ibid*, 3.2.37, 1.3.40.
101. *Ibid*, 1.2.6-10, 1.1.32.
102. *Ibid*, 2.1.23.
103. *Ibid*, 1.1.4.
104. *Ibid*, 1.1.12, 1.2.19-21, 3.2.11-12.

105. *Saurabha*, 1.2.19-21.
106. *Ibid*, 3.2.12-14.
107. SNKS contains such descriptions of the qualities like *śānti*, *kānti* *sudhānidhi* (Cf. *Ślokas* 1 and 3).
108. The *Daśāśloki* (contains such descriptions. See also chapter two above.)
109. *Mañjūṣā*, pp. 43-45.
110. It may be inferred that such aspects of *bhakti* came to the Nimbārka school at a later period. If the Saurabhakāra ever considered the *premaviśeṣalakṣaṇā bhakti* based on the tender qualities of Brahman as a means to liberation, he could have emphasized such qualities of Brahman in the *Saurabha* itself.
111. *Īśā* 1.1. *Muṇḍ* 1.1.6, 3.1.3.
112. *Saurabha* 1.4.23-26.
113. *Ibid*, 3.2.14.
114. *Ibid*, 1.1.19, 1.4.15.
115. We will discuss these points in detail in chapter eleven.
116. *Chānd* 3.19.1, *Tait* 2.6.
117. *Chānd* 3.19.1 *Tait* 2.7, Cf. *Saurabha* 2.1.17.
118. *Brh* 1.4.7.
119. *Saurabha*, 1.4.15.
120. *Ibid*, 1.4.26.
121. *Ibid*, 1.4.10.
122. *Chānd*, 6.1.3-4.
123. *Saurabha*, 1.4.23-24.
124. *Ibid*, 2.1.23-24, 2.1.27, 2.1.30.
125. *Ibid*, 2.1.29.
126. *Ibid*, 2.1.33, Cf. 2.1.20.
127. *Ibid*, 1.4.24, 2.1.24-26.
128. In Western philosophy too the relationship between the cause and the effect is a classical problem. The Thomist tradition asserts that the effect is in the cause as cause (*Effectus est in causa in quantum est causa*). Indian tradition of the *satkāryavāda* too has a similar view.
129. *Saurabha*, 2.1.23.
130. *Ibid*, 3.2.37, 2.1.25-27.
131. *Brh* 1.4.26.

132. *Ibid*, 2.1.26.
133. *Ibid*, 2.1.13.
134. *Ibid*, 1.1.5, 1.4.1-13, 2.1.10, 2.2.1-2.
135. *Ibid*, 1.1.5.
136. *Ibid*, 1.2.9.
137. *Ibid*, 2.2.1.
138. *Ibid*, 1.1.5, 1.1.10.
139. *Ibid*, 1.1.8, 1.1.11-12, 1.4.9-10.
140. *Ibid*, 2.2.2-3, 5.
141. *Ibid*, 2.2.4, 7.
142. *Ibid*, 2.2.6-8.
143. *Ibid*, 1.1.7-8, 1.1.12.
144. *Ibid*, 1.4.16-17, Cf. 1.1.5-12.
145. *Ibid*, 1.4.23-27.
146. *Ibid*, 1.1.15.
147. *Ibid*, 1.4.3.
148. *Ibid*, 1.4.11.
149. *Ibid*, 2.1.4-10, 23-27.
150. *Ibid*, 2.2.3.
151. *Ibid*, 2.2.7.
152. *Ibid*, 2.2.11-17.
153. *Ibid*, 2.2.11.
154. *Ibid*, 2.2.12.
155. *Ibid*, 2.2.14.
156. *Ibid*, 2.2.13.
157. *Ibid*, 2.2.15.
158. *Ibid*, 2.2.16.
159. *Ibid*, 2.2.17.
160. *Ibid*, 2.2.18.
161. *Ibid*, 2.2.19.
162. *Ibid*, 2.2.20.
163. *Ibid*, 2.2.21.
164. *Ibid*, 2.2.22.
165. *Ibid*, 2.2.23.
166. *Ibid*, 2.2.37.
167. *Ibid*, 2.2.38.

168. *Ibid.*, 2.2.38.
169. *Ibid.*, 2.2.39. It would also imply that Brahman has no body either eternal or non-eternal, material or non-material.
170. *Ibid.*, 2.2.40. *bhoga* generates *karma*, which is the cause of bondage.
171. *Ibid.*, 2.2.41. The ultimate cause must be Beginningless, Omnipotent and Omniscient. He is without an origin as well as an end.
172. *Ibid.*, 2.2.42.
173. *Ibid.*, 2.2.43.
174. *Ibid.*, 2.2.44. The ultimate cause is the one who is Omniscient, Omnipotent and there exists nothing besides Him.
175. *Ibid.*, 2.2.45.
176. *Ibid.*, 2.1.15, "*kāraṇa sadbhāva kāryopalabheḥ*".
177. *Ibid.*, 2.1.16, "*āvarakālīnasya kāryasya kāraṇe sattvād*".
178. *Ibid.*, 1.4.23-24.
179. *Ibid.*, 2.1.10-11.
180. *Ibid.*, 2.1.71.
181. *Ibid.*, 2.1.14; 2.1.21.
182. *Ibid.*, 2.1.4-7.
183. *Ibid.*, 1.4.3.
184. *Ibid.*, 1.4.8, Cf. *Śvet* 4.5.
185. *Ibid.*, 1.4.10. It is to be noted that while some great Nimbārka scholars like Puruṣottama (Cf. *Mañjūśāp.* 657) and Devācārya (S.J. 1.1.2, p. 121) defend the position of the Saurabhakāra that Brahman is both the *nimitta* and *upādānakāraṇa* of the universe, another great thinker of Nimbārka School, Vanamāli Miśra (Vide SSSV. 10-12, 16-17, 19-21) considers Brahman as the *nimittakāraṇa* only and *prakṛti* as the *upādānakāraṇa* of the universe.
186. *Ibid.*, 3.1.31.
187. *Ibid.*, 2.1.32. That the creative sport of Brahman is not the same as the *rāsailā* (dalliance of Kṛṣṇa with the *gopis*) is self evident.
188. *Ibid.*, 2.1.33-34.
189. *Bṛh.* 3.2.13.
190. *Saurabha*, 2.4.19-21. The Saurabhakāra follows the comparatively older Upaniṣadic theory of tripartition (*trivṛttikāraṇa*) (*Chānd* 6.3.3) rather than the later theory of *Pañcikāraṇa* adopted by the *Vedāntaratnamāñjūśā* (p. 36).

191. *Saurabha*, 2.4.20.
192. *Ibid*, 2.4.19.
193. *Ibid*, 2.3.15, 2.4.1-4.
194. *Ibid*, 2.3.14.
195. Purusottama in his *Vedāntaratnamāñjuṣā* 9 (pp. 23-31) explains the process of evolution in the Sāṃkhya lines.
196. *Saurabha*, 2.3.5.
197. *Ibid*, 2.3.6.
198. As pointed by Roma **Bose** (1940 p. 345) Nimbārka takes the *sūtra*: "yāvad vikāram tu udbhavo lokavat(Saurabha 2.3.6) to mean that whenever there is an effect there is origin. His explanation of the *sūtra* seems to be rather simple. Also his illustration for *lokavat* namely "in ordinary life when referring to the group of Devadatta's sons the origin of some of them is mentioned, thereby the origin of all the rest is mentioned" lacks sophistication and refinement.

Śaṃkara on the other hand takes the *sūtra* to prove that the ether etc. are effects. He constructs his arguments as follows:

No non-effect is divided.

The ether is divided.

Therefore the ether is an effect.

For Śaṃkara the problem is not merely the non-mention of ether, which has been answered in the previous *sūtra*. Here the *kāryatva* (the created nature) of the world is being settled. He is also aware that the *sūtra* does not say "yāvad vibhāgas tāvad vikāra" but on the contrary "Yāvad vikāras tāvad vibhāga". Śaṃkara does not want to change the formulation of the *sūtra*. Therefore he formulates a negatives syllogism as given above.

Division is a property of effect. Division is the proper middle term (*liṅga*) applicable to all the members of the class and only to them (*omni et soli*). If there is something to which division does not apply, it must be uncreated. That to which the middle term "division" cannot be applied and that which is uncreated is the *ātman*.

Śaṃkara's interpretation of *lokavat* is also different. He connects it with the preceding part of the *sūtra*, meaning in ordinary life we observe that whatever is an effect is divided.

199. *Saurabha*, 2.3.9-12.
200. *Ibid*, 2.3.13. It is to be noted that Śaṃkara does not consider *sūtras* 9 to 12 as *pūrvapakṣa*. But he accepts all the 5 *sūtras*

(9-13) as the *siddhānta*. *Sūtra* 13 is considered as clarifying the position that the subtler elements are giving rise to the grosser elements. The elements themselves are unable to do it. But the Lord, who abides within the subtler elements, gives rise to the grosser elements.

201. *Saurabha*, 2.3.15.
 202. *Ibid*, 2.3.15.
 203. *Ibid*, 2.3.13.
 204. *Ibid*, 2.3.14.
 205. *Ibid*, 2.1.9.
 206. *Ibid*, 1.2.8.
 207. *Ibid*, 3.2.11.
 208. *Ibid*, 2.3.45-46.
 209. *Ibid*, 2.1.9, 2.1.13.
 210. *Ibid*, 2.3.45-48, The *amśāmsī* relation is to be understood in a metaphysical and transcendental level rather than on a physical level. *Vide* chapter eleven below.
 211. *Ibid*, 2.1.13, 2.1.21-22 *Vide infra* chapter eleven.
 212. *Ibid*, 1.1.1. 1.1.2 etc.
 213. *Ibid*, 1.2.9-10, etc.
 214. *Ibid*, 1.1.4, 3.2.39-41.
 215. *Ibid*, 3.2.5.
 216. *Ibid*, 3.2.24. See chapter ten for the means of liberation.
 217. *Ibid*, 1.4.15, It is to be noted that in the *Saurabha* there is no mention of the descent or manifestation of Brahman in the form of *avatāras* and *vyūhas* in order to liberate his devotees as accepted by the Nimbārkites of today, perhaps, on the basis of *Daśaślokī* 4.8.
- (1) Vanamāli Miśra (SSS, IV. 23-27) describes the descent of the four-fold divine emanations (*Vyūha*) consisting of Vāsudeva, Saṁkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha from the Supreme godhead.
 - (2) Puruṣottama (*Mañjūṣā* on DS' 5) describes the 3 types of Divine Incarnations (*Avatāras*). They are the *Guṇāvatāra*, the *Puruṣavatāra* and *Līlavatāra*. Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva who are the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world respectively with the aid of *rajas*, *sattva* and *taṁas* respectively are the *Guṇāvatāras*. There are also 3 *Puruṣāvatāras*. They are *kāraṇārṇavaśayi* (god lying in the Ocean of causal water) *garbhodaśayi* (god lying in the cosmic embryo) and

kṣīrodaśayī (god lying in the ocean of causal milk). The *Līlāvatāras* are divided into two types. They are *Āveśāvatāras* and *Svarūpāvatāras*. While the first category of *avatāras* are influenced by God the second are the incarnations of His essential nature. The *Āveśāvatāras* are again of two kinds. *Svāṁśāveśa* and *Śaktyaṁśāveśa*. The latter are again divided into two classes, *Prabhava* and *Vibhava*. Nara and Nārāyaṇa are examples of *svāṁśāveśa avatāras*, which are incarnations of Brahman's own parts influenced by Him. The *Śaktyaṁśāveśas* are incarnations influenced by the parts of His power. Among them, the examples for *prabhavas* are Dhanvantari, Paraśurāma etc. while Kapila, Nārada, Vyāsa, etc. are the *vibhava* incarnations. Nrsiṁha, Rāma and Kṛṣṇa are the examples of *svarūpāvatāra*. There are two kinds of *svarūpāvatāras*. Partial and complete. *Matsya* (fish), *Kūrma* (tortoise), *Varāha*, etc. are only partial *svarūpāvatāra* while the incarnations as Rāma and Kṛṣṇa are complete. (Cf. Also Giridhara Prapanna in his *Laghumañjūṣā* on DS' 4).

Chapter 9

1. *Saurabha*, 2.3.17
2. *Ibid*, 2.3.42.
3. *Ibid*, 2.3.43.
4. *Ibid*. 2.3.44.
5. Cf. *Bhagavadgītā* 7.5, *apareyam itas tv anyāṁ prakṛtiṁ viddhi me paraṁ jīvabhūtām*.
6. *Kaustubha*, 2.3.42, "aṁśo hi śaktirūpo grāhyah".
7. *Saurabha*, 2.3.42.
8. *Ibid*, 2.3.45-46.
9. *Chānd*, 8.5.1.
10. *Saurabha*, 3.2.5-6.
11. *Ibid*, 1.2.8.
12. *Muṇḍ*, 3.1.1., *Saurabha*, 1.3.8, 3.2.13.
13. *Saurabha*, 3.2.12.
14. *Ibid*, 2.3.47.
15. *Saurabha*, 2.3.18.
16. Nimbārka seems to be justified to take *jñāḥ* as *jñātā* (Cf. Pāṇini 3.1.35) Śaṅkara on the other hand takes *jñāḥ* as *jñānam*. **Ghate** is of the opinion that Nimbārka's view is to be accepted (*Vide Ghate* 1960. p. 93).
17. *Saurabha*, 2.3. 25-26.

18. Saurabha, 2.3.26-30.
19. *Ibid*, 2.3.27.
20. *Ibid*, 2.3.32-40.
21. Tait.Sam. 2.5.5. "svargakāmo yajeta".
22. Brh 1.4.7. "Mumuksur brahmopāsita".
23. Tait. 2.5, "vijñānam yajñam tanute", (Cf. Saurabha 2.3.35).
24. Saurabha, 2.3.32.
25. *Ibid*, 2.3.38.
26. *Ibid*, 2.3.35-37.
27. *Ibid*, 2.3.35.
28. *Ibid*, 2.3.34.
29. *Ibid*, 2.3.33.
30. Brh, 2.1.17-18.
31. Saurabha, 4.4.18.
32. *Ibid*, 2.3.40.
33. *Ibid*, 2.3.41.
34. *Ibid*, 4.4.20.
35. *Ibid*, 1.3.22.
36. Muṇḍ, 2.2.10, Katha 5.15.
37. Saurabha 2.3.39.
38. *Ibid*, 2.3.36.
39. *Ibid*, 2.3.41, 2.1.33.
40. *Ibid*, 1.2.8.
41. *Ibid*, 1.3.7.
42. *Ibid*, 3.2.1-6.
43. Vide *infra*. chapter ten.
44. Saurabha, 2.3.19-22.
45. Brh, 4.4.2.
46. Saurabha, 2.3.19.
47. *Ibid*, 2.3.22.
48. Brh, 4.4.22 "He who is made of knowledge among the vital breath, who is the light within the heart" (Cf Kaustubha 2.3.24).
49. Saurabha, 2.3.23
50. *Ibid*, 2.3.25-26.
51. *Ibid*, 2.3.26.
52. *Ibid*, 2.3.28.

53. *Ibid*, 2.3.29.
54. *Ibid*, 2.3.48.
55. *Ibid*, 2.3.48.
56. *Ibid*, 2.3.31.
57. *Ibid*, 2.3.50.
58. *Ibid*, 2.3.51.
59. *Ibid*, 2.3.52.
60. *Ibid*, 2.3.49.
61. *Ibid*, 3.2.1-6.
62. *Ibid*, 3.2.4.
63. *Ibid*, 3.2.7
64. *Ibid*, 2.3.30.
65. *Ibid*, 3.2.8.
66. *Ibid*, 3.2.9.
67. The Saurabhakāra interprets the compound in the *sūtra* 3.2.9 *karmānuśmṛti śabda vidhibhyaḥ* as (1) *karmānuśmṛti* (2) *śabda* and (3) *vidhibhyaḥ* while others including Śrīnivāsa break the compound *karmānusmṛti* into two viz. *karma* and *anusmṛti*, thus offering four reasons instead of the three offered by the Saurabhakāra.
68. *Saurabha* 3.2.10.
69. *Ibid*, 4.2.1 ff.
70. *Ibid*, 1.3.26.
71. *Ibid*, 1.3.27.
72. *Ibid*, 1.3.28-29.
73. *Ibid*, 1.1.31.
74. *Ibid*, 1.3.33.
75. *Ibid*, 3.3.32, Cf. Śāṅkarabhāṣya on the same *sūtra*, where he mentions the names of Sanatkumāra, Nārada etc, which are left out by Nimbārka.
76. *Vide supra*. p. 249
77. *Vide supra*, chapter eight, *Saurabha*, 1.3.34-40.
78. *Vide infra*, chapter ten.
79. *Saurabha*, 3.1.17, Cf. *Chānd* 5.10.4-8, *Brh*, 6.2.16.
80. *Saurabha*, 3.2.5, See also chapter eight above.
81. *Ibid*, 1.3.19-20.
82. The Nimbārkites consider bondage to be a reality, not a phenomenal appearance. Bondage is the soul's connection

with *avidyā* and its effects in the form of merits and demerits. Cf. also (1) Puruṣottama Prasāda Vaiṣṇava. SAKV, p. 53 and p. 71; (2) Vanamāli Miśra. VSS, 1.8-21.

83. Saurabha 4.2.8-11.
84. *Ibid*, 3.3.30.
85. *Ibid*, 4.2.11-12
86. *Ibid*, 4.2.14-15.
87. *Ibid*, 3.3.30, 4.2.9.
88. *Ibid*, 3.3.27.
89. *Ibid*, 2.3.16.
90. *Ibid*, 2.3.24.
91. *Ibid*, 2.4.1-18.
92. *Ibid*, 2.4.1-4, 2.4.8.
93. *Ibid*, 2.4.10-12.
94. *Ibid*, 2.4.14-16.
95. *Ibid*, 2.4.7.
96. *Ibid*, 3.2.13.
97. *Ibid*, 1.1.2.
98. *Ibid*, 1.4.3.
99. *Ibid*, 1.4.25, 1.4.27, 1.3.42. 2.1.25-26, 2.2.37.
100. *Vide* chapter two where it is pointed out that Nimbārka cannot be the author of *DS*.
101. *BS* 2.2.28-32.
102. Saurabha, 2.2.28.
103. *Ibid*, 2.2.29.
104. *Ibid*, 2.2.30.
105. *Ibid*, 2.3.31.
106. *Ibid*, 2.3.32.
107. Śrīnivāsa in the *Vedānta Kaustubha* gives a detailed account of the doctrine of the *Vijñānavādins* and the *Sūnyavādins*. He also refutes their doctrines with more detailed reasoning. *Vide Kaustubha* 2.2.28.
108. Later Nimbārkites like Vanamāli Miśra refutes the illusion theories of the Advaitins. *Vide VSS*, IV 180-194.

Chapter 10

1. Cf. Saurabha, 2.1.8-10.
2. *Ibid*, 4.2.14.

3. *Ibid*, 4.2.15. See footnote 152 below.
4. Later Nimbārkites give a detailed account of these various duties. Cf. Giridharaprapanna. "LM" pp. 26, and 36-37.
5. Saurabha, 3.4.32, 4.1.16, 4.1.18.
6. *Ibid*, 3.4.27.
7. *Ibid*, 3.4.28-29.
8. *Ibid*, 3.4.32-33.
9. *Ibid*, 3.4.33.
10. *Ibid*, 3.4.37.
11. *Ibid*, 3.4.47....*ity gr̥hiṇopasaṁhāraḥ sarvāśrama dharma sadbhāvāt sarva dharma pradarśanārthaḥ*.
12. Chānd, 2.23.1, Cf. Saurabha, 3.4.48.
13. Saurabha, 3.1.25.
14. *Ibid*, 3.4.32.
15. *Ibid*, 4.1.14.
16. *Ibid*, 4.1.14.
17. *Ibid*, 1.1.4, 3.4.27, 3.4.32.
18. *Ibid*, 3.4.33.
19. *Ibid*, 3.4.33-34.
20. *Ibid*, 3.4.35.
21. *Ibid*, 3.4.1.
22. *Ibid*, 3.4.25.
23. *Ibid*, 3.4.9-11.
24. *Ibid*, 3.4.15.
25. *Ibid*, 3.4.41.
26. *Ibid*, 3.4.2 *karmāṅgabhūta kartṛ saṁskāradvāreṇa vidyāyāḥ karmāṅgatvam, kartuḥ karmasṛṣṭvāt*.
27. *Ibid*, 3.4.4-7
28. *Ibid*, 3.4.3.
29. Chānd, 1.1.10 "What alone one does with knowledge, with faith, with the mystic doctrine, that alone becomes more potent. (Chānd 8.15.1) "Having studied the Veda in the house of a teacher in accordance with rules in (the leisure) time left over from doing work for the teacher, having returned to his own home studying his sacred text in some clean spot" (Br̥h 4.4.2) "Knowledge and work lay hold of him.
30. Saurabha, 3.4.8-12.
31. *Ibid*, 3.4.13-14.

32. *Saurabha*, 3.3.43-50.
33. *Ibid*, 3.4.16, Here Nimbārka accepts what has already been accepted by Manu 2.87. Nimbārka also points out that the *Chāndogya* speak of the right of those who are between the āśramas to vidyā.
34. *Saurabha*, 3.4.17.
35. *Ibid*, 3.4.18-20.
36. *Ibid*, 3.4.36-37.
37. *Ibid*, 3.4.25.
38. *Ibid*, 3.4.27.
39. See chapter eight for the qualifications for *Brahmajijñāsā*.
40. *Saurabha*, 1.3.34-41.
41. *Ibid*, 3.4.40.
42. *Ibid*, 3.4.41.
43. *Ibid*, 1.3.34-41.
44. *Ibid*, 3.4.31.
45. *Ibid*, 3.4.28, Cf. *Chānd* 5.2.1, Verily, to one who knows thus, there is nothing whatever that is not food. *Manusmṛti* 10.104. He who being in danger of life eats food from anyone whatsoever. *Bhagavadgītā* 5.10. He is not touched by sin as a lotus leaf is not touched by water.
46. *Saurabha* 1.1.1.
47. Cf. *Kaṭha* 1.3.14.
48. *Brh* 2.4.5, 4.5.6. Cf *Saurabha* 4.1.1
49. *Chand* 6.14.2. "a man who has got a teacher knows. He has to wait just until he is freed (from the body) and then he becomes united (with Brahman).
50. *Saurabha*, 4.1.3.
51. *Chānd* 3.14.3.
52. *Brh*. 3.4.1.
53. *Saurabha*, 3.3.52.
54. *Ibid*, 4.3.14-15.
55. *Ibid*, 3.3.51.
56. *Ibid*, 4.1.4-6.
57. *Ibid*, 4.1.4.
58. *Ibid*, 4.3.15.
59. *Ibid*, 3.3.35-37.
60. Nimbārka describes the various types of meditation as

upāsanam, Cf. Saurabha 3.3.1 *anekatra proktam apy upāsanam ekam eva codanādy aviśeṣāt*.

61. Saurabha, 3.4.8.
62. Cf. *Ibid*, 4.1.3 also UK 4.1.3 and 4.1.6.
63. *Ibid*, 3.3.51-52.
64. *Ibid*, 4.1.5.
65. *Ibid*, 4.1.5.
66. *Ibid*, 3.3.19, 3.3.31, Vide also Brh 5.6, Śat Br. 10.6.3, Chānd 3.14.
67. *Ibid*, 3.3.10.
68. *Ibid*, 3.4.21-22. The Saurabhakāra holds in Saurabha 3.3.7-9 that the *udgītha* propounded in Brh 1.1.1-7 and Chānd 1.2.1-7 are different *vidyās* in themselves in spite of the fact that both of them have the same name (*udgītha*), on account of the difference of the object. In Chāndogya, the *praṇava* which is an *avayava* (part) of the *udgītha* is to be meditated on under the aspect of Prāṇa, while in Brhadāranyaka, the entire *udgītha* is to be meditated on.
69. Saurabha 3.3.55, Vide also Chānd 8.1-8.6
70. *Ibid*, 3.3.56, Vide also Chānd 5.11-5.18.
71. For Upakośala *vidyā*. Cf. Chānd. 4-10-4.15. For Pañcāgnividyā See Brh 6.3, Chānd 5.4, 5.10. For Madhuvidyā See Brh. 2.5.6, 2.5.19. See also fn 4 in chapter seven.
72. Saurabha, 3.3.1-5.
73. *Ibid*, 3.3.57-58.
74. *Ibid*, 3.3.56.
75. *Ibid*, 3.3.11, 3.3.13, 3.3.31, 3.3.34, 3.3.37, 3.3.35.
76. *Ibid*, 3.3.11.
77. *Ibid*, 3.3.33-34, Cf. Brh 3.8.8.
78. *Ibid*, 3.3.33-34, Cf. Brh 3.8.8.
79. Chānd, 8.1.5.
80. Saurabha, 3.3.38.
81. Brh 4.4.22.
82. Saurabha, 3.3.38.
83. *Ibid*. 3.3.38
84. *Ibid*, 3.3.5.
85. *Ibid*, 3.3.55.
86. *Ibid*, 3.3.12, 3.3.15, 3.3.20-25.
87. *Ibid*, 4.1.7-10.

88. Saurabha, 4.1.11.
89. *Ibid*, 4.1.12.
90. *Ibid*, 3.4.50.
91. *Ibid*, 3.4.49.
92. *Ibid*, 3.4.46.
93. *Ibid*, 3.4.49.
94. Kaustubha, 3.4.49.
95. Kaustubha, 3.4.50.
96. Saurabha, 3.4.50, 3.4.38.
97. Cf Katha, 6.18.
98. Saurabha, 3.2.5, 4.1.13-14.
99. *Ibid*, 4.1.15.
100. *Ibid*, 4.1.19.
101. *Ibid*, 3.4.51.
102. Saurabha 3.2.24 But Brahman is revealed in devotional meditation (*Bhaktiyoge dhyāne*) in accordance with the following *Śruti* and *Smṛti* texts, viz, "He, with his nature purified through the clarification of the knowledge of Brahman perceives, meditating him who is without parts" (*Mund* 3.1.8) "But through exclusive devotion, I may be known thus, O Arjuna, and perceived in truth, and entered, O conqueror of enemies". (*Gītā* 11.54).
103. Cf. *Bhagavadgītā* 11.54-55, 12.6-20, 18.54-58, 18.66.
104. *Ibid*, 3.2.25. Just as there is manifestation of the sun, fire and the like through the repetition of the means resorted to by those who long for them, so there is "non-difference" (*avaiśeṣyam*) in the case of Brahman too, i.e. there is "manifestation" of Brahman. The sense is that the direct vision of Brahman results from the incessant repetition of the *Sādhana*s or the means consisting in perfect meditation.
105. *Mañjūṣā*, p. 97. pp. 115-18, pp. 126-28.
106. SAKV, p. 127 f.
107. LM. pp. 33-37.
108. Saurabha 1.1.1. "*bhagavat prasādepsunā...*"
109. *Ibid*, 4.2.16.
110. The idea of grace is known to the Upaniṣadic sages also. The *Kaṭhopaniṣad* speaks clearly of the inadequacy of human efforts to attain liberation. "This soul (*ātman*) is not to be

obtained by instruction, nor by intellect, nor by much learning. He is to be obtained only by the one whom he chooses, to such a one that soul reveals his own person (*Kaṭha* 1.2.23).

111. *Saurabha*, 4.1.16
112. *Chānd*, 4.14.3.
113. *Saurabha*, 4.1.17.
114. Helmuth von **Glazenapp**, 1963, p. 81. Chacko **Valiaveetil** (1980, pp. 58-61) explains various Vedāntic understanding of the *jīvan mukti*. While the Advaita School of Śaṅkara accepts "*jīvan mukti*" Rāmānuja, Madhva and Bhāskara do not accept the possibility of liberation in the embodied state.
115. *Saurabha*, 3.4.51, 4.1.15.
116. Similar is the view of other systems of philosophy which accept the reality of the world and the distinction of *jīva* from God. Cf. Vatsyāyana on *Nyāya Sūtra* 4.2.43. Curiously enough that while Madhva Mukunda (Cf *PPGV*. IV, 18-22, pp. 879-83) refutes the advaitic doctrine of *jīvan mukti* (the term *jīvan mukti* is hardly used by Śaṅkara. Cf. **Deussen**: 1912, p. 425 and S.N. **Dasgupta**. A history of Indian philosophy, Vol. II p. 264) Vanamāli Miśra seems to accept an embodied emancipation for some devotees, who have acquired spiritual fitness for experiencing God (VSS 2.39) although he himself criticises the Advaitins' concept of embodied release (VSS 2.95). Keśavakāśmīrībhāṭṭa is another great Nimbārkit who refutes the *jīvan muktivāda* of the Advaitins. Cf. *VKP* 4.4.7.
117. *Saurabha*, 4.2.7, Cf. *BS*, 4.1.13.
118. *Saurabha*, 4.3.1. ff.
119. *Ibid*, 3.1.8.
120. *Ibid*, 3.1.17.
121. They act contrary to the scriptural injunction i.e. they do what is forbidden and refuse to do what is prescribed. (*Saurabha*, 3.1.12).
122. *Chānd*, 6.9.2, "ta iha vyāghro vā sinho va vṛko vā varāho vā daṁśo vā maśako vā yad yad bhavanti tadā bhavanti".
123. *Chānd*, 6.8.6.
124. *Praśna*, 3.9.
125. *Brh*, 4.3.38, 4.4.2, *Praśna*, 6.3.
126. *Brh*, 4.4.5, *Saurabha*, 4.2.1-6.
127. *Saurabha*, 4.2.7.

128. *Saurabha*, 3.1.6.
129. *Ibid*, 3.1.6, *Chānd*, 5.10.3-4, Cf. *Brh* 6.2.16. The path of the fathers, beginning with *dhūma* meant for a performer of good deeds, becomes darker and darker as one proceeds along. As pointed out by Roma **Bose** this description seems to be a figurative expression of the inadequacies of the rites and works in effecting the total liberation of man. A man who spends all his life in performing rituals and "good deeds" becomes more and more deluded as he proceeds. All what such good works can obtain for him is a temporary enjoyment in the world of the moon. (VPSK Vol. III p. 39).
130. *Saurabha*, 3.1.8.
131. *Ibid*, 3.1.22-24.
132. *Ibid*, 4.2.16.
133. *Ibid*, 4.2.17.
134. *Ibid*, 3.3.26.
135. *Ibid*, 3.3.27.
136. *Kauṣ*, 1.4.
137. *Saurabha*, 4.2.7.
138. *Ibid*, 3.3.30.
139. *Ibid*, 3.3.30, 4.2.8-10. It is significant to note that the Saurabhakāra does not call this special place as *Vaikunṭha*. Puruṣottama Prasāda Vaiṣṇava considers the abode of the Supreme God as *Vaikunṭha*, which is spiritual, possessed of the six qualities of lordship made of pure *aprakṛta sattva* and without the three-fold qualities of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. It is eternal, imperishable, inexhaustible, supernatural, non-spatial, non-temporal, uncaused, supramundane and transcendental. Cf. SAKV, pp. 86-87.
140. *Saurabha*, 3.3.31.
141. *Ibid*, 4.3.1-3. *Chānd*, 4.15.5, 5.10.1-2, *Brh* 6.2.15, *Kauṣ* 1.3.
142. *Saurabha*, 4.2.18-20.
143. *Saurabha*, 4.3.4-5. The path of the gods is a brighter one in comparison to the path of the Fathers. It becomes more and more luminous as one progresses on his way. He is accompanied by more lustrous and powerful deities. It may be an allegorical expression of the spiritual transformation of the knower into *Brahma sāmānyam* (similarity with Brahman). The path of knowledge leads the seeker to his ultimate goal, his *summum bonum*, the attainment of Brahman, from where there is no return to this world of misery. (Cf VPSK Vol III P.39).

144. *Saurabha*, 4.3.6-15.
145. *Muṇḍ*, 3.2.6 "But they all, attaining the highest immortality, are freed in the world of Brahman at the time of the great end.
146. *Kūrma Purāṇa*, 12.5-6. When the universal dissolution has come as well as the end of the highest then they with their selves realized, enter the highest place together with Brahman.
147. For a detailed and comparative study of the concept of *Mokṣa* see: (a) Ashok Kumar **Lad**. (1973)
(b) Helmuth von **Glaser** (1963)
148. Cf Also *Chānd* 8.1.5.
149. *RV*. 1.89.8 ff.
150. A.B. **Keith**, *The Religions and Philosophy of the Vedas and the Upanishad*, Vol. II, (Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 32) p.410
151. *Saurabha*, 4.2.14.
152. *Ibid*, 4.2.15. Those subtle elements together with speech and the rest come to have non-division (*avibhāga*) i.e. essential identity, (*tādātmyāpattiḥ*) with the Highest. "On account of the declaration" "And their name and form are destroyed, it is simply called a Person" (*Prāśna* 6.5).
153. *Saurabha*, 3.3.30.
154. *Ibid*, 3.2.26, *Brahmasākṣātkārād heto stena saha sāmīyam yāti*. (also *Bhagavadgītā* 14.2).
155. *Ibid*, 4.4.19.
156. *Ibid*, 4.4.19, 1.1.15, 1.1.18
157. *Ibid*, 4.4.1-7, 3.3.30.
158. *Ibid*, 4.4.7, 4.4.16, 4.4.19.
159. *Ibid*, 4.4.4 "muktah parasmād ātmānam vibhāgāvirodhinā'vibhāgenānubhavati, Tattvasya tadānīm aparokṣato dṛṣṭatvāt. śāstrasyāpy evam dṛṣṭatvāt.
160. *Ibid*, 4.4.18.
161. *Ibid*, 1.3.42, 4.4.4, 4.4.17, 4.4.1.
162. *Ibid*, 4.4.9.
163. *Ibid*, 1.1.2, 4.4.20.
164. *Ibid*, 4.4.9, 4.4.13-14.
165. *Ibid*, 1.1.15, 1.1.18, 1.1.20, 3.2.39, 4.4.19 etc.
166. *Ibid*, 4.4.8.
167. *Ibid*, 3.3.40.

- 168 *Saurabha*, 4.4.9.
- 169 *Ibid*, 4.4.11-13.
- 170 *Ibid*, 4.4.13.
- 171 *Ibid*, 4.4.14, 4.4.2.
- 172 *Ibid*, 4.4.15.
- 173 *Ibid*, 4.4.4. The freed soul realizes itself "as non-divided" (*avibhāgena*) from the Highest Self, which non-division is compatible with a division (*vibhāgāvirodhinā'vibhāgena*) (between the two), since this truth is directly intuited at that time (viz. during release), and since scripture too intuits this.
- 174 *Saurabha*, 4.4.22.

Chapter 11

1. *Saurabha* 2.1.14.
2. *Ibid*, 2.1.21.
3. *Ibid*, 2.3.42.
4. *Ibid*, 1.1.3, 2.1.26.
5. *Muṇḍaka*, 1.1.3, "Of these two, one tastes the sweet berry, the other looks on without eating". (Cf. *Saurabha*, 1.3.7, 3.2.13. *Brh*, 4.3.21). "Embraced by the intelligent soul he does not know anything eternal nor anything internal". *Saurabha*, 4.4.16, Cf. *Saurabha*, 1.3.43 which describes the *jīva* as a non-knower in deep sleep.
6. *Svet* 6.9, "He is the cause, the Lord of the lord of causes, Cf. *Saurabha*, 4.4.20, *Brh* 4.4.22, "The controller of all, the ruler of all (Cf. *Saurabha*, 4.2.20, 1.3.44).
7. *BS* 1.1.17, 18, 20, 22.; 1.2.3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11, 12, 21, 23.; 1.3.2, 5, 19.; 2.1.21; 2.3.24, 3.2.27-30, 4.4.15-16 etc.
8. Cf. **Ghate** (1960 p. 28).
9. *Saurabha*, 2.1.13. 2.3.28.
10. *Ibid*, 2.3.42.
11. *Ibid*, 1.1.18.
12. *Ibid*, 1.2.12.
13. *Ibid*, 1.2.21.
14. *Ibid*, 1.2.8, 1.3.7, 3.2.13-14.
15. *Ibid*, 4.4.20, 1.3.42, 4.4.15.
16. *Chānd*, 3.14.1. *Sarvaṃ khalvidam brahma tajjālāniti śānta upāsīta*, Cf. *Saurabha*, 1.2.1, 2.1.14, Cf. Also 3.2.37.

Chānd, 6.1.4 Vācārāmbhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam
mr̥ttiketyeva satyam, Cf. Saurabha, 2.1.14.

Chānd, 6.9.4, ātadātmyam idaṁ sarvaṁ tat satyaṁ tattvam
asī, Cf. Saurabha, 2.1.14.

Brh, 1.4.10, aham brahmāsmi (incidentally it may be noted
that the Saurabhakāra does not refer to this śruti text).

Brh, 2.5.19, ayam ātmā brahma, Cf. Saurabha, 2.1.20.

17. Cf. the conclusions arrived at by V.S. **Ghate** on the *advaita* theory of Śaṅkara and the *bheda* theory of Madhva. (Vide **Ghate**, 1960, pp 156-170.) Śaṅkara, conscious of the fact that he is going against the ordinary understanding of the *sūtras* while imposing his view on them, adds a note of explanation in some cases (eg. 1.1.17, 1.2.6,20; 1.3.19). According to Śaṅkara the difference between Brahman and the *jīva* is due to *māyā* and therefore is only phenomenal (*vyāvahārika*) as opposed to real (*Pāramārthika*). Yet Śaṅkara has to concede at *sūtra* 1.2.12 that one of the two namely *jīva* is the *gantr* (the goer) while the other (*Brahman*) is the *gantavya* (the goal of the journey).
18. *Ibid*, p. 169-70.
19. *Saurabha*, 2.1.17.
20. *Ibid*, 2.1.18.
21. *Ibid*, 2.1.19.
22. *Vide supra*, chapter eight.
23. V.S. **Ghate**, 1960, p. 162.
24. *Saurabha*, 1.4.26. "Brahmaiva nimittam upādānaṁ ca. Kutah? tadātmānam svayamakurate (Tait 2.7) ity ātmakṛteh. nanu kartuḥ kutaḥ kṛtviṣayatvaṁ? Pariṇāmāt sarvajñaṁ sarvaśakti brahma svasāktivikṣepeṇa jagadākāram svātmānam pariṇamayya, avyakṛtena svarūpeṇa śaktimatā kṛtimatā pariṇatam eva bhavati.
25. Cf. *Saurabha*, 2.1.23-30.
26. *Ibid*, 2.1.26.
27. Thomas **Fawcett**, 1970, p. 50.
28. *Saurabha*, 2.1.14.
29. *Ibid*, 1.4.21.
30. *Ibid*, 3.2.20, 2.3.42.
31. *Ibid*, 3.2.11, 1.2.8.
32. *Ibid*, 2.1.13, *Brahmaṇo jagad upādānatve jīvarūpeṇa brahmaṇa eva sukhaduḥkhabhokṛtvāpatter prasiddhobhokṛ*

niyantr vibhāgo na syād iti cet, avibhāge'pi
samudratarāṅgayor iva tayor vibhāgaḥ sīyāt.

33. *Ibid*, 2.1.13.
34. *Ibid*, 2.1.13, 3.2.28.
35. *Ibid*, 2.1.23, 1.4.26.
36. *Ibid*, 2.3.42.
37. *Ibid*, 3.2.27.
38. Saurabha, 2.1.14, *kāryasya kāraṇānanyatvam asti, na tvatyantabhinnatvam. kutaḥ?* "vācāraṁbhaṇam vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttiketyeva satyam (Chānd 6.1.4),, "aitadātmyam idam sarvam tat satyam tat tvam asi" (Chānd 6.9.4) "sarvam khalvidam brahma" (Chānd 3.14.1) ityādibhyah.
39. See "Brahman and the Universe are correlative" in chapter eight p. 239.
40. M.M Agrawal, 1977, p. 46.
41. Annambhaṭṭa, Tarkasangraha: "tadātmyasambandhāvacc-hinnapratīyogitākonyonyabhāvaḥ" (Kāśī ed. 1939, p. 133).
42. Saurabha, 1.1.4, 1.4.11.
43. *Ibid* 2.1.23-24.
44. (a) Saurabha, 2.1.21. "We hold that the creator of the world is Brahman, who is "something more" than, i.e. superior to, the embodied soul, the enjoyer of pleasure and pain. "On account of the designation of difference" in the passage "who rules the soul within" (Śat Br 14.6.7.30) there is no absolute non-difference between the two."
(b) Saurabha 2.1.22 "Like the diamond, the lapis lasuli, the ruby and the rest which are the modifications of the earth, the individual soul, though non-different from Brahman, is also different from Him, possessing, as it does, some particular qualities of its own...."
45. Vide V.S. Ghate, 1960, pp 156-170.
46. When we say that Brahman is an incomprehensible mystery we do not mean that we cannot understand the Reality of Brahman, but that the very mode of this Reality is beyond the comprehension of our daily experience. He ever remains the Beyond, the Absolute, the Infinite and the Transcendent. He cannot be exhausted by the human knowledge or human experience.

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